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Abstract 
This thesis critically intervenes into the interdisciplinary space of trauma theory by both 
identifying and circumventing the tendency of theorists to posit trauma in a relation of 
either transcendence or immanence to the contexts in which it occurs. In the classical 
trauma theories of Shoshana Felman, Dori Laub, and Cathy Caruth, trauma is broadly 
defined as a disruptive and aporetic event that shatters the cognitive, experiential, and 
representational frameworks necessary for making sense of the occurrence. These 
theorists conceptualise trauma as transcendent, seeing trauma as existing “outside” or 
“beyond” the frameworks in which it comes into being. However, more recent critics 
enter a polemic with classical trauma theorists by reconceptualising trauma as immanent 
to the all too human frameworks that facilitate its occurrence in the first place. 
I contend that the mutual exclusive insistence that trauma need either be 
conceived as immanent to, or transcendent of, the frameworks in which it occurs has led 
to a conceptual impasse in trauma theory that is rooted in a false dichotomy between these 
extremes. Tracing this oppositional tendency across a broad disciplinary spectrum, 
engaging contributions to trauma theory from philosophy, literary theory, and history, the 
major aim of this thesis to move beyond the false dichotomy between the immanent and 
the transcendent by revealing that these terms are inextricably bound. Drawing on the 
works of Hannah Arendt, Giorgio Agamben, Sigmund Freud, Jacques Lacan, Jean 
Laplanche, and Jean-François Lyotard (to name only a few), this thesis revitalises the 
space of trauma theory by offering a series of interlocking arguments that conceptualise 
the alterity of trauma as being immanent to the frameworks it transcends. This 
paradoxical logic is at the crux of what I refer to as the immanence of traumatic rupture.  
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Introducing Trauma 
The story of trauma […] as the narrative of a belated experience, far from telling of an escape 
from reality—the escape from a death, or from its referential force—rather attests to its endless 
impact on life (Caruth 1996, 7). 
Trauma is a disruptive experience that disarticulates the self and creates holes in existence; it 
has belated effects that are controlled with difficulty and perhaps never fully mastered 
(LaCapra [2001] 2014, 41). 
The term “trauma” is etymologically derived from the Greek meaning for “wound” and 
was originally used in medicine to denote a wound to the tissues of the body (Caruth 
1996, 3). More recently, however, trauma has come to designate the wounding impact of 
a sudden, overwhelming shock to the mind or psyche. In her influential trauma theory, 
Cathy Caruth defines trauma as “the wound of the mind—the breach in the mind’s 
experience of time, self, and the world” (1996, 4). She argues that unlike a bodily wound, 
trauma is not “simple and healable […] but [is] rather an event that […] occurs too soon, 
too unexpectedly, to be fully known and is therefore not available to consciousness until it 
imposes itself again, repeatedly, in the nightmares and repetitive actions of the survivor” 
(ibid.). Trauma bypasses conscious awareness at the time that it occurs only to manifest 
itself belatedly in repetitive symptoms. While trauma is oft understood to reside in an 
event having occurred in the past, it is not until after this event that the impact of trauma 
is felt. It is thus difficult—if not impossible—to identify the precise origins of trauma. 
The dual temporality of trauma, where that which occurs too soon paradoxically arises 
too late, means that trauma bears just as much weight on the present and the future as it 
does on the past. 
 Academic interest in trauma escalated in the 1990s after the publication of 
Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub’s collaboration, Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in 
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Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History (1992), Caruth’s edited volume, Trauma: 
Explorations in Memory (1995),1 and her monograph, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, 
Narrative, and History (1996). These texts are formative in what is now known as 
“classical” and “literary” trauma theory. Amongst the most striking features of trauma 
theory is its interdisciplinary make-up, with the study of trauma cutting across a vast 
disciplinary spectrum. “Trauma,” as Dominick LaCapra explains, “presents a unique 
instance of […] a cross-disciplinary problem, for it falls within the compass of no single 
genre or discipline” ([2001] 2014, 204). Caruth attributes the interdisciplinary scope of 
trauma theory to “the radical disruption and gaps of traumatic experience” (1995, 4) and 
Robert Eaglestone argues that trauma is “both the origin and disruption […] of discipline-
specific knowledge” (2014, 12).   
 Felman and Laub’s Testimony exemplifies the interdisciplinary make-up of trauma 
theory, with the text emerging from the “collaboration of two authors, engaged in 
separate, yet complementary fields of endeavour” (1992, xiii). Where Felman is a literary 
critic—“a professional interpreter of texts” (ibid.)—Laub is a child survivor of the 
Holocaust, a practicing psychoanalyst, and a cofounder of the Fortunoff Video Archive 
for Holocaust Testimonies at Yale—thus, “a professional interpreter of people” (ibid.). 
Meanwhile, Caruth’s landmark edited volume, Trauma, features a range of scholars 
situated across a myriad of disciplines, including film director Claude Lanzmann, 
neurobiologists Bessel Van der Kolk and Onno Van der Hart, sociologist Kai Erikson, 
and feminist psychotherapist Laura S. Brown, amongst others. Caruth’s own work in 
trauma theory draws on the deconstructivist insights of Paul de Man and the 
                                                 
1 The essays featured in Caruth’s edited volume were originally published in two special issues of American 
Imago, titled “Psychoanalysis, Culture and Trauma,” which appeared in 1991 in issues 1 and 4 of volume 
48. 
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psychoanalytic methods of Sigmund Freud and Jacque Lacan.2 Although the respective 
works of Felman, Laub, and Caruth form the backbone of trauma theory, trauma theorists 
do not offer a unified theory of trauma; rather, trauma theory consists of a multitude of 
trauma theories. What these theorists nonetheless have in common is that they loosely 
characterise trauma as an overwhelming event that is fundamentally enigmatic, 
unknowable, and other. 
 LaCapra is another important trauma theorist who testifies to the interdisciplinary 
constitution of this space. His most notable works in trauma theory include Representing 
the Holocaust: History, Theory, Trauma (1996), Writing History, Writing Trauma ([2001] 
2014), and History and its Limits: Human, Animal, Violence (2009). LaCapra takes issue 
with the critical project set out by literary trauma theorists such as Felman and Caruth, 
seeing their emphasis on the alterity of trauma as being riven with dehistoricing 
hyperbole. He perceives their work as being problematic insofar as they attribute to 
trauma “an unmodulated orphic, cryptic, indirect, allusive form that may render or 
transmit the disorientation of trauma but provide too little a basis for attempts to work it 
through” ([2001] 2014, 106). LaCapra’s unique brand of trauma theory is situated at the 
intersection between history and psychoanalysis. He perceives literary trauma theory, on 
the one hand, as giving rise to a non-specific and homogenised notion of trauma. On the 
other hand, he combats the tendency of historians, in their quest for readability and 
cohesion, to “take the trauma out of trauma” (ibid., x).  
While the study of trauma implicates a plethora of disciplines, many of the key 
insights developed by trauma theorists are rooted in their engagements with the traumas 
of the Holocaust. Discussions of the Holocaust are often centred on claims of 
                                                 
2 This thesis engages with Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis, but the work of de Man exceeds its 
scope. It is, nonetheless, important to acknowledge de Man’s influence on trauma theory—specifically in 
the works of Caruth and Felman. 
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“unspeakability,” “unrepresentability,” “incomprehensibility,” and the like. Despite the 
different meanings of these terms, Berel Lang points out that they share “a basic internal 
feature: their assertion of a limit to the intelligibility and/or representability of the 
Holocaust, which is thus held to be beyond our (that is, human) capacity to describe and 
understand adequately or, perhaps, at all” (2005, 74). The perceived inability to know or 
to represent the Holocaust has contributed to the notion that trauma is fundamentally 
other. Positing the Holocaust as the “watershed of our times” (1992, xiv), Felman and 
Laub draw on these events to demonstrate the rupturing impact of trauma as exceeding 
experiential, cognitive, and representational frameworks—however different these terms 
might be.  
However, polemical responses to the purported unrepresentability of trauma are 
proliferating. Naomi Mandel’s Against the Unspeakable: Complicity, the Holocaust, and 
Slavery in America (2006), identifies a “rhetoric of the unspeakable,” which encompasses 
the recurring tropes of “unrepresentability” and “incomprehensibility” that dominate 
trauma and Holocaust discourse. Mandel sees this rhetoric as removing the traumas from 
the concrete historical and socio-cultural contexts in which they occurred. What she finds 
most troubling about the perceived unspeakability of the Holocaust is that this kind of 
language renders the events “‘inhuman’ and hence as inaccessible to human 
understanding, external to the speech community that forms human culture” (ibid., 39). 
Giorgio Agamben is also critical of the language of unrepresentability, for it confers on 
the Holocaust “the prestige of the mystical” (2002, 32). He contends: “[t]o say that 
Auschwitz is ‘unsayable’ or ‘incomprehensible’ is equivalent to euphemein, to adoring in 
silence, as one does with a god” (ibid., 32-3). In a similar vein, Gillian Rose asserts that 
upholding the unrepresentability of the Holocaust mystifies “something we dare not 
understand, because we fear that it may be all too continuous with what we are—human, 
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all too human” (1996, 43, emphasis in original). In upholding the unrepresentability of 
trauma—whether it be the specific traumas of the Holocaust or trauma more broadly—
trauma theorists posit trauma as a transcendental impossibility, whilst overlooking it as an 
immanent possibility.  
Critics, moreover, accuse trauma theorists of radically decontextualising trauma—
of positing it outside of the historical, socio-political and cultural frameworks in which it 
occurs (Craps 2014; Eaglestone 2014; Kansteiner 2004, 2008; LaCapra [2001] 2014; 
Mandel 2001, 2006). Trauma theorists, some argue, are more concerned with the elusive 
and disruptive impact of trauma than they are with what it is exactly that trauma disrupts 
(Kansteiner 2004; Kansteiner and Weilnböck 2008). In response to this oversight, 
theorists emphasise the necessity of grounding trauma in the various contexts that give 
rise to its occurrence in the first place (Craps 2013, 27; Rothberg 2014a, xv) and contend 
that trauma is an event that is on the same continuum as these contexts (Brown 1995; 
Craps 2013, 2014). Such conceptual gestures move away from the notion of trauma as an 
extraordinary event and reconfigure trauma an event that is all too ordinary.  
The Immanence of Traumatic Rupture 
Whilst it is crucial to develop new understandings of trauma that attend to the 
shortcomings of classical trauma theories, focusing too narrowly on the contexts that give 
rise to trauma, whilst dismissing the rupturing impact of trauma altogether, leads to a 
conceptual impasse. In Traumatic Realism: The Demands of Holocaust Representation 
(2000), Rothberg reveals the exclusionary logic accompanying debates surrounding the 
traumas of the Holocaust. He identifies two dominant yet contradictory perspectives, 
which he terms antirealist and realist. Antirealists characterise trauma as an event that is 
unknowable and unrepresentable (ibid., 4). Realists, on the other hand, argue that trauma 
is entirely knowable and representable and can indeed “be translated into a familiar 
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mimetic universe” (ibid., 3-4). Ruth Leys also argues that trauma theory is caught 
between two opposing viewpoints, which she calls mimetic and antimimetic (2000, 8-9).3 
The mimetic position posits trauma as fundamentally unknowable and unrepresentable, 
whereas the antimimetic maintains that trauma can be known and represented. Leys 
argues that 
current debates over trauma are fated to end in an impasse, for the simple reason that they are 
the inescapable outcome of the mimetic-antimimetic oscillation that has determined the field of 
trauma studies throughout the century [… This] means that discussions of trauma are 
characteristically polarised between competing positions each of which can be maintained in its 
exclusiveness only at the price of falling into contradiction or incoherence (ibid., 305, emphasis 
in original). 
Following Rothberg and Leys, this thesis argues that these conflicting approaches are 
symptomatic of a false dichotomy which arises through the assumption that trauma need 
either be characterised as transcendent or immanent, extraordinary or ordinary, 
unrepresentable or representable. On the one hand, theorists present trauma as 
transcending the limits of language and thought. Conversely, critics conceive trauma as 
an event that it is all too immanent, and entirely accessible, to language and thought.  
This thesis critically intervenes into the interdisciplinary space of trauma theory 
and proposes a move beyond the current impasse rooted in the perceived mutual 
exclusivity between the transcendent and the immanent with regards to trauma. Far from 
residing on either the inside or the outside of language and thought, this thesis argues that 
                                                 
3 In Trauma: A Genealogy (2000), Leys traces the tension between the mimetic and antimimetic to “the 
problem of imitation, defined as a problem of hypnotic imitation” (8, emphasis in original). She explains 
that the study of trauma emerged from associative studies of hypnosis, in which traumatised individuals 
under hypnosis were argued to repeat the situation that led to their illness. Accordingly, the mimetic 
position upholds that individuals suffering from trauma were unable to comprehend the event that 
precipitated their traumatic symptoms in, but were able to reenact the traumatic event whilst under 
hypnosis. Conversely, the antimimetic position arose from the repudiation of mimesis, which lent itself to 
positivist interpretations which viewed trauma “as if it were a purely external event coming to a sovereign if 
passive victim” (ibid., 10).  
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the rupturing impact of trauma is both immanent to, and transcendent of, language and 
thought. This thesis, in other words, conceptualises the alterity of trauma as being 
immanent to the very frameworks that it transcends. This paradoxical logic is the crux of 
what I refer to as the immanence of traumatic rupture.  
Notes on Terminology  
Trauma exceeds the bounds of the individual’s psyche and so too refers to the wounding 
of the collective frameworks that constitute individuals. LaCapra argues that “it is 
misguided to see trauma as a purely psychological or individual phenomenon” ([2001] 
2014, xi). Trauma, he explains, “has crucial connections to social and political conditions 
and can only be understood and engaged with respect to them” (ibid.). Meanwhile, 
Erikson observes that “the tissues of community can be damaged in much the same way 
as the tissues of mind and body” (1995, 185). He thus defines individual and collective 
trauma in the following terms:  
By individual trauma I mean a blow to the psyche that breaks through one’s defences so 
suddenly and with such brutal force that one cannot react to it effectively […].  
By collective trauma, on the other hand, I mean a blow to the basic tissues of social 
life that damages the bonds attaching people together and impairs the prevailing sense of 
communality (Erikson citing himself in ibid., 187, emphasis in original).  
Collective trauma implicates the social and the cultural, with the former pertaining to “the 
organisation of social relations in society” (Smelser 2004, 37) and the latter consisting of 
the “grouping of elements—values, norms, outlooks, beliefs, ideologies, knowledge […] 
linked with one another to some degree as a meaning-system” (ibid.). Social trauma 
consists of social disruptions and catastrophes (ibid., 37), whereas cultural trauma 
involves disruptive events which undermine “cultural values, outlooks, norms, or, for that 
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matter, the culture as a whole” (ibid., 38). Smelser adds that trauma can implicate both 
society and culture together—that is, trauma can occur on a socio-cultural level.  
In this thesis, I uphold the view that the individual and collective frameworks that 
trauma disrupts are intricately entangled. A framework is a basic structure which groups 
together a series of disparate elements into a unified whole. The term framework can just 
as easily be replaced with structure, context, order, or matrix, which are terms that I use 
synonymously throughout this thesis. Frameworks constitute one’s perceptions of 
reality—they “contain, convey, and determine what is seen” (Butler [2009] 2016, 10). 
Frameworks are constitutive in the sense that they tacitly guide one’s experience. They 
are not simply external structures that lie outside of the individual; frameworks constitute 
one’s innermost beliefs, perceptions, and experiences in, and of, reality. 
While I do not explicitly engage with Jacque Lacan’s work on trauma until 
Chapter Six of this thesis, the concept of framework that I am deploying invokes his 
psychoanalytic insights.4 I situate the notion of the framework in a parallel relation to the 
Lacanian orders of the symbolic and the imaginary, and envision the incursion of the 
traumatic real within these orders as equivalent to the rupturing impact of trauma on a 
given framework. Like a framework, the imaginary and the symbolic are the structural 
matrices through which reality is constituted and perceived. While the imaginary is 
associated with the illusionary image of the subject as a self-identical “I” ([1949] 2006), 
the symbolic pertains to the governing laws of language and culture ([1954] 1991). Lacan, 
however, does not espouse social constructivism; he does not conceive of the constitutive 
frameworks of the symbolic-imaginary as being deterministic. Lacanian psychoanalysis 
                                                 
4 The notion of framework that I use in this thesis is also influenced by Jean-François Lyotard’s concept of 
the metanarrative (1984). A metanarrative is any totalising framework of thought that claims to determine 
the meaning of any possible event by orienting it towards an ultimate truth. Metanarratives assume a 
legitimising function insofar as they serve as yardsticks to measure and authenticate heterogeneous genres 
of discourse. 
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distances itself from structuralism and aligns itself with poststructuralism in emphasising 
the moments of contingency within the symbolic-imaginary orders. That which disrupts 
the symbolic-imaginary is the incursion of the traumatic real ([1954] 2006, [1955] 1991).  
Lacan conceptualises the real as both a brute presymbolic force and as an 
unassimilable residue that cannot be absorbed into the symbolic-imaginary.5 The real 
manifests as kinks and tears in the symbolic-imaginary; however, the real itself is too 
overwhelming to be directly encountered. The real is in and of itself an impossibility, so 
the only way to access it is through “the go-between” of the symbolic-imaginary ([1955] 
1991, 97). Although the real appears outside and beyond these orders, it is only from 
within them that the real announces itself. The notion of the real as existing prior to one’s 
emergence into the symbolic-imaginary cannot be apprehended until after the subject 
enters these constitutive frameworks. In this sense, the traumatic real is both immanent to, 
and transcendent of, the symbolic-imaginary. It is transcendent insofar it exists “before” 
the domesticating efforts of the symbolic-imaginary and thus resides “outside” of these 
orders. Yet it is immanent to the extent that it is only from the “inside” of these orders 
that the notion of the real as existing on the “outside” of them can be posited; it is only 
“after” the emergence of the subject that what occurred “before” the subject can be 
retroactively constituted.  
Influenced by, but not limited to, these key Lacanian insights, this thesis traces the 
oscillating tension that occurs when positing trauma on either the inside or the outside of 
a multitude of frameworks. Such frameworks include patriarchy and neo-liberal 
capitalism (Chapters One and Three); the psychical apparatus (Chapters One, Four, Five, 
                                                 
5 In this thesis, I place a hyphen between the symbolic and the imaginary unless otherwise made obvious. 
The hyphen between these orders signifies their intricate entanglement. In hyphenating the symbolic-
imaginary, I place the symbolic before the imaginary because Lacan upholds that the imaginary (and the 
real for that matter) is structured by the symbolic ([1964] 1998a, 62). This insight will be further discussed 
in Chapter Six.  
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Six and Seven); juridico-historical frameworks (Chapters Two, Three, and Four); 
psychoanalytic frameworks (Chapters One, Four, Five, Six, and Seven); and 
representational frameworks (Chapters One, Two, Four, Five, Six and Seven). As earlier 
explained, the key problematic that this thesis responds to is the assumption that trauma 
need either exist in a relation of transcendence or immanence to a given framework. In 
interrogating the hitherto underexplored link between the seemingly opposing terms of 
the immanent and the transcendent with regards to the question of trauma, this thesis does 
not favour either of these extremes at the expense of the other. Instead, it places them into 
a dialogic exchange by simultaneously examining both the frameworks that trauma 
disrupts as well as the wounding impact of trauma itself.   
Further Thesis Aims 
In this thesis, I discuss trauma at an individual, collective, originary, and historical level; 
however, one of my central aims is to reveal that trauma is irreducible to these terms. As 
an event that precludes the subject’s ability to experience it as it strikes, trauma is a 
quantitative rather than a qualitative term. It designates the shattering impact of an 
overwhelming event rather than the event that purportedly caused the rupture. As well as 
rupturing conscious awareness, trauma fractures the bounds separating seemingly distinct 
categories. In illuminating the wounding impact of trauma on both individual and 
collective consciousness—as well its disruption to the very categories of the individual 
and the collective—chapters Two and Three of this thesis consider the individual traumas 
of the Holocaust as implicating collective socio-cultural frameworks more broadly. A 
more significant aim that I set out to achieve in Chapter Seven is the problematisation of 
the categories of what LaCapra terms “historical” and “originary” trauma. LaCapra 
conceives historical trauma as pertaining to historically specific events such as the 
Holocaust, whereas he perceives originary trauma as designating the traumatic coming-
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into-being of the subject. The major difference between these terms, according to 
LaCapra, is that historical trauma is locatable in a specific time, place, and event, while 
originary trauma is historically unlocalisable in that it precedes, and is the very condition 
of, the subject’s historical reality ([2001] 2014, 81). Contra LaCapra, I argue that trauma 
internally disrupts and cuts across both of these categories. Challenging the view that 
trauma can be situated in a historical event of the past, I contend that trauma—whether it 
is conceived at a historical or an originary level—precludes the possibility of 
experiencing an event historically. Given this, trauma withstands specification and 
categorisation. Trauma, I argue, is a quantitative rather than a qualitative notion—it 
designates a disruptive force rather than the event that purportedly causes this disruption. 
The aforementioned aim is closely related to another central aim of this thesis—
that is, of conceptualising trauma as unpresentable. I address this aim in Chapter Seven 
by intervening into the polemic I mentioned earlier between the un/representability of 
trauma. Instead of upholding the dichotomous view that trauma need either be 
representable or unrepresentable, I contend that trauma is unpresentable. The problem 
with the notion of un/representability (regardless of whether the term “representability” is 
accompanied by the prefix, “un”) is that it implies that trauma is presented to 
consciousness on its arrival and that the problems associated with trauma are to do with 
the subject’s ability to represent this initial presentation. I argue that since trauma 
bypasses conscious awareness as it occurs, the polemic between the un/representability 
misses the defining feature of trauma. In characterising trauma as unpresentable, I move 
beyond the mutual exclusive insistence on the un/representability of trauma; offer a 
corrective to the imprecise language at the crux of this polemic; and provide an 
innovative term for conceptualising trauma.  
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Another central aim of this thesis that I set out to fulfil in Chapter Seven is to 
reclaim the notion of repression (specifically originary repression) in relation to trauma. 
In trauma theory, the model of repression has been discarded in favour of that of 
dissociation. Repression is considered as an erroneous term for describing the psychical 
impact of trauma because it implies that the trauma is first registered to consciousness 
before being repressed into the unconscious (Howell and Itzkowitz 2016; Van der Kolk 
and Van der Hart 1995). Van der Kolk and Van der Hart insist that although “the concepts 
of dissociation and repression have been used interchangeably by Freud and others with 
regard to trauma, there is a fundamental difference between them” (1995, 168). They 
contend that trauma cannot be repressed because  
‘repression’ evokes the image of a subject actively pushing the unwanted traumatic memory 
away. Personal consciousness stays in its place, as it were; it is the traumatic memory that is 
removed. It is highly questionable whether this is actually the case. Contemporary research has 
shown that dissociation of a traumatic experience occurs as the trauma is occurring (ibid.). 
As Van der Kolk and Van der Hart see it, dissociation and repression are fundamentally 
incompatible terms: “traumatic memories cannot be both dissociated and repressed” 
(ibid.). They also argue that “[a]ttempts to relate both models to each other have, so far, 
been rather unsuccessful” (ibid., 168-9). This thesis responds to the perceived failures of 
those who have unsuccessfully attempted to relate dissociation and repression to one 
another. In so doing, I contend that this failure is based on the limitations that accompany 
the notion of secondary repression. Secondary repression suggests that the trauma is 
registered to consciousness before being repressed; however, originary repression does 
not succumb to this view. While I agree that dissociation is a perfectly suitable term to 
describe the psychical processing of trauma, I argue that repression and dissociation need 
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not be conceived as incompatible concepts, if the notion of originary repression is slightly 
broadened.   
Originary repression is ordinarily associated with originary trauma, which, as I 
have explained, marks the traumatic origins of subjectivity. The traumatic origins of 
subjectivity are inaccessible because they predate the emergence of the subject, furnished 
with the ability to cognitise the traumatic event and to prescribe to it a specific quality. 
Rather than identifying originary repression as necessitating originary trauma alone, I 
argue that the concept can be broadened to account for trauma in general. I draw on the 
work of Jean-François Lyotard (1990) in arguing that originary repression designates an 
originary forgetting of that which precedes the formation of the subject equipped with the 
capacity to forget. In this way, originary repression is not presented to consciousness to 
begin with and is thus forgotten “before” forgetting. In light of this definition, I contend 
that originary repression can account for what LaCapra terms originary as well as 
historical trauma (although as mentioned earlier, these are categories that I do not 
ultimately subscribe to).   
The final aim of this thesis is to consider the means through which trauma 
implicates reality and fantasy, without being reducible to either of these extremes alone. 
In so doing, I contribute to debates surrounding Freud’s so-called abandonment of the 
seduction theory. Where Freud’s earlier work on seduction grounds trauma in an external 
event having occurred in the past, his later work in psychoanalysis focuses on the internal 
vicissitudes of fantasy. Critics of Freud interpret this shift as a betrayal of the reality of 
his patients’ accounts of trauma (Herman 1992; Masson 1985; Van der Kolk and Van der 
Hart 1995). By turning to the realm of fantasy, critics accuse Freud of suggesting that the 
traumatic realities suffered by his patients are nothing but fantasmatic illusions. I argue 
that these critics uphold a false distinction between reality and fantasy that is based on a 
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fundamental misunderstanding of the psychoanalytic notion of fantasy. Far from lying in 
opposition to reality, psychoanalysis conceives fantasy as a fundamental component of 
reality. Within psychoanalysis—specifically Lacanian psychoanalysis—reality is not 
understood as being perceivable as it “really is.” Instead, the subject’s experience in, and 
of, reality is constituted by fantasy. Lacanian psychoanalysis, in particular, maintains that 
fantasy is structured by the matrices of the symbolic-imaginary, which are notions that I 
previously introduced. This in itself undermines the mutually exclusivity between reality 
and fantasy; but this thesis is primarily concerned with the relation between these terms 
with regards to trauma. Trauma, I argue, is the incursion of the real that disrupts the 
fantasy frame of reality, yet it is only from within fantasy that the real of trauma can be 
encountered. In this way, trauma is an immanent wound to the fantasmatic constructs of 
reality.   
It is important to note that I am not interested in providing a character defence of 
Freud. I acknowledge that it might very well be the case that he abandoned the seduction 
theory due to an unwillingness to challenge the prevailing patriarchal attitudes of his 
peers. Nor do I limit myself to examining the oscillating tension between reality in 
fantasy in Freud’s work itself—this task falls outside of the scope of this thesis, not to 
mention the fact that it has already been taken up by Jean Laplanche,6 John Fletcher,7 
Maria Torok and Nicholas Rand.8 My argument does, however, provide an implicit 
conceptual defence of Freud in that I do not view reality and fantasy as oppositional 
                                                 
6 I will consider Laplanche’s work on Freud’s shift from reality to fantasy accompanying the latter’s 
abandonment of the seduction theory in Chapter Seven of this thesis.  
7 Fletcher, following Laplanche, traces the tension between reality and fantasy across Freud’s oeuvre and 
argues that his so-called abandonment of the seduction theory is not at all a clean break from reality to 
fantasy, as many critics of Freud claim (2005, 2013). Fletcher, however, remarks that it is not just the case 
of Freud’s critics misconstruing his work on reality and fantasy; it is Freud himself who is responsible for 
the idea that there is a mutually exclusive relation between these terms (2013, 7).    
8 See “The Concept of Psychical Reality and its Traps” in Questions for Freud: The Secret History of 
Psychoanalysis (1997, 24-44).  
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terms. Trauma, I argue, implicates both the real and the fantasmatic, and reducing trauma 
to either one of these extremes at the expense of the other overlooks the dynamic 
interplay between them.  
Notes on Methodology and Structure 
In accordance with the wounding impact of trauma on chronological temporality, this 
thesis does not unfold in a linear path. Rather than building on itself in a causal 
progression—which is something that the very idea of trauma resists—the thesis 
identifies the key tensions in trauma theory that persist across a number of disciplines, 
including, but not limited to, philosophy, literary theory, and history. This thesis does not 
apply a theoretical lens to an “actual” case study of trauma. Instead, it illuminates a 
recurring tension that arises when situating trauma in a relation of either immanence or 
transcendence to a given framework.  
The methodological process of this thesis can be best described in terms of a 
hermeneutic spiral. Following the radical hermeneutics of Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg 
Gadamer ([1960] 2013) describes hermeneutics as a circular and dialogic process of 
understanding, which interweaves between question and answer, the familiar and the 
strange. The hermeneutical process is crucial to any attempt to understand trauma, with 
such understandings necessitating a discussion of both the past and the present, the 
outside and the inside, the unknowable and the knowable. The hermeneutics described by 
Gadamer consists of a polarity between the alterity of the text and the familiar horizons 
that inform one’s interpretation of it. The hermeneutical task is not to resolve or to cover 
over this tension, but to bring it out and to seek a space in between (ibid., 306). This is 
exactly what I aim to do in considering the immanence of traumatic rupture. Instead of 
reducing trauma to either the inside or the outside of a given framework, I exacerbate the 
tension between these terms and place them into a dialogic relation.  
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The hermeneutic circle consists of the following process: the interpreter’s 
encounter with a text is framed by their “fore-conceptions” of what it means, but as the 
process of hermeneutics unfolds, the interpreter’s initial fore-conceptions are replaced 
with more suitable ones (ibid., 280). The relation between the text and the interpreter is 
thus reciprocal. The circular process of understanding does not converge into an objective 
point of truth and can more appropriately be described as an ongoing process of 
refinement (albeit one without any teleological endpoint). As already noted, the 
premise—or fore-conception—of this thesis is that a tension arises when conferring on 
trauma the status of either the immanent or the transcendent. This thesis utilises the 
hermeneutic process to interweave between this premise and a range of texts that both 
explicitly and implicitly deal with the question of trauma. But while Heidegger and 
Gadamer use the circle to describe the hermeneutical process, I opt for the metaphor of a 
spiral. A circle invokes a two-dimensional object, while the spiral more fittingly 
encapsulates the degree to which the process of understanding unfurls and coils back onto 
itself. In accordance with the hermeneutic spiral, this thesis forms a dialogue between the 
aforementioned premise and a series of texts, coiling into different layers of 
understanding as each chapter unfolds. As I move from one chapter to the next, I 
reconsider the basic premise of the thesis in a different context, incorporating the insights 
that I arrive at in the previous chapters into the successive chapters.  
While each chapter of this thesis forms a discrete spiral of its own, the thesis is 
made up of two main parts, which constitute two major turns of the hermeneutic spiral. 
Part One focuses on the tension between the ordinary and the extraordinary in the context 
of trauma, while Part Two moves from the extra/ordinary to the originary. In what 
follows, I will unpack the function and content of Part One along with the first few 
chapters of this thesis that belong to it before moving onto Part Two and the series of 
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chapters which form the latter half of the thesis. The primary focus of Part One is the 
tension between the extraordinary and the ordinary, which I place under the broader 
tension between the transcendent and the immanent that lies at the heart of this thesis. 
Where I situate the extraordinary on the side of the transcendent, the ordinary dwells on a 
plane of immanence. Part One consists of chapters One to Four, in which I interrogate 
different manifestations of the polarity between the extraordinary and the ordinary. Such 
manifestations include the polemic between the unique and the comparable, the 
exceptional and the exemplary, the exception and the norm, and the radical and the banal. 
I contend that the insistence on upholding either one of these extremes at the expense of 
the other is rooted in a false dichotomy underpinning the conceptualisation of trauma, in 
which trauma is characterised as an event that either transcends ordinary experience or as 
an event that is immanent to it. As well as tracing and categorising this tension under the 
banner of the extra/ordinary (which, again, comes under the broader banner of the 
transcendent and the immanent), each chapter in Part One moves beyond the presumed 
mutually exclusivity between these terms by revealing that far from lying in opposition to 
one another, these terms are inextricably bound. The chapters constitutive of Part One 
offer a series of interlocking arguments which demonstrate the means through which 
trauma implicates both the transcendent and the immanent, showing that neither one of 
these extremes holds at the expense of the other. These interlacing arguments contribute 
to the major contention of this thesis concerning the immanence of traumatic rupture.  
In Chapter One, I conceptualise and contextualise trauma by providing a 
genealogical overview of the rise and fall of trauma as an object of study. In accordance 
with the central thematic of Part One, Chapter One frames the key debates in trauma 
theory around the polemic between the ordinary and the extraordinary. While 
foundational trauma theorists such as Felman, Laub, and Caruth posit trauma as a sudden 
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and extraordinary event, a rising trend in more recent accounts of trauma has been to 
resituate trauma away from the extraordinary and into the ordinary. Rather than resolving 
this tension, Chapter One utilises it as a productive space in which to build this thesis and 
to conceptualise trauma.  
Chapter Two considers the tension between the ordinary and the extraordinary in 
debates surrounding the Holocaust. Although the Holocaust is described as an 
extraordinary and rupturing event, scholars have more recently argued that the event is 
both ordinary and on the same continuum as the contexts in which it occurred. I examine 
the Holocaust as an exemplar of trauma in the work of Felman and Laub—who also, and 
somewhat paradoxically, conceive the Holocaust as an exceptional and unique event. 
Chapter Two thus reveals the hitherto unidentified tension between the exceptional and 
the exemplary in the context of trauma, which I posit as a subset of the tension between 
the extra/ordinary. In overcoming the mutual exclusivity between these terms, I draw on 
Agamben’s methodological category of the paradigm. In so doing, Chapter Two provides 
an explanation and justification of my recurrent reference to the Holocaust as an 
exemplary, yet exceptional, traumatic event across this thesis.  
Chapter Three draws on the tension between the extra/ordinary in the work of 
Agamben and Hannah Arendt. In this chapter, I begin with Primo Levi’s notion of the 
grey zone and move on to explore Agamben’s adaptation of this concept to consider the 
zone of indistinction that engulfs the exception and the norm into a zone of ambiguity. 
Chapter Three also considers Arendt’s earlier notion of radical evil, which posits the 
phenomenon as unthinkable and unspeakable, in contrast to her later work on the banality 
of evil, which characterises evil as being all too ordinary. Rather than viewing Arendt’s 
earlier and later perspectives as contradictory, I argue that they can actually be read as 
complementary. In juxtaposing Arendt’s seemingly opposing views, Chapter Three sheds 
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new light on the tension between the ordinary and the extraordinary in the context of 
trauma. I argue that what is truly radical about trauma is that it stems from the everyday 
contexts in which it occurs. In demonstrating the inextricable link between the exception 
and the norm, the radical and the banal, this chapter upholds the immanence of traumatic 
rupture as implicating both of these extremes in a dialogic and reciprocal exchange.  
Chapter Four examines the notion of witnessing in the work of Felman, Laub, and 
Agamben and considers the tension between the extra/ordinary as it manifests in the 
im/possibility of bearing witness to the in/human conditions of Auschwitz. I posit the 
impossibility of witnessing and the category of the inhuman on the side of the 
extraordinary. Conversely, I place the possibility of witnessing and the category of the 
human on the side of the ordinary. Chapter Four focuses on the collapse of witnessing 
postulated by Felman and Laub, who conceive the rupturing impact of trauma as 
precluding the possibility of witnessing the traumatic event as it occurs. In opposition to 
the juridico-historical notion of witnessing, which puts the onus on the witness to provide 
a factual and accurate description of a past event, trauma theorists argue that witnessing 
dramatises the im/possibility of witnessing the traumatic event on its occurrence. Chapter 
Four argues that the impossibility of witnessing gives rise to its very possibility, and that 
the other-than-human is immanent to the human. I draw on these insights to contribute to 
the overarching sentiment of this thesis concerning the immanence of traumatic rupture. 
Having unpacked the function of each chapter of Part One of this thesis, I will 
now turn my attention to Part Two. The second part of the thesis consists of chapters Five 
to Seven, in which I spiral back on the tension between the extra/ordinary and introduce 
the notion of the originary. I turn to originary trauma through Freud’s work on the origins 
of life through the traumatic awakening from death (Chapter Five); Lacan’s work on the 
subject’s traumatic entrance into the symbolic-imaginary (Chapter Six); and Laplanche’s 
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insights on the primal scene of seduction (Chapter Seven). Part Two continues with the 
major aim of this thesis of identifying and unravelling the mutual exclusivity between the 
extra/ordinary through the immanence of traumatic rupture. However, Part Two further 
complicates this dichotomy through the notion of the originary.  
As well as extending my focus from the extra/ordinary to the originary, the aim of 
Part Two is to examine the tension between reality and fantasy in relation to the origins of 
the traumatic event. As I have already mentioned, this means extrapolating on Freud’s so-
called abandonment of the seduction theory, which marks a shift in emphasis from the 
external event of trauma to the internal vicissitudes of fantasy. Instead of upholding a 
false dichotomy between these terms—as Freud himself and so many of his critics do—I 
draw on psychoanalysis to demonstrate the means through which the reality of trauma 
necessarily implicates fantasy.  
Chapter Five signals a move beyond the extra/ordinary and into the originary by 
considering a series of tensions in Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle ([1920] 1961). 
In this chapter, I examine the compulsion to repeat that lies at the crux of trauma as a 
phenomenon that implicates the extraordinary, the ordinary, and the originary. The 
compulsion to repeat overrides the ability to remember an event that was too 
overwhelming to be cognitised at the time of its occurrence. Having identified repetition 
compulsion in the aberrant context of trauma, Freud moves on to identify the compulsion 
to repeat in the most ordinary of situations—namely, in the activities of children. 
Following this, Freud’s work takes another unexpected shift, in which repetition 
compulsion is not only perceived as cutting across the extra/ordinary, but also appears as 
the originary condition of life itself, through which the death drive comes into being. 
Chapter Five considers the origins of life as a traumatic awakening from death, whilst 
conceptualising the death drive as repeating the traumatic origins of life through its 
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striving to return the living organism to its former state of inertia. In this way, trauma 
comes to be conceived as cutting across not only the extra/ordinary, but so too the 
originary.  
Chapter Six turns to Lacanian psychoanalysis to problematise the mutual 
exclusivity between reality and fantasy. In so doing, I posit reality as being constituted by 
fantasy, which is, in turn, structured by the symbolic-imaginary. In this chapter, I argue 
that critics of Freud who interpret the shift in his work from the external reality of trauma 
to the internal vicissitudes of fantasy uphold a false dichotomy between these terms. 
Chapter Six draws on Lacan’s ontological triad of the symbolic and the imaginary as the 
determining structures of fantasy and considers the real as a disruption to these 
constitutive frameworks. Rather than perceiving the traumatic real as lying beyond the 
symbolic-imaginary determinates of reality, Chapter Six posits the encounter with the real 
as occurring within these orders. In other words, Chapter Six argues that the missed 
encounter with the traumatic real—which is generally perceived as transcending the 
symbolic-imaginary—is immanent to these orders, thus supporting the immanence of 
traumatic rupture.  
Chapter Seven is the moment of climax in this thesis, in which I fulfil three of my 
most important thesis aims—namely, of problematising the distinction between historical 
and originary trauma; of presenting trauma as unpresentable; and of reclaiming the notion 
of repression. I address these aims by invoking the Freudian concept of Nachträglichkeit, 
which designates the bidirectional temporality of trauma as implicating the external event 
of the past and its internal reconstruction in the present. While Freud’s translators tend to 
privilege either one of these extremes at the expense of the other, I draw on the work of 
Laplanche to argue that trauma necessitates a relationship between both. In synthesising 
the bidirectional movements of Nachträglichkeit, Laplanche conceptualises trauma as an 
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originary rather than a historical occurrence. In view of this, I consider LaCapra’s 
distinction between the historical and the originary and ultimately argue these categories 
are at odds with the peculiar temporality of trauma. As well as problematising the bounds 
separating the historical from the originary, Chapter Seven turns to the work of Lyotard to 
address two of the other aims of this thesis—that is, of configuring trauma as an 
unpresentable event and of reclaiming the language of repression in regard to the 
psychical impact of trauma.  
In the final chapter of this thesis, I reflect on the most significant aim of this 
thesis—that is, the immanence of traumatic rupture. I then return to my insights regarding 
the unpresentability of trauma, in conjunction with the immanence of traumatic rupture, 
to propose an avenue through which this unpresentability can be presented without being 
forgotten anew. Here, I draw on Lyotard’s postmodern modality of the sublime which, I 
argue, does not set out to present the unpresentable origins of trauma but, rather, presents 
that these origins are in fact unpresentable. I further propose that the postmodern sublime 
can present the unpresentability of trauma as existing on a plane of immanence—in the 
“here and now” as opposed to a transcendent “beyond.” Through this non-
representational and non-nostalgic tool, I reinforce the view that trauma spills across the 
past and the present alike. Far from being reducible to an event of the past, trauma bears 
equal weight on the present and the future. While this might at first seem pessimistic, I 
argue that this insight has the potential to liberate the subject from a paralysing fixation 
on an unattainable traumatic past without denying its brute factuality. 
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Part One – Between the Ordinary and the 
Extraordinary   
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Chapter One – Situating Trauma: Between the Extra/Ordinary 
From the late nineteenth century to the present, the study of trauma has received 
increasing academic attention across a broad disciplinary spectrum. Contemporary trauma 
theory came to prominence in response to the onslaught of violent events that occurred 
throughout the twentieth century, including World War I, World War II, the Holocaust, 
the Vietnam War, and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Felman thus 
pronounces the twentieth century “a century of traumas and (concurrently) a century of 
theories of trauma” (2002, 1). Trauma theorists broadly define trauma as “the wounding of 
the mind brought about by sudden, unexpected emotional shock” (Leys 2000, 4, emphasis 
in original). Rather than referring to a specific event, trauma resides in the wounding 
impact of an event. This means that not all violent events are necessarily traumatic in and 
of themselves. Erikson asserts that “[t]he most violent wrenchings in the world […] have 
no clinical standing unless they damage the workings of a mind or body” (1995, 184). An 
event experienced as traumatic by some may not be traumatic for others; the traumatic 
stressor “may or may not be catastrophic, and may not traumatize everyone equally” 
(Caruth 1995, 4). With regards to trauma, it is the latter “harm that defines and gives 
shape to the initial event, the harm that gives it its name” (Erikson 1995, 184-5, emphasis 
in original).   
 In recent years, however, trauma theory has been subject to much criticism. With a 
primary focus on the disruptive force of trauma, trauma theorists such as Felman, Laub, 
and Caruth are accused of blatantly disregarding what it is exactly that trauma disrupts 
(Kansteiner 2004; Kansteiner and Weilnböck 2008). Critics have stressed the necessity of 
looking beyond the wounding impact of trauma to consider the contexts which enable 
traumatic events to occur in the first place (Craps 2013, 27; Rothberg 2014a, xv). In 
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response to the various limitations of the event-based model of trauma—which conceives 
trauma as a sudden and out of the ordinary occurrence—critics have recently posited 
trauma as an event that is firmly rooted in the contexts in which it occurs. But a problem 
with recent attempts to reconceive trauma as an ordinary event is that they risk effacing 
the wounding impact of trauma. Given this, there is a significant tension between accounts 
which posit trauma as residing on either the inside or the outside of the frameworks that it 
comes into being.  
This is the first of four chapters in Part One of this thesis to highlight a series of 
tensions that arise in attempting to situate trauma on either side of the extraordinary or the 
ordinary. As noted previously, Chapter One provides a contextual and conceptual 
overview of trauma, whilst illuminating the competing claims that trauma has on the 
extra/ordinary. The chapter begins by genealogically tracing the rise and fall of interest in 
trauma to have occurred from the late nineteenth century to the late twentieth century. 
After considering the contextual frameworks in which the study of trauma has come to 
prominence, this chapter goes on to examine the shattering impact of trauma through the 
lens of Caruth and her colleagues, who insist that trauma is impossible to comprehend and 
that any effort to do so closes over the wounding impact of trauma.  
In identifying the tendency of trauma theorists to overemphasise the disruptive 
qualities of trauma, this chapter then goes on to engage with some important criticisms of 
trauma theory. A key concern—which will be addressed towards the end of this chapter—
is that from the onset of its study, trauma has been understood as an event that occurs 
outside of the range of ordinary experience, thus disregarding those traumatic events that 
occur all too regularly in the lives of people from marginalised and oppressed groups. 
Indeed, the kinds of events that are deemed traumatic are reliant on structural frameworks 
that legitimise the suffering of some at the expense of others. This raises a significant 
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tension between the ordinary and the extraordinary: while trauma may very well be 
experienced as a sudden, shocking event, the prevalence of trauma in the contemporary 
world is a direct result of certain structural frameworks which facilitate the normalisation 
of the seemingly abnormal or extraordinary. But rather than reducing trauma to either side 
of the extraordinary or the ordinary, Chapter One draws on this tension as a productive 
basis for this thesis.  
The Rise and Fall of Trauma as an Object of Study 
Prior to the eruption of classical trauma theory out of the 1990s, trauma spiralled in and 
out of focus across the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Herman 1992; Leys 2000, 
3). The history of trauma is far from continuous: “[p]eriods of investigation have 
alternated with periods of oblivion. Repeatedly in the past century, similar lines of inquiry 
have been taken up and abruptly abandoned, only to be rediscovered later” (Herman 
1992, 7). Without denying certain continuities in the history of trauma, Leys argues that 
trauma cannot be reduced to a common lineage and utilises a Foucauldian genealogical 
approach to underscore the “waxing and waning of interest in trauma in the course of 
more than a century” (2000, 3). Providing a coherent history of trauma is a difficult task 
since it is reliant on stitching together a concept that has emerged and dissipated in 
discontinuous ways across varied contexts (Luckhurst 2008, 19). Rather than providing a 
history of trauma, this section follows the path of Herman (1992), Leys (2000), and 
Luckhurst (2008) by providing a genealogical overview of the rise and fall of the concept. 
A genealogical approach is wary of the fact that  
[t]he history of a concept is not wholly and entirely that of its progressive refinement […] but 
that of its various fields of constitution and validity, that of its successive rules of use, that of 
the many theoretical contexts in which it developed and matured (Luckhurst 2008, 19). 
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Rather than reducing trauma to a common lineage, a genealogical approach unearths and 
fuses together disparate manifestations of trauma, which have become intelligible in 
accordance with shifting socio-cultural frameworks. In his own genealogy of trauma, 
Luckhurst also draws on the work of Bruno Latour in characterising trauma as a complex 
“assemblage” or “knot” that “loops through different knowledges, institutions, practices, 
social, political, and cultural forums” (ibid., 14). Utilising a genealogical approach to the 
examination of trauma, this section continues by unravelling what Luckhurst refers to as 
“the complex elements that have been knotted into the notion of trauma” (ibid., 15).  
Where the classical medical usage of trauma denoted a bodily wound caused by a 
physical blow, trauma is more recently understood as a wound inflicted on the mind or 
psyche (Caruth 1996, 3; Luckhurst 2008, 2-3). In English, trauma was first used in the 
seventeenth century in medicine and was posited as a bodily injury resulting from an 
external blow (Luckhurst 2008, 2). The status of trauma as a psychological phenomenon 
was roughly acquired at the turn of the twentieth century, with the concept of trauma 
shifting from a bodily wound to the wounding of the mind, still thought to be caused by 
an external agent. From the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century, figures such as 
Jean-Martin Charcot, Pierre Janet, Josef Breuer and Freud helped to resituate trauma 
away from the physical towards the psychical.  
Charcot’s investigations into hysteria at the famous Salpêtrière asylum in Paris 
from 1862-93 marked roughly the beginning of the study of psychological trauma 
(Herman 1992, 10; Leys 2000, 2; Luckhurst 2008, 34). Charcot subsumed trauma under 
the category of hysteria, where he linked hysterical symptoms to accidents, after which 
patients would develop symptoms such as amnesia, paralysis, and fainting (Luckhurst 
2008, 35). While hysteria had previously been viewed as a condition proper to women, 
originating in the uterus (as per the Greek hystera—meaning, uterus), Charcot made the 
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destabilising observation that men too could exhibit symptoms of hysteria (Herman 1992, 
10).9  
Appointed by Charcot to the Salpêtrière in 1890, Janet furthered the view that 
hysteria was the result of trauma. He argued that traumatic memories are split off from 
consciousness and are stored in a dissociated psychical stream that is unable to be 
voluntarily accessed (Luckhurst 2008, 42). Janet’s writings on dissociation, which 
highlight the inability to access one’s own traumatic past, profoundly influenced the 
trauma theory to have emerged out of the 1990s, as did the writings of Freud—both his 
individual studies on traumatic neurosis and his collaborative work with his colleague, 
Breuer. Indeed, Freud’s early writings on hysteria, as well as his later writings on accident 
and war-related trauma, are crucial to the development of the trauma concept. 
 Having also visited Charcot at the Salpêtrière during 1885-6, Freud began to focus 
on hysteria, viewing hysterical symptoms as a result of traumatic neurosis. In their 
collaborative clinical and research efforts, Freud and Breuer engaged with and listened to 
patients suffering from hysteria to help relieve them from their traumatic symptoms. The 
psychotherapeutic techniques employed by Freud and Breuer centred on the methods of 
catharsis and verbally working-through the trauma. Indeed, they had discovered  
that each individual hysterical symptom immediately and permanently disappeared when we 
had succeeded in bringing to light the memory of the event by which it was provoked and in 
arousing its accompanied affect, and when the patient had described that event in the greatest 
possible detail and had put the affect into words ([1895] 1955, 6, emphasis in original). 
                                                 
9 Herman explains that Charcot’s venture into the domain of hysteria was credited at the time as being 
courageous because hysteria had hitherto not been viewed as a topic worthy of serious scientific 
investigation (1992, 10). Until the discovery of psychological trauma, women suffering from so-called 
hysterical symptoms were commonly perceived to be perverse. Despite his courageous gesture, Charcot 
problematically treated his patients as case studies—as instruments used to further the cause of science. 
Although “Charcot paid minute attention to the symptoms of his hysterical patients, he had no interest 
whatsoever in their inner lives. He viewed their emotions as symptoms to be catalogued. He described their 
speech as ‘vocalization’” (ibid., 11).  
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Patients repeatedly reported incidents of sexual abuse in their clinical sessions with Freud 
and Breuer. Because of this striking correlation, they “put forward the thesis that at the 
bottom of every case of hysteria there are one or more occurrences of premature sexual 
experience” ([1896] 1962, 203, emphasis in original).  
 However, troubled by the implications of this hypothesis, Freud abandoned his 
work on hysteria. Drawing from a series of unpublished letters between Freud and 
Wilhelm Fliess, Jeffrey Masson’s polemic, The Assault on Truth: Freud’s Suppression of 
the Seduction Theory (1985), argues that Freud actively supressed his seduction theory 
out of cowardice. He maintains that Freud withdrew from his research due to his concerns 
over the social implications of the prevalence of sexual abuse (Herman 1992, 14; Masson 
1985). For if Freud’s theory proved correct,  
he would be forced to conclude that what he called “perverted acts against children” 
were endemic, not only among the proletariat of Paris, where he had first studied 
hysteria, but also among the respectable bourgeois families of Vienna, where he had 
established his practice (Herman 1992, 14). 
Freud subsequently shifted his focus from the effects of external traumas on the psyche to 
the effects of repressed erotic infantile fantasies, which he theorised through the Oedipal 
Complex10 (Leys 2000, 4). Psychoanalysis thereby arose from Freud’s abandonment of 
hysteria, a process in which he purportedly replaced a real scene of unsolicited childhood 
seduction with the inner world of unconscious fantasy (Masson 1985, 113).  
                                                 
10 The Oedipal complex is Freud’s well-known theory of the stages of child development. Drawing on 
Sophocles’ play, Oedipus Rex, Freud defines the Oedipal complex as a set of loving and hostile 
unconscious wishes that a child holds towards their parents (Evans 2006, 130; Laplanche and Pontalis 
[1973] 1988, 282-3). The complex is based on feelings of love towards one parent (Evans explains that in 
the “positive” form of the Oedipal complex, the love is directed towards the parent of the opposite sex; for 
Lacan, however, it is always directed towards the mother (2006, 130)) and a jealous rivalry with the other 
parent. The Oedipal complex takes place between the ages of three and five, escalating at age three before 
being resolved at age five when the child identifies with the rival parent and renounces their desire for the 
other parent (ibid., 131). Freud derives every psychopathology to failures in the Oedipal Complex (ibid.). 
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Freud’s theoretical shift from the effects of external traumas on the psyche to the 
effects of repressed erotic infantile fantasies is viewed as problematic within feminist and 
trauma theoretic discourses alike, with Freud accused of denying the reality of his 
patients’ accounts of sexual abuse.11 Much criticism of Freud is due to his assertion that 
trauma need not derive from an actual event but, rather, from fantasmatic constructions of 
an imagined event. Freud’s earlier work on hysteria stressed that traumatic symptoms 
were the result of premature childhood seduction, and thus the result of an external event, 
while his later work shifted to the internal world of unconscious fantasy. Freud’s turn 
away from the external cause of trauma to the internal world of fantasy is perceived by 
some as both a dismissal and a betrayal of the traumatic realities that his patients had 
endured. Van der Kolk and Van der Hart argue that Freud’s conceptual shift denied the 
significance of external traumata on the psyche and further accuse Freud of “dismiss[ing] 
the terrifying reality of many patients’ experiences” (1995, 434). The authors continue: 
“psychoanalysis […] came to emphasize the force of forbidden wishes, [yet] it ignored 
the continued power of overwhelming terror” (ibid.). Herman similarly argues that 
Freud’s shift from actual to fantasised scenes of seduction silenced the traumas of sexual 
violence suffered by women (1992, 14). Psychoanalysis, born “[o]ut of the ruins of the 
traumatic theory of hysteria […] was founded in the denial of women’s realities” (ibid.). 
Herman continues: 
Sexuality remained the central focus of inquiry. But the exploitative social context in which sexual 
relations actually occur became utterly invisible. Psychoanalysis became a study of the internal 
vicissitudes of fantasy and desire, dissociated from the reality of experience. By the first decade of 
the twentieth century, without ever offering any clinical documentation of false complaints, Freud 
                                                 
11 The shift in Freud’s work from the external reality of trauma to the internal realm of fantasy is a major 
theme of Part Two of this thesis and receives detailed consideration in Chapter Seven. 
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had concluded that his hysterical patients’ accounts of childhood sexual abuse were untrue: “I was 
at last obliged to recognize that these scenes of seduction had never taken place, and that they were 
only fantasies which my patients had made up” (ibid.). 
While Freud later revisited the issue of trauma in his studies of transportation and 
industrial accidents and trench warfare, his work on hysteria marks the last of his 
endeavours into the effects of trauma related to sexual abuse. Given this, Freud is 
criticised for reinforcing prevailing patriarchal attitudes that attach more importance to 
the traumas experienced by men in the context of war than to the traumas of sexual 
assault experienced by many women, often at the hands of men. 
 In Freud’s defence, theorists argue that polemical responses to his theoretical shift 
derive from “a fundamental misunderstanding of his thought” (Leys 2000, 19). Susannah 
Radstone asserts that Freud’s critics perceive the traumatic event as though it were 
intrinsically traumatic, when Freud had always insisted on the presence of fantasy and 
unconscious wish as being inextricably tied to trauma (2000, 89). Through a misreading 
of Freud, “[t]rauma theorists associate trauma not with the effects of triggered 
associations but with the ontologically unbearable nature of the event itself” (ibid.). 
Freud’s early work on hysteria problematised the notion that an event can be traumatic in 
and of itself. As Luckhurst argues,  
Freud never simply replaced the ‘real event’ with fantasy, truth with falsity. Rather, he 
considered traumatic memories as particularly hemmed in by resistances to being brought into 
conscious recall and were thus subject to multiple tricks of transformation or displacement, 
intertwining the real and the fantasmatic (2008, 47).  
Luckhurst shows that it is not a case of “either/or” when it comes to situating trauma in 
either reality or fantasy but is, rather, an instance in which fantasy and reality coalesce, so 
that it is impossible distinguish between the two (ibid.). Although this is a topic that will 
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receive consideration in Part Two of this thesis (most notably in Chapters Six and Seven), 
it nonetheless bears on what is at stake in this present chapter—that is, of providing a 
genealogy of the rise and fall of the study of trauma.  
 It is also worth noting that theorists such as Laplanche and Fletcher have argued 
that Freud’s so-called abandonment of the seduction theory does not represent a clean 
break from the external reality of trauma to the internal realm of fantasy (Fletcher 2005, 
9). Fletcher, following Laplanche, argues that elements of the seduction theory which 
emphasis the external reality behind trauma persist throughout Freud’s work (ibid.). 
Fletcher explains that on “either side of the so-called theoretical break or turn […] there is 
an array of closely related concepts […] in which elements of memory and fantasy 
combine in different ways and repeat” (2013, 8). Yet it was Freud himself who was 
responsible for oversimplifying the turn in his work from reality to fantasy as a 
polarisation: “[t]he further he moved away from his earlier theory, both in time and in 
thought, the more he was prone to give a misleading polarized retrospect on his now long 
abandoned ‘error’ and to present it in terms of a mutually exclusive opposition between 
fantasy and the real event” (ibid., 7).    
After Freud abandoned his studies on hysteria, the question of trauma lost focus at 
the turn of the century and it was not until the outbreak of World War I that renewed 
interest in the issue resurfaced (Leys 2000, 4). A revival in the study of trauma occurred 
when soldiers subjected to trench warfare started exhibiting symptoms that resembled the 
hysterical symptoms identified by Charcot and his colleagues in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries (Herman 1992, 20). The term “shell shock” was subsequently 
coined to describe the nervous disorder thought to be brought about by the concussive 
effects of exploding shells, though it was soon discovered that soldiers who had not 
endured physical injury went on to exhibit similar psychological symptoms as those 
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injured in the direct line of combat (ibid., 26). Symptoms of shell shock were thus 
acknowledged as being caused by psychological, rather than physical, trauma (ibid.). As 
John Fletcher remarks: “the First World War, with its shell-shock and battlefield traumas, 
had put the anomalies of a fully psychical trauma, apparently resulting from the violent 
impact of external physical events, back on the agenda” (2013, 289, emphasis in original).  
However, public consciousness was unsympathetic at the time to those suffering 
from the traumas of the war and often viewed those who exhibited symptoms of trauma 
with contempt (ibid., 21). After the war, soldiers suffering from trauma were perceived as 
cowards and malingerers by those who were adamant to forget the bloody past (ibid.). 
Given this, large-scale interest in trauma for the most part dissipated, but the question of 
trauma reemerged during and after World War II (ibid.). When the Second World War 
broke out, military physicians worked to break the stigma of war neurosis, arguing that 
anyone could break down in the line of combat and it was not a sign of weak character 
(ibid.). Moreover, therapeutic and academic engagements with survivors of the Holocaust 
were formative in the development of the trauma concept—but more will be said on this 
is Chapter Two. In addition to the aforementioned series of events to have informed the 
conceptual development of trauma, advocacy work during and after the Vietnam War, as 
well as the political activism of the Women’s Liberation Movement of the 1970s—which 
fought to spread awareness of domestic and sexual abuse—culminated in the official 
recognition of the psychological damage resulting from exposure to extreme events.   
In 1980, the American Psychiatric Association included Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD) in the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-IIIR). The category of PTSD was intended to account for the long-
recognised, but formerly dismissed, symptoms of psychological trauma brought on by a 
broad range of events deemed traumatic, including—but not limited to—natural disasters, 
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war, sexual abuse, and child abuse. Through the new diagnostic tool of PTSD, disorders 
that had been previously referred to as hysteria, shell shock, combat and war neurosis, and 
concentration camp and survivor syndrome, had now been officially acknowledged and 
legitimised.  
In her Introduction to the foundational edited collection, Trauma, Caruth explains 
that although the definition of PTSD is highly contested, it is generally agreed to consist 
of 
a response, sometimes delayed, to an overwhelming event or events, which takes the 
form of repeated, intrusive hallucinations, dreams, thoughts or behaviours stemming 
from the event, along with numbing that may have begun during or after the experience, 
and possibly also increased arousal to (and avoidance of) stimulants recalling the event 
(1995, 2).  
PTSD helped to account for a series of symptoms exhibited by people when “confronted 
with an experience involving ‘actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a physical 
threat to the psychical integrity of the self’ considered to be outside the range of normal 
experience” (Luckhurst 2008, 1). Such symptoms include avoidance, hypervigilance, 
intrusive memories, flashbacks and recurring nightmares that are all linked to the initial 
traumatic scene but are nonetheless experienced after the event’s occurrence. 
 Although the concept of trauma has come to exceed the diagnostic and 
pathologising scope of the DSM, the official recognition of trauma by the APA brought 
forth a tremendous wave of literature on trauma that traversed vast inter- and multi-
disciplinary spaces. This literature includes what is now referred to as “classical” and 
“literary” trauma theory, which features the work of Felman, Laub, and Caruth. Despite 
the inclusion of PTSD in the DSM, Caruth argues that the concept of trauma has given 
rise to at least as many questions as it has answered. She asserts that if the category of 
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PTSD has helped to clarify symptoms related to trauma, it has done so at a fundamental 
cost of understanding (1995, 4). In response to the shattering impact of trauma, Caruth 
and her colleagues call for an investigation of the crises of history, experience, and 
representation brought about by traumatic events.  
Trauma, Theory, and Crisis 
Central to the very immediacy of [… trauma] is a gap that carries the force of an event 
and does so precisely at the expense of simple knowledge and memory. The force of this 
experience would appear to arise precisely, in other words, in the collapse of its 
understanding (ibid., 7). 
Having provided a genealogical overview of the rise and fall of trauma across the late 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this section moves on to configure the disruptive and 
shattering impact of trauma through the work of Caruth and some of the contributors to 
her edited volume, Trauma (1995).12 Caruth conceptualises trauma as an enigmatic and 
aporia-laden event that bypasses conscious awareness at the time of its occurrence only to 
manifest belatedly in intrusive repetitive symptoms. For Caruth, the central aporia of 
trauma lies in the impossibility of voluntarily accessing one’s own traumatic past; this 
past is something that it imposes itself on the individual against their conscious will. 
Trauma theory responds to the disruptive impact of trauma and characterises trauma as an 
event that lies outside of cognitive, experiential, and representational frameworks.  
Although Freud did not develop a stable and coherent theory of trauma, his studies 
on the topic have become indispensable tools for trauma theorists. Trauma theorists offer 
a different reading of Freud than standard psychoanalytic readings centred on the Oedipal 
Complex and its focus on the repression of unconscious wishes (Caruth 1996, 135n18). 
                                                 
12 Where this present chapter focuses on Caruth, the trauma theories of Felman and Laub will be explored in 
detail in Chapters Two, Three, and Four of this thesis. 
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Psychoanalysis, Caruth explains, is traditionally “associated with the theory of repression 
and return of the repressed, as well as with a system of unconscious symbolic meanings 
(the basis of the dream theory in its usual interpretation)” (1996, 135n18). However, 
trauma “emerges in psychoanalytic theory […] as an interruption of the symbolic system 
and is linked, not to repression, unconsciousness, and symbolization, but rather to a 
temporal delay, repetition, and literal return” (ibid.).13 Rather than being repressed, 
traumatic memories are unassimilated fragments of the traumatic event which are 
dissociated from consciousness. While the notion of dissociation is associated with 
Freud’s early work on hysteria, repression is associated with Freud’s theories of 
psychoanalysis, centred on the repression of unconscious wishes indicative of the Oedipal 
complex (Van der Kolk and Van der Hart 1995, 168). Here, he moved away from actual 
to fantasmatic events of infantile sexual seduction, which he theorised under the Oedipal 
Complex.  
A central concept that trauma theorists derive from Freud’s writings is the notion of 
latency.14 Latency designates the sudden, overwhelming shock of trauma, which cannot 
be assimilated into consciousness as it occurs and instead arrives belatedly. Caruth utilises 
Freud’s work on accident and war related trauma as a platform for theorising the inherent 
latency of trauma. In so doing, she draws on a famous passage from Freud’s Moses and 
Monotheism (1939) to configure trauma as “the story of an accident” (1996, 6, 1995, 7): 
It may happen that someone gets away, apparently unharmed, from the spot where he [sic] has 
suffered a shocking accident, for instance a train collision. In the course of the following 
weeks, however, he develops a series of grave psychical and motor symptoms, which can be 
ascribed only to his shock or whatever else happened at the time of the accident. He has 
                                                 
13 The notion of trauma as a disruption to psychoanalytic theory is a major theme of Chapter Five of this 
thesis. 
14 The notion of latency is derived from Freud’s concept of Nachträglichkeit, which will receive special 
attention in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
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developed a “traumatic neurosis.” This appears quite incomprehensible and is therefore a novel 
fact. The time that elapsed between the accident and the first appearance of the symptoms is 
called the “incubation period,” a transparent allusion to the pathology of infectious disease 
[…]. It is the feature one might term latency (Freud 1939, 109-10, emphasis in original).   
In citing this passage, Caruth draws attention to the gap between the traumatic event and 
the belated onset of traumatic symptoms. While the person in Freud’s example could very 
well be interpreted as repressing the traumatic accident only to remember what happened 
later, Caruth insists that they could not have repressed or forgotten what occurred. She 
argues instead that the traumatised individual did not actually experience the event at the 
time of its arrival. Freud’s example does not reveal the movement from the event to its 
repression to its return but, rather, demonstrates the feature of latency: “it is only through 
its inherent forgetting that it can be experienced at all” (1995, 8). “The experience of 
trauma, the fact of latency,” Caruth adds, “would thus seem to consist, not in the 
forgetting of a reality that can hence never be fully known, but in an inherent latency 
within the experience itself” (ibid.).  
For Caruth, the fundamental enigma of trauma pertains to its strange temporal 
structure. She argues that the “overwhelming immediacy” of trauma gives rise to its 
“belated uncertainty” (ibid.). Trauma is an event that arrives both too soon and too late: 
trauma “is experienced too soon, too unexpectedly, to be fully known and is therefore not 
available to consciousness until it imposes itself again, repeatedly, in the nightmares and 
repetitive actions of the survivors” (1996, 4). Caruth explains that what is peculiar about 
trauma is “the way that its very unassimilated nature—the way it was precisely not known 
in the first instance—returns to haunt the survivor later on” (ibid., emphasis in original). 
The impact of the traumatic event manifests belatedly in symptoms such as flashbacks, 
nightmares, intrusive thoughts, and other traumatic affects that have since been grouped 
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under the banner of PTSD (ibid.). As an event that is too overwhelming to be experienced 
at the time of its arrival, trauma continually reemerges long after the initial traumatic 
scene.  
 The inherent latency of trauma means that trauma cannot be reduced to either the 
precipitating event or the repetitive symptoms that follow. Caruth famously argues that 
trauma resides in the “structure of its experience or reception: the event is not assimilated 
or experienced fully at the time, but only belatedly” (1995, 4, emphasis in original). In 
bypassing conscious awareness at the time of the precipitating event, trauma breaches the 
psyche and cannot be registered through ordinary mechanisms of experience and 
cognition. As Laub explains, trauma “precludes its registration; the observing and 
recording mechanisms of the human mind are temporarily knocked out, malfunction” 
(1992, 57). Trauma splits or dissociates the psyche, disrupting conscious awareness at the 
time the event unfolds. Van der Kolk and Rita Fisler define dissociation as the 
“compartmentalization of experience: elements of the experience are not integrated into a 
unitary whole, but are stored in memory as isolated fragments consisting of sensory 
perceptions or affective states” (1996, 355). Since the traumatic event defies conscious 
awareness and experiential frameworks, Caruth refers to trauma as an unclaimed 
experience—a phrase which she also uses as the title of her 1996 monograph. 
  Caruth’s work on trauma takes into account a range of resources, from Freudian 
psychoanalysis to the neurobiological insights of Van der Kolk and Van der Hart. In a 
collaborative essay by Van der Kolk and Van der Hart featured in Caruth’s famous edited 
volume, the authors investigate the effects of trauma on the memory system through the 
conceptual developments of Janet. Van der Kolk and Van der Hart posit the memory 
system as “the central organizing apparatus of the mind, which categorizes and integrates 
all aspects of experience and automatically integrates them into ever enlarging and 
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flexible meaning schemes” (1995, 159). The basic function of the memory system is to 
store and categorise “incoming sensations into a matrix for proper integration of 
subsequent internal and external stimuli” (ibid., 169). While most information is 
effortlessly synthesised into consciousness via the process of automatic memory, Van der 
Kolk and Van der Hart use the term narrative memory to refer the process through which 
experiences are converted into language and endowed with meaning (ibid., 160). 
Language makes experience not only meaningful but also accessible by integrating lived 
events into the schemas of one’s life history and autobiography (ibid., 176). The ease in 
which an experience is assimilated into narrative memory is reliant upon how readily it 
fits within preexisting mental schemas (ibid., 160). Where familiar and predictable 
experiences are easily assimilated, novel or unexpected experiences are more difficult to 
integrate (ibid.). At the extreme end of this spectrum lies traumatic experiences, which 
cannot be processed by the memory system and are split off from conscious awareness 
and voluntary retrieval (ibid.).  
Unlike narrative memories, “traumatic memories” are not memories in the 
ordinary sense of the term. Rather, traumatic memories are unassimilated etchings of the 
traumatic event that are spilt off from consciousness and are unable to be endowed with 
narrative meaning. Residing outside of representation in a dissociated state of 
consciousness, traumatic memories are unprocessed, unsymbolised fragments of the 
traumatic event that have not been integrated into the memory system. Caruth describes 
traumatic memories as literal etchings of the traumatic event: they are literal inscriptions 
of the traumatic event that have not been processed by consciousness or converted into 
narrative. Van der Kolk and Van der Hart portray traumatic memories as “unassimilated 
scarps of overwhelming experiences, which need to be integrated with existing mental 
schemes, and be transformed into narrative language” (ibid., 176).  
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Van der Kolk and Van der Hart further explain that when a traumatic event is 
dissociated, “fragments of these unintegrated experiences may later manifest as 
recollections or behavioural re-enactments” (ibid.). Unavailable to voluntary retrieval, 
traumatic memories manifest belatedly through flashbacks, nightmares, and other 
repetitive symptoms.15 Since “the crucial factor that determines the repetition of trauma is 
the presence of mute, un-symbolized and unintegrated experiences” (ibid., 167), the task 
of translating traumatic memories into narrative is conceived as a way of overcoming 
traumatic symptoms. Until a person can convert their experience of trauma into language, 
adverse traumatic symptoms are “passively endured [… and] relived repeatedly” (ibid.); it 
is only after trauma is placed in language and converted into narrative memory that 
“inferences and suppositions about the meaning of an event be made” (ibid., 170) and the 
intrusive clutches of trauma can be overcome. 
However, significant obstacles stand in the way of converting traumatic memories 
into narrative memories: drawing these memories into consciousness and converting them 
into language can neutralise and distort the precision of these memories. As Kali Tal 
explains, “[a]ccurate representation of trauma can never be achieved […] since, by its 
very definition, trauma lies outside of the bounds of ‘normal’ conception” (1996, 15). 
Laub further highlights the difficulties of endowing traumatic memories with narrative 
meaning:  
The traumatic event, although real, took place outside the parameters of “normal” reality, such 
as causality, sequence, place and time. The trauma is thus an event that has no beginning, no 
ending, no before, no during and no after. This absence of categories that define it lends it a 
quality of “otherness,” a salience, a timelessness and a ubiquity that puts it outside the range of 
associatively linked experiences, outside the range of comprehension of recounting, of mastery. 
                                                 
15 Repetition compulsion will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Five and Chapter Six of this thesis. 
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Trauma survivors live not with memories of the past, but with an event that could not and did 
not proceed through to its completion, has no ending, attainted no closure, and therefore, as far 
as survivors are concerned, continues into the present and is current in every respect. The 
survivor, indeed, is not truly in touch either with the core of his [sic] traumatic reality or with 
the fatedness of its reenactments, and thereby remains entrapped in both (1992, 69).   
Trauma is other to cognitive and experiential categories, unassimilable to conscious 
awareness and voluntary retrieval. The inability to know or to express trauma to oneself 
or others gives rise to the characterisation of trauma as fundamentally enigmatic and 
transcendent. Laub and Nanette C. Auerhahn suggest that the “radical break between 
trauma and culture” is such that “victims often cannot find categories of thought or words 
to express their experience” (1993, 288). Trauma defies the ability to be integrated into 
narrative frameworks and loses its fundamental character when it is “transformed into a 
story, placed in time, with a beginning, a middle and an end” (Van der Kolk and Van der 
Hart 1995, 177).  
Given the issues that arise in attempting to narrate that which characteristically 
defies narration, Caruth highlights a crucial dilemma: 
trauma […] requires integration, both for the sake of testimony and for the sake of cure. But on 
the other hand, the transformation of the trauma into a narrative memory that allows the story 
to be verbalized and communicated, to be integrated into one’s own, and other’s knowledge of 
the past, may lose both the precision and the force that characterizes traumatic recall (1995, 
153).  
How can trauma be assigned a place in narrative when trauma, by its very definition, 
exceeds that which can be narrated? It is often seen as sacrilegious (in a nontheological 
sense) to superimpose narrative form onto the formless traumatic event (ibid., 154). This 
attitude is affirmed in the accounts of numerous survivors of trauma who are faced with 
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both the necessity and impossibility of translating their experiences of trauma into words. 
Holocaust survivor, Sonia Weitz, duly expresses this sentiment in a poignant passage: 
People have said that only survivors themselves understand what happened. I’ll go a step 
further. We don’t … I know I don’t … 
So there is a dilemma. What do we do? Do we not talk about it? Elie Wiesel has said 
many times that silence is the only proper response but then most of us, including him, feel that 
not to speak is impossible. To speak is impossible, and not to speak is impossible (cited in 
ibid.). 
In Holocaust Testimonies: The Ruins of Memory, Lawrence L. Langer observes that many 
survivors of trauma are “both willing and reluctant to proceed with [… narrative] 
chronology; they frequently hesitate because they know that their most complicated 
recollections are unrelated to time” (1991, 174). Converting the unassimilable fragments 
of trauma into narrative “seems to many survivors to imply the giving-up of an important 
reality, or the dilution of a special truth into the reassuring terms of therapy” (Caruth 
1995, vii). Caruth subsequently maintains that “the possibility of integrating the lost event 
into associative memories, as part of the cure, [… can be] seen precisely as a way to 
permit the event to be forgotten” (ibid., vii). She warns that “the capacity to remember is 
also the capacity to elide or distort” (ibid., 154). While assigning narrative coherence to 
trauma is urgently required for the cessation of suffering, this process imposes form onto 
chaos, sense onto nonsense, and is complicit in forgetting the unassimilable character of 
trauma. For “beyond the loss of precision there is another, more profound disappearance: 
the loss, precisely, of the event’s essential incomprehensibility, the force of its affront to 
understanding” (ibid.). 
 Nevertheless, trauma theorists such as Caruth argue that the impossibility of 
representing trauma “does not necessarily mean the denial of a transmissible truth” 
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(ibid.). Since the truth of trauma lies in the incomprehensibility of its occurrence, a central 
concern for trauma theorists is to openly encounter trauma rather than encapsulate it in 
narrative or theory. There is a complex relation between trauma and trauma theory: 
although trauma forms the basis of inquiry for trauma theorists, trauma is a phenomenon 
that characteristically disrupts the possibility of its theorisation. Hence, what is at stake in 
trauma theory is to bear witness to the shattering impact of trauma without concealing the 
truth of the event’s essential incomprehensibility. Trauma theory is not as much 
concerned with providing a stable and coherent theory of trauma as it is with bringing to 
light, and of bearing witness to, the unsettling impact of trauma.  
To encounter trauma is to encounter the impossible: “trauma opens up and 
challenges us to a new kind of listening, the witnessing, precisely, of impossibility” (ibid., 
10, emphasis in original). What is important is “to be able to listen to the impossible […] 
to have been chosen by it, before the possibility of mastering it with knowledge” (ibid. 
10, emphasis in original). Caruth suggests that trauma theory should both speak but, more 
importantly, listen “from the site of trauma” itself (ibid., 11, emphasis in original). She 
calls on the interdisciplinary space of trauma theory to respond to the disruption 
indicative of trauma and to pay close attention to the “the new ignorance that trauma 
introduces among us” (ibid.). In this way, trauma theory provides an ethical framework 
for listening to the suffering of others. Caruth argues that the wounding impact of trauma 
provides a link not only between disparate disciplines, but also between different cultures 
(ibid.). However, Caruth’s unwillingness to pursue this link between different cultures, as 
well as her perceived overemphasis on the shattering impact of trauma, has led trauma 
theory into its own state of crisis. 
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Trauma Theory in Crisis 
The tendency of trauma theorists to underplay the contextual situatedness of trauma has 
given rise to serious backlash. The fact that trauma theorists tend not to engage with the 
historical specificities of trauma and instead focus on its disruptive impact has put trauma 
theory in a state of crisis. John Mowitt argues that classical trauma theory is subject to its 
own trauma “[t]o the extent that trauma has, though its study, come to designate an 
expressive limit—an unspeakable event […] while exhibiting a reticence about its own 
history” (2000, 273). Wulf Kansteiner has criticised trauma theory on more than one 
occasion, denouncing it as nothing more than an “interdisciplinary research trajectory that 
has gone astray” (2004, 195). He argues that the lack of historical precision exhibited by 
trauma theorists has resulted in a homogenising concept of trauma (ibid.). Indeed, trauma 
theory’s emphasis on the shattering impact of trauma is seen as erasing the specificity of 
concrete traumatic occurrences.  
 As well as being criticised for disregarding the contextual frameworks in which 
trauma occurs, trauma theorists are accused of taking for granted their own privileged 
subject positions in theorising trauma. Caruth and her colleagues are charged with 
ignoring the structural (for example, historical, socio-cultural) frameworks that determine 
what kinds of events are deemed traumatic, as well as disregarding their own complicity 
in systems that enable the traumatisation of non-Western and marginalised others in the 
first place (Craps 2013, 2014; Eaglestone 2014; Radstone 2007; Rothberg 2014a, 2014b). 
In this way, trauma theory “risks assisting in the perpetuation of the very beliefs, 
practices, and structures that maintain existing injustices and equalities” (Craps 2013, 2).  
Although trauma theory claims to open an ethical space dedicated to listening to 
the suffering of others, trauma theorists are criticised for silencing the types of suffering 
that do not fit within its limited frame. Indeed, trauma theorists disregard the wealth of 
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literature on trauma and memory written by minority writers and those who lie outside of 
the West. Craps points out that the founding texts in trauma theory “(including Caruth’s 
own work) largely fail to live up to [… their] promise of cross-cultural engagement” 
(2013, 2). He argues that trauma theory “reflects a Eurocentric, monocultural orientation” 
that excludes and marginalises traumas that occur disproportionately in the lives of people 
from non-Western and minority groups (2014, 24). Tal similarly observes that trauma 
theorists such as Caruth make “reference only to Euro-American thinkers and scholars, 
and reinscribe […] Western colonialism upon the body of the alien Other” (1996, n.p.). In 
a similar vein, Radstone draws attention to the fact that 
it is the suffering of those, categorized in the West as ‘other,’ that tend not to be addressed via 
trauma theory—which becomes in this regard, a theory that supports politicized constructions 
of those with whom identification via traumatic sufferings can be forged and those from whom 
such identifications are withheld (2007, 25, emphasis in original).  
Consequently, Craps asserts that to move beyond its Eurocentric bias, trauma theory 
“requires a commitment not only to broadening [… its] usual focus […] but also to 
acknowledging the traumas of non-Western or minority populations for their own sake” 
(2013, 19).  
Another key criticism of trauma theory is targeted at the underlying assumption 
that a concept developed in the West can be seamlessly transposed into other contexts. 
Van der Kolk, Lars Weisaeth, and Van der Hart, for instance, remark that “people have 
always known that exposure to overwhelming terror can lead to troubling memories, 
arousal, and avoidance” (2012, 47). However, some find the assumption that extreme 
events affect all people in the same way untenable. In Cultural Trauma and Collective 
Identity, Jeffrey C. Alexander and his colleagues argue that when trauma theorists insist 
that trauma is a timeless and universal phenomenon, they inevitably commit a 
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“naturalistic fallacy” (2004, 8). In accordance with the cultural constructivist perspective 
upheld throughout the volume, Alexander argues that trauma “cannot be seen as [an] 
automatic, or natural, response […] to the actual nature of an event itself” (ibid., 9). In the 
same edited volume, Smelser remarks that “trauma is not a thing in itself but becomes a 
thing by virtue of the context in which it is implanted” (2004, 34). He maintains that “the 
status of trauma as trauma is dependent on the sociocultural context of the affected 
society at the time the historical event or situation arises” (ibid., 36). Meanwhile, in his 
timely study, The Harmony of Illusions: Inventing Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(1995), Allan Young argues that 
[f]rom the nineteenth century on, it has been observed that people do not respond uniformly 
when exposed to the same potentially traumatizing event […]. Encounters with death and 
injury affect different people in different ways, also […] different people can have profoundly 
different conceptions of what constitutes a realistic “threat” (1995, 284, emphasis in original). 
Far from being a timeless and universal entity, trauma “is glued together by the practices, 
technologies, and narratives with which it is diagnosed, studied, treated, and represented 
by the various interests, institutions, and moral arguments that mobilized these efforts” 
(ibid., 5).16 This was established in the first section of this chapter, where it was revealed 
that the rise and fall of the trauma concept has been closely tied to the socio-cultural 
frameworks that have legitimised trauma as a discrete line of inquiry.  
                                                 
16 While Young insists that trauma is not a natural, timeless, or universal phenomenon, he does not wish to 
deny the lived experience of trauma but, rather, “to explain how it [… has] been made real, to described the 
mechanisms through which these phenomena penetrate people’s lives, worlds, acquire facticity and shape 
the self-knowledge of patients, clinicians, and researchers” (1995, 6, emphasis in original). Despite the 
differing contexts that determine what kind of instances can be considered traumatic, this does not make 
trauma any less ontologically real for the people who experience it. Although trauma is no doubt dependent 
on the socio-cultural contexts in which it resides, “the reality of PTSD is confirmed empirically by its place 
in people’s lives, by their experiences and convictions, and by the personal and collective investments that 
have been made in it” (ibid., 5). 
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From the Extraordinary to the Ordinary 
Much of the criticism levelled against trauma theorists is due to their primary focus on 
events rather than structures. Trauma theorists focus too heavily on the wounding impact 
of trauma at the cost of examining how trauma comes into being and what it is exactly 
that trauma disrupts. Indeed, an event-based model of trauma fails “to account for 
traumatic events occurring in the context of a long-term pattern of oppression or 
persecution based on group identity, including race, gender and class” (Tal 1996, n.p.). 
Craps adds that “by narrowly focusing on the level of the individual psyche, one tends to 
leave unquestioned the conditions that enabled the traumatic abuse, such as political 
oppression, racism, or economic domination” (2013, 28). Rothberg further remarks that 
the focus on trauma as an extraordinary occurrence comes “at the expense of insidious, 
originary, everyday, and slow forms of violence” (2014b, n.p.). 
Critics argue that in positing trauma as an extraordinary event, trauma theorists 
take for granted the norms of experience proper to hegemonic groups. To conceive 
trauma as an event that disrupts ordinary experience—as an event outside its usual 
range—the parameters of “normal” experience are presupposed. This issue is exemplified 
in debates surrounding Category A of PTSD. When the APA included PTSD in the DSM, 
Category A stipulated to clinicians diagnosing individuals with the disorder that “[t]he 
person has experienced an event that is outside of the range of usual human experience” 
(1987, 250, my emphasis). In an insightful feminist critique of the trauma concept, 
featured in Caruth’s foundational edited volume, Brown reveals that the definition of 
PTSD is based on the experiences proper to dominant groups, so that 
[t]he range of human experience becomes the range of what is normal and usual in the lives of 
men of the dominant class; white, young, able-bodied, educated, middle-class, Christian men. 
Trauma is thus what disrupts these particular human lives, but no other. War and genocide, 
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which are the work of men and male-dominated culture, are agreed upon traumata; so are 
natural disasters, vehicle crashes, boats sinking in the freezing ocean. Public events, visible to 
all, rarely themselves harbingers of stigma for their victims, things that can and do happen to 
all men, all of these constitute trauma in the official lexicon (1995, 121). 
Insisting that trauma occurs outside of ordinary experience is problematic because it 
disregards and excludes marginalised and subjugated groups who experience trauma as a 
regular part of their existence. Alexander maintains: 
it has been the non-Western regions of the world, and the most defenceless segments of the 
world’s population, that have recently been subjected to the most terrifying traumatic injuries. 
The victims of Western traumas have disproportionately been members of subaltern and 
marginalised groups (2004, 24).   
This problem is also striking in the context of sexual abuse committed by men against 
women, for such “experiences are not unusual statistically; they are well within the ‘range 
of human experience’” (Brown 1995, 120-1), but give rise to symptoms of trauma 
nonetheless.17 In response to this issue, Brown argues that “private, secret, insidious 
traumas […] are more often than not those events in which the dominant culture and its 
forms and institutions are expressed and perpetuated” (ibid., 102). She suggests that 
dominant groups are invested in concealing the traumatic experiences of marginalised 
groups: 
[t]o admit that these everyday assaults on integrity and personal safety are sources of psychic 
trauma, to acknowledge the absence of safety in the daily lives of women and other non-
                                                 
17 In demonstrating the effects of the exclusionary classification of the first official diagnosis of PTSD, 
Brown draws on anecdotal evidence of a court proceeding, where she was testifying on behalf of a client 
suing her step-father for damages to assist in the costs of treatment for PTSD after he had sexually abused 
her. After Brown had testified that one in three girls are sexually abused by the age of sixteen, the defence 
attorney objected to the diagnosis of PTSD because incidents of sexual abuse and incest are far from 
uncommon: “How, asked this attorney, who represented the perpetrator, could my patient possibly have 
PTSD? After all, wasn’t incest relatively common? […]. Incest wasn’t unusual, wasn’t ‘outside the range of 
human experience.’ How could it be called trauma?” (1995, 120).  
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dominant groups, admits to what is deeply wrong in many sacred social institutions, and 
challenges the benign mask behind which everyday oppression operates (ibid., 105).  
It must be noted that although important work such as Brown’s has resulted in the 
amendment of Category A of the DSM, which no longer states that an event must occur 
outside of the range of human experience for it to be considered traumatic, the status of 
trauma as an unexpected and out of the ordinary event still underpins the trauma theory 
being written today. 
 In opposition to the idea that trauma is an aberrant event situated outside the 
parameters of everyday experience, there have been a number of recent attempts to 
reposition trauma away from the suddenness of its occurrence and back into the realm of 
the ordinary. Brown uses the term insidious trauma to account for the fact that in 
patriarchal societies, “rape trauma is a part of everyday life” (1995, 107). Brown suggests 
that rape trauma is not an anomalous occurrence but is in fact a daily part of existence for 
many people, particularly members of oppressed and disadvantaged groups (ibid.). 
Trauma is not an exception to the norm but, is, rather, constitutive of the norm: it forms 
“a continuing background noise rather than an unusual event” (ibid., 103).18 
 Another notable effort of repositioning trauma back into the realm of the everyday 
can be found in Rothberg’s notion of implicated subjects (2014a, 2014b),19 which is a 
term that he uses to account for privileged Western subjects’ complicity in the 
traumatisation of others, specifically in the context of neo-liberal capitalism. For 
                                                 
18 Brown’s notion of insidious trauma is influenced by what Diana E.H. Russell’s calls secret trauma 
(1986), which denotes the prevalence of incest experienced by women and children at the hands of male 
relatives. What these notions share in common is that they challenge the classification of trauma as an 
exceptional and anomalous event. As Brown and Russell see it, the prevalence of trauma stemming from 
sexual abuse is firmly rooted in patriarchal structures that facilitate the sexual objectification of women, 
leading to men feeling entitled to women’s bodies. 
19 Rothberg’s notion of implicated subjects will be returned to in Chapter Three of this thesis, albeit in a 
different theoretical context. 
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Rothberg, implicated subjects are “beneficiaries of a system that generates dispersed and 
uneven experiences of trauma and wellbeing simultaneously” (2014a, xv). He emphasises 
the importance of reflecting on one’s own subject position in the traumatisation of others, 
with “our seemingly insatiable consumption of clothes and gadgets and our habituation to 
the benefits of globalization” (ibid.). Indeed, Rothberg highlights the necessity of 
identifying “the structures of globalization undergirding [… the] (all too ordinary)” 
(2014a, xv) occurrence of trauma. The widespread complicity in the disproportionate 
occurrence of trauma affirms the necessity of contemporary thinkers of trauma to 
acknowledge the structural frameworks that makes trauma possible at all, as well as 
considering their own subject positions in relation to these traumatising structural 
frameworks. Otherwise, trauma theorists risk “assisting in the perpetuation of the very 
beliefs, practices, and structures that maintain existing injustices and equalities” (Craps 
2013, 2). 
 In response to the shortcomings of trauma theorists, Craps’ Postcolonial 
Witnessing: Trauma Out of Bounds (2013) “elaborate[s] a supplementary model of 
trauma which—unlike the traditional individual and event-based model—can account for 
and respond to collective, ongoing, everyday forms of traumatizing violence” (4). Craps 
acknowledges “the impact of everyday racism, sexism, homophobia, classism, ableism, 
and other forms of structural oppression” (ibid., 25-6) and delves into instances of racism 
as a source of everyday trauma (ibid., 26). While overt forms of racism such as violent 
attacks are considered traumatic under the event-based model of trauma, “more covert, 
subtle, ambiguous, and complex racist incidents operating at institutional and cultural 
levels” (ibid.) do not fit within this mould. According to Craps, racism in Western 
countries  
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typically takes the form of daily micro-aggressions such as being denied promotions, home 
mortgages, or business loans; being a target of a security guard; being stopped in traffic; or 
seeing one’s group portrayed in a stereotypical manner in the media […]. One such incident 
alone may not be traumatizing, but traumatization can result insidiously from cumulative 
micro-aggressions: each one is too small to be a traumatic stressor, but together they can build 
to create an intense traumatic impact (ibid.). 
In a similar vein, Greg Forter distinguishes between two types of trauma, which he 
refers to as punctual and non-punctual (2007, 259). Thinkers such as Caruth are 
concerned with what Forter terms punctual traumas, which are “read as shocks that 
disable the psychic system”—that is, “psychic concussion[s] that short-circuit [… the 
traumatised individual’s] capacity to ‘process’ the traumatizing event as it took place” 
(ibid., 260). Whilst acknowledging the important developments of trauma theorists 
surrounding the event-based model of trauma, Forter maintains that non-punctual traumas 
are not accounted for under the rubric of Caruth and her colleagues. Non-punctual 
traumas include “the trauma induced by patriarchal identity formation rather, say, than the 
trauma of rape, the violence not of lynching but of everyday racism” (ibid., 260). While 
punctual traumas may indeed be characterised as sudden, unexpected shocks, non-
punctual traumas are “so chronic and cumulative, so woven into the fabric of our 
societies, that they cannot count as ‘shocks’ in the way that Nazi persecution and 
genocide do in the accounts of Caruth and others” (ibid.).  
Between the Ordinary and the Extraordinary 
I agree that it is important to move beyond the event-based model of trauma to consider 
insidious forms of trauma that are consistent with the norm. I argue, however, that trauma 
implicates both the punctual and the non-punctual, the extraordinary and the ordinary, and 
that these extremes need not be read as being mutually exclusive. While it is problematic 
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to assume that trauma can only be an extraordinary event, it is also erroneous to assume 
that trauma need only occur on the level of the ordinary, with one of these types of trauma 
precluding the other. Instead of throwing the baby out with the bathwater (so to speak), 
the latter form of trauma should be used to enrich the former notion of trauma. I propose 
that a more productive approach than upholding a false dichotomy between the 
extraordinary and the ordinary is to explore the tension between these terms as a 
constructive space for theorising trauma.  
 Rothberg draws attention to the means through which trauma spills across the 
ordinary and the extraordinary in his discussion of the factory fires in South Asia in 2012 
(2014a, xiv). Hundreds of people making garments for companies such as H&M and Wal-
Mart were killed in these fires, with many others who managed to survive—as well as the 
relatives of those who lost family members—traumatised. While the notion of trauma as 
an extraordinary occurrence may very well apply to the people who experienced the fires, 
this notion of trauma comes into conflict with the structural frameworks that facilitate 
traumas such as these. Indeed, this devastating instance is only one amongst many other 
traumatic events resulting from the exploitation of workers for neo-liberal capital gain. 
Rothberg thus reveals the competing claims that trauma has on the extraordinary and the 
ordinary: 
We have a sudden event of extreme violence that could very well have traumatized survivors 
of the fires and families and loved ones of the workers who perished […]. But, in addition, that 
event takes place on the site of—and thoroughly embedded within—a system of violence that 
is neither sudden nor accidental: exploitation in the age of globalized neo-liberal capitalism 
(ibid.) 
Accounting for the overwhelming and disruptive impact of trauma, whilst at the same 
time acknowledging the structural frameworks that enable trauma to happen at all, 
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Rothberg’s example highlights the inability to situate trauma on either side of the ordinary 
or the extraordinary alone.  
A dominant theme in contemporary debates on trauma has been to uphold the 
opposing viewpoints that trauma is either an extraordinary or ordinary event. However, 
such debates insist on a false dichotomy between the extraordinary and the ordinary, with 
one of these extremes automatically foreclosing the possibility of the other. This, in turn, 
has led to a conceptual impasse in trauma theory. Rather than dismissing the view that 
trauma is a shocking and extraordinary event in favour of a notion of trauma as immanent 
and everyday, I stress the importance of accounting for both extremes. While traumatic 
events may well be facilitated by structural frameworks such as patriarchy, white-
supremacy, and neo-liberal capitalism, it is—as Rothberg points out—difficult “to 
imagine trauma as not involving dislocation of subjects, histories, and cultures” (ibid., 
xii). Trauma may very well be the direct result of oppressive structural frameworks; 
however, the notion of trauma—as per its etymology—denotes a wound to these 
frameworks. Instead of adopting an “either/or” approach to the problem of trauma, this 
chapter suggests that the rupturing impact of trauma confuses the distinction between the 
ordinary and the extraordinary, thus implicating both extremes. Indeed, the aim of this 
chapter has been to reveal, rather than to reconcile, the tension between these oppositions. 
This tension will serve as a productive space for conceptualising trauma across this thesis.  
In Chapter Two, I will explore a similar set of tensions which arise in the space of 
Holocaust studies between the characterisation of the Holocaust as either unique or 
ordinary and, by extension, either exceptional or exemplary. While characterisations of 
the Holocaust tend towards either of these extremes, with one being upheld at the expense 
of the other, these terms are by no means mutually exclusive. In order to move past the 
current impasse in trauma theory it is necessary to account for both the extraordinary and 
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the ordinary facets of trauma. As this thesis continues, these false dichotomies will be 
revealed as traversing vast interdisciplinary and conceptual spaces in view of radically 
calling their mutual exclusivity into question.   
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Chapter Two – Trauma and the Holocaust: From Exceptional to Exemplary 
Having traumatised a vast number of individuals, the Holocaust was also the occasion of a 
collective historical trauma. Hence, while coming to terms with its reality and ramifications 
was initially delayed, it can now be said to have projected its impact both forward and 
backward in time, an explosion of destructive energy at the heart of Western Civilization that 
compels us to rethink our assumptions about the nature of humanity and culture, history and 
progress, politics and morality (Omer Bartov 2000, 165, emphasis in original).  
What is now known as “the Holocaust” designates a series of events encompassing the 
systematic, industrialised murder of approximately six million European Jews by Nazi 
Germany during the Second World War (Levi and Rothberg 2003, 3). Although these 
genocidal20 events took place during World War II, the Holocaust was not actually part of 
the war (ibid.). Sanctioned through Adolf Hitler’s “Final Solution”—a plan to annihilate 
the entire Jewish population of Europe—the Holocaust is “the product of an extremist, 
antisemitic worldview that attempted to actualize a ‘utopian’ vision of racial purity, even 
at the expense of the war effort” (ibid.). In accordance with the Final Solution, the chief 
victims of the Holocaust were Jews; however, they were not the only victims of the 
Holocaust. Poles, Roma, physically and mentally disabled people, political prisoners, and 
people with non-heterosexual orientations were amongst the other victims of the Nazis. 
Just as not all the victims of the Holocaust were Jews, the Holocaust is not the only 
instance of genocide to have occurred within the twentieth century.21 Despite this, the 
Holocaust has become the most frequently mentioned trauma in recent history and has 
                                                 
20 The term genocide consists of the prefix, geno-, deriving from the Latin gens, meaning a race of people, 
and the suffix -cide, meaning killing (Beech 2009, 207). However, the term is more recently understood as 
exceeding the etymological roots of its suffix and of encompassing the destruction of any particular group 
of people. Peter Hayes and John K. Roth offer a useful definition of genocide “as the intended destruction, 
in whole or in part, of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group” (2010, 2).  
21 Other genocides to have occurred in the twentieth century include the Armenian Genocide, the Bosnian 
Genocide, and the Rwandan genocide against the Tutsis—to name only a few. 
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received a tremendous amount of attention across vast multi- and interdisciplinary spaces. 
Such spaces include Holocaust studies and trauma theory, the latter of which takes the 
Holocaust as a paradigmatic traumatic event.  
 Where the first chapter of this thesis focused on the rise and fall of interest in 
trauma to have occurred across the late nineteenth century and the twentieth century—
including the treatment and study of patients with hysteria and traumatised war 
veterans—this chapter will examine the phenomenon of trauma with specific reference to 
the Holocaust. As well as receiving critical focus through engagements with war veterans 
exhibiting symptoms of so-called shell shock, a focus on trauma arose from work with 
Holocaust survivors (Leys 2000, 5). Amongst the series of events informing the 
development of the trauma concept, the Holocaust is arguably the most significant. The 
study of trauma gained enormous momentum through theoretical and therapeutic 
engagements with survivors of the Holocaust, with such engagements heavily influencing 
the conceptualisation of trauma. The Holocaust—as Kate Douglas, Gillian Whitlock, and 
Bettina Stumm explain—plays a crucial role “in shaping the precepts, concepts, and 
language of trauma studies [… and] is necessarily embedded, and germinal even in 
studies where it is not ostensibly the point of reference” (2008, 7).22 Thus, an examination 
of the theoretical insights derived from the Holocaust is a crucial step in conceptualising 
trauma, with the events of the Holocaust and the category of trauma being inextricably 
bound. 
                                                 
22 Susannah Radstone similarly points out the significance of the Holocaust in the theorisation of trauma, 
defining trauma theory as “work around the experience of survivors of the Holocaust and other catastrophic 
personal and collective experiences and the theoretical and methodological innovations that might be 
derived from this work and applied more generally” (2007, 10). Meanwhile, Craps asserts that “trauma 
theory is a field of cultural scholarship developed out of an engagement with Holocaust testimony, 
literature, and history” (2013, 9). 
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Trauma theorists have, more recently, been subject to a number of criticisms 
regarding their primary engagement with the Holocaust in conceptualising trauma. The 
concept of trauma developed by trauma theorists is criticised for exhibiting a Eurocentric 
bias towards the traumas of the Holocaust, which comes at the expense of focusing on 
other traumas to have occurred outside of the West (Craps 2013, 2014; Kal 1996; 
Traverso and Broderick 2010). What is more, in developing a concept of trauma based on 
the traumas of the Holocaust, trauma theorists are criticised for assuming this concept can 
be seamlessly transferred into other contexts. It is argued that constructing a general 
theory of trauma based on the historically specific events of the Holocaust is limited in its 
applicability to other historical events. Although critics have challenged the Eurocentric 
underpinnings of the trauma concept, they are yet to examine the tension that occurs when 
drawing on the exceptional historical events of the Holocaust as an exemplar for trauma. 
In this chapter, I illuminate this hitherto unidentified tension and move beyond the mutual 
exclusivity between these seemingly opposing terms.  
Building on Chapter One of this thesis, the function of Chapter Two is to 
contextualise trauma through the traumas of the Holocaust and to further conceptualise 
trauma by examining key insights in Holocaust studies. The first chapter of this thesis 
identified a tension that arises in attempting to situate trauma on either side of the 
ordinary or the extraordinary. In Chapter Two, I reveal a correlative tension in the context 
of the Holocaust. This tension exists between the characterisation of the Holocaust as an 
unprecedented rupture in Western culture versus the characterisation of the Holocaust as 
an ordinary event that is firmly rooted in the contexts (for example, Nazi Germany, 
Western modernity) within which the events took place. On the one hand, the Holocaust 
is presented as a unique and exceptional event, marking an unbridgeable rupture between 
the event and its intelligibility in language and thought. On the other hand, the Holocaust 
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is conceived as an event that is consistent with the contexts within which the atrocities 
occurred. As Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg explain:  
the issue of the singularity of the Holocaust is embedded in a series of binary oppositions […] 
the uniqueness of the Shoah is counterposed to its historicization, the one excluding the other. 
Similarly, the singularity of the Holocaust is counterposed to its universality—and once again, 
the one excludes the other (2003, 444).  
This chapter proposes that debates surrounding the uniqueness versus the comparability 
of the Holocaust sheds new light on the tension between the ordinary and the 
extraordinary facets of trauma. In both instances, there is an unwillingness to step outside 
of a series of false dichotomies to consider the extent to which these seemingly 
oppositional claims might actually be compatible. 
 This chapter unfolds over five sections. The first section considers the naming of 
the Holocaust to both clarify the terminology that I will be using throughout the thesis 
when referring to the Holocaust and to highlight the difficulty of rendering a singular 
historical event intelligible in language. The second section goes on to examine the role of 
the Holocaust in the trauma theory of Felman and Laub. Following this, the next section 
considers the characterisation of the Holocaust as a unique occurrence in Holocaust 
discourse, while the fourth section of this chapter examines key criticisms of Holocaust 
uniqueness theses. Such criticisms draw attention to the dehistoricising connotations of 
positing the Holocaust as an exceptional historical event. Finally, the concluding section 
of this chapter interjects in arguments that insist on maintaining the polemic between the 
unique versus the comparable status of the Holocaust and, more importantly, addresses 
the question of how the exceptional events of the Holocaust can be used as an exemplar 
for trauma. 
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Naming the Events 
The different names of the events […] all with their different histories and deeply rooted 
frameworks are themselves signs of coming to terms with the events in different ways 
(Eaglestone 2004, 2n4).  
Ongoing debates surrounding the genocide of the European Jewry by Nazi Germany 
reveal that the process of naming events is far from an innocuous task. As was seen in 
Chapter One, rendering traumatic events intelligible in language is a particularly fraught 
process insofar as the shattering impact of trauma ruptures the frameworks in which the 
intelligibility of trauma depends. In an essay featured in a famous collection edited by 
Saul Friedlander, Probing the Limits of Representation: Nazism and the “Final Solution” 
(1992), Peter Haidu draws attention to the extreme difficulties of situating singular 
historical entities in the generalising frame of language. One of the problems with this 
process is that something irrevocably gets left behind and the uniqueness of the event is 
jeopardised. Language is laden with “narratological, theological, historical, political, 
rhetorical, and philosophical” (Haidu 1992, 279) baggage. The difficulties of naming the 
events of the Holocaust—or any other event for that matter—is that “[t]he language used 
to construct contemporary experiences is always already inscribed with past experiences, 
and cannot help but introduce elements of meaning that are of questionable relevance to 
the topic at hand” (ibid.). This makes it difficult—if not impossible—to truly account for 
the singularity of the events’ occurrence. Worse still, the linguistic baggage of past events 
may serve to functionalise, trivialise, or sacralise the atrocities of the Holocaust.  
“Holocaust” has become the most frequently used term to refer to the genocide of 
the European Jews. The use of the term “Holocaust” to describe the Jewish genocide is 
relatively recent and did not enter into common lexicon until around the 1960s (Rothberg 
2000, 280). Agamben explains that it was Elie Wiesel who coined “Holocaust” to 
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designate the Jewish genocide, but explains that Wiesel came to regret the use of the term 
“and wanted to take it back” (2002, 28). Etymologically, “holocaust” derives from the 
Greek holokaustos, translated from the Old Testament in the third century BC, signifying 
a burnt sacrifice offered to divinity (Petrie 2000, 31). Jon Petrie asserts “‘Holocaust’ is a 
name that provides the event with meaning, and the meaning carries deep religious 
connotations […]. Holocaust means sacrifice, God, purpose” (ibid., 31-2). Objections to 
the use of this term pertains to its biblical origins. When applied to the genocide of the 
European Jews, “Holocaust” configures the event as an act of divinity, in which humanity 
was complicit (Mandel 2001, 206-7). The term “Holocaust” is spurned due to its 
sacralisation and functionalisation of the events. Haidu argues that 
Holocaust represents not only disaster and catastrophe, but functionalizes [… the events] as a 
burnt offering, a sacrifice willingly offered to divinity, a divinity apparently hungry and thirsty 
for the blood of innocents, a sacrifice which, properly enacted, might allow the victims the 
possibility of an eventual redemption (1992, 279, emphasis in original). 
Agamben also rejects “Holocaust” for implying “an unacceptable equation between 
crematoria and altars” (2002, 31). A term such as this “arises from this unconscious 
demand to justify a death that is sine causa—to give meaning back to what seemed 
incomprehensible” (ibid., 28). When conceived as a “burnt offering” or “divine 
catastrophe” whose victims are perceived as “martyrs,” the events are sacralised and 
functionalised. Bruno Bettelheim retorts that “[t]o call these most wretched victims of a 
murderous delusion, of destructive drives run rampant, martyrs of a burnt offering is a 
distortion invented for our comfort, small as it may be” (cited in Mandel 2001, 206). 
Indeed, Agamben agrees that “[w]hat happened in the camps has little to do with 
martyrdom” (2002, 26). 
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 An alternative name for the genocide of the Jews of Europe is “Shoah,” which is a 
Hebrew term denoting a catastrophe specific to Jewish people. While this term also has 
biblical connotations—“Shoah” means “disaster sent from God” (Haidu 1992, 279)—the 
use of the Hebrew term is intended as a safeguard against appropriation to the extent that 
it preserves the Jewish specificity of the genocide. However, “Shoah” is also problematic, 
as it was not only Jewish people who were murdered, but also Romanian people, mentally 
and physically disabled people, people with non-heterosexual orientations, and many 
others.23 Moreover, the term “Shoah” draws the events into biblical discourse, which may 
result in their sacralisation and functionalisation.  
 To avoid the problems with the biblical terms “Holocaust” and “Shoah,” scholars 
turn to the proper name “Auschwitz” in naming the events. “Auschwitz” is the 
Germanised name for the Polish town of Oświęcim, which Nazi Germany occupied 
during the Second World War, and where they built the notorious concentration and 
extermination camps which are referred to by the same name (Rothberg 2000, 28).24 
“Auschwitz” assumes synecdochic and metonymic meaning: the place-name refers to 
both the events proximate to the site of Auschwitz and to the totality of events (namely, 
the Nazi genocide) of which Auschwitz is one part (ibid., 28).25 Rothberg explains that 
                                                 
23 Avishai Margalit and Gabriel Motzkin explain that  
[t]he Jews were not the Nazis’ only victims. The Nazis had plans for other peoples, and 
began to apply their program to the Poles by liquidating the Polish elites. Gypsies [sic] and 
homosexuals also figured high on their list. And the whole process was given a trial run in 
the partial extermination of the mentally retarded [sic]. Nonetheless, it has been the 
extermination of the Jews that has caught the postwar collective imagination, and not these 
other exterminations. The Nazis, as evidenced in their ideology, reserved a special place 
for the Jews (1996, 79). 
24 Rothberg observes that the use of the Germanised name of Oświęcim, Auschwitz, comes from the 
language of the occupying power and reveals colonial violence (2000, 28). 
25 Rothberg traces the use of the proper name Auschwitz to Theodor Adorno’s famous pronouncement: “to 
write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric” (cited in Rothberg 2000, 25). Nonetheless, it is unlikely that Adorno 
had the same object in mind as what is now known as the Holocaust— “[m]ore likely, he was referring to the 
totality of Nazi barbarism, and not necessarily its specifically Jewish component” (ibid., 280). Although 
Auschwitz is today perhaps the most well-known concentration camp in Western consciousness, when 
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“Auschwitz” “is intended to refer not so much to a place as to an event or events […]. We 
know today that the event to which it refers is the slaughter by Nazi Germany of more 
than one million people (of whom 90 percent were Jewish) during the course of four years 
(1940-1944)” (ibid.). But the term “Auschwitz” is not without its own problems. Mandel 
argues that “Auschwitz offers a reductive account of the events in invoking this particular 
concentration camp to stand in for and generalize a much broader reaching and complex 
historical occurrence” (2006, 34). She maintains that “by giving the horror a specific 
location and a name, the horror is localized, abstracted, and isolated, as if the Holocaust is 
what occurred at the camps” (ibid.).  
 Despite the problems associated with the terms “Holocaust,” “Shoah,” and 
“Auschwitz,” these terms have taken on new meaning; they have departed on new 
trajectories that separate them from their etymological roots. Indeed, LaCapra asserts that 
rejecting a term based on solely on its etymology “ignores the way usage over time may 
deplete or even wash away etymological sediment in the meaning of a term” (2007, 141). 
Those who draw on the most well-known term to describe the Jewish genocide—namely, 
“Holocaust”—may do so because of its “currency in their society and culture, not because 
of any investment in a certain idea of sacrifice” (ibid.). What is more, LaCapra suggests 
that “the banalized use of the term Holocaust may be beneficial in eroding any sacrificial 
connotation” (ibid., emphasis in original). Acknowledging that “no term is 
unproblematic,” LaCapra suggests that 
[t]he best (or “good enough”) strategy may be both to recognise that there are no pure or 
innocent terms (however “purified” by critical analysis) and to avoid fixation on one term as 
innocent or another as taboo. Instead […] one might employ a multiplicity of terms (Holocaust, 
                                                 
Adorno spoke of Auschwitz in 1949, the American and European public were more familiar with the camps 
liberated by the allied forces, such as Buchenwald, Dachau, and Belsen (ibid., 28).  
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Auschwitz, Shoah, Nazi genocide, and so forth) in a flexible manner that resists fixation while 
acknowledging the problem of naming (ibid., 142). 
Although the terms “Holocaust,” “Shoah,” and “Auschwitz” are not without problems, I 
am required to use at least one name to refer to the events in question. Following 
LaCapra’s proposition, this thesis makes use of the aforementioned terms 
interchangeably. 
Trauma and the Holocaust 
Felman and Laub’s Testimony (1992) consists of a series of reflections on the devastating 
impact of the Holocaust, which have since come to form the backbone of trauma theory. 
Felman and Laub’s collaborative work has become a foundational text in trauma theory 
and is a book built on a primary engagement with the devastating impact of the 
Holocaust. Blurring the distinction between the individual and the collective, Felman and 
Laub read the Shoah as not only traumatic for those who were directly involved in the 
events, but also traumatic on a collective socio-cultural level. The Holocaust is perceived 
as a traumatic rupture in the frameworks necessary for making sense of the occurrence, 
whether they be individual psychological frameworks or broader collective frameworks. 
Indeed, the traumatic impact of Auschwitz has brought about a series of collective crises, 
having shattered the metanarratives heralded by modernity; the key principles of 
Enlightenment thought; as well as radically calling into question the way that the 
discipline of history is carried out and understood. Felman and Laub argue that the events 
of the Holocaust reveal “the ways in which our cultural frames of reference and our 
preexisting categories which delimit and determine our perception of reality have failed, 
essentially, both to contain, and to account for, the scale of what has happened in 
contemporary history” (ibid., xv). 
   
 
64 
 
 
Felman and Laub interpret the traumas of Auschwitz as a “radical historical crisis” 
(ibid. xvii), whereby systems of thought have “failed both to contain, and to account for, 
the scale of what has happened” (ibid., xv). They characterise the Holocaust as an event 
of such extreme magnitudes that it has ruptured contemporary thought, delimiting cultural 
frames of reference and preexisting categories of explanation (ibid.). Contributing to a 
large canon of literature that upholds the exceptionality of the Holocaust, Felman and 
Laub describe the events as “uniquely devastating,” “unprecedented,” and 
“inconceivable” (ibid., xvii). Here, a tension arises between the exceptional and the 
exemplary: while Felman and Laub characterise the Shoah as a “unique,” “exceptional,” 
and “singular” occurrence, their work on the specific events of the Shoah has been used to 
inform a general theory of trauma. This raises the question of how a singular historical 
event can be drawn on as an exemplary instance of trauma. This section will go on to 
extrapolate this tension. 
 In Chapter Three of Testimony, titled “An Event Without a Witness: Truth, 
Testimony and Survival,” Laub formulates the aetiology of trauma as an event without a 
witness, as per the title of his chapter.26 He argues “that what precisely made a Holocaust 
out of the event is the unique way in which, during its historical occurrence, the event 
produced no witnesses” (ibid., 80, emphasis in original). Laub defines the witness as 
someone who perceives the truth of an event on its arrival—a task that requires lucidity, 
unaffectedness, and detachment from that which is taking place (ibid., 81). However, the 
events of Auschwitz were unable to be adequately grasped as they were occurring. Given 
this, these traumas mark an experiential and epistemological rupture—or, a “historical 
gap” in Laub’s idiom (ibid., 84). Since the traumas of the Holocaust annihilated its 
                                                 
26 Felman and Laub’s claim that the Holocaust resulted in a collapse of witnessing is a topic that receives 
special attention in Chapter Four of this thesis. 
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witnesses, “it is only now, belatedly, that the event begins to be historically grasped and 
seen” (ibid., 81, emphasis in original).  
Caruth comments that while Laub’s “remarks define a specific quality of the 
Holocaust in particular which we would not wish to generalize, he touches on something 
nonetheless that seems oddly to inhabit all traumatic experience: the inability to fully 
witness the event as it occurs” (1995, 7). However, Craps points out the irony of Caruth’s 
statement: although she claims that Laub’s work on the Shoah should not be generalised, 
“she goes on to do exactly that” (2013, 9). Indeed, the historical gap brought on by the 
Holocaust is said to illuminate the structure of trauma in general, whereby an event that is 
too overwhelming to be experienced at the time that it occurs can only be apprehended 
belatedly.27  
 Like Laub’s remarks in Testimony, which exceed the scope of Auschwitz and 
touch on the experience of trauma more broadly, the significance of Felman’s reflections 
on the Holocaust go beyond her concern with these historically specific events. Felman 
sees the Holocaust as radically altering the way that history is written and understood—
not only in regards to the writing and understanding of the Holocaust, but to the writing 
and understanding traumatic events in general. Felman characterises the Holocaust as a 
historically impossible event that resulted in the disappearance of its referent at the time 
of its occurrence. She then draws on this insight to problematise the relation between 
other events and their historicisation.  
 In Chapter Four of Testimony, titled “Camus’ The Plague, or a Monument to 
Witnessing,” Felman posits the Shoah as an event that was unable to be witnessed at the 
                                                 
27 The belated reception of the Holocaust exhibits the inherent latency of trauma. Indeed, the Holocaust was 
not a part of public consciousness until decades after the actual events occurred. Hidden behind the more 
general horrors of the Second World War, it was not until around the 1960s that the Holocaust began to be 
collectively recognised (LaCapra 2014, 172). 
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time it occurred, exceeding the referential frameworks necessary for experiencing the 
events. She explains: “[b]ecause our perception of reality is moulded by frames of 
reference, what is outside them, however immanent and otherwise conspicuous, remains 
historically invisible, unreal, and can only be encountered by a systematic disbelief” 
(ibid., 103). In substantiating this assertion, Felman draws attention to the widespread 
disbelief amongst Jewish people regarding the Nazis’ agenda. At the time of the 
Holocaust, the victims were unable to fathom what was happening to them: they “did not 
believe in all the information that was forthcoming about the Nazis’ final aims,” because 
“the whole scheme was beyond human imagination; they thought the Nazis incapable of 
the murder of millions” (ibid.). Felman goes on to argue that “the unreality that strikes 
[…] the event before and during its occurrence [is evidenced] through the victims’ own 
refusal to believe in its historic referentiality” (ibid., 104). Thus, the historical necessity of 
bearing witness could not be met at the time Auschwitz occurred because the excessive 
structure of the event was unable to be contained within the referential frameworks that 
shape reality.  
The Holocaust has brought about a radical rethinking of categories of historical 
interpretation; it not only raises questions pertaining to its own interpretation, but also 
“raises problems about the nature of the discipline of history itself—metahistorical 
problems” (Eaglestone 2004, 137). Felman poses a series of metahistorical questions 
regarding the disruptive impact of the Holocaust on the relation between narrative and 
history. She defines history and narrative in the following terms: “[t]hat ‘something 
happened’ in itself is history; that ‘someone is telling someone else that something 
happened’ is narrative” (ibid., 93). While narrative is a speech act that reports historical 
facts, history is “parallely but conversely, the establishment of the facts of the past 
through their narrativization” (ibid.). History and narrative have mutual claims on each 
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other: narrative is an essential component of history, and history depends on 
narrativisation (ibid.). However, Felman argues that the Shoah brought about a disruption 
between narrative and history. She asserts that “the traditional shuttle movement between 
narrative and history” (ibid., 94-5) has been radically altered by the Holocaust. Felman 
asks how narrative history can bear witness to not only the wounding impact of the 
Holocaust, but also to “the way in which the impact of history as holocaust has modified, 
affected, shifted the very modes of relationship between narrative and history” (ibid., 95, 
emphasis in original).  
 In their separate—yet interconnected—chapters of Testimony, Felman and Laub 
demonstrate the impossibility of witnessing both the Shoah in particular and trauma more 
broadly. Caruth repeats a similar theoretical gesture in her Introduction to Trauma. 
Reconfiguring history through the lens of trauma, Caruth argues that “[f]or history to be a 
history of trauma means that it is referential precisely to the extent that it is not fully 
perceived as it occurs; or to put it somewhat differently, that a history can be grasped only 
in the very inaccessibility of its occurrence” (1995, 8). This is an interesting conceptual 
gesture, for not only is the Holocaust drawn on as an exemplary instance of trauma, 
trauma itself is used to exemplify the even broader functioning of history in a post-
Auschwitz setting. But if the Holocaust is truly an exceptional historical event like 
Felman and Laub claim, in what sense can this event be mobilised to configure not only a 
general theory of trauma, but also a general theory of history as traumatic? While I will 
return to this question both later in this chapter and in the next chapter of this thesis, I will 
now consider some criticisms of trauma theory that highlight the tension between the 
historical situatedness of the Shoah and the broader concept of trauma that is derived 
from these events. 
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Holocaust theorists express doubt that the psychological category of trauma can 
account for the historically specific events of Auschwitz. Kansteiner levels a particularly 
scathing criticism towards the interdisciplinary make-up of trauma theory. Situated at the 
intersection of Holocaust studies and psychoanalysis, Kansteiner argues that trauma 
theory “has neither the rigour and vision nor the precision and social relevance of the two 
independent traditions of […] research which it tried to integrate and bring to bear on 
each other” (2004, 195). Eaglestone is also sceptical towards the ability of the trauma 
concept to account for the historical particularity of the Shoah, warning that the concept 
of trauma may “overcode accounts of the Holocaust” (2004, 33). When applied to the 
Holocaust, Eaglestone perceives the category of trauma as being “already twice 
metaphorical” (ibid.), while Kansteiner argues that “[t]he trauma paradigm might soon 
collapse as a result of its overextension” (2004, 213). Given this, the concept of trauma is 
perceived as being too abstract to account for the historically specific events of 
Auschwitz.  
 Trauma theorists are, moreover, accused of exhibiting a Eurocentric bias towards 
the Shoah; it is assumed that a theory of trauma built from the historically specific events 
of the Shoah can be applied to other non-Western traumas. Tal argues that it is wrong of 
American scholars to consider the Holocaust as an exemplary instance of trauma at the 
expense of traumas that they themselves are implicated in in virtue of being American 
(1996, n.p.). When trauma theorists turn to the Holocaust instead of looking at the 
traumas suffered by African Americans and Native Americans, they “perpetuate the racist 
and Eurocentric structures that were responsible for the traumatization of those 
populations in the first place” (ibid.). Craps similarly argues that trauma theory has 
focused too heavily on Auschwitz as a paradigmatic instance of trauma and, in so doing, 
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marginalises the suffering that occurs outside of the West, or runs the risk of 
appropriating non-Western traumas into a Eurocentric frame (2014, 46).  
 Another important criticism that is specifically targeted at the trauma theories of 
Felman and Caruth is that positing history as traumatic “conflate[s] the traumatic and the 
non-traumatic” (Kansteiner 2004, 194). Caruth’s characterisation of “trauma as history” 
and Felman’s understanding of “history as holocaust” collapse the history of trauma and 
the trauma of history into one another: 
One could easily assert that this definition is as true of history generally, as it is true of a 
history of trauma, since history is a compendium of past, and therefore inaccessible events—
events not fully perceived as they occur—given meaning later in a process of narrative 
construction (Tal 1995, n.p.).  
Indeed, trauma theorists are criticised for generalising the concept of trauma in 
accounting for the phenomenon of history itself. Kansteiner adds that in highlighting “the 
alleged traumatic component in all representations of history,” theorists such as Caruth 
and Felman transform “the experience of trauma into a basic anthropological condition” 
(2004, 204). In this way, trauma theorists are accused of exploiting the events of the 
Holocaust and the concept of trauma that is derived from these events to develop a 
general theory of history (ibid.). Thus, on the one hand, the concept of trauma developed 
from the Holocaust is problematic in its applicability to other (specifically non-Western) 
traumas. Conversely, the notion of trauma developed by trauma theorists is too broad to 
account for the historical situatedness of Auschwitz. What is at stake in the future of 
trauma theory is to account for historically specific events without over-extending the 
concept of trauma. 
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The Uniqueness of the Holocaust 
Having revealed the tension between the exceptionality of the Holocaust and its 
exemplary status in trauma theory, I will now consider dominant claims in Holocaust 
studies regarding the characterisation of Auschwitz as unique and exceptional. While this 
section considers accounts centred on the uniqueness of the Shoah, the next section 
moves on to discuss arguments against Holocaust uniqueness. I suggest that this polemic 
is correlative to that which occurs between the ordinary and the extraordinary in the 
instance of trauma. In both of these contexts, there is an unwillingness to step outside of a 
series of binary oppositions to consider the extent to which these terms might actually be 
compatible.  
 The exceptionality of the Holocaust is a dominant and recurring trope in 
Holocaust and trauma studies alike. Holocaust uniqueness claims separate the Shoah from 
other historical events, positing it as a caesura, rupture, or novum in the continuum of 
history (Milchman and Rosenberg 2003, 446). Milchman and Rosenberg explain that a 
“caesura would be that which, within history, interrupts history and opens up another 
possibility of history, or else closes off all possibility of history” (ibid.). Auschwitz is 
argued to have “closed a door on another world, the world shaped by the imminent dream 
of perpetual peace, and the idea of inevitable and continuous progress, that had been one 
strand of the Enlightenment project” whilst at the same time opening “a door into a world 
in which human-made mass-death can become constitutive of the sociocultural matrix” 
(ibid., 446). 
 Wiesel is the most famous writer to uphold the inability to comprehend the Shoah, 
arguing that it transcends all frameworks for making sense of the occurrence: “the 
Holocaust transcends history […]. The Holocaust? The ultimate event, the ultimate 
mystery, never to be comprehended or transmitted” (cited in Fine 2001, 132). Jewish 
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author and child survivor of the Shoah, Aharon Appelfield, similarly affirms that “the 
inability to express your experience and the feeling of guilt combined together and 
created silence […] its essence will always remain within that sphere which no expression 
can encompass” (cited in Laub and Podell 1995, 993). George Steiner’s famous assertion 
that “[t]he world of Auschwitz lies outside speech as it lies outside of reason” (1967, 146) 
also attests to the inability to grasp the events, as does the writings of K-Zetnik (a.k.a. 
Yehiel Dinoor) who writes that there are no words to express what transpired on “Planet 
Auschwitz.”28 These are just a few examples of those who uphold the exceptionality of 
the Shoah.  
 Arendt was amongst the first writers to describe the Holocaust as an 
incomprehensible and unprecedented occurrence and is thus an important contributor to 
Holocaust uniqueness theses.29 In her earlier essays, written throughout the 1940s and 
1950s, Arendt conceives of the Holocaust as a rupture in understanding and an aberration 
of history.30 What Arendt refers to as totalitarianism, which encompasses the events of the 
                                                 
28 In a poignant passage, the writer known as K-Zetnik describes Auschwitz as follows: 
 
Time there was different from what it is here on earth. Every split second ran on a different 
cycle of time. And the inhabitant of that planet had no names. They had neither parents nor 
children. They did not dress as we dress here. They were not born there nor did anyone 
give birth. Even their breathing was regulated by the laws of another nature. They did not 
live, nor did they die, in accordance with the laws of this world. Their names were 
numbers ‘K-Zetnik so and so’ (cited in Felman 2002, 136). 
29 Arendt does not call the genocide of the European Jews the Shoah, Auschwitz, or the Holocaust—these 
terms were not in circulation at the time she was writing the essays cited in this chapter. Arendt herself 
refers to the events associated with the genocide as totalitarianism. Nonetheless, her arguments readily 
apply to the events discussed in this chapter. 
30 Arendt upholds this position in “Understanding and Politics (the Difficulties in Understanding)” ([1954] 
1994b), “On the Nature of Totalitarianism: An Essay in Understanding” ([1954] 1994a), and “Social 
Science Techniques and the Study of Concentration Camps” ([1950] 1994). However, it is largely agreed 
that Arendt’s earlier insights, which conceive Nazi totalitarianism in terms of its incomprehensibility, 
appear to be at odds with her later thesis concerning the banality of evil. After attending and reporting on 
the trial of Adolf Eichmann, Arendt abandoned her earlier insights regarding the rupturing effects of radical 
evil, in favour of the notion of the banality of evil. While this chapter focuses on Arendt’s earlier work 
centred on the incomprehensibility of the Holocaust, the shift in Arendt’s work from radical to banal will be 
discussed in Chapter Three of the thesis. Rather than reading Arendt’s shift as problematic, I will argue that 
Arendt’s earlier and later works need not be at odds.  
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Shoah, “constitute[s] a break with all our traditions” and has “clearly exploded our 
categories of political thought and our standards for moral judgement” ([1954] 1994b, 
310). In her essay, “Social Science Techniques and the Study of Concentration Camps” 
([1950] 1994), Arendt delineates that which is comprehensible about Nazi totalitarianism 
from that “which explode[s …] whole framework[s] of reference” (234). The difference 
between the comprehensible and the incomprehensible is that where the former pertains 
to “commonly accepted research techniques and scientific concepts” (ibid.), the latter is 
beyond the limits of preexisting categories of explanation. Arendt argues that the 
concentration and extermination camps established by the Nazis have ruptured 
preconceived social and political categories. The concentration and extermination camps 
constitute   
that stumbling-block on the road toward the proper understanding of contemporary politics and 
society which must cause social scientists and historical scholars to reconsider hitherto 
unquestioned fundamental preconceptions regarding the course of the world and human 
behaviour (ibid., 232).  
While aggressive wars, slavery, racism, colonialism, and world rule all have clear motives 
that can be clearly understood through preexisting categories of explanation, what 
happened in the concentration and extermination camps cannot be adequately accounted 
for (ibid., 233-4).  
 Since the events of Auschwitz have ruptured traditional categories of thought, 
Arendt condemns the gross inadequacies that occur when “submerg[ing] what is 
unfamiliar and needs to be understood in a welter of similarities” ([1954] 1994b, 313). 
Attempts to understand the Shoah will remain unsuccessful if one is to—as Friedrich 
Nietzsche writes in his Will to Power—“dissolve the ‘unknown’ into the known” (cited in 
ibid.). An abyss separating past and present trajectories of thought, the Holocaust 
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“demonstrates a horrible originality which no farfetched historical parallels can alleviate” 
(ibid., 309). In her essay, “Understanding and Politics (The Difficulties of 
Understanding)” ([1954] 1994b), Arendt warns against paralleling past traumas with 
current political experiences: 
we think we have inherited the wisdom of the past to guide us through […] but the trouble with 
the wisdom of the past is that it dies, so to speak, in our hands as soon as we try to apply it 
honestly to the central political experiences of our time. Everything we know of totalitarianism 
demonstrates a horrible originality which no farfetched historical parallels can alleviate (309).  
Arendt identifies the dangers of reducing totalitarianism into preconceived 
categories of explanation, arguing that the crudest of these categories is the framework of 
causality adopted by historians (ibid., 319-20). The hazards of interpreting historical 
phenomena under the rule of causality is that this category reduces every event to a past 
cause (ibid.). While causality provides the pretence of being “able to explain events by a 
chain of causes which eventually lead to them” (ibid., 318), the “proper meaning” of an 
event always transcends that which can be deduced solely from the past (ibid., 318-9). For 
Arendt, the insufficiency of causal explanations is such that they foreclose the possibility 
of something irrevocably new occurring—“history without events becomes the dead 
monotony of sameness, unfolded in time” (ibid., 320). More importantly, at least in the 
context of Holocaust uniqueness claims, the framework of causality does not exhaust the 
question of Auschwitz. If one, for instance, were to explain the Shoah as the result of a 
long line of anti-Semitism throughout history without also considering other important 
facets of these complex series of events, one misses the horrible originality of the events 
in question ([1950] 1994, 233). Against those who propose that what is unique about the 
Holocaust is that it was targeted towards specifically Jewish victims, Arendt argues that if 
anything, the anti-Semitism underpinning the Final Solution undermines the uniqueness 
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of the genocide: “Anti-Semitism by itself has such a long and bloody history that the very 
fact that the death factories were chiefly fed with Jewish ‘material’ has somewhat 
obliterated the uniqueness of this ‘operation’” (ibid., 234).  
 Arendt is not alone in condemning the insufficiency of causal frameworks in 
accounting for the singularity of the Shoah—Lanzmann takes Arendt’s claim even 
further. “The destruction of the European Jews,” he writes, 
cannot be deduced from prior causes. The attempt to do so is in a certain sense a denial of its 
reality, a refusal of the upsurge of violence, the expression of a desire to clothe its implacable 
nudity, to ward it off and therefore to refuse to see it, to look it in the face in its utmost aridity 
and incomparability. In a word, it is to make it weaker (1979, 142).  
Lanzmann rejects chronological narratives of the Holocaust, dismissing them as “nothing 
but a succession of befores and afters,” when the Shoah exceeds causal explanations 
(ibid.). However, a key difference between Lanzmann’s and Arendt’s accounts is that 
where the former maintains that any attempt to understand the Shoah is obscene, Arendt 
argues that new tools can be created to understand the events. Although Arendt upholds 
the incomprehensibility of the Holocaust under traditional frameworks of thought, she 
does not suggest that the task of understanding must be discarded altogether. Arendt does 
not as much argue that the camps are beyond understanding, as much as she argues that 
preexisting categories of explanation have been stretched to their limits by these events, 
to the extent that they are no longer sufficient in accounting for what occurred (Fine 2001, 
132). “If the Holocaust has deprived us of our traditional tools of understanding,” Robert 
Fine comments, “we must still confront the difficulty of constructing new tools” (ibid., 
135, emphasis in original). Despite “the difficulties of understanding,” Arendt defends 
this activity as being of utmost importance. Understanding is “the specifically human way 
of being alive […] to reconcile ourselves to a world in which such things are possible at 
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all” ([1954] 1994b, 308). To abandon the pursuit of understanding is to surrender to the 
unprecedented horrors of Nazi totalitarianism (Fine 2001, 134). Given this, a large portion 
of Arendt’s own writings are dedicated to understanding the phenomenon of 
totalitarianism, which she saw the central political experience of her time.  
Against Holocaust Uniqueness 
In recent years, the perceived inability to explain or to comprehend Auschwitz has been 
subject to significant criticism, giving rise to a polemic between scholars who uphold the 
characterisation of the Holocaust as either incomprehensible or comprehensible, 
extraordinary or ordinary. Against Holocaust uniqueness claims, a rising trend in 
Holocaust discourse is to criticise the grounds on which the Holocaust is presented as an 
“unrepresentable,” “unspeakable,” “incomprehensible,” et cetera, occurrence. As well as 
criticising the imprecise and equivocal use of the aforementioned terms, critics of the 
perceived uniqueness of the Holocaust raise concerns over situating the Holocaust beyond 
the limits of language and thought. They warn that an exclusive stress on the inability to 
comprehend Auschwitz may dehistoricise and decontextualise the events, rendering them 
outside of—and other to—the concrete historical contexts in which the atrocities 
occurred. Moreover, the validity of Holocaust uniqueness claims are called into question 
in the context of identity politics, with the Eurocentric frame through which the Shoah is 
figured as a preeminent traumatic event in history being criticised. Given this, the 
perceived uniqueness of Auschwitz is accused of entering a competition for primacy in 
the vast historical horizon of twentieth century atrocities.  
 In his essay, “From Exception to Exemplum: The New Approach to Nazism and 
the ‘Final Solution’” (1994), Kansteiner traces a paradigm shift in perceptions of the 
Holocaust from exceptional to exemplary. He objects that Holocaust uniqueness claims 
fail to grasp the significance of the Shoah in terms of its historical context and its 
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comparability to other events (1994, 149). In refusing to situate Auschwitz in its historical 
context, he argues that proponents of Holocaust uniqueness theses fail “to acknowledge 
the importance of a general, comparative framework for the interpretation of Nazism” 
(ibid., 150). “The concept of singularity,” Kansteiner argues, 
is unfit to fulfil the task at hand because of its tendency to resist contextualizations of the 
“Final Solution.” As applied to date it has precluded the construction of historical analogies, 
continuities, and a sense of the directedness of the historical process that are characteristic of 
full-fledged historical narration (ibid., 149-50)  
The notion of Holocaust uniqueness thus fails “to address the question of if and how the 
‘Final Solution’ can be integrated into larger conceptual and narrative frameworks, for 
example, the history of the twentieth century, the history of modernity, or even the history 
of modern science” (ibid., 149). Kansteiner notes that while it was initially common 
practice to affirm the uniqueness of the Holocaust, scholars are more recently intent on 
illustrating the normality of the events.  
It is further noted that just because the Holocaust was unique and unprecedented at 
the time the events occurred does not mean that this is still the case. Avishai Margalit and 
Gabriel Motzkin suggest that “even if the Holocaust may have been unprecedented, new 
brutalities in the future may relegate the Holocaust to being merely the first instance of a 
new form of social behaviour” (1996, 66). Although the Shoah may have at one stage 
been considered unique and unprecedented, this will not always hold true: “the Holocaust 
is unique only in relation to subsequent events. When the Holocaust will be viewed from 
a future perspective, it may then appear to be quite normal” (ibid., 69). For instance, the 
industrialised technology used for the genocide of the Jews has subsequently been 
normalised in the process of killing animals in the meat industry, so that that which was 
formerly seen as being unprecedented has, in turn, gone on to establish a new precedent.  
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 While some critics of the perceived exceptionality of Auschwitz are specifically 
concerned about the dangers of removing the events from their proper place in history, 
others argue that the Holocaust uniqueness thesis is an ideological construct that 
marginalises the traumatic suffering of non-Western others (Finkelstein 2000, 2003; 
Mandel 2001, 2006; Novick 2000). In his timely work, The Holocaust in American Life 
(2000), Peter Novick criticises the ideological dogmas associated with Auschwitz 
uniqueness claims. He argues that “an angry insistence on the uniqueness of the 
Holocaust” not only enters “a competition for recognition but a competition of primacy” 
(2000, 9). He retorts: 
The assertion that the Holocaust is unique—like the claim that it is singularly 
incomprehensible or unrepresentable—is, in practice, deeply offensive. What else can all this 
possibly mean except “your catastrophe, unlike ours, is ordinary; unlike ours is 
comprehensible; unlike ours is representable” (ibid., 9).   
Norman G. Finkelstein takes this assertion even further in condemning Holocaust 
memory as a dangerous ideological construct that has vested interests in casting Israel as 
a victim state and of exempting the state’s criminal actions towards Palestine from 
international scrutiny. In his controversial study, The Holocaust Industry: Reflections on 
the Exploitation of Jewish Suffering (2003),31 Finkelstein argues that the memory of the 
Shoah has been radically abused—it “has been used to justify criminal policies of the 
Israeli state and US support for these policies” (7-8). As he sees it, Auschwitz uniqueness 
claims are being used as a form of “intellectual terror” and “moral blackmail” (2000, 
120). For example, prominent figures such as Wiesel place a taboo on comparing the 
                                                 
31 Finkelstein argues that what is now known as the Holocaust is an ideological representation of an actual 
historical event that has a tenuous connection with the reality of the Nazi holocaust itself (2003, 3). Given 
this, he uses the expression Nazi holocaust to refer to the actual historical events and the Holocaust to 
denote the ideological representation of the events (ibid.).  
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Holocaust to other events in history, accusing those who “dare to compare” of committing 
“a subtle form of anti-Semitism” and of betraying Jewish history (ibid., 123).32 Deborah 
E. Lipstadt’s Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory (1993), 
repeats Wiesel’s gesture in arguing that denying the uniqueness of the Holocaust 
constitutes an insidious form of anti-Semitism (Finkelstein 2000, 129). Indeed, Rothberg 
observes that “proponents of uniqueness assiduously search out and refute all attempts to 
compare or analogize the Holocaust in order to preserve the memory of the Shoah from 
its dilution or relativization” (2009, 9). Lipstadt goes as far as to argue that “relativiz[ing] 
the Holocaust through comparison and analogy” is akin to “deny[ing] its very existence” 
(ibid.). 
In radical opposition to thinkers such as Lipstadt and Wiesel, Finkelstein stresses 
the necessity of comparing Auschwitz to other historical atrocities and to “open our hearts 
to the rest of humanity’s sufferings” (2003, 8). He draws a lesson from his mother, who 
was herself a Holocaust survivor: 
I never once heard her say: Do not compare. My mother always compared. No doubt historical 
distinctions must be made. But to make out moral distinctions between “our” suffering and 
“theirs” is itself a moral travesty […]. In the face of the sufferings of African-Americans, 
Vietnamese and Palestinians, my mother’s credo always was: We are all holocaust victims 
(ibid., emphasis in original).  
Indeed, it is crucial to consider the privileged position granted to the Holocaust as coming 
at the expense of acknowledging other genocidal atrocities to have occurred throughout 
                                                 
32 Finkelstein provides an example of the critical backlash that has resulted from comparing the Holocaust 
to other historical events: “Some years back, the spoof of a New York tabloid was headlined ‘Michael 
Jackson, 60 Million Others, Die in Nuclear Holocaust.’ The letters page carried an irate protest from 
Wiesel: ‘How dare people refer to what happened yesterday as a Holocaust? There was only one 
Holocaust’” (2000, 123). 
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history, such as the genocide of the Tutsis in Rwanda; the mass killings under the rule of 
Pol Pot in Cambodia; the genocide of indigenous peoples through the process of 
colonisation; or the Palestinian genocide by the state of Israel—to list only a few.  
 Another important criticism of Holocaust uniqueness claims pertains to the extent 
to which all events in history can be considered unique in the sense that every event is 
nonidentical with any other event (Margalit and Motzkin 1996, 65). Novick argues that 
when applied to the Shoah, “the notion of uniqueness is quite vacuous. Every historical 
event […] in some ways resembles events to which it might be compared and differs from 
them in some ways” (ibid.). He continues: “to single out those aspects of the Holocaust 
that were distinctive […] and to ignore those aspects that shares with other atrocities, and 
on the basis of this gerrymandering to declare that the Holocaust is unique, is an 
intellectual sleight of hand” (ibid.). Meanwhile, Finkelstein agrees that claims of 
Holocaust uniqueness are redundant: 
Every historical event is unique, if merely by virtue of time and location, and every historical 
event bears distinct features as well as features in common with other historical events. The 
anomaly of the Holocaust is that its uniqueness is held to be crucial. What other historical 
event, one might ask, is framed largely for its categorical uniqueness? Typically, distinctive 
features of the Holocaust are isolated in order to place it in a category apart (2000, 120-1).  
Considering such insights, Holocaust uniqueness claims appear self-effacing: if every 
event in history is singularly unique, then it is absurd to refer to the Holocaust as though it 
were preeminently unique.  
 Despite the merits of the various criticisms of the perceived uniqueness of the 
Holocaust, I argue that the aforementioned critics uphold a false dichotomy between the 
unique and the comparable character of the Holocaust, as though these events must be one 
of these things and not the other. Moving beyond this “either/or” logic, Rothberg’s 
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insightful book, Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of 
Decolonization (2009), illuminates and reconciles the dichotomous assumptions at play in 
characterisations of the Shoah. He identifies the uniqueness/comparability polemic as 
being rooted in a politics of “competitive memory,” which partake “in a zero-sum game 
of competition and recognition” (ibid., 9). Rejecting the mutual exclusivity of these 
tendencies, Rothberg advances the following: 
Far from blocking other historical memories from view in a competitive struggle for 
recognition, the emergence of Holocaust memory on a global scale has contributed to the 
articulation of other histories—some of them predating the Nazi genocide, such as slavery, and 
others taking place later, such as the Algerian War of Independence (1954-62) or the genocide 
in Bosnia during the 1990s (ibid., 6). 
Holocaust memory does not necessarily detract from the recognition of other historical 
atrocities. Since the Shoah has been granted recognition unheard of by other incidents of 
genocide to have occurred throughout history, the Holocaust is often drawn upon as a 
comparativist tool to draw attention to other historical atrocities.33 In this way, Auschwitz 
is invoked to render other historical events visible. This is at the crux of what Rothberg 
formulates as “multidirectional memory,” which “draw[s] attention to the dynamic 
transfers that take place between diverse places and times during the act of remembrance” 
(ibid., 11). He continues:  
[t]hinking in terms of multidirectional memory helps explain the spiralling interactions that 
characterise the politics of memory […] that the use of the Holocaust as a metaphor or analogy 
                                                 
33 This is the case since the Holocaust is viewed as a model of “success.” Apart from being the most 
rigorously studied genocidal event within recent history, this so-called “success” is also ascribed to the fact 
that Jews were given the state of Israel and American support for the defence of this state, as well as having 
received monetary reparation for the atrocities. 
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for other events and histories has emerged precisely because the Holocaust is widely thought of 
as a unique and uniquely terrible form of political violence (ibid.). 
In light of Rothberg’s insights, I suggest that claims of Holocaust uniqueness may be 
utilised to exhibit the uniqueness of other events without entering into a competition for 
primacy with other atrocities to have occurred throughout history. In moving beyond the 
tension between the dichotomous assertions surrounding the unique and the comparable, 
the exceptional and the exemplary—which recurs throughout Holocaust studies and 
trauma theory alike—this chapter concludes by turning to the work of Agamben and his 
methodological apparatus of the paradigm. I propose that by considering the Holocaust as 
a paradigm for other singular traumatic events, the Holocaust maintains its historical 
specificity whilst at the same time functioning to render other instances of trauma 
intelligible. Given this, the concluding section of this chapter argues that positing the 
unique events of the Holocaust as an exemplar of trauma need not be considered as being 
problematic.  
The Exceptional Exemplar: Considering Auschwitz as an Agambenian Paradigm 
The previous two sections of this chapter turned to the polemic surrounding the 
characterisation of the Holocaust as either unique or comparable to shed light on the 
tension between the characterisation of trauma as either extraordinary and the ordinary. 
Where Chapter One sought to bypass this dichotomous logic by drawing on the tension 
between these extremes as a productive basis for conceptualising trauma, this chapter 
moves beyond dominant debates in Holocaust discourse that are so intent on positing the 
Holocaust on either side of the unique or the comparable.  
This chapter has also illuminated a tension between the characterisation of the 
Holocaust as an exceptional historical event and its use as an exemplar in trauma theory. 
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Theoretical and therapeutic engagements with Auschwitz have been formative in the 
development of the trauma concept, with Felman and Laub’s reflections on these events 
constituting the backbone of trauma theory. However, Felman and Laub go to 
considerable lengths to posit the Shoah as a singular and uniquely devastating event, 
which implies that these specific traumas withstand comparison. If this is the case, to 
what extent can the events of the Holocaust be drawn on to configure trauma more 
broadly? As already noted, Felman and Laub’s conceptual gesture gives rise to (at least) 
two problems. Firstly, a concept of trauma developed through engagements with the 
Holocaust is limited in its applicability to other events. The second issue arises when 
accounting for a singular historical event under the generalising frame of trauma. Trauma 
is at once both too general and too specific: trauma is too broad to account for singular 
historical events, but the concept of trauma derived from a focus on the Shoah is too 
specific to be applied to other instances of trauma.  
This concluding section of Chapter Two circumvents the tension between the 
uniqueness of the Holocaust and its role as an exemplar in trauma theory, as well as 
moving beyond the polemic between the unique and the comparable in Holocaust 
discourse. Here, I argue that Auschwitz can be considered both unique and comparable, 
exceptional and exemplary. I propose that positing the unique events of the Shoah as an 
exemplar of trauma need not efface the singularity of the Holocaust nor need it negate the 
singularity of other traumatic events. Instead, I conceive both trauma and the Holocaust as 
singularities that can be placed side-by-side to exhibit a broader framework of 
intelligibility. In arguing this point, I turn to Agamben’s work on the paradigm.  
 In his essay, “What is a Paradigm?,” featured in The Signature of All Things: On 
Method (2009), Agamben etymologically traces the term “paradigm” to the Greek 
paradiegma, meaning that which is shown alongside. Agamben introduces the paradigm 
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to account for the contextual situatedness of singular historical phenomenon, whilst at the 
same time mobilising this phenomenon to reveal a frame of intelligibility between 
historical singularities. Agamben elaborates on his methodological category of the 
paradigm to remedy common misunderstandings of his writings (9). Rather than offering 
historical reports or reconstructions, Agamben clarifies that his work utilises certain 
historical phenomenon as paradigms which function to “constitute and make intelligible a 
broader historical-problematic context” (ibid.).34 The paradigm is not a tool of the 
historian: it is not only concerned with past historical phenomenon, but of drawing on 
events of the past to aid the understanding of the present. Across his work, Agamben sets 
out to reveal broader historical landscapes that escapes the historian’s gaze (ibid., 31). 
 Amongst other sources, Agamben draws the paradigm from Thomas S. Kuhn’s 
1962 book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. There, Kuhn outlines two meanings of 
the paradigm. The first meaning denotes the “disciplinary matrix”—that is, the set of 
values, models and techniques—by which members of a scientific community abide 
(ibid., 11). The second meaning (which both Kuhn and Agamben find more novel than 
the first) replaces the explicit rules that a member of a scientific community might follow 
with a single element in a set (ibid.). Where, in common understanding, the paradigm is 
thought of as a “disciplinary matrix” or “discursive framework” constitutive of a general 
set, Agamben, following Kuhn, posits the paradigm as a singularity, thus replacing “the 
universal logic of the law” with “the specific and singular logic of the example” (ibid., 
12). The paradigm has a double function: it places a historical singularity alongside 
another singularity to reveal a broader framework of intelligibility between these 
singularities. 
                                                 
34 Agamben explains that in his work, the figures of Homo Sacer, the Muselmann, the concentration camp, 
and the state of exception all function as paradigms (ibid., 9).  
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 Along with Kuhn, Agamben aligns his paradigmatic method with the work of 
Michel Foucault. Although Foucault never explicitly defined the paradigm (and went to 
great lengths to differentiate his own method from Kuhn’s), Agamben argues that 
Foucault’s work treats a number of historical singularities as paradigms.35 One example is 
Foucault’s work on the Panopticon in Discipline and Punish ([1975] 1991). Foucault’s 
treatment of the Panopticon exhibits the dual function of the paradigm: it mobilises a 
singular historical entity—namely, Jeremy Bentham’s model of the Panopticon—to 
reveal the broader functioning of panopticism. Foucault’s use of the Panopticon is 
paradigmatic in the “strict sense: it is a singular object that, standing equally for all others 
of the same class, defines the intelligibility of the group of which it is a part and which, it 
at the same time constitutes” (ibid., 17).  
In further conceptualising the paradigm, Agamben draws on the synonymous 
notion of the example, which he goes on to distinguish from the exception. An example is 
a normal case that is part of a set, whereas an exception is something that does not fit 
within a given set. Although these terms appear in opposition to one another—“[t]he 
exception is situated in a symmetrical position with respect to the example” (1998, 21)—
they are actually reliant on each other in constituting a set: the “[e]xception and example 
constitute the two modes by which a set tries to found and maintain its own coherence” 
(ibid.). Agamben does not posit the example and the exception in mutually exclusive 
terms since both appear on either side of set. The difference between the exception and 
the example is that where the former is a unique case that ostensibly stands outside of a 
set of rules, the latter exhibits the set of which it forms a part. Nonetheless, the only way 
that the example can achieve this is by moving outside the set. While Agamben 
                                                 
35 “The great confinement, the confession, the investigation, the examination, the care of the self: all of 
these are historical phenomena that Foucault treats as paradigms” (Agamben ibid., 17). 
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characterises the exception as an “inclusive exclusion,” he posits the example as an 
“exclusive inclusion” (ibid.). The meaning of this becomes apparent in relation to the set 
of which the exception and the example constitute: the exception is included in virtue of 
its exclusion from a given set and the example is excluded from other particulars in the 
set to exhibit its very belonging to this set. In other words, the paradigm is removed from 
its set and suspended from its normal use to reveal commonalities between other 
particularities in the set. Jacob Meskin and Harvey Sharpiro explain that “[t]he 
paradigmatic relation […] is both a part and apart” (2014, 425, emphasis in original). In 
exhibiting its belonging to a set, the paradigm must be parted from the set of which it is a 
part.  
The paradigm forms an analogical relation to other singularities within a set. 
Agamben turns to Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, where Aristotle separates the analogical 
function of the paradigm from the logical procedures of deduction and induction. 
Aristotle writes: “the paradigm does not function as a part with respect to the whole […] 
nor as a whole with respect to the part […] but as a part with respect to the part … if both 
are under the same but one is better known than the other” (citied in Agamben 2009, 19). 
While deductive procedures move from the universal to the particular, and inductive 
procedures move from the particular to the universal, the paradigm abides by another 
principle altogether—namely, that of analogy (ibid., 19). The paradigm’s analogical 
function challenges the ascending and descending movement between the particular and 
the universal evidenced in inductive and deductive logic. Instead, the paradigmatic 
relation moves from one singularity to another singularity.   
Radicalising Aristotle’s brief thesis on the paradigm, Agamben argues that the 
paradigm dissolves the substantive differences between the particular and the general 
(ibid., 20). Rather than seeing these extremes as being mutually exclusive, the paradigm 
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“intervenes in the dichotomous logic (particular/universal; form/content; 
lawfulness/exemplarity; and so on) […] to transform them into a force field traversed by 
polar tensions, where […] their substantive identities evaporate” (ibid., 20). 
Unencumbered by the dichotomous logic of the general and the particular, the paradigm 
introduces an “analogical third” which makes it impossible to differentiate between the 
two extremes (ibid.). By neutralising the binary logic between the part and the whole, the 
particular and the general, the analogical function of the paradigm “entails a movement 
that goes from singularity to singularity and, without ever leaving singularity, transforms 
every singular instance into an exemplar of a general rule that can never be stated a 
priori” (ibid., 22, emphasis in original). Neither general nor particular, the paradigm is a 
singularity which produces a framework of intelligibility between itself and other 
singularities. Given this, the paradigmatic relation makes it “impossible to clearly 
separate an example’s paradigmatic character—its standing in for all cases—from the fact 
that it is one case among others” (ibid., 19). The general rule does not preexist the 
particular cases of which it applies but, rather, is itself constituted through the paradigm 
(ibid., 21). Indeed, Agamben emphasises the constitutive role of the paradigm, which is 
“never already given, but is generated and produced” (ibid., 23). Rather than 
presupposing a universal rule, the paradigm functions in such a way that it constitutes this 
rule at the same time that it reveals it. The rule does not precede the paradigm; the rule is 
immanent to the paradigm (ibid., 31).   
The Agambenian paradigm has tremendous potential in accounting for the 
singularity of the traumas of the Holocaust and its use as an exemplar in trauma theory. A 
provisional application of the paradigm to the question of trauma could conceive trauma 
as the general set, whilst positing historical particularities such as the Shoah, the Rwandan 
genocide, the Palestinian genocide, et cetera, as singularities within this set. In light of 
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this, a paradigm can be produced by moving from one of the aforementioned singularities 
to another. This does not entail the movement of deduction, which starts from the general 
(trauma) to the particular (Auschwitz), nor does is it indicative of the inductive movement 
from the particular (Auschwitz) to the general (trauma). Instead, this use of the 
Agambenian paradigm moves from one singularity (Auschwitz) to another singularity 
(the Palestinian genocide). While this does not mean that the Holocaust can be mobilised 
as a paradigmatic instance of trauma more broadly, it does mean that the Holocaust can 
be used as a paradigmatic instance of other singular instances of trauma in particular.  
However, this is a conservative application of the paradigm which can in fact be 
taken much further. For Agamben does not only state that the paradigm moves from one 
singularity to another singularity, he radically problematises the relation between the 
general and the particular. Treating trauma as a general framework and the Shoah as a 
particular example within this framework reinforces the dichotomy between the general 
and the particular, which Agamben goes to considerable lengths to neutralise through the 
analogical function of the paradigm. Agamben asserts that the general does not precede 
the particular—it is the paradigm which itself constitutes the general. Indeed, the 
paradigmatic relation makes it impossible to distinguish between the general and the 
particular, for the paradigm simultaneously functions as both a general rule and a 
singularity. Given this, the Shoah need not be conceived as a singularity within the 
general frame of trauma. By mobilising the Holocaust as a paradigmatic instance of 
trauma, both trauma and Auschwitz can instead be conceived as singularities placed side-
by-side in an analogous relation. In so doing, trauma and the Holocaust produce a new 
framework of intelligibility.  
In considering Auschwitz as a paradigm of trauma, the event maintains its 
historical specificity whilst at the same time functioning to make intelligible other 
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instances of trauma. Placing the traumas of the Holocaust in an analogous relation to 
other instances of trauma is not a means of appropriating singularities under a general 
rule. The paradigm does not subsume disparate historical phenomenon under its own 
rule—it places singularities side-by-side in an analogous relation. The analogous relation 
constitutive of the paradigm produces a framework of intelligibility that renders other 
singular instances of trauma visible. In so doing, the paradigm illuminates previously 
unperceived relations between each singularity whilst at the same time constituting these 
relations. By dispensing with the dichotomous logic between the particular and the 
general, drawing on the events of the Holocaust as an exemplar for trauma need not be 
considered as problematic.  
While this chapter has utilised the paradigm to facilitate a move beyond the 
opposition between the exceptional and the exemplary in the context of trauma, the 
problem that was raised in the second section of this chapter remains—namely, that in 
drawing on trauma to conceptualise the broader structure of history, trauma theorists 
conflate the exception and the norm, the traumatic and the non-traumatic. This tension 
will be carried over into the next chapter of this thesis, in which I examine the tension 
between the exception and the norm as correlative to the tension between the 
extraordinary and the ordinary. Chapter Three of this thesis circumvents the dichotomous 
logic surrounding the exception and the norm by expanding on my discussion of 
Agamben’s notion of the exception. As well as highlighting the tension between the 
exception and the norm, Chapter Three considers two further tensions that arise through 
the dichotomous relation between victim and perpetrator and Arendt’s accounts of evil as 
either radical or banal. In so doing, I place these dichotomies in a dialogic relation with 
one another. In accordance with the immanence of traumatic rupture, I argue that trauma 
is irreducible to either one of these terms alone and implicates both extremes. 
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Chapter Three – Word-and-Thought-Defying Banality: The Grey Zone Between 
Victims and Perpetrators, the Exception and the Norm 
Trauma theorists illuminate the strange tendency of trauma to spill across seemingly 
distinct categories. Implicating the individual and the collective, the traumas of the 
Holocaust exceed the limits of a wound inflicted on an individual’s psyche and so too 
denote a wound in collective consciousness. Characterising the twentieth century as “a 
century of traumas,” Felman suggests that the twenty-first century is a post-traumatic era 
(2002, 1). For Felman, “we are still wounded by the Holocaust, and […] we harbor the 
unfinished business of this recent history within us” (1992, 123-4). As was mentioned in 
Chapter Two of this thesis, Felman extends the rupturing impact of trauma to the general 
structure of history, as being comprised of events that are unable to be witnessed at the 
time they unfold. This reveals the traumatic structure of “history as holocaust”: like 
trauma, history can only be experienced belatedly—that is, after the fact of its occurrence. 
Caruth similarly considers the extent to which everyone is caught up in trauma in virtue 
of belonging to a shared traumatic history (1996, 24). In this way, the traumas of the 
Holocaust not only implicate those who were directly involved in the atrocities—namely, 
the primary witnesses; the Holocaust implicates secondary witnesses—that is “the 
readers, listeners, and viewers who issued forth in the aftermath of the Holocaust” (Sanyal 
2015, 26). 
However, trauma theorists are accused of over-identifying with actual victims of 
trauma by eradicating the difference between those who have experienced traumatic 
events and those who are living in the traumatic aftermath of such events. Leys argues 
that trauma theorists transform victimhood into something that is “unlocatable in any 
particular person or place, thereby permitting it to migrate or spread contagiously to 
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others” (2000, 296). Kansteiner and Weilnböck insist that trauma theorists “conflate the 
psychological challenges that all human beings face in their everyday life […] with the 
extraordinary psychological ordeal encountered, for example, by victims of extreme 
violence” (2008, 236). Meanwhile, LaCapra maintains that the concept of trauma 
deployed by trauma theorists gives rise to “the idea of a wound culture or the notion that 
everyone is somehow a victim (or, for that matter, a survivor)” ([2001] 2014, 77). In 
accordance with these criticisms, it would seem that in a post-traumatic era, everyone is 
in some sense a survivor of the shattering impact of trauma, regardless of whether one has 
been directly exposed to such devastating events as the Holocaust. In this way, trauma 
theorists are seen as conflating the exception and the norm, the traumatic and the non-
traumatic (LaCapra [2001] 2014; Leys 2000; Kansteiner 2004; Kansteiner and Weilnböck 
2008). 
The aims of Chapter Three are twofold. Firstly, this chapter spirals back to a key 
issue that has recurred over the previous chapters of this thesis—namely, the inability to 
situate trauma on either side of the extraordinary or the ordinary. In this chapter, I posit 
Agamben’s work on the exception and Arendt’s notion of radical evil on the side of the 
extraordinary. On the other hand, Agamben’s insights regarding the norm and Arendt’s 
work on the banality of evil are situated on the side of the ordinary. Rather than upholding 
a false dichotomy between these terms, this chapter considers the extent to which the 
ordinary and the extraordinary, the exception and the norm, the radical and the banal, 
might actually reinforce each other. Secondly, Chapter Three turns to a further problem 
that occurs in conceptualising trauma—that is, the zone of indeterminacy that may arise 
between victims and perpetrators. This is not to conflate these distinct categories, but to 
look beyond the mutual exclusivity of these dichotomies to consider their intricate 
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entanglement. In so doing, one is in a better position to make way for new categories that 
might better explain the complex subject positions implicated in situations of trauma. 
The first section of Chapter Three draws on the testimonial insights of Levi to 
illuminate the strange tendency of trauma to rupture the divide between seemingly 
distinct categories. Levi’s concept of the grey zone—which becomes an important 
concept in the work of Agamben—reveals the extent to which the traumas of Auschwitz 
have radically called into question the bounds separating victims and perpetrators, good 
and evil. Forced into situations of extreme complicity, some victims in camps such as 
Auschwitz collaborated with the enemy, inhabiting a grey zone where traditional 
categories of thought crumble. Levi considers this zone of indeterminacy to be the most 
awful crime of the Nazis and as the most difficult aspect of the camps to understand.  
The second section of this chapter considers Agamben’s take on Levi’s report of a 
soccer match that occurred at Auschwitz between certain prisoners of the camps and the 
Schutzstaffel (SS). Levi and Agamben maintain that while the soccer match seems to 
represent a moment of solace amongst a backdrop of horrors, the seemingly ordinary 
game is what is most horrifying about Auschwitz. Agamben argues that the grey zone is 
not only a space in which victims become perpetrators, but is a zone of ambiguity 
between the exception and the norm. He suggests that the soccer match that occurred at 
Auschwitz has carried on into the present insofar as the camps are the hidden nomos of 
contemporary juridico-political structures.  
The third section of this chapter considers the rupturing impact of trauma on the 
divide separating the individual and the collective, the private and the public, through 
Felman’s observations regarding the necessary relation between trauma and trials to have 
emerged in the twentieth century. In the wake of cataclysmic events such as the 
Holocaust, Felman posits the trial as a means of coming to terms with the rupturing 
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impact of trauma in both individual and collective consciousness. In consolidating this 
claim, she turns to Arendt’s report on the trial of Adolf Eichmann.36 Revisiting the work 
of Arendt through the lens of trauma, this section moves on to examine the extent to 
which preexisting categories of thought—such as the legal notions of culpability and 
personal responsibility—are forced to grapple with the disruptive impact of Auschwitz.  
The fourth section of Chapter Three examines Arendt’s confrontation with 
Eichmann in Jerusalem. Following this, the fifth section considers Arendt’s thesis on the 
banality of evil, thus revealing a tension between her earlier and later thoughts on this 
phenomenon. While Arendt’s earlier work characterises evil as radically other to any 
known frame of reference, her later work on the banality of evil posits the phenomenon as 
something that is all too ordinary. This chapter draws on the tension between Arendt’s 
seemingly contradictory positions concerning radical and banal evil as correlative to the 
tensions that recur across Part One of this thesis—namely, the tension between the 
extraordinary and the ordinary. The tension between the extraordinary and the ordinary, 
as I made clear in the Introduction to this thesis, comes under the broader banner of that 
which exists between the transcendent and immanent.  
Although radical and banal evil are often seen as contradictory—or at least 
incompatible—concepts, the sixth section of this chapter argues that these terms can be 
read as complementary. Where Arendt’s earlier work on radical evil aids an 
understanding of the shattering impact of trauma, her later work on the banality of evil 
                                                 
36 Eichmann joined the Austrian Nazi Party in 1932 and was to remain a member of the SS for twelve years 
and three months (Arendt [1963] 2006, 33). He quickly climbed the ranks of the Nazi Party, moving to 
Germany and becoming an SS senior functionary: the head of Department IV-D-4, in charge of Jewish 
Affairs and Deportations. Eichmann had not joined the Nazis out of conviction for their program. He had 
never read Mein Kampf and he did not know the Party program when he joined. Eichmann said in court that 
he was “swallowed up by the Party against all expectations and without previous decision” (ibid.). Arendt 
notes that this was a common trait of many Nazi officials, who did not take the Party program seriously, and 
instead prided themselves on being part of a movement (ibid., 43). For Eichmann, the question at the time 
had not been “why join the Nazis?”, but “why not?” 
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shows that unprecedented destruction might very well be a result of ordinary or banal 
motives. This reveals that evil is extraordinary to the extent that it derives from that which 
is ordinary. These insights are used to shed light on the problems that occur when 
attempting to posit trauma as either transcendent or immanent, extraordinary or ordinary. 
Instead of assuming that trauma must be either one of these things at the expense of the 
other, I argue that trauma implicates both extremes. In my discussion of Arendt, I aim to 
reveal that the radical and the banal, the extraordinary and the ordinary, the transcendent 
and the immanent, need not be conceived as being at odds. Whilst being a seemingly 
ordinary man, Eichmann was responsible for extraordinary destruction. Moreover, the 
ordinariness of Eichmann is that which is most difficult to comprehend. This is what 
Arendt refers to as the word-and-thought-defying banality of evil. Evil is word-and-
thought-defying not in spite of, but because of, its banality.  
The Grey Zone: Between Victims and Perpetrators 
It is not the purpose of this chapter to conflate victims and perpetrators, nor is it to 
suggest that traumatic situations are the same as normal situations. I am interested, 
instead, in moving beyond the mutual exclusiveness of these terms by considering the 
wounding impact of trauma on the bounds separating these distinct categories. In this 
section, I consider Levi’s notion of the grey zone to demonstrate the disruptive impact of 
trauma on the categories of victim and perpetrator and along with it, the straightforward 
divide between innocence and guilt, good and evil.  
  In his essay, “The Grey Zone,” featured in The Drowned and the Saved ([1986] 
1989), Levi describes the reality of camps such as Auschwitz as irreducible to preexisting 
frames of thought, including the bipartisan divide between good and evil, friend and 
enemy, us and them. Levi explains that language and conceptual thought attempt to 
categorise all that exists—including historical and natural phenomenon—into simplifying 
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schemas of understanding, without which the world would remain an “infinite, undivided 
tangle” (ibid., 22). When faced with events that occur in history, which are “not always 
identifiable in a single unequivocal fashion” (ibid., 23), historians tend to form 
incompatible understandings (ibid., 22). Despite this, popular history “shuns half-tints and 
complexities” (ibid.) and reduces “the river of human occurrences to conflicts, and the 
conflicts to duels—we and they, Athenians and Spartans, Romans and Carthaginians” 
(ibid.). However, what happened in the camps cannot be reduced to these binary 
oppositions. Levi contends that “the network of human relationships inside the Lagers 
was not simple: it could not be reduced to the two blocs of victims and perpetrators” 
(ibid., 23).  
In challenging the dichotomous assumptions built into language and common 
understanding, Levi formulates the concept of the grey zone, which is a zone of 
ambiguity in which fundamental categories of thought cave in on one another. The space 
of the camp is a perfect example of the grey zone, which does not conform to any  
simple model which we atavistically carry within us—‘we’ inside and the enemy outside, 
separated by a sharply defined geographic frontier [… T]he enemy was all around but also 
inside, the ‘we’ lost its limits, the contenders were not two, one could not discern a single 
frontier but rather many confused, perhaps innumerable frontiers, which stretched between 
each of us (ibid.). 
The zone of ambiguity within the camps made it impossible to find solidarity with other 
prisoners or even with oneself, since one was confronted with both the enemy outside and 
the enemy within. Stretching across the camps, the grey zone has “ill-defined outlines 
which both separate and join the two camps of masters and servants. It possesses an 
incredibly complicated internal structure, and contains within itself enough to confuse our 
need to judge” (ibid., 27). Many figures in the camps dwelt within the grey zone, 
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including those who cooperated with the SS by doing extra jobs (“sweepers, kettle 
washers, night-watchmen, bed smoothers, […] checkers of lice and scabies, messengers, 
interpreters, assistants’ assistants” (ibid., 29)) for some extra soup so that they might live 
just a little while longer. At the extreme end of this spectrum there were prisoners like the 
Sonderkommando, who dwelt at the epicentre of the grey zone.   
The Sonderkommando, euphemistically referred to by the SS as the “special 
squad,” were a group of prisoners selected to run the gas chambers and crematoria in the 
extermination camps. These prisoners performed the horrifying tasks of leading other 
prisoners to their death in the gas chambers; dragging out their bodies; shaving their 
heads; extracting the gold fillings from their teeth (so that these valuable materials would 
not go to waste); incinerating the corpses in the crematoria; and of emptying out the 
remaining ash from the ovens (ibid., 34). Just how the Sonderkommando were able to 
cope with having to carry out such horrible tasks is not easy to fathom. Some witnesses 
say that they were provided with copious amounts of alcohol and “were in a permanent 
state of complete debasement and prostration” (ibid., 36). Levi reports that 
[o]ne of them declared: ‘Doing this work, one either goes crazy the first day or gets 
accustomed to it.’ Another, though: ‘Certainly I could have killed myself or got myself killed; 
but I wanted to survive, to avenge myself and bear witness. You mustn’t think that we are 
monsters; we are the same as you, only much more unhappy (ibid.).  
According to Agamben, the fact that the Sonderkommando were able to endure the most 
horrible of situations is testimony to “the incredible tendency of the limit situation to 
become the habit” (2002, 49). For in the camps, situations that would ordinarily be 
considered extreme formed the basis of everyday life. The extent to which the exception 
collapses into the norm will be extrapolated in the next section of this chapter. For the 
meantime, it is worth further examining the figure of the Sonderkommando who occupied 
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a space at the centre of the grey zone between victims and perpetrators, innocence and 
guilt.  
The Sonderkommando were separated from the other prisoners in the camp: they 
were kept in better living conditions with more food and were allowed to keep goods such 
as alcohol and cigarettes that had been salvaged from those sent to the gas chambers. But 
the prisoners forced into the Sonderkommando cannot be perceived as privileged. Levi 
argues that “one hesitates to speak of privilege: whoever belonged to this group was 
privileged only to the extent that—but at what cost—he had enough to eat for a few 
months, certainly not because he could be envied” (ibid., 34). Although they lived in 
better physical conditions than the other prisoners, the horrific and humiliating work that 
the Sonderkommando were forced to endure—where they were complicit in the 
destruction of their own people—had a decisively traumatic impact on those who had 
been a part of the so-called “special squad.” Moreover, the Sonderkommando were not 
exempt from the death sentence applying to all the prisoners of the camp. As “the bearers 
of a horrendous secret” (ibid., 36), they were destined for the gas chambers and 
crematoria, often after only just a few months of being part of the Sonderkommando. 
Ensuring that no one would live to speak of the horrors of the gas chambers, each squad 
of Sonderkommando were soon disposed of by the SS: each “remained operative for a 
few months, then it was suppressed [… and] the next squad burnt the corpses of its 
predecessors” (ibid., 34).  
While the SS may very well have assembled the Sonderkommando to carry out 
those awful tasks that they themselves were unwilling to perform—perhaps alleviating “a 
few consciences here and there” (ibid., 35)—the true horror of this forced complicity is 
that it displaced the culpability of the perpetrators onto their victims, robbing the latter of 
their victimhood and innocence. The chain of complicity in which the Sonderkommando 
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were forced to be a part of was one in which the oppressed became the oppressors and 
victims became perpetrators. “This institution,” writes Levi, “represented an attempt to 
shift on to others—specifically the victims—the burden of guilt, so that they were 
deprived of even the solace of innocence” (ibid., 37). The SS had transformed the 
Sonderkommando into “colleagues, by now as inhuman as themselves, hitched to the 
same cart, bound together by the foul link of imposed complicity” (ibid., 38). Levi 
considers the creation of the Sonderkommando as the Nazis’ “most demonic crime” (ibid., 
37) and insists that one not pass judgement on those “who have known such extreme 
destitution” (ibid., 36). He implores “that we meditate on the story of ‘the crematorium 
ravens’ with pity and rigour, but that a judgement of them be suspended” (ibid., 43).  
In his meditation on the grey zone, Levi refers to Miklós Nyiszli’s37 report of a 
soccer match that occurred at Auschwitz between the SS and the Sonderkommando: 
So, Nyiszli tells how during a ‘work’ pause he had attended a soccer game between the S.S. 
and the S.K. (Sonderkommando) […]. Other men of the S.S. and the rest of the squad are 
present at the game; they take sides, bet, applaud, urge the players on as if, rather than at the 
gates of hell, the game were taking place on the village green (ibid., 38). 
The game of soccer—in which two opposing teams “enter the field on equal footing, or 
almost” (ibid.)—demonstrates the imposed complicity of the Sonderkommando. In 
staging this game, it was as if the SS were saying “[w]e have embraced you, corrupted 
you, dragged you to the bottom with us” (ibid.). Levi perceives this soccer match as a 
perfectly striking example of the grey zone, in which victims and perpetrators enter a 
zone of indistinction. 
                                                 
37 Nyiszli (1901-) is a survivor of Auschwitz who was a part of the Sonderkommando, as well as being 
forced to be the chief medical doctor for the SS.   
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 In drawing on the figure of the Sonderkommando to problematise the divide 
between victims and perpetrators, innocence and guilt, I am not suggesting that there is no 
distinction between these categories or that they should be discarded altogether. The 
complicity of the Sonderkommando was forced on them by the SS in a deliberate attempt 
to contaminate their innocence, so to celebrate this collapse would be akin to repeating 
the gesture of the Nazis. While I do not mean to suggest that “we” are “all” 
Sonderkommando, I do intend on highlighting the means through which traumatic 
situations blur the divide between seemingly oppositional categories. Having revealed the 
grey zone between these terms, one might be in a better position to look beyond these 
strict dichotomies to make way for other categories which might better account for 
situations of trauma. Having considered the zone of indistinction between victims and 
perpetrators through the insights of Levi, the following section of this chapter turns to the 
work of Agamben to examine the grey zone between the exception and the norm. This 
will aid an understanding of how traumatic events can be used to shed light on ordinary 
events.  
The Exception and the Norm 
As well as highlighting an indeterminate grey zone between victims and perpetrators, the 
soccer match that occurred at Auschwitz draws into view a relation of ambiguity between 
the exception and the norm. Like Levi, Agamben argues that the display of normalcy in 
the game is what makes it so awful: 
This match might strike someone as a brief pause of humanity in the middle of an infinite 
horror. I, like the witnesses, instead view this match, this moment of normalcy, as the true 
horror of the camp. For we can perhaps think that the massacres are over—even if here and 
there they are repeated, not so far away from us. But that match is never over; it continues as if 
uninterrupted. It is the perfect and eternal cipher of the “gray zone,” which knows no time and 
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is in every place […]. But also hence our shame, the shame of those who did not know the 
camps and yet, without knowing how, are spectators of that match, which repeats itself in every 
match in our stadiums, in every television broadcast, in the normalcy of everyday life. If we do 
not succeed in understanding that match, in stopping it, there will never be hope (2002, 26). 
The game of soccer that occurred at Auschwitz brings to light the normalcy—indeed, the 
banality—of the horrors that occurred in the camps. The soccer match serves as a 
paradigm of the grey zone. As Leland de la Durantaye explains, “[f]or Agamben, the 
soccer game serves as a parable or emblem of the false sense of distance and security in 
which we live” (2009, 256-7).  
 Before I go on to explain what Agamben means when he argues that the soccer 
match that occurred in Auschwitz has continued on into the present, I will first consider 
the controversy that has resulted from his claim. Such controversy resonates with the 
criticisms of trauma theorists that were mentioned in both Chapter Two of this thesis as 
well as in the introduction of this present chapter. As well as being criticised for 
appropriating the status of victim (“I, like the witnesses, instead view this match, this 
moment of normalcy, as the true horror of the camp” (2002, 26)), Agamben is accused of 
over-extending a particular historical event into a broader post-Auschwitz setting. In 
drawing on Levi’s notion of the grey zone to explain the broader functioning of post-
Auschwitz culture, Debarati Sanyal accuses Agamben of “conflating the extermination 
camp and civilian life” (2002, 8). To say that there is ongoing systemic complicity in the 
soccer match that began in Auschwitz is to perform a theoretical “gesture that reaches 
beyond the concentrationary camp experience to include ‘us’ in a general condition of 
traumatic culpability” (ibid., 9). Leys criticises Agamben for insinuating that “the 
experience of Auschwitz is just as traumatic for us as it was for the original victims” 
(2007, 163, emphasis in original). By obfuscating the divide between the extraordinary 
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and the ordinary, Agamben is seen as suggesting “that the extreme, eliminationist 
violence masked by a game in Auschwitz is fundamentally the same as the violences 
masked by contemporary mass culture” (ibid., 7).  
These criticisms of Agamben also apply to trauma theorists, who mobilise their 
reflections on particular historical occurrences such as the Holocaust to formulate the 
crisis of history and representation that “we” are “all” forced to reckon with in a post-
traumatic era. Critics see this conceptual gesture as eradicating the historical specificity of 
the Holocaust and of erasing the distinct subject positions of primary witness and 
secondary witness. By turning to extreme situations like Auschwitz to explain the general 
and the everyday, trauma theorists are criticised for fusing the exception and the norm, 
the traumatic and the non-traumatic. Thus, in her work on post-Auschwitz culpability, 
Sanyal argues that  
the gray zone is currently deployed as the metaphor for an ongoing contamination that 
implicates secondary witnesses—that is to say, the readers, listeners, and viewers who issued 
forth in the aftermath of the Holocaust—within a general web of culpability (2002, 3).  
Through their invocation of the grey zone, Sanyal accuses both trauma theorists and 
Agamben of conflating the subject positions of actual victims of trauma with those who 
live in the traumatic aftermath of events such as the Holocaust. She and others argue that 
Agamben and trauma theorists alike dislodge traumatic events from their concrete 
historical context into a setting in which “we” are “all” universally embedded.  
The above criticisms stress the importance of treating historical singularities as 
singularities and of reserving the status of victim for those who directly experience 
traumatic events. Indeed, there is a tremendous gap between the victims of the Shoah and 
those who are living in the traumatic aftermath of these events. However, this does not 
foreclose the possibility of placing singularities side-by-side in a paradigmatic relation to 
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reveal commonalities between them. As was shown in Chapter Two, the paradigm 
dissolves the substantive differences between the general and the particular whilst 
maintaining the integrity of singular historical events. In the context of trauma, the 
inability to witness the Holocaust might serve to illuminate the inability to witness other 
traumatic events at the time of their occurrence. The crisis of witnessing brought on by 
the traumas of the Holocaust might also serve to reveal the inability to witness non-
traumatic events as they unfold. This is not to conflate the traumatic and the non-
traumatic, the exception and the norm but, rather, to draw on these events to illuminate 
hitherto unidentified similarities. 
As well as downplaying the function of the paradigm of preserving the singularity 
of discrete historical phenomenon, the aforementioned critics of Agamben tend to 
overlook his broader philosophical project. They focus only on his arguments in 
Remnants of Auschwitz, whilst forgetting that this text is a part of the Homo Sacer series. 
They also misconstrue Agamben’s theses as being historical when they are in fact 
ontological. Any universalisms implicit in Agamben’s work stem from the ontological 
status he attributes to juridco-political structures. In this section, I examine the state of 
exception as the necessary foundation of the juridco-political. Agamben’s work on the 
state of exception justifies his claim that the soccer match in Auschwitz is still continuing. 
Indeed, this claim is tied to Agamben’s argument that the exception has increasingly 
become the norm in modern political states. As the materialisation of the state of 
exception, the camp is the hidden matrix of the juridical-political structure in which we 
are still living. This is why the soccer match that occurred at Auschwitz is not yet over. 
Agamben theorises that the state of exception is a preventative police measure 
designed to avert dangers to the security of the state (1998, 167). The state of exception 
enables the suspension of individuals’ rights, allowing the internment of individuals 
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independent of criminal behaviour (ibid.). The Nazis pronounced a state of exception 
when they took power of Germany in 1933, suspending the individual liberties previously 
guaranteed under the Weimar constitution (ibid., 169). Thus, the juridical basis for 
interning prisoners in Nazi Germany was not ordinary law but, rather, the state of 
exception (ibid., 167). The first concentration camp at Dachau, purportedly designed for 
“political prisoners,” was separated from ordinary law, including “the rules of prison and 
penal law, which then and subsequently had no bearing on it” (ibid.). Agamben, however, 
notes that the Nazis did not make explicit reference to the state of exception in their 
decree (namely, the Decree for the Protection of the People and the State), so the state of 
exception was “left in force in the normal situation” (ibid., 168). Given this, “[t]he state of 
exception ceases to be referred to as an external and provisional state of factual danger 
and comes to be confused with juridical rule itself” (ibid., emphasis in original).  
In State of Exception (2005), Agamben provides a number of examples to support 
his claim that the state of exception is “one of the essential practices of modern political 
states” (2). As well as offering the example of the Hitler’s suspension of the Weimar 
constitution, Agamben provides the example of the “military order” given by George W. 
Bush in November 2001, which authorised the “indefinite detention” of noncitizens 
suspected of terrorism (ibid., 3). For Agamben, modern politics signals an ongoing state 
of exception, in which the exception is increasingly becoming the norm. But before I 
elaborate on this, it is important to consider Agamben’s insights concerning the 
interrelation between the exception and the norm.  
 Across his work, Agamben argues that the exception is both the limit and the 
foundation of the normal legal order (1998, 12). The state of exception is an “inclusive 
exclusion” in which the exception is excluded from—and, in effect, included in—the 
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normal situation (ibid., 22).38 Despite being excluded from the norm, the exception is not 
entirely removed from it (ibid.). The exception does not reside outside of the norm—it is 
not transcendent. For when the exception is excluded, the exception maintains its relation 
to the norm through the norm’s suspension (ibid., 17-8). Given this, the validity of the 
normal legal order is maintained through the form of its suspension in the state of 
exception (ibid., 17). The relation between the exception and the norm is that the latter 
“applies to the exception in no longer applying, in withdrawing from it” (ibid., 18, 
emphasis in original). The state of exception is an inclusive exclusion insofar as  
[w]hat is outside is included […] by means of the suspension of the juridical order’s validity—
by letting the juridical order, that is, withdraw from the exception and abandon it. The 
exception does not subtract itself from the rule; rather, the rule, suspending itself, gives rise to 
the exception and, maintaining itself in relation to the exception, first constitutes itself as a rule. 
The particular “force” of law consists in this capacity of law to maintain itself in relation to an 
exteriority (ibid.). 
In its relation of exteriority, the exception gives rise to the norm as an interiority. The 
exception does not simply exist outside of the norm; rather than existing as a pure state of 
exclusion, the state of exception is an inclusive exclusion which allows the norm to come 
into being. Thus, in Agamben’s work, the exception and the norm enter a zone of 
indeterminacy. The norm consists of “nothing but what it manages to capture inside itself 
through the inclusive exclusion of the exceptio: it nourishes itself on this exception” 
(ibid.). Accordingly, the exception does not lie beyond a certain threshold but is, rather, 
immanent to the norm—the limit and the norm “illuminate each other from the inside” 
(ibid., 49). 
                                                 
38 Agamben’s theses on the exception as an “inclusive exclusion” and the example as an “exclusive 
inclusion” were touched on in Chapter Two of this thesis in my discussion of the paradigm.  
   
 
104 
 
 
 In Remnants of Auschwitz, Agamben draws on the “limit situation” or the 
“extreme situation,” evoked by philosophers and theologians alike, as being analogous to 
the state of exception (2002, 48). Like the state of exception—which is both the 
foundation and the limit of the normal juridical order—the limit situation is constitutive 
of the normal situation (ibid.). Agamben explains that although the limit and the norm 
secretly institute each other, they are usually separated in time and space (ibid., 50). 
Auschwitz, however, brought the exception and the norm together: “Auschwitz is 
precisely the place in which the state of exception coincides perfectly with the rule and 
the extreme situation becomes the very paradigm of daily life” (ibid., 49). Here, the limit 
was collapsed into the norm and could no longer function as a distinguishing criterion 
(ibid.). Thus, the lesson of the camps is “that of absolute immanence, of ‘everything being 
in everything’” (ibid., my emphasis). In this way, limit events not only explain 
exceptional circumstances but also explain the general and the norm (ibid.). This is 
because the exception is the very foundation of the norm.  
To understand Agamben’s controversial claim in Remnants of Auschwitz 
concerning the ongoing game of soccer, it is necessary to consider his argument in Homo 
Sacer (1998) and Means Without End (2000) that the camps are the hidden nomos of the 
modern. For Agamben, the camp is both a specific historical phenomenon and the 
materialisation of the state of exception. Rather than basing his examination of the camps 
on what occurred there, Agamben reflects on the juridico-political structure of the camps 
that allowed what occurred there to happen in the first place (1998, 166). Such an 
examination leads Agamben to regard the camps as not simply “a historical fact and an 
anomaly belonging to the past […] but as the hidden matrix and nomos of the political 
space in which we are still living” (ibid.).  
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In his State of Exception, Agamben formulates the camp as “the space that is 
opened when the state of exception begins to become the rule” (2005, 168-9, emphasis in 
original). As a concrete manifestation of the state of exception, the camp occupies a space 
that cuts across the inside and the outside of the normal legal order: 
The camp is a piece of land placed outside the normal juridical order, but it is nevertheless not 
simply an external space. What is excluded in the camp is, according to the etymological sense 
of the term ‘exception’ (ex-capere), taken outside, included through its own exclusion. But 
what is first of all taken into the juridical order is the state of exception itself (ibid., 169-70, 
emphasis in original). 
In the camp, the state of exception is “given a permanent spatial arrangement, which as 
such nevertheless remains outside the normal order” (ibid., 168-9). As the materialisation 
of the state of exception, in which the exception maintains the norm in its relation of 
exteriority, the camp serves as the originary condition of the normal legal order. Agamben 
maintains that because the camp “is the hidden matrix of the politics in which we are still 
living […] we must learn to recognize [the camp] in all its metamorphoses into the zones 
d’attentes of our airports and certain outskirts of our cities” (ibid., 175). The detention 
centres that Australia established in Nauru and Mannus Island; Camp Delta at 
Guantanamo Bay; and the Bosnian rape camps, are only a few modern-day examples of 
the materialisation of the state of exception in the space of the camp.  
In light of these insights, when Agamben argues that the soccer match that 
occurred in Auschwitz continues well into the present, he does not—as his critics argue—
obfuscate the distinction between victims and perpetrators, nor does he collapse primary 
and secondary witnesses. Instead, Agamben shows how the state of exception is both the 
limit and the foundation of the very juridico-political structure in which we are still living. 
The soccer match is used as a paradigm of the grey zone which, in turn, serves as a 
   
 
106 
 
 
paradigm of the camp. These spaces illuminate the ongoing state of exception in modern 
juridico-political structures. Indeed, the camp is a sign of the state of exception being 
increasingly invoked by contemporary political states, with the state of exception 
manifesting itself in the concrete spatial arrangements of modern-day camps (for 
example, Guantanamo Bay, et cetera).  
By placing Auschwitz in a paradigmatic relation to contemporary camps, 
Agamben maintains the singularity of these spaces whilst revealing them as 
concretisations of the state of exception. To extend these insights to trauma theory, it can 
be argued that configuring trauma as a paradigm for history might also preserve the 
singularity of the traumatic and the non-traumatic whilst maintaining their singularity. If 
Felman and Caruth’s respective comments on history as holocaust and history as trauma 
are interpreted through the Agambenian category of the paradigm, the traumatic and the 
non-traumatic can retain their singularity whilst illuminating hitherto unidentified 
relations between the extraordinary and the ordinary, the exception and the norm.  
Having examined the intricate relation between the exception and the norm in the 
work of Agamben, the following sections of this chapter consider the writings of Arendt 
through the lens of trauma. In so doing, I will reflect on the rupturing impact of trauma on 
preexisting categories of thought, specifically the legal categories of criminality and 
personal responsibility. In what follows, I consider the extent to which the extraordinary 
implicates the ordinary, revealing that these categories need not be conceived as being 
mutually exclusive. In this way, I uphold the immanence of traumatic rupture as a notion 
which bypasses the dichotomous assumptions in trauma theory that are so intent on 
positing trauma on either side of the ordinary or the extraordinary, the immanent or the 
transcendent, with one of these possibilities automatically foreclosing the possibility of 
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the other. As will be shown, trauma cuts across both extremes and is irreducible to the 
dichotomous logic at the crux of the polemic between the extra/ordinary. 
Trials and Traumas 
In an era in which trials—televised and broadcast—ceased to be a matter of exclusive interest 
to jurists and penetrated and increasingly invaded culture, literature, art, politics, and the 
deliberated public life of society at large, the hidden link between trauma and the law has 
gradually become more visible and more drastically apparent (Felman 2002, 2). 
In The Juridical Unconscious: Trials and Traumas in the Twentieth Century (2002), 
Felman illuminates the link between trials and traumas that was brought to the forefront 
of collective consciousness in the twentieth century. She argues that in the wake of 
individual and collective traumas, “the promised exercise of legal justice—of justice by 
trial and law—has become civilization’s most appropriate and most essential, most 
ultimately meaningful response to the violence that wounds it” (ibid., 3). Through her 
exposition on the crucial relation between traumas and trials, Felman shows that trauma 
spills across the personal and the collective, the private and the public, and cannot be 
situated in either of these extremes alone. The shattering impact of trauma, she writes, 
“unsettles the stereotypical division between the public and the private and requires a 
rethinking […] of the relationship between what is presumed to be private trauma and 
what is presumed to be collective, public trauma” (ibid., 5).  
Felman posits the trial as a tool for coming to terms with the wounding impact of 
trauma in personal and collective consciousness. However, this is not to say that trauma 
can be completely healed or closed over by the trial. Trauma is a wound that cannot be 
contained in the language of the law; trauma haunts the proceedings as an excess that 
could at any time burst through the legal frame. While “the law tries to contain trauma 
and to translate it into legal-conscious terminology, thus reducing its strange interruption 
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[…] it often is in fact trauma that takes over and whose surreptitious logic in the end 
reclaims the trial” (ibid.). Situated at the level of the juridical unconscious, the disruptive 
impact of trauma pushes its way into juridical consciousness, manifesting itself in the 
breaks and disruptions that occur within the trial.  
In establishing the crucial link between traumas and trials, Felman turns to 
Arendt’s report on Eichmann’s trial in Jerusalem. The trial of Eichmann is a platform for 
coming to terms with the traumatic impact of the Holocaust. Although I do not rely solely 
on Felman’s reading of Arendt, and instead turn to a discussion of Arendt’s primary texts 
themselves, my reading is nonetheless influenced by Felman’s work on trauma. Read 
through the lens of trauma, Arendt’s earlier work on radical evil informs an account of the 
devastating impact of trauma. Arendt’s later work on Eichmann, on the other hand, is 
useful in conceiving the ordinary components of trauma. In accordance with the major 
theme of Part One of this thesis—that is, the tension between the extraordinary and the 
ordinary—I place Arendt’s insights on radical evil on the side of the extraordinary and 
her work on the banality of evil on the side of the ordinary. Where the next two sections 
of this chapter will closely examine Arendt’s report on Eichmann’s trial, this current 
section unpacks Arendt’s earlier notion of radical evil and prefaces the important shift 
that occurs in her work regarding the nature of evil and the function of the law in 
comprehending this phenomenon.  
The problem of evil is a central concern across Arendt’s philosophical corpus—
indeed, she predicts that evil will be “the fundamental question of postwar life in Europe” 
([1945] 1994, 134). While this prediction was not altogether accurate, the question of evil 
nonetheless remained an important topic for Arendt, who dedicated a large portion of her 
work to forming an understanding of the unprecedented evils that arose out of Nazi 
totalitarianism. In The Origins of Totalitarianism ([1951] 1973), Arendt upholds the 
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Kantian notion of radical evil as a phenomenon that ruptures preexisting categories of 
thought. In the preface to the first edition of this book, Arendt explains that radical evil 
withstands “the rules of common sense and self-interest” and that it cannot “be deduced 
by any humanly comprehensible motives,” including those of “greed, covetousness, [or] 
resentment” (ibid., xii). Radical evil signals a breaking point in civilisation that gives rise 
to “holes of oblivion” (ibid.). Arendt stresses the inability of the judicial system or of any 
other preconceived categories of thought to adequately account for the enormity of radical 
evil: “we […] have nothing to fall back on in order to understand a phenomenon that 
nevertheless confronts us with its overpowering reality and breaks down all standards we 
know” (ibid., 459).  
Arendt’s shift in perspective from radical to banal evil is prefaced in her written 
correspondence with Karl Jaspers. At around the time of the Nuremberg trials—a series 
of trials held from 1945 to 1946 by the allied forces after the Second World War—Arendt 
stresses the inability of the law to measure the enormity of the crimes committed by the 
Nazi perpetrators. When faced with the question of totalitarian evil, Arendt explicitly 
argues that the Nazis’ crimes cannot be grasped by the law, or by any other conceptual 
framework for that matter. As Arendt sees it, the guilt of the perpetrators and the 
innocence of the victims “oversteps and shatters” ([1946] 1992, 54) the limits of the law. 
In a letter to Jaspers, Arendt writes: 
[t]he Nazi crimes, it seems to me, explode the limits of the law; and that is precisely what 
constitutes their monstrousness. For these crimes, no punishment is severe enough […]. That 
is, this guilt, in contrast to all criminal guilt, oversteps and shatters any and all legal systems. 
That is the reason why the Nazis in Nuremberg are so smug. They know that, of course. And 
just as inhuman as their guilt is the innocence of the victims […]. We are simply not equipped 
to deal, on a human, political level, with a guilt that is beyond crime […]. I don’t know how we 
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will ever get out of it, for the Germans are burdened now with […] hundreds of thousands of 
people who cannot be adequately punished within the legal system (ibid.). 
Here, Arendt speaks of the inability of the law to account for the extremity of totalitarian 
evil, which she posits in radical opposition to all existing frames of reference.  
Jaspers, however, disagrees with the key claims made by Arendt in her letter. He 
argues that positing the guilt of the perpetrators beyond comprehension mystifies and 
mythologises something that needs to be judged within the sober realm of the law (ibid., 
62). While Arendt attempts to overcome the reductionism of the law in emphasising the 
incomprehensibility of radical evil, Jaspers objects to Arendt’s gesture, seeing it as both 
mystifying and aestheticising the Nazi perpetrators. With regard to the former charge of 
mystification, Jaspers accuses Arendt of positing the guilt of the perpetrators in a quasi-
theological realm, ungraspable by human thought. In relation to the latter charge of 
aestheticisation, Jaspers accuses Arendt of conferring on Nazi evil the prestige of myth 
and legend (ibid.). Although Arendt is only half convinced by Jaspers’ critique at the time 
of this particular exchange of letters (ibid.), after attending and reporting on the trial of 
Eichmann, she retracts her previously held thesis on radical evil in favour of what she 
terms the banality of evil.39 More will be said on the banality of evil in the coming 
sections of this chapter, but, in the meantime, it is worth further reflecting on the shift that 
occurs in Arendt’s perspective regarding the relationship between evil and the function of 
the law in apprehending such evil.  
In contrast with her earlier emphasis on the shattering effects of evil on 
fundamental categories of thought, including the discourse of the law, Arendt’s later work 
posits the law as the only possible means for meting out justice for the crimes committed 
                                                 
39 Felman notes: “When the Eichmann trial is announced fifteen years later, Jaspers and Arendt switch 
positions. Jaspers maintains that Israel should not try Eichmann, because Eichmann’s guilt—the subject of 
the trial—is ‘larger than law’” (2002, 139-40) 
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by Nazi perpetrators. While Arendt’s earlier writings argue that Nazi evil cannot be 
measured by any existing yardstick—including, but not limited to, the law—she later 
posits the law as an essential platform for making sense of evil. Arendt still maintains that 
the Nazis’ crimes are unprecedented in kind, however she insists that it is the law itself 
which must live up to the task of understanding by establishing a new precedent under 
which the crimes can be assessed.  
In another letter to Jaspers, written right before the Eichmann trial in 1961, Arendt 
remarks on the importance of the law in coming to terms with the immensity of 
Eichmann’s crimes, despite the fact that such crimes cannot be accounted for within any 
preexisting legal framework: 
it seems to me to be in the nature of this case that we have no tools to hand except legal ones 
with which we have to judge and pass sentence on something that cannot even be adequately 
represented either in legal terms or in political terms. That is precisely what makes the process 
itself, namely the trial, so exciting (ibid., 417).  
This letter reveals a common thread in Arendt’s work regarding the rupturing impact of 
Nazi evil and the difficulty of containing it in language and thought. Although there is a 
significant shift that occurs between Arendt’s earlier and later accounts of evil, as well a 
shift in the role that Arendt attributes to the law in apprehending such evil, she 
consistently affirms the Nazis’ crimes as unprecedented in kind. The difference is that 
where Arendt’s earlier work stresses the shattering impact of the Nazis’ crimes on 
preexisting categories of thought, her later work emphasises the need to reexamine 
existing frameworks to accommodate for that which is profoundly and unsettlingly new.  
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Arendt in Jerusalem  
Arendt attended and reported on the trial of Eichmann for The New Yorker,40 later 
expanding and publishing the series of articles in her famous—yet controversial—book, 
Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil ([1963] 2006). Eichmann was 
kidnapped from Argentina41 by the Mossad on 11 May, 1960, to be brought to trial in the 
District Court of Jerusalem on April 11, 1961 (ibid., 21-2). Having facilitated the death of 
countless people, Eichmann stood accused on fifteen counts, including crimes against the 
Jewish people, crimes against humanity, and war crimes (ibid., 21). Yet to each of these 
counts, Eichmann pleaded that he was not guilty in the sense of the indictment (ibid.). For 
“the indictment implied not only that he had acted on purpose, which he did not deny, but 
out of base motives and in full knowledge of the criminal nature of his deeds” (ibid., 25). 
The problem with the indictment was that what Eichmann had done was only a crime in 
retrospect; Eichmann had always acted as a law-abiding citizen under the Third Reich 
(ibid.). Over the course of his trial, Eichmann reiterated that he was guilty only of “aiding 
and abetting” the commissioning of the crimes in which he stood accused (ibid., 22). He 
further objected that he had “never killed a Jew, or for that matter, I never killed a non-
Jew” (ibid., 22).  
                                                 
40 The idea to report on Eichmann’s trial was not The New Yorker’s, but Arendt’s own. As a Jew, a former 
German, a displaced person, and a social critic, attending the trial was an obligation that Arendt thought she 
owed to her past (Elon 2006a, xii). Eichmann in Jerusalem was a deeply personal work for Arendt, and the 
task of writing this report helped to relieve Arendt from a heavy burden (ibid., ix). She had never seen a 
Nazi criminal with her own eyes and wanted to understand the man responsible for the murder of countless 
people. 
41 After the defeat of the Nazis, Eichmann fled to Argentina, having obtained papers and a work visa under 
the alias of Ricardo Klement (ibid., 236). Prior to his capture, Eichmann had been living with his family in a 
poor suburb of Buenos Aires with no electricity or running water (ibid., 237). Eichmann lived a dreary life 
in Argentina, working in number of poorly paid jobs, including laundry work and rabbit farming (ibid.). He 
grew tired of living a life of anonymity and bragged endlessly about his Nazi identity to the other Nazis 
who were also hiding out in Argentina (ibid.). Eichmann would repeat ad nauseam to almost anyone who 
would listen that he was responsible for the death of millions of people (ibid., 47). It would seem that 
“bragging had always been one of his cardinal vices” (ibid., 29). Given this, it was not difficult for the 
Israeli Secret Services to find Eichmann. Arendt remarks: “the puzzle is not how it was possible to find 
Eichmann’s hideout but, rather, how it was possible not to discover it earlier” (ibid., 238). 
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In his most prominent role in the SS, Eichmann was responsible for the logistics 
behind the expulsion of the Jews, which later involved the deportation of Jews to 
concentration and extermination camps. Eichmann played a central role in the Nazi 
machinery of mass murder: it was up to him and his department how many people could 
and should be transported to the concentration and extermination camps (ibid., 153). But 
Eichmann was not bothered by his conscience whilst facilitating the transportation of 
Jews to their imminent deaths; his thoughts were preoccupied “with the staggering job of 
organization and administration” (ibid., 151). Eichmann was “an important conveyor 
belt” (ibid., 153) in the Nazi genocide of the European Jewry; however, he saw himself as 
an individual who was merely carrying out his duties. Arendt remarks that what 
Eichmann saw as a job, “with its daily routines, its ups and downs, was for the Jews quite 
literally the end of the world” (ibid., 153). Eichmann facilitated mass murder from a safe 
distance, as though it were merely a matter of administration and bureaucracy. It is for 
this reason that Eichmann has been infamously dubbed the “desk murderer” (Cesarani 
2006).  
The prosecutor at Eichmann’s trial, Gideon Hausner, was unable to understand 
someone who had facilitated mass murder without killing anyone with his own hands and 
continually attempted to prove that Eichmann was guilty of murder (ibid., 215). Yet there 
was no evidence in the court to support that Eichmann had actually killed anyone—at 
least directly. He knew perfectly well of the reality of the exterminations, but this was a 
reality that Eichmann was unwilling to face—he claimed that he could not stand the sight 
of blood without becoming physically weak (ibid., 87).42 On a few occasions, Eichmann 
had been sent to the camps against his wishes to oversee what was taking place, but he 
                                                 
42 Eichmann told his boss, Heinrich Müller, the former head of the Gestapo, that he was not “‘tough 
enough’ for these sights, that he had never been a soldier, had never been to the front, [and] had never seen 
action” (ibid., 89). 
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reported that these incidents were deeply traumatic for him.43 He complained that “he 
could not sleep and had nightmares” (ibid.). Despite a few isolated incidents, Eichmann 
did not see much of what happened: “he had never actually attended a mass execution by 
shooting,” nor had he “actually watched the gassing process” (ibid.).  
In her report on Eichmann’s trial, Arendt examines the extent to which the court 
of Jerusalem was forced to reckon with the unprecedented character of Eichmann’s 
crimes, when these crimes ruptured preexisting notions of criminality. In an attempt to 
rethink legal meaning in the wake of Auschwitz, Arendt questions the juridical notion of 
personal responsibility—a notion that the law presupposes—when numerous Nazi 
perpetrators such as Eichmann claimed to be simply carrying out their duties (Fine 2001, 
139). After Auschwitz, there is a tremendous gap between carrying out one’s duties and 
being responsible for one’s actions, which becomes evident when considering the 
widespread complicity with Nazi totalitarianism in German society at the time of the Nazi 
regime. This is not to absolve perpetrators from responsibility or guilt, but to question 
preexisting notions of legal culpability to account for the fact that monstrous actions need 
not be derived from monstrous intentions.  
Far from dismissing Eichmann’s horrendous deeds, Arendt argues that the absence 
of base motives exhibited by Eichmann in his task of facilitating genocide is both the 
highest and newest crime in, and against, humanity. Arguing that the banality of evil 
signals a break in traditional notions of criminality, Arendt highlights the urgent task of 
reconciling the gap between the unprecedented nature of Eichmann’s crimes and the 
judgement of the law. She questions how the law can mete out adequate punishment for 
                                                 
43 Rothberg points out that “perpetrators of extreme violence can suffer from trauma—but this makes them 
no less guilty of their crimes and does not necessarily entail claims to victimization or even demands on our 
sympathy” (2009, 90). The notion of perpetrator trauma receives special attention in LaCapra’s Writing 
History, Writing Trauma ([2001] 2014).  
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Eichmann given his lack of base motives. Because Eichmann’s crimes were 
unprecedented in kind, reaching an understanding and ascertaining justice requires a 
restructuring of the legal imagination by inventing new legal idioms under which 
Eichmann’s crimes can be assessed (Bilsky 1996, 144). 
Arendt’s report on Eichmann’s trial is ultimately critical.44 She places great 
importance on the trial as a platform for understanding Eichmann’s crimes and perceives 
the court of Jerusalem as falling short of establishing this. Arendt contends that the court 
of Jerusalem played out as a parodic show trial, whereby various political discourses 
functioned to derail the pursuit of justice.45 A just trial, according to Arendt, would focus 
on determining the crimes committed by Eichmann in accordance with the law. However, 
the Prime Minister at the time, David Ben Gurion, was determined to stage a trial that 
would leave its mark on history—highlighting on-going Jewish struggles, and of creating 
a sense of national solidarity amongst the Jewish people. It seemed to be in the court’s 
best interest to emphasise the anti-Semitism stratagem behind the Final Solution and to 
position Eichmann as the mastermind behind the Holocaust. As Arendt sees it, the 
prosecution functioned as a mouth-piece for the prime minister, deliberately 
                                                 
44 Although Arendt’s report on Eichmann’s trial is largely critical, it is worth noting that there are some 
aspects of the trial that Arendt approved of. Other critics at the time believed that Eichmann should not be 
tried in the court of his victims because it would obstruct the objectivity of the proceedings. Arendt 
disagreed with this sentiment and thought that it was only fair that Eichmann should be tried in Jerusalem. 
Arendt also held great respect for the judges of the trial and agreed that Eichmann deserved the death 
penalty. 
45 Given the political discourses functioning within the court, Arendt objects to the trial on the grounds that 
“it is not an individual that is in the dock at this historic trial, and not the Nazi regime alone, but anti-
Semitism throughout history” (ibid., 19). “Justice”, writes Arendt,  
demands that the accused be prosecuted, defended, and judged, and that all the other questions 
of seemingly greater import […] be left in abeyance. Justice insists on the importance of Adolf 
Eichmann […] the man in the glass booth built for his protection […]. On trial are his deeds, 
not the sufferings of the Jews, not the German people or mankind, not even anti-Semitism or 
racism ([1963] 2006, 5). 
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misconstruing Eichmann as a calculating murderer when he was little more than a 
thoughtless bureaucrat. 
The Banality of Evil 
When Arendt was confronted with Eichmann in court, she was immediately taken aback 
by his sheer ordinariness. The man seated in the glass bullet-proof booth surrounded by 
guards did not appear to be a dangerous psychopath or a monster but, rather, an ordinary 
person. This was consolidated by one of the Israeli court psychiatrists in charge of 
Eichmann’s psychological evaluation, who had declared him to be “a completely normal 
man, more normal, at any rate, than I am after examining him” (ibid., 25). Another 
psychiatrist had found that Eichmann’s “whole psychological outlook, his attitude toward 
his wife and children, mother and father, brothers, sisters, and friends was ‘not only 
normal but most desirable’” (ibid., 25-6). In her own examination, Arendt observes that 
Eichmann did not at all appear to be anti-Semitic: “his was obviously no case of insane 
hatred of Jews, of fanatic anti-Semitism, or indoctrination of any kind” (ibid., 26). 
Eichmann was thus in no position to claim moral or legal insanity for the crimes that he 
had committed. In The Life of the Mind ([1971] 1978), Arendt explains that during 
Eichmann’s trial, she was 
struck by a manifest shallowness in the doer that made it impossible to trace the incontestable 
evil in his deeds to any deeper level of roots or motives. The deeds were monstrous, but the 
doer—at least the very effective one now on trial—was quite ordinary, commonplace, and 
neither demonic nor monstrous. There was no […] firm ideological convictions or specific evil 
motives, and the only notable characteristic […] was something entirely negative: it was not 
stupidity but thoughtlessness (4, emphasis in original). 
Thoughtlessness, for Arendt, resides in the inability to think for oneself or from another 
person’s perspective.  
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Arendt contends that Eichmann’s thoughtlessness was closely connected to his 
inability to speak coherently in court ([1963] 2006, 49). There were two major obstacles 
that stood in the way of deriving a coherent statement from Eichmann. Firstly, his 
memory was faulty and he could only remember things that directly bore on his career 
(ibid., 62). Secondly, and most importantly, he had memorised a number of stock phrases 
and clichés that corresponded to important moments of his life (ibid., 53). The kind of 
language demonstrated by Eichmann throughout his trial is typical of the SS mentality, 
where various “language rules” were contrived to camouflage the reality of the 
horrendous crimes that were being perpetrated (ibid., 69). For example, under the Nazi 
rule, the notion of “genocide” was expressed through the administrative language of the 
“Final Solution,” and the word for “murder” was replaced with the notion of granting a 
“mercy death” or of carrying out “compulsory euthanasia” (ibid., 70). Any sympathy the 
Nazis may have felt for their victims was flipped around onto themselves—“instead of 
saying: What horrible things I did to people!, the murderers would be able to say: What 
horrible things I had to watch in the pursuance of my duties, how heavily the task 
weighed upon my shoulders!” (ibid., 106). Under the Third Reich, the moral law was 
turned upside-down, to the extent that “evil lost its distinctive characteristic by which 
most people had until then recognized it” and “[c]onventional goodness became a mere 
temptation which most Germans were fast learning to resist. Within this upside-down 
world Eichmann […] seemed not to have been aware of having done evil” (Elon 2006a, 
xiii). 
Couched in Nazi rhetoric, Eichmann’s thoughtlessness obstructed him from 
perceiving responsibility for his actions. The practice of self-deception had become so 
rampant under Nazi-occupied Germany that it had become ingrained in Eichmann’s own 
mentality, over-riding his moral conscience (ibid., 50-1). Eichmann was able to shield his 
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conscience from the harsh reality of what it was that he was actually doing—namely, 
facilitating mass murder—through the use of cold, bureaucratic jargon. The Nazi rhetoric 
that Eichmann relied so heavily on throughout his trial proved to be a major source of 
frustration to the court. When the prosecution appeared to grow tired of Eichmann’s 
shallow testimony, Eichmann apologised, admitting that “[o]fficialise is my only 
language” (ibid., 48).  
The bureaucratic jargon uttered by Eichmann throughout his trial appeared to 
Arendt as self-deception, through which he evaded responsibility for his criminal actions. 
She argues that “no communication was possible with him [Eichmann], not because he 
lied but because he was surrounded by the most reliable of all safeguards against the 
words and the presence of others, and hence against reality as such” (ibid., 49). Where 
Arendt perceives Eichmann as “genuinely incapable of uttering a single sentence that was 
not a cliché” (ibid., 45), the court thought that the emptiness of Eichmann’s words was 
feigned. Still adamant that Eichmann acted with base motives, the court of Jerusalem 
“sought the easiest way out of the dilemma between the unspeakable horror of the deeds 
and the undeniable ludicrousness of the man who perpetrated them, and declared him a 
clever, calculating liar—which he obviously was not” (ibid., 54). Arendt retorts that 
“everyone could see that this man was not a ‘monster,’ but it was difficult indeed not to 
suspect that he was a clown” (ibid.). Eichmann was not a criminal mastermind—his 
crimes were the horrifying result of his inability to think for himself, or from another 
person’s perspective. As Arendt sees it, it was this inability to think that predisposed 
Eichmann to becoming one of the worst criminals of all time (Elon 2006a, xiii). 
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 Along with Arendt’s report itself, the phrase used in the subtitle of her book—“the 
banality of evil”—has gained considerable controversy,46 and has been subject to a 
plurality of interpretations, misinterpretations, and applications.47 Arendt herself only 
uses her famous phrase twice in her book: in the subtitle and in the closing sentence, 
where she sums up “the lesson that this long course in human wickedness had taught us—
the lesson of the fearsome, word-and-thought-defying banality of evil” (ibid., 252, 
emphasis in original). One must be careful, however, of making sweeping generalisations 
about the banality of evil and of suggesting that there is an Eichmann in “all” of “us.” In a 
postscript to Eichmann in Jerusalem, Arendt clarifies that she did not intend her book to 
be a general treatise on evil and that her focus was on Eichmann himself: “a man of flesh 
and blood with an individual history [… a] unique set of qualities, peculiarities, 
behavioural patterns, and circumstances” (ibid., 285). When Arendt speaks of the banality 
of evil, she does so “on a strict factual level, pointing to a phenomenon which stared one 
in the face at the trial” (ibid., 287). She rejects the idea that Eichmann was simply a cog in 
a machine because this conceptual sleight of hand absolves Eichmann from responsibility 
for his crimes. It is as if to say that  
he acted not as a man but as a mere functionary whose functions could just have easily have 
been carried out by anyone else, it is as if a criminal pointed to the statistics on crime—which 
set forth so-and-so many crimes per day are committed in such-a-such a place—and declared 
                                                 
46 Arendt was subject to a number of personal attacks: she was called a “self-hating Jew” who had written a 
pro-Eichmann book and even received death threats (Elon, 2006b). 
47 The Yale psychologist, Stanley Milgram, tested Arendt’s thesis on the banality of evil when conducting 
his famous experiment, in which participants were instructed to administer almost lethal doses of electric 
shocks to other participants. Milgram found that a clear majority of people were willing to cooperate. He 
later remarked that “[a]fter witnessing hundreds of ordinary people submit to authority in our own 
experiments, I must conclude that Arendt’s conception of the banality of evil comes closer to the truth than 
one might dare imagine […] ordinary people, simply doing their jobs, and without any particular hostility 
on their part, can become agents in a terrible destructive process.” (cited in Baer 2001, n.p.). Following 
Milgram, others have taken Arendt’s thesis as proof that there is “an Eichmann in all of us” and any one 
could have done the same if they were in Eichmann’s situation (ibid.). 
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that he only did what was statistically expected, that is was mere accident he did it and not 
someone else, since after all, somebody had to do it (ibid., 289). 
Although Arendt perceives Eichmann as an ordinary man, she does not suggest that he is 
innocent of the crimes that he committed. After all, it is the function of a trial to transform 
so-called “cogs” back into human perpetrators and to hold them accountable for their 
criminal acts (ibid.).  
The banality of evil is illustrative of the sheer ordinariness of Eichmann and the 
role he played in the facilitation of mass murder. Arendt remarks that the man responsible 
for the death of millions himself “personified neither hatred or madness nor an insatiable 
thirst for blood” (Elon 2006a, xiii). In observing that “one cannot extract any diabolical or 
demonic profundity from Eichmann,” Arendt reaches the chilling conclusion that “[i]t 
was sheer thoughtlessness—something by no means identical with stupidity—that 
predisposed [… Eichmann] to become one of the greatest criminals of that period” 
([1963] 2006, 287-8). Perhaps the most horrifying consequence of Arendt’s verdict is that 
thoughtlessness “can wreak more havoc than all the evil instincts taken together which, 
perhaps, are inherent in man [sic]” (ibid., 288).  
The banality of evil moves beyond the image of the Nazis as monsters, thus 
demythologising and demystifying the phenomenon of evil. Yet because Arendt believed 
that Eichmann had no sinister motives, and had characterised him as an ordinary man, she 
has been accused of disrespecting the victims of the Holocaust and of exonerating 
Eichmann for his crimes. While Arendt’s thesis on the banality of evil has been accused 
of absolving Eichmann from responsibility for his criminal actions, it is a concept that 
actually heightens personal responsibility, insofar as it repositions Nazi evil away from a 
quasi-theological realm into a context that is all too human. Some have perceived 
Arendt’s remarks on the banality of evil as trivialising the suffering of the victims and of 
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diminishing the immensity of the crimes committed. However, the banality of evil applies 
to the man who committed such heinous crimes and not to his crimes themselves. Paul 
Formosa explains that “[i]t was not Eichmann’s evil that was banal, indeed, far from it, 
his actions involved perpetrating radical evil. Rather it was Eichmann himself that was 
banal” (2008, 90). Given the common misunderstandings of Arendt’s claims, Seyla 
Benhabib suggests that “[a] better phrase than the ‘banality of evil’ might have been the 
‘routinization of evil’ or its Alltäglichung (everydayness)” (1990, 185).  
Reconciling the Radical and Banal: Word-and-Thought-Defying Banality 
The question of whether Arendt’s divergent claims regarding radical and banal evil can be 
reconciled has been the focus of much debate. In a famous exchange of letters with 
Arendt, Gersholm Scholem retorts that Arendt’s notions of radical and banal evil are 
contradictory. In response to Scholem’s criticism, Arendt admits to having changed her 
mind regarding the character of evil: 
I changed my mind and do no longer speak of “radical evil” […]. It is indeed my opinion now 
that evil is never “radical,” that it is only extreme, and that it possesses neither depth nor any 
demonic dimension. It can overgrow and lay waste the whole world precisely because it 
spreads like a fungus on the surface. It is “thought-defying,” as I said, because thought tries to 
reach some depth, to go to the roots, and the moment in concerns itself with evil, it is frustrated 
because there is nothing. That is its “banality” (cited in Bernstein 1996, 138). 
Though it might appear that Arendt’s notion of the banality of evil contradicts her earlier 
thesis on radical evil, scholars have recently argued that these concepts are actually 
compatible, if not, complementary (Bernstein 1996; Formosa 2008). Formosa argues that 
although these terms are independent (in that “neither concept depends on the other for its 
sense” (2008, 97)), they can “stand side by side without contradiction” and can even shed 
light on one another (ibid., 98-9). The notion of radical evil enriches the banality of evil in 
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emphasising the enormity of the atrocities and the inability to contain them within legal 
categories (ibid., 99). Conversely, the banality of evil sheds light on radical evil in 
showing that evil that is radical in scope can in fact be derived from banal motives (ibid.). 
The banality of radical evil can be observed when unprecedented destruction is carried 
out by ordinary people. 
Richard J. Bernstein similarly points out that Arendt’s earlier work on radical evil 
and her later work on the banality of evil share the central argument that evil actions 
cannot be deduced solely from evil motives (1996, 145). Arendt’s seemingly conflicting 
theses undermine traditional understandings of evil as being rooted in the motivation to 
commit evil. In addition to these insights, I would add that Arendt consistently upholds 
the unprecedented nature of evil in her accounts of radical and banal evil. The difference 
is that where her former notion of radical evil denies the ability of thought to come to 
terms with the phenomenon of evil, her later account of the banality of evil emphasises 
the necessity of creating new legal (and conceptual) precedents in the wake of the 
unprecedented. Despite this different emphasis, the idea that Nazi evil is unprecedented in 
kind consistently spans across Arendt’s earlier and later work.   
In agreement with Formosa and Bernstein, I contend that Arendt’s earlier and later 
characterisations of evil can be read as complementary. The notion of radical evil 
demonstrates the horrifying originality of Nazi evil, while the banality of evil highlights 
the fact that unprecedented destruction need not be perpetrated by demons or monsters 
and can be the result of banal motives. Far from being contradictory claims, I argue that 
radical and banal evil can be used to enrich one another and can, moreover, be used to 
shed light on the concept of trauma that I am developing in this thesis. Where radical evil 
corresponds with the extraordinary, the banality of evil can be situated on the level of the 
ordinary. Highlighting the compatibility between the concepts of radical and banal evil 
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can be used to inform a concept of trauma that implicates the extraordinary and the 
ordinary, the transcendent and the immanent, the word-and-thought-defying and the 
banal. While on the surface, these notions might appear as contradictory, they need not be 
read as such. As tremendous as the consequences may be, many traumas arise from 
ordinary contexts and it is this very ordinariness that makes trauma so word-and-thought-
defyingly awful. In other words, the realisation that trauma is not necessarily the result of 
monstrous intentions and can easily be perpetrated by people on an everyday basis is what 
makes it so horrible.  
I suggest that when Arendt speaks of “the word-and-thought-defying banality of 
evil” (ibid., 252, emphasis in original), that which defies thought is its very proximity to 
the ordinary contexts in which it occurs. In this way, what is ungraspable by language and 
thought—indeed, that which is word-and-thought-defying—is its very immanence in 
language and thought. Haidu advances a similar argument in affirming that what is so 
unspeakable and unthinkable about perpetrators of the Holocaust is “the fact that we are 
products of the same genealogy” (1992, 295): 
We share the same culture, within certain limitations; we share similar ideological systems, as 
well as the same models of discourse as the perpetrators and, it must be added, the victims. 
Apophasis is a reaction of our historians, of our readers, of our congeners in the skein of a 
specific culture and history. Would a reading of the historical record of the programmed 
extermination of the Jews by a historian whose specific subjectivity was not implicated in the 
Event48 produce the same sense of “unspeakability”? Indeed, would the Event strike that 
historian with the same sense of “exceptionality”? (ibid.). 
                                                 
48 Rather than referring to the genocide of the European Jewry as the Holocaust, Shoah, or Auschwitz, 
Haidu opts for the use of the term, Event. He does so in an effort to get around the etymological baggage 
associated with the aforementioned terms. This is an issue I discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis.  
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Rather than perceiving the unspeakable and the unthinkable as residing outside or beyond 
language and thought, Haidu’s conceptual gesture posits these phenomena as being 
immanent to language and thought. Far from being transcendent, unspeakability and 
unthinkability are reactions to that which is “all too uncomfortably familiar” (ibid., 284). 
Instead of dismissing the phenomena of unspeakability and unthinkability in favour of the 
ordinary and banal, Haidu reconciles these terms and shows that they need not be 
considered mutually exclusive. In this way, the relation between the ordinary and the 
extraordinary is revealed in a relation of reciprocity.  
 The word-and-thought-defying banality of evil is aptly demonstrated in an article 
by Tom Meagher titled “The Danger of the Monster Myth” (2014). In this article, 
Meagher reflects on his encounter in court with Adrian Bayley, the man who brutally 
raped and murdered his wife, Jill Meagher in Melbourne, Australia.49 Prior to being 
confronted with Bayley, Meagher “had formed an image that this man was not human, 
that he existed as a singular force of pure evil who somehow emerged from the ether” 
(ibid., n.p.). However, contrary to the image that Meagher had formed of his wife’s 
murderer, the man on trial appeared before him as a seemingly ordinary person.  
 As indicated by its title, the aim of Meagher’s article is to debunk the “monster-
myth,” which is the narrative that men who commit violence against women are 
anomalous monsters rather than ordinary men. It is a myth which reinforces the view that 
violence against women is an exception to the norm, thus allowing “normal men” to 
differentiate themselves from so-called “monster rapists.” In dispelling the monster-myth, 
Meagher challenges the commonly accepted view that violence perpetrated by men 
against women deviates from socio-cultural norms and instead argues that “violent men 
                                                 
49 On 22 September 2012, Jill Meagher was raped and murdered by Adrian Bailey in Melbourne, Australia. 
Meagher’s death received a tremendous amount of public attention and profoundly unsettled people living 
in and around Melbourne.  
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are socialised by the ingrained sexism and entrenched masculinity that permeates […] 
daily interactions” (ibid.). Indeed, “most rapists are normal guys, guys we might work 
beside or socialise with, our neighbours or even members of our family” (ibid.). Meagher 
reveals that violence perpetrated by men against women is not an aberration of socio-
cultural norms but is, rather, continuous with them. The very ordinariness of men who 
commit acts of violence against women is what Meagher considers to be truly 
disturbing—even more disturbing than his previously held idea of rapists as anomalous 
monsters. This is the crux of my interpretation of Arendt’s comments regarding the word-
and-thought-defying banality of evil. Evil is banal to the extent that ordinary people can 
commit extraordinary violence. Yet the fact that horrible acts can be committed by 
ordinary people is what makes it word-and-thought-defying.  
Challenging the dichotomy between the extraordinary and the ordinary invites one 
to reflect on their own complicity in the traumatisation of others. To question one’s 
complicity in traumatising socio-cultural structures requires a departure from the limited 
categories of victim and perpetrator, along with the scapegoating mechanisms that 
support the view that evil is not committed by people like “us,” but by an anomalous few. 
This is not to say that there is no distinction between people who do and do not commit 
violent crimes and that the categories of victim and perpetrator should be thrown away 
altogether. Instead, it is to acknowledge that there are other subject positions implicated 
in the traumatisation of others that fall outside of the dominant victim-perpetrator 
imaginary. In this way, I do not suggest that “we” are “all” somehow the same as 
Eichmann and Bayley. Rather, I am using the cases of Eichmann and Bayley as launch-
pads for critical self-reflection.  
Rothberg’s recent work on “implicated subjects” invites those who hold 
privileged subject positions to consider their complicity in the traumatisation of others. 
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He argues that the categories of victim and perpetrator are insufficient for thinking about 
trauma because the “victim-perpetrator imaginary […] tends to polarize and purify the 
relationship between victims and perpetrators, [and] evacuate[s] the field of other crucial 
subject positions” (2014b, n.p.). Indeed, the rupturing impact of trauma calls into 
question the clear-cut distinction between victims and perpetrators of trauma. For 
instance, the soldiers who fought in World War I, World War II, and the Vietnam War, 
were both victims and perpetrators of traumatising conditions of violence (ibid.). Insisting 
on the fixed categories of victim and perpetrator not only disregards the complexity of the 
heterogeneous subject positions implicated in situations of trauma, but also forecloses the 
possibility of accounting for other subject positions that lie outside of this dominate 
imaginary. Looking beyond the victim-perpetrator framework, Rothberg defines 
implicated subjects as the “collection of subjects who enable and benefit from traumatic 
violence without taking part in it directly” (ibid.). The idea of implicated subjects  
describes the indirect responsibility of subjects situated at temporal or geographic distance 
from the production of social suffering […]. [I]mplication draws attention to how we are 
entwined and folded into (“im-pli-cated in”) histories and situations that surpass our agency as 
individual subjects […]. Neither simply perpetrators nor victims, though potentially either or 
both at other moments, implicated subjects are participants in and beneficiaries of a system that 
generates dispersed and uneven experiences of trauma and well-being simultaneously (ibid., 
emphasis in original).   
Rothberg’s notion of implicated subjects looks beyond an event-based focus of trauma— 
which characterises trauma as an extraordinary occurrence—to consider structural forms 
of trauma that result from capitalist globalisation (ibid.). Rather than being an exception 
to the norm, the traumas that accompany neo-liberal capitalism are all too continuous 
with the norm. In accordance with the insights derived from Arendt, Haidu, and Meagher, 
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I would add that the fact that trauma results from one’s everyday actions is what makes 
trauma so thought-defyingly horrible.  
It is important to note that in turning to Rothberg’s work on implicated subjects, I 
am not suggesting that this term should be applied to Eichmann or Bayley. The notion of 
implicated subjects does not refer to direct perpetrators of violence and is instead 
intended to account for those who do not fit within the victim-perpetrator framework. 
However ordinary Eichmann and Bayley might appear, there is a tremendous gap 
between internalising socio-cultural norms (for example, patriarchy) and committing acts 
of violence. Nonetheless, by acknowledging that not all perpetrators are monstrous 
aberrations and that some are in fact ordinary people, one might be in a better position to 
reflect on one’s own complicity in the traumatisation of others, even if one is not directly 
committing acts of criminal violence.  
Traumatic Zones of Indeterminacy 
This chapter has considered the zone of indeterminacy between the exception and the 
norm, and the radical and the banal, as correlative to the tension at the basis of Part One 
of this thesis—namely, the tension between the ordinary and the extraordinary. Where 
Agamben’s and Arendt’s respective notions of the exception and radical evil correspond 
to the pole of the ordinary, the notions of the norm and the banality of evil are posited on 
the side of the ordinary. Rather than upholding a false dichotomy between these terms, 
this chapter has revealed that both extremes are implicated in one another. In so doing, 
Chapter Three turned to Agamben’s work on the interrelation between the exception and 
the norm to reveal the intricate relation between these extremes. Insofar as the state of 
exception marks the very foundation of the normal legal order, the exception and the 
norm can no longer be thought of as being oppositional. Meanwhile, in illuminating the 
tension in Arendt’s work between the radical and the banal, this chapter has shown that 
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these extremes are not at all contradictory and can in fact be used to shed light on one 
another. What Arendt refers to as the word-and-thought-defying banality of evil 
implicates the extraordinary and the ordinary, the transcendent and the immanent. 
Although many perpetrators of trauma (for instance, Eichmann and Bayley) are 
responsible for extraordinary destruction, they need not be thought of as aberrant 
monsters but, rather, ordinary people. The sheer ordinariness of these perpetrators, along 
with the realisation that we belong to the same socio-cultural frameworks as them, 
implicates the extraordinary and the ordinary, the radical and the banal.      
 As well as illuminating the interrelation between the exception and the norm, and 
the radical and the banal, this chapter has problematised the straightforward divide 
between victims and perpetrators in the context of trauma. To say that trauma is a 
phenomenon that ruptures the bounds separating these seemingly distinct categories is not 
to say that the notions of victim and perpetrator should be conflated or discarded 
altogether. Instead, I have suggested that there is a need to create new conceptual 
frameworks which might better account for the complex subject positions implicated in 
situations of trauma. Rothberg’s notion of implicated subjects—which I discussed in the 
previous section of this chapter—is one such example of a subject position which cannot 
be reduced to the dominant victim-perpetrator imaginary.  
Having destabilised the subject positions of victim and perpetrator in Chapter 
Three of this thesis, Chapter Four—which forms the concluding chapter of Part One—
moves on to consider the more fundamental question of human subjectivity, along with 
the desubjectifying and dehumanising impact of trauma. Turning to the work of Felman, 
Laub, and Agamben, I reveal a tension between the possibility and the impossibility of 
bearing witness to trauma, as well as the dichotomous logic that opposes the human and 
the inhuman. In accordance with the major theme of Part One, Chapter Four posits these 
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tensions as being correlative to the tension between the ordinary and the extraordinary. I 
situate the impossibility of witnessing trauma on the side of the extraordinary and the 
possibility of witnessing on the side of the ordinary. Similarly, the inhuman is placed at 
the level of the extraordinary, while the human is situated on the side of the ordinary. 
Rather than upholding the mutual exclusivity between the extra/ordinary, manifest in the 
im/possibility of witnessing the in/human, the next chapter of this thesis shows how these 
terms are inextricably bound.  
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Chapter Four – The Im/possibility of Witnessing Trauma: Bearing Witness to the 
Inhuman as Immanent to the Human 
Where Chapter Three of this thesis examined the means through which trauma 
problematises the subject positions of victim and perpetrator, Chapter Four turns to the 
more fundamental question of human subjectivity with regards to the dehumanising and 
desubjectifying effects of trauma. In order to consider this, one must reflect on what it is 
to be a human subject in the first place.50 The subject of classical humanism is conceived 
as a unitary, autonomous, and self-identical individual; however, the events of Auschwitz 
radically call into question what is traditionally thought to be a human subject. In 
response to the devastating impact of the Holocaust, trauma theorists reformulate 
subjectivity through the structure of witnessing, which they conceive through the dialogic 
relation between self and other. In instances of trauma, the possibility of addressing and 
responding to another is destroyed and so too is one’s ability to address and to respond to 
oneself. What is at stake in trauma theory is to reconstitute the victim’s lost subjectivity in 
the aftermath of trauma. But this does not imply a nostalgia for a unified subject, heralded 
by traditional humanistic models of subjectivity. Instead, trauma theorists conceive the 
self as being formed in relation to the other. Given this, the process of witnessing trauma 
proceeds through the dialogic encounter between a traumatised being and an external 
other. This, in turn, reconstitutes the victim’s internalised self and other necessary for 
their sense of themselves as a subject.   
 As was discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis, Felman and Laub interpret trauma 
“as a radical historical crisis of witnessing, and as the unprecedented, inconceivable, 
                                                 
50 Although they have different meanings which I do not wish to conflate, this chapter uses the terms 
human, subject, and self synonymously. Conversely, the terms inhuman, object, and other are used as 
synonyms.   
   
 
131 
 
 
historical occurrence of ‘an event without a witness’—an event eliminating its own 
witnesses” (1992, xvii, emphasis in original). The authors argue that the traumas of the 
Holocaust precluded the ability to be witnessed as the events unfolded, obstructing “the 
human cognitive capacity to perceive and to assimilate the totality of what was really 
happening at the time” (Laub 1992, 84-5). But in stressing the impossibility of witnessing 
trauma, trauma theorists are accused of positing trauma in a transcendent and inhuman 
realm, inaccessible to language and thought. Agamben levels this very accusation against 
Felman and Laub, who he sees as mystifying the impossibility of witnessing Auschwitz.  
Agamben’s critique of Felman and Laub relates to the central theme of Part One 
of this thesis—that is, the tension between the extraordinary and the ordinary. On the one 
hand, the impossibility of witnessing dwells on the side of the extraordinary, whereas the 
possibility of witnessing rests on the side of the ordinary. As was made clear in the 
Introduction to this thesis, the tension between the extra/ordinary corresponds to the 
polemic between the transcendent and the immanent, with the extraordinary falling under 
the banner of the transcendent and the ordinary under the immanent. In the context of this 
present chapter, the impossibility of witnessing trauma inadvertently positions trauma as 
extraordinary and transcendent, while the possibility of witnessing trauma situates the 
phenomenon as being immanent.  
In response to the dilemma between these terms, Chapter Four demonstrates the 
means through which trauma implicates both the possibility and the impossibility of 
witnessing. Rather than perpetuating the false dichotomy between the possible and the 
impossible, the immanent and the transcendent, I emphasise the necessary relation 
between these seemingly opposing views. While the first few sections of this chapter 
consider the im/possibility of witnessing in the trauma theory of Felman and Laub, the 
final two sections of this chapter turn to Agamben’s work on witnessing the traumas of 
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Auschwitz. Here, I argue that the accounts offered by Felman, Laub, and Agamben have 
much more in common than Agamben himself is willing to admit. Across their respective 
works, the authors maintain the impossibility of witnessing as being the basis of the 
possibility of witnessing, as well as conceiving the inhuman as the innermost condition of 
the human. 
As well as circumventing the false dichotomy between the im/possibility of 
witnessing trauma, this chapter moves beyond the binary opposition between the human 
and the inhuman, the self and the other. I identify the tension between these extremes as 
being correlative to the tension between the ordinary and the extraordinary, the immanent 
and the transcendent. In overcoming the mutual exclusivity between these terms, I insist 
that the other should not be construed as a transcendent other, who is outside or beyond 
the self. I argue, instead, that the other is the very foundation of the self. In formulating 
the necessary relation between the human and the inhuman, the self and the other, 
Chapter Four contributes to the overarching argument of this thesis concerning the 
immanence of traumatic rupture.  
In the first section of this chapter, I examine the discrepancy between the juridico-
historical and psychoanalytic notions of witnessing. More specifically, I consider the 
means through which the traditional notion of the witness, found in historical and 
juridical discourse, is called into question by the rupturing impact of trauma. In 
opposition to the juridico-historical notion of the witness, which is based on the ability of 
the eyewitness to provide a factual account of an event that occurred in the past, trauma 
theorists reconceive witnessing as a performative speech act that unfolds in the present. 
While traditional notions of the witness privilege the “constative,” which is the content 
and information testified to by the witness, trauma theorists emphasise the 
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“performative,” which cannot be known prior to its utterance and instead unfolds through 
the spontaneous event of witnessing. 
In the following section of this chapter, I continue with my engagement with 
trauma theory to unravel the paradoxes of witnessing trauma from the inside-out. Such 
paradoxes lie in the inability to bear witness to one’s own death or descent into the 
inhuman. But although trauma theorists uphold the impossibility of witnessing trauma, 
they derive the possibility of witnessing from its very impossibility. Through the 
performative event of bearing witness, she who testifies dramatises the impossibility of 
witnessing the traumatic event on its occurrence. In other words, the retroactive process 
of witnessing performatively reenacts that which was impossible to see at the time of the 
traumatising event.  
The next section of Chapter Four further develops the notion of witnessing as 
constitutive of the structure of subjectivity. As was previously mentioned, trauma 
theorists destabilise the traditional notion of the subject—as a self-identical and 
autonomous being—by stressing the interrelation between self and other as the necessary 
ground for subjectivity. Accordingly, the ability to bear witness to oneself is reliant on 
one’s dialogic relation to the other. Trauma annihilates subjectivity by precluding one’s 
ability to address and respond to an other, which, in turn, destroys the ability to address 
and respond to oneself. Given this, the notion of witnessing espoused by trauma theorists 
assumes the dual function of signifying the structure of subjectivity as well as designating 
the crucial process of reconstituting subjectivity in the aftermath of trauma.  
In the next section of this chapter, I turn to Agamben’s formulation of bare life in 
Homo Sacer, before turning to the Muselmänn as an exemplary figure of bare life. The 
Muselmänner are those in Auschwitz who had been dehumanised to the extent that they 
lacked any identifiable quality of what constitutes a uniquely human existence. However, 
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rather than simply opposing the Muselmänn to the human, Agamben argues that the 
Muselmänn dwells in a zone of indistinction, in which the human and inhuman can no 
longer be told apart. As the extreme limit of the human, the Muselmänn is not a figure 
that is other to the human but is, rather, the necessary condition of the human, which is 
immanent to the human itself. The second last section of this chapter examines 
Agamben’s work on witnessing, in which he emphasises the necessary relation between 
the possibility and impossibility of witnessing, arguing that she who bears witness must 
do so in response to the inability to witness. Accordingly, witnessing takes place when the 
human and the inhuman, as well as the possibility and the impossibility of language, enter 
a zone of indistinction. 
Witnessing: Between History and Psychoanalysis 
The notion of witnessing is traditionally, in historical and legal discourse, conceived as 
the eyewitness, who is beckoned to provide an impartial, yet firsthand, account of an 
event that they have lived through (Felman 1992, 207; Oliver 2001, 85). In the context of 
a trial, eyewitnesses—who are “those who have firsthand knowledge through experience” 
(Oliver 2001, 85)—are called on when supporting elements of truth are called into 
question (Felman 1992, 6). In aiding the process of fact finding, the witness’ testimony 
enables a judge and jury to make an informed decision about the true nature of an event 
(Oliver 2001, 86). However, in response to the juridical and historical demands of the 
witness, Felman raises an important question:  
if the essence of the testimony is impersonal (to enable a decision by a judge or jury […] about 
the true nature of the facts of an occurrence; to enable an objective reconstruction of what 
history was like, irrespective of the witness), why is it that the witness’s speech is so uniquely, 
literally irreplaceable? (1992, 205). 
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Felman draws attention to the interplay between the personal and the impersonal 
components of witnessing, whereby the witness testifies to an impersonal truth that can 
only be arrived at through the unique subject position of the witness. Witnessing goes 
beyond the impersonal and the objective, constituting a unique “performance of a story 
which […] cannot be carried out by anyone else” (ibid., 206, emphasis in original). The 
witness’ oath binds them to the truth; to bear witness is to assume a personal 
responsibility for an impersonal truth, of which the consequences extend beyond the 
limits of subjective experience (ibid.). Indeed, Felman affirms that “[s]ince the testimony 
cannot be simply relayed, repeated or reported by another without thereby losing its 
function as a testimony, the burden of the witness—in spite of his or her alignment with 
other witnesses—is a radically unique, noninterchangeable and solitary burden” (ibid., 3). 
The solitary burden of the witness is reinforced by Paul Celan and Wiesel. Where Celan 
writes that “[n]o one bears witness for the witness” (cited in ibid.), Wiesel laments that 
“[i]f someone else could have written my stories […] I would not have written them. I 
have written them in order to testify. And this is the origin of the loneliness that can be 
glimpsed in each of my sentences, in each of my silences” (cited in ibid.). 
Trauma theorists problematise the traditional juridical and historical notions of the 
eyewitness as a vessel of objective truth. Felman and Laub argue that trauma destroys the 
capacity to witness the traumatising event as it occurs, thus leading to a crisis of 
witnessing and correlative crises in history and truth. Laub explains that the historical and 
juridical demands placed on the witness rest on the ability of the witness to remove 
themselves from “the contaminating power of the event so as to remain a fully lucid, 
unaffected witness, that is, to be sufficiently detached from the inside, so as to stay 
entirely outside of the trapping roles” (ibid., 81, emphasis in original). The traumas of the 
Holocaust, however, destroyed the victims’ capacity to “step outside of the coercively 
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totalitarian and dehumanizing frame of reference in which the event was taking place, and 
provide an independent frame of reference through which the event could be observed” 
(ibid.). The traumatising conditions of Auschwitz resulted in the loss of the cognitive 
abilities of the victims, so that what was happening at the time of the event was unable to 
be recorded in perception and memory (ibid.). Given this, Laub remarks that “what 
precisely made a Holocaust out of the event is the unique way in which, during its 
historical occurrence, the event produced no witnesses” (ibid., 80, emphasis in original). 
Similarly, Felman maintains that the shattering impact of the Shoah is such that 
“witnessing itself has undergone a major trauma” (ibid., 206). She thus describes trauma 
as “an unprecedented, inconceivable […] event without a witness, an event which 
historically consists in the scheme of the literal erasure of its witnesses” (ibid., 211, 
emphasis in original). 
Since the event of trauma is unable to be witnessed at the time it occurs, a crisis 
arises in response to the juridical and legal notion of the eyewitness, as she who testifies 
to the truth of an event. If trauma is an event that is too overwhelming to be 
comprehended at the time of its occurrence, how can one be expected to provide an 
objective and factual account of it? The crisis of truth constitutive of trauma is aptly 
demonstrated in an anecdote provided by Laub, who recorded a testimony from an 
eyewitness to the Auschwitz uprising51 for the Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies 
at Yale, which he later screened at an interdisciplinary conference on the Holocaust (ibid., 
                                                 
51 The revolt at Auschwitz occurred on October 7, 1944. This was facilitated by a group of Jewish women, 
including Ester Wajcblum, Ella Gärtner, and Regina Safirsztain, who had spent several months smuggling 
small amounts of gunpowder from a munitions factory at Auschwitz. Róza Robota, a woman working at the 
clothing detail at Auschwitz, passed on the gunpowder to her allies in the Sonderkommando, who planned 
to blow up the crematoria and start a revolt. During the revolt, several hundred prisoners escaped, but 
almost everyone who escaped was later caught by the SS and killed. The SS were able to trace the source of 
the gunpowder to Ester Wajcblum, Ella Gärtner, and Regina Safirsztain, who they brutally tortured and 
murdered. Despite being tortured, the women refused to give up the names of their comrades (United States 
Holocaust Memorial Museum, n.d.). 
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59). The eyewitness testifying to the uprising provided a compelling account of four 
crematoria chimneys going up in flames at the hands of revolting prisoners: “‘[a]ll of 
sudden,’ she said, ‘we saw four chimneys going up in flames, exploding. The flames shot 
into the sky, people were running. It was unbelievable’” (cited in ibid.). After listening to 
the testimony of the witness, the historians at the conference clarified that it was actually 
only one—and not four—chimneys that had exploded (ibid.). In response to this factual 
inaccuracy, a particularly intense argument broke out between Laub and the historians 
regarding the validity of the witness’ testimony. In view of remaining as empirically 
accurate as possible, the historians dismissed the eyewitness’ account because she had 
misrepresented the number of chimneys that had been destroyed (ibid.).  
Laub adamantly disagrees with the historians, who were judging the validity of the 
testimony solely on its adherence to empirical facts: 
The historians could not hear, I thought, the way in which her silence was itself part of her 
testimony, an essential part of the historical truth she was precisely bearing witness to. She saw 
four chimneys blowing up in Auschwitz: she saw, in other words, the unimaginable taking 
place in front of her own eyes. And she came to testify to the unbelievability, precisely, of what 
she had eye witnessed—this bursting open of the frame of Auschwitz (ibid., 62). 
From Laub’s psychoanalytic perspective, there is more at stake in witnessing than the 
transmission of information or the verification of facts. In counterpart to the historians, he 
argues that the witness was not testifying to the number of chimneys that exploded “but to 
something else, more radical, more crucial: the reality of an unimaginable occurrence” 
(ibid., 60). The number of chimneys blown up, in other words, was of less importance 
than the fact of the revolt, which was incomprehensible under the extreme conditions of 
Auschwitz (ibid.). Given this, Laub discovers a psychoanalytic truth within the supposed 
inaccuracy of the testimony. While the historians were looking to verify their preexisting 
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knowledge of the event, the witness’ testimony bore witness to a truth that resists 
empirical verification. This truth—which is at odds with historical and juridical notions of 
truth—cannot be measured in terms of its accuracy. In light of this, the notion of 
witnessing developed by trauma theorists exceeds the limits of what is traditionally 
conceived of as truth, calling forth a less restrictive model of witnessing that is not limited 
to ascertaining that which can be empirically verified or provided as fact.  
Laub sees the witness as testifying to a historical truth, but this is not the truth of 
the historians. The historical truth that emerges through the testimony of the witness is the 
truth of the incomprehensibility of trauma. Laub declares that  
[w]hat ultimately matters in all processes of witnessing, spasmodic and continuous, conscious 
and unconscious, is not simply the information, the establishment of facts, but the experience 
itself of living through testimony, of giving testimony (ibid., 85, emphasis in original). 
Laub’s anecdote highlights the discrepancy between juridico-historical and 
psychoanalytic notions of truth. Where the former notion of truth rests on the ability of 
the eyewitness to testify to an empirically verifiable truth, Laub’s psychoanalytic 
framework enables, somewhat paradoxically, the truth of the incomprehensibility of 
trauma to appear.  
The discrepancy between the juridico-historical and the psychoanalytic notions of 
witnessing is based on the distinction between the constative and the performative.52 
Where juridical and historical discourse privilege the constative—that is, the information 
or facts testified to by the eyewitness—trauma theorists look to the performative for a 
truth that exceeds that which can be provided as fact. In the latter context, witnessing is 
conceived as a spontaneous event that unfolds in the present rather than a factual 
                                                 
52 The distinction between the constative and the performative was first formulated by J.L. Austin. He 
developed these notions in a series of lectures delivered at Harvard University in 1955 that have since been 
published in a volume titled How to do Things with Words (1962). 
   
 
139 
 
 
description of the past. “In the testimony,” Felman explains, “language is in process and 
in trial, it does not possess itself as a conclusion, as the constatation of a verdict or the 
self-transparency of knowledge” (ibid., 5). Traditional conceptions of truth, heralded by 
historical and juridical discourse, go as far as to conceal the performative or 
psychoanalytic truths of testimony. When testimony is valorised for its accuracy, 
“[h]istorical facts conceal the process of witnessing and the performance of testimony” 
(Oliver 2001, 91). This can be seen in Laub’s example, where the historians, in effect, 
silenced the witness by invalidating and disregarding her testimony.  
The historians rejected the witness’ testimony due to its purported inaccuracies 
regarding the number of chimneys that exploded during the prisoner’s revolt. However, 
what the historians did not hear—what their rejection of the testimony ultimately silenced 
and concealed—were other truths that are at stake within the context of witnessing. These 
truths are the performative truths of the testimonial process itself, which cannot be known 
prior to their utterance and instead emerge through the event of witnessing as it unfolds in 
the present. Rather than simply being a factual account of an event that occurred in the 
past, bearing witness is itself an event—it is “a performative engagement between 
consciousness and history, a struggling act of readjustment between the integrative scope 
of words and the unintegrated impact of events” (Felman 1992, 114). Given this, the act 
of bearing witness is very much an event in itself in which the traumatic event is not 
simply testified to by the survivor, but through them.  
Conceived as a performative speech act, the witness’ testimony can offer neither 
“a completed statement,” nor “a totalizable account” of the traumatic event (ibid., 5). 
Instead, witnessing is “a mode of truth’s realization beyond what is available as 
statement, beyond what is available, that is, as a truth transparent to itself and entirely 
known, given, in advance, prior to the very process of its utterance” (ibid.). Felman thus 
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conceives witnessing as “a discursive practice, as opposed to pure theory” (ibid.); 
witnessing is a performative event of speech that “‘exceeds’ and thereby undermines the 
self-certainty of theoretical discourses” (ibid.). The psychoanalytic notion of witnessing 
espoused by Felman and Laub is much more concerned with that which exceeds the 
bounds of knowledge—that is, the very impossibility of knowledge—than it is with 
acquiring facts that support preexisting frameworks of understanding. Felman writes: 
To testify—to vow, to tell, to promise and produce one’s own speech as material evidence for 
truth—is to accomplish a speech act, rather than to simply formulate a statement. As a 
performative speech act, testimony in effect addresses what in history is action that exceeds 
any substantialised significance, and what in happenings is impact that dynamically explodes 
any conceptual reifications and any constative delimitations (ibid.). 
Trauma theorists thus offer an “ethics of testimony” that provides a “postmodern mode of 
discursive legitimacy” for the local and plural testimonies of survivors (Katz 2001, 71). In 
trauma theory, testimony functions to subvert the logocentric closure of theoretical 
discourse—the testimony embodies a dissonance which undermines conceptual 
reifications (ibid., 71-2). Witnessing, then, disrupts “the everyday and ensure[s] that it be 
marked by the open wound left in history” (Felman 1992, 5). By pointing to the limits of 
closure, the witness’ testimony assumes a temporal presence, where one must be 
vulnerable to the reception of the uniqueness and singularity of its event (Katz 1998, 71-
2). Given this, bearing witness constitutes a nonrepresentational approach to trauma. 
Witnessing is a precocious mode of accessing the reality of the traumatic event, but not in 
the sense that it represents the unrepresentable. Instead, witnessing is a self-referential 
event of language which assumes a temporal presence through the aspect of 
performativity. 
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The Impossibility of Witnessing from the Inside-Out 
[I]t was […] the very circumstance of being inside the event that made unthinkable the very 
notion that a witness could exist, that is, someone who could step outside of the coercively 
totalitarian and dehumanizing frame of reference in which the event was taking place, and 
provide and independent frame of reference through which the event could be observed. One 
might say that there was, thus, historically no witness to the Holocaust, either from outside or 
from inside the event (Laub 1992, 81, emphasis in original). 
The crisis of witnessing the Holocaust cuts across the inside and the outside of the 
traumas: neither the victims—whom Laub classifies as “insider-witnesses”—nor any third 
parties or bystanders—whom he terms “outsider-witnesses”—could bear witness to what 
was happening at the time of its occurrence. Laub explains that an outsider-witness is “the 
next door neighbour, a friend, a business partner, community institutions including the 
police and the courts of law, as well as […] potential rescuers and allies from other 
countries” (ibid., 80). However, outsider-witnesses failed to bear witness to what was 
happening during the events of the Holocaust. Meanwhile insider-witnesses could not 
detach themselves from the events to sufficiently bear witness to what was occurring. 
Laub argues that “most actual or potential witnesses failed one-by-one to occupy their 
position as a witness, and at a certain point it seemed as if there was no one left to witness 
what was taking place” (ibid.). The Nazis physically removed the death camps from plain 
sight, so that the outside world could not see what was happening. Meanwhile, the world 
inside the camps was unable to be grasped by those who were immersed within it. Indeed, 
Kelly Oliver asserts that “[e]ven those who saw could not see, because it was impossible 
to grasp a world that was not a world, a world that was inhuman” (2001, 90).  
The crisis of witnessing brought on by the Shoah is such that its potential 
witnesses from the inside were both cognitively and physically destroyed. Victims were 
not only “empirically annihilated as witnesses—murdered—but also cognitively and 
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perceptually destroyed as witnesses because they were turned into objects and 
dehumanised” (ibid., 89). As well as physically “exterminating” their victims, the 
systematic degradation and dehumanisation that the Nazis subjected their victims to 
rendered the latter incapable of expressing their victimhood to even themselves. “The 
Nazi system,” explains Laub, 
turned out therefore to be fool proof, not only in the sense that there were in theory no outside 
witnesses but also in the sense that it convinced its victims, the potential witnesses from the 
inside, that what was affirmed about their ‘otherness’ and their ‘inhumanity’ was correct and 
that their experiences were no longer communicable to even themselves, and therefore, perhaps 
never took place. This loss of the capacity to be a witness to oneself and thus to witness from 
the inside is perhaps the true meaning of annihilation (1992, 81-2).   
In the dehumanising framework of the camps, it was often the case that victims became 
convinced of their own inhumanity. Many victims had already been dehumanised well 
before being physically murdered. Levi, for example, remarks in reference to those who 
were dehumanised in Auschwitz, that “[o]ne hesitates to call them living: one hesitates to 
call their death death” ([1947] 1987, 96). This is compounded by the language of the SS, 
who prohibited the use of the words “bodies” and “corpses” to refer to those they had 
murdered. Felman cites another survivor of the Shoah who explains that “[t]he Germans 
even forbade us to use the words ‘corpse’ or ‘victim.’ The dead were blocks of wood, 
shit. The Germans made us refer to the bodies as figuren, that is, as puppets, as dolls, or 
as Schmattes, which means ‘rags’” (1992, 210).  
Since the Nazis cognitively murdered their victims before physically murdering 
them, Agamben arrives at the awful conclusion that the Nazis were in a sense correct in 
referring to the corpses as objects and not bodies. He explains: “this means—and this is 
why Levi’s phrase is terrible—that the SS were right to call the corpses figuren. Where 
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death cannot be called death, corpses cannot be called corpses” (2002, 70).53 The Nazis 
went to all lengths to dehumanise their victims, to physically murder them, and to reduce 
“even the materiality of the dead bodies to smoke and ashes” (ibid.). Deprived of any 
language of their own, and degraded in the language of the oppressors, the victims of the 
Nazis lacked any meaningful framework under which to conceive their victimhood. 
Meanwhile, those who were murdered in the camps lacked the ability to bear witness 
insofar as it is impossible to bear witness to one’s own death.  
Felman and Laub agree that trauma precludes its ability to be witnessed from both 
the inside and the outside of the event: “[i]t is not really possible to tell the truth, to 
testify, from the outside. Neither is it possible […] to testify from the inside” (Felman 
1992, 232, emphasis in original). Just as it is impossible to witness one’s own death from 
the inside of death, it is also impossible to bear witness to one’s own dehumanisation 
from the vantage point of the inhuman. Bearing witness to one’s own annihilation is 
paradoxical, for extreme oppression and subordination reduce subjects to objects and 
objects are divested of the capacity to speak (Oliver 2001, 95). In other words, being 
transformed into an object cannot be borne witness to because the transition from human 
to inhuman, subject to object, marks the inarticulate descent into speechless 
objectification.  
Drawing attention to the paradox of witnessing the Holocaust from the inside-out, 
Felman asks:  
                                                 
53 Agamben comments that “in Auschwitz, it is no longer possible to distinguish between death and mere 
decease, between dying and ‘being liquidated’” (ibid. 76). The implications of Heidegger’s claim (which 
was later taken up by Arendt) is that the concentration camps lead to “the fabrication of corpses” is that 
it is no longer possible truly to speak of death, but rather something infinitely more appalling. 
In Auschwitz, people did not die; rather, corpses were produced. Corpses without death, non-
humans whose decease is debased into a matter of serial production. And, according to a 
possible and widespread interpretation, precisely this degradation of death constitutes the 
specific offense of Auschwitz, the proper name of its horror (ibid. 72). 
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What would it mean for the witness to reopen his [sic] own grave—to testify precisely from 
inside the very cemetery which is not yet closed? And what would it mean, alternatively, to 
bear witness from inside the witness’s empty grave—empty both because the witness in effect 
did not die, but only died unto himself, and because the witness who did die was, consequent to 
his mass burial, dug up from his grave and burned to ashes—because the dead witness did not 
even leave behind a corpse or a dead body? (1992, 225). 
In this context, the inability to bear witness from the inside corresponds to the inability to 
witness one’s own death or descent into the inhuman. This raises the question of what it 
means to bear witness to the impossibility of witnessing, both in relation to those whose 
subjectivity had been annihilated and to those who had been literally annihilated. In 
relation to the former, Oliver explains that it is impossible to bear witness “to becoming 
an object, since objects have nothing to say […] the experience of becoming an object 
cannot be described, since it is the experience of becoming inarticulate” (2001, 99). 
Because there is no speech to express the disappearance of speech, the impossibility of 
bearing witness from the inside means bearing “witness from inside the living pathos of a 
tongue which nonetheless is bound to be heard as noise” (Felman 1992, 231).  
Although it is impossible to bear witness to trauma from the inside-out, trauma 
theorists argue that the impossibility of witnessing can—and must—give rise to the 
possibility of witnessing. Indeed, Felman paradoxically derives the necessity of 
witnessing from its very impossibility (ibid., 224). In bearing witness to the impossibility 
of witnessing, the witness testifies to not only that which they were able to see with their 
own eyes at the time of the traumatising event but, more importantly, performatively 
reenacts what was impossible to see. Understood as a performative speech act, the power 
of the witness’ testimony lies in her reenactment and dramatisation of the impossibility of 
witnessing.  
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The retroactive process of witnessing enables the survivor to assume a space that 
cuts across the inside and the outside of trauma: the survivor of trauma transmits her 
testimony “to another outside oneself and then take[s] it back again, inside” (Laub 1992, 
69). The witness’ testimony  
is transformative because it reestablishes the dialogue through which representation and 
thereby meaning are possible, and because this representation allows the victim to reassert his 
own subjective agency and humanity into an experience in which it was annihilated or reduced 
to guilt and self-abuse (Oliver 2001, 93).  
In this way, “witnessing enables the subject to reconstitute the experience of 
objectification in ways that allow her to reinsert subjectivity into a situation designed to 
destroy it” (ibid., 98).  
Witnessing as the Dialogic Structure of Subjectivity: Reconstituting the Subject in the 
Wake of Desubjectification 
Despite the impossibility of witnessing trauma from the inside-out, bearing witness is 
essential to the process of working-through54 trauma and of reconstituting one’s humanity 
after being reduced to an inhuman object. In trauma theory, the process of witnessing 
functions to reconstitute subjectivity in the wake of dehumanisation. However, the 
remaking of the subject in response to the desubjectivising event of trauma does not 
imply a nostalgia for traditional notions of the subject, as an autonomous and unitary self. 
Trauma theorists reconceive subjectivity through the interrelation between self and other. 
Accordingly, the other does not lie in opposition to the self but is, rather, its necessary 
condition.  
                                                 
54 The notion of working-through, which Freud develops in opposition to acting-out, will be considered at 
length in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
   
 
146 
 
 
Trauma theorists conceive witnessing as the very structure of human subjectivity, 
founded on one’s ethical relation to an other. Subjectivity is formulated as the capacity to 
address and to respond to an other, which, in turn, gives rise to the possibility of 
addressing and responding to oneself (Laub 1992, 81-2; Oliver 2001, 17). Accordingly, 
Laub formulates the notion of an “internal” and an “external” witness. The internal 
witness is an internalised addressable other who sustains one’s sense of oneself as a 
subject, while the external witness is a concrete other who founds the possibility of the 
internal witness. “Without an external witness,” Laub explains, “we cannot develop or 
sustain the internal witness necessary for the ability to interpret and represent our 
experience, which is necessary to subjectivity” (1992, 88). In a similar vein, Oliver 
formulates subjectivity through the dialogic relation with others that underpins the 
structure of witnessing; subjectivity is founded on the address-ability and response-ability 
at the heart of witnessing. She explains: “[t]he responsibility inherent in subjectivity has 
the double sense of the condition of possibility of response […] and the ethical obligation 
to respond to and to enable response-ability from others born out of that founding 
possibility” (2001, 15).  
If to conceive of oneself as a subject is reliant on the possibility of being 
addressed by an other, it is argued that “[o]ppression, domination, enslavement, and 
torture work to undermine and destroy the ability to respond and thereby undermine and 
destroy subjectivity” (ibid., 17). According to Laub, Auschwitz was a 
a world in which the very imagination of the Other was no longer possible. There was no 
longer an other to which one could say “Thou” in the hope of being heard, of being recognised 
as a subject, of being answered. The historical reality of the Holocaust became, thus, a reality 
which extinguished philosophically the very possibility of address, the possibility of appealing, 
or of turning to, another. But when one cannot turn to a “you” one cannot say “thou” even to 
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oneself. The Holocaust created in this way a world in which one could not bear witness to 
oneself (1992, 81-2, emphasis in original). 
Traumatic events annihilate the traumatised being’s sense of themselves as a subject by 
foreclosing the possibility of an external witness of whom one can address and respond 
to. When the possibility of addressing and responding to an other is annihilated, so too is 
the internal witness, which is the necessary ground of subjectivity. In other words, in the 
absence of an external witness, one loses the capacity to bear witness to oneself. Given 
that the structure of witnessing is constitutive of subjectivity, an event without a witness 
is an event without a subject. 
In the aftermath of trauma, the belated process of witnessing assumes the function 
of reconstituting the traumatised being’s annihilated sense of self. But this is not to say 
that the subject was a stable and coherent entity prior to the desubjectivising event of 
trauma. Indeed, trauma theorists conceive of the self as being constitutively split through 
the self-other relation. Hence, the process of witnessing is conceived as a means of 
reconstituting a self who was always already fractured. The process of witnessing “works 
through the trauma of objectification” (ibid., 105) by retroactively reinserting oneself as a 
subject into a situation in which they were reduced to an object. Susan Brison explains 
that “just as one can be reduced to an object […] one can become a human subject again 
through telling one’s narrative to caring others who are able to listen to them” (1999, 48). 
The retroactive task of witnessing is one in which the traumatised being reclaims her 
position as a witness by reconstituting an internalised and addressable other inside herself. 
In forming a dialogue with an external, concrete other, the traumatised being can 
construct a dialogue with herself.  
Given this, the process of witnessing requires the presence of an open and 
emphatic listener and is necessarily a dialogic encounter between self and other, the 
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narrator and the listener. In the process of witnessing, the listener accompanies the 
narrator on “the eerie journey of testimony” (Laub 1992, 76). Laub claims that “as an 
interviewer, I am present as someone who actually participates in the reliving and 
reexperiencing of the event” (ibid.). The retrospective process of bearing witness 
reconstitutes the inner witness through engaging with an external witness. Through this, 
the subject’s inner witness is slowly restored, as they begin to construct a dialogue with 
an other—a dialogue that is necessary for being able to construct a dialogue with oneself. 
As Laub explains, the process of witnessing, which gives birth to testimony, “is, 
therefore, the process by which the narrator (the survivor) reclaims his [sic] position as a 
witness: reconstitutes the internal ‘thou,’ and thus the possibility of a witness or a listener 
inside himself” (ibid., 85). Witnessing thus restores the internal witness through 
“reinstituting subjective agency as the ability to respond or address oneself” (ibid., 105).  
Between the Human and the Inhuman 
Some want to understand too much too quickly; they have explanations for everything. Others 
refuse to understand; they offer only cheap mystifications. The only way forward lies in the 
space in between these two options (Agamben 2002, 13). 
Here, Agamben evokes the dilemma at the very basis of this thesis. On the one hand, 
there are those who refuse to acknowledge the wounding impact of trauma and reduce its 
wounding impact back into the very frameworks it shatters. On the other hand, there are 
those who uphold the impossibility of understanding trauma and, in so doing, posit 
trauma in a transcendent and mystical realm. Agamben accuses Felman and Laub of the 
latter: in affirming the impossibility of witnessing trauma, they insinuate that trauma 
transcends language and thought. Although Agamben agrees that “Auschwitz was a 
unique event in the face of which the witness must in some way submit his [sic] every 
word to the test of an impossibility of speaking” (ibid., 157), he cautions against 
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transforming the events “into a reality entirely separated from language” (ibid.).55 As well 
as accusing trauma theorists of mystifying trauma, he argues that they fail to adequately 
interrogate the “threshold of indistinction between inside and outside [… which] could 
have led to a comprehension of the structure of testimony” (ibid., 36). In other words, 
Agamben criticises trauma theorists for overlooking the means through which the outside 
of language bears on the inside of language and how the impossibility of witnessing gives 
rise to the possibility of witnessing. In remedying what he perceives as a fundamental 
mistake in trauma theory, Agamben argues that the impossibility of witnessing is founded 
on the very possibility of witnessing, in which language and non-language, as well as the 
human and the inhuman, coincide. 
While I agree that a space between the mutually exclusive poles of the immanent 
and the transcendent is urgently required to move beyond the current impasse in trauma 
theory—indeed, delineating this space is the central aim of this thesis—I suggest that 
Agamben’s critique of trauma theorists, which he only offers in passing, is not entirely 
justified. While Agamben’s objections to the notion of witnessing developed in trauma 
theory functions as a platform for his own compelling model of witnessing, he fails to 
acknowledge the similarities between his own work and that of the trauma theorists he 
criticises. As this chapter has made clear, trauma theorists do in fact examine the relation 
between the possibility and the impossibility of witnessing. As was shown in the previous 
sections of this chapter, Felman and Laub derive the possibility of witnessing from its 
impossibility; the process of witnessing proceeds as a belated response to an event which 
was impossible to witness at the time of its occurrence. Nonetheless, a key difference 
between the model of witnessing offered by trauma theorists and Agamben is that where 
                                                 
55 Agamben also argues that trauma theorists unconsciously repeat the silencing gesture of the Nazis in 
affirming the impossibility of witnessing Auschwitz (2002, 36). 
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the former see witnessing as reconstituting the subject in the aftermath of 
desubjectification, Agamben uses the notion of witnessing to illuminate that there was 
never a stable subject to begin with. But instead of reading Agamben’s notion of 
witnessing in opposition to that of the trauma theorists I have discussed throughout the 
first three sections of this chapter, I suggest that their respective notions are actually 
compatible and can be read in such a way as to enrich each other.  
To understand Agamben’s account of witnessing in Remnants of Auschwitz, it is 
necessary to position his insights in relation to his foundational work in Homo Sacer. In 
this latter mentioned text, Agamben examines the zone of indeterminacy between the 
human and the inhuman, which forms the basis of his assertion that the structure of 
witnessing consists of the (non)coincidence between the in/human. Agamben begins 
Homo Sacer by reflecting on zoē and bios as the two terms that the ancient Greeks had to 
express life (1998, 1). Where zoē denotes “the simple fact of living common to all living 
beings (animals, men, or gods),” bios indicates “the form or way of living proper to an 
individual or a group” (ibid.). Arne De Boever explains that zoē tends to correspond with 
Agamben’s work on biology, whereas bios coincides with his work on ethics and politics 
(2001, 39). Agamben derives the distinction between zoē and bios from Aristotle who, in 
a canonical passage in the Politics, opposes “the simple fact of living” (that is, zoē) to 
“politically qualified life” (namely, bios) (1998, 2). Following Aristotle, Agamben 
characterises the human as a principally political formation, positing biopolitics—which I 
will go on to explain later—as the originary relation between life and politics, in which 
“life presents itself as what is included by means of exclusion” (ibid., 7). Zoē is an 
inclusive exclusion from bios: zoē is included from bios through being excluded. The 
notion of the inclusive exclusion of zoē from bios is akin to the inclusive exclusion of the 
exception from the norm, which I discussed in Chapter Three of this thesis. In separating 
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itself from bios in a relation of exteriority, zoē gives rise to bios as an interiority. Far from 
opposing bios, zoē reinforces bios and serves as its foundation in a similar means to 
which the state of exception founds the possibility of the norm.  
Agamben introduces the further notion of bare life to designate the founding 
political distinction between zoē and bios. The political distinction in Western thought 
between zoē and bios produces bare life by excluding the inhuman from the human. Bare 
life and zoē are not simply interchangeable concepts. Rather, bare life emerges when bios 
calls zoē into question; bare life is produced through the separation of zoē from bios (De 
Boever 2011, 31). Bare life, in other words, is the term that Agamben uses to refer to a 
politicised version of zoē and is tied to the sovereign exception (ibid., 39), which I 
explained in Chapter Three.  
In further considering the relation between zoē and bios, the human and the 
inhuman, Agamben turns to a passage in Aristotle’s Politics regarding the transition from 
voice to language as the ontological basis of the human (1998, 7).56 Aristotle’s distinction 
between human and non-human animals is that where the former has language to express 
the just and the unjust, and the good and the bad, the latter only have voice to express 
pleasure and pain. However, it is precisely this “extra capacity” with which Agamben 
takes issue, whether it be the additional capacity for language or politically qualified life. 
The only way that these categories can exist is through an inclusive exclusion of zoē from 
bios, human life from inhuman life. Just as bare life is constituted through excluding and 
                                                 
56 In this passage, Aristotle announces: 
 
Among living beings, only man has language. The voice is the sign of pain and pleasure, and 
this is why it belongs to other living beings (since their nature has developed to the point of 
having the sensations of pain and pleasure and of signifying the two). But language is for 
manifesting the fitting and the unfitting and the just and the unjust. To have the sensation of the 
good and the bad and of the just and the unjust is what is proper to men as opposed to other 
living beings, and the community of these things makes dwelling and the city (cited in 
Agamben 1998, 7-8).  
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preserving zoē in bios—which is akin to the inclusive exclusion of the inhuman from the 
human—the speaking being enters language only by preserving the impossibility of 
language within itself. “The living being,” writes Agamben, “has logos by taking away 
and conserving its own voice in it, even as it dwells in the polis by letting its own bare life 
be excluded, as an exception, within it” (ibid., 8). 
 The inclusion of zoē through its exclusion from politically qualified life is at the 
crux of what Agamben, following Foucault, calls biopolitics and biopower.57 Foucault 
defines biopolitics as a type of power that is targeted towards the human species—that is, 
as a regulatory form of power aimed at “taking control of life and the biological processes 
                                                 
57 Pieter Vermeulen notes that Foucault uses the terms biopolitics and biopower interchangeably without 
differentiating between the them (2014, 152, n. 1). Following Agamben, I use biopolitics rather than 
biopower. Nonetheless, the notion of power is a central concept in Foucault’s philosophical corpus that 
requires at least some form of acknowledgement. Foucault formulates two models of power: disciplinary 
power and biopower. In the body of this chapter, I will briefly examine his notion of biopower, and will 
explain in this footnote what Foucault means by disciplinary power, in particular, and power, in general. 
For Foucault, disciplinary power is a type of power that creates individuals so that they possess normative 
self-understandings. In Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison ([1975] 1991), disciplinary power is 
conceived by Foucault as a specific type of power originally located within disciplinary institutions (such as 
hospitals, schools, barracks, et cetera), which has since been dispersed throughout the entire social body. 
Foucault’s general model of power, which informs his notions of disciplinary power and biopower 
alike, is based on his rejection of juridical models of power as a fundamentally prohibitive force. Foucault 
repositions power as a micro-relational entity that is constitutive more than it is repressive. Rather than 
perceiving power as a device that restricts subjects, power is formulated as traversing and producing 
subjects (Foucault [1977] 2002, 60). Foucault reconceptualises power in positive rather than negative terms: 
as productive micro-relational forces rather than a prohibitive force that is possessed by hegemonic 
structures. In “Truth and Power”, Foucault explains: 
 
What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn’t only 
weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it produces 
pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive 
network which runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance 
whose function is repression (ibid.). 
 
A force penetrating bodies and materially manifesting itself through processes of subjectivasation, power 
exemplifies an instance in which the outside dwells, and is constitutive of, the inside of the subject. In other 
words, power is a device that is situated on both the inside and outside: external political powers are 
internalised through processes of subjectivisation. Although Foucault’s notion of power complicates the 
distinction between the inside and the outside, Agamben argues that “the point at which these two faces of 
power converge” is not sufficiently taken up by Foucault (1998, 5). “[W]here,” asks Agamben, “in the body 
of power is the zone of indistinction (or, at least, the point of intersection) at which techniques of 
individualization and totalizing procedures converge?” (ibid., 6). In response to this question, Agamben 
asserts that the distinguishing feature of modern politics is that it is no longer possible “to hold subjective 
technologies and political techniques apart” (ibid.).  
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of man-as-species” ([1976] 2003, 246-7).58 Towards the end of the first volume of The 
History of Sexuality ([1976] 1998), Foucault situates the birth of biopolitics at the 
“‘threshold of modernity’ […] when the life of the species is wagered on its own political 
strategies” (143). He declares that “[f]or millennia, man remained what he was for 
Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity for a political existence; modern 
man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in question” (ibid.). 
Agamben agrees with Foucault in many respects. Both theorists posit biopolitics as “the 
decisive event of modernity,” which signals a “radical transformation of the political-
philosophical categories of classical thought” (Agamben 1998, 4). However, Agamben 
disagrees with Foucault over one significant detail: where Foucault categorises biopolitics 
as a uniquely modern invention, Agamben suggests that biopolitics has existed from 
classical to modern democracy. According to Agamben, biopolitics dwells in the polis 
through the inclusive exclusion of zoē from bios. Thus, biopolitics is, paradoxically 
enough, both the “foundational event of modernity” and “in itself, absolutely ancient” 
(ibid., 9).  
In classical democracy, bare life was located at “the margins of the political order” 
(ibid.), whereas the defining mark of modern democracy is that the borders separating zoē 
from bios begin to blur, and “the bare life that dwelt there frees itself in the city and 
becomes both subject and object of the conflicts of the political order” (ibid.).59 The 
crucial difference between classical and modern politics is that where the former excludes 
and disregards the bare life on which it is founded, the latter draws bare life to the 
                                                 
58 A key difference between Foucault’s notions of disciplinary power and biopower is that where the former 
is targeted towards individuals, the latter is concerned with the human species as a whole ([1976] 1998, 
246). As Vermeulen explains, biopower “surreptitiously influence[s] and optimize[s] the lives of the 
people—not by disciplining bodies, but by regulating populations” (2014, 146). 
59 For Agamben, the fact that bare life is at once a manifestation of power and something that needs to be 
emancipated from power is the central aporia of modern Western democracy: “Hence, too, modern 
democracy’s specific aporia: it wants to put the freedom and happiness of men into the very place—‘bare 
life’—that marked their subjection” (1998, 10).  
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forefront of its political focus.60 While the exclusion of bare life from politically qualified 
life is as ancient as democracy itself, the significant feature of modern democracy is that 
it reveals “the hidden foundation on which the entire political system rest[s]” (ibid.). In 
classical politics, the exception (which, in this context, manifests as bare life) remained 
hidden in the margin of politics; however, the defining feature of modernity is that the 
exception encroaches on the norm (that is, politically qualified life) to the point where the 
two have become indistinguishable. “The decisive fact,” writes Agamben, 
is that, together with the process by which the exception everywhere becomes the rule, the 
realm of bare life—which is originally situated at the margins of the political order—gradually 
begins to coincide with the political realm, and exclusion and inclusion, outside and inside, 
bios and zoē, right and fact, enter into a zone of irreducible indistinction (ibid.).  
Far from marking a clean break from classical politics, Agamben shows that the 
dehumanising conditions of Auschwitz—in which politically qualified life is reduced to 
bare life—were immanent to the very political structures that it left in ruins.  
 In Remnants of Auschwitz, Agamben posits the Muselmänn61 as the central 
biopolitical figure of the camps and as a paradigmatic instance of bare life. Dwelling 
between life and death, the human and the inhuman, the Muselmänner are those who had 
been dehumanised in the camps and had been reduced to automatic and unthinking 
bodies. Testimonial discourse describes the Muselmänn as an utterly abject being on the 
threshold of life and death; she has been stripped of her humanity to the extent that she no 
                                                 
60 Agamben explains: “Placing biological life at the centre of its calculations, the modern State does nothing 
other than bring to light the secret tie uniting power and bare life, thereby reaffirming the bond” (ibid., 6). 
61 Agamben speculates that the deprecatory use of the term Muselmänn—which translates to English as 
Muslim—may “be found in the literal meaning of the Arabic word for “muslim”: the one who submits 
unconditionally to the will of God” (ibid., 45). This at least partially explains the prejudiced association of 
Islam with fatalism and the Muselmänner’s resignation of their will as correlative to this (ibid.). 
Nonetheless, Agamben explains that “while the muslim’s resignation consists in the conviction that the will 
of Allah is at work every moment and in even the smallest events, the Muselmänn of Auschwitz is instead 
defined by a loss of all will and consciousness” (ibid.). 
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longer reacts to nervous stimuli and has no regard left for anything that resembles human 
dignity. Jean Améry describes the Muselmänn as “a staggering corpse, a bundle of 
physical functions in its last convulsions” (cited in ibid., 41). The Muselmänner were 
hated amongst the other prisoners of the camps and were also referred to as “the living 
dead,” “husk men,” “cretins,” and “donkeys” (ibid., 44). They had resigned to their own 
dehumanisation and had been stripped of their will. As well as being physically decrepit, 
the Muselmänn lacked existential regard and thus the capacity for what constitutes a 
uniquely human existence (Mills 2003). For Agamben, the Muselmänn is an exemplary 
figure of bare life, marking a threshold of indistinction between the categories of the 
human and the inhuman. The Muselmänn, in other words, signifies the point at which 
both life and death, the human and the inhuman, become indistinguishable.  
Rather than positing the Muselmänn as other to the human, Agamben shows that 
the Muselmänn marks the point at which it is no longer possible to distinguish between 
the human and the inhuman. The Muselmänn is not someone who has been stripped of 
their humanity—they are not “the cipher of the point of no return and the threshold 
beyond which one ceases to be human” (ibid., 63). Instead, the Muselmänn is situated at 
the threshold of indistinction between the human and the inhuman—that is, “a point at 
which human beings, while apparently remaining human beings, cease to be human” 
(ibid., 55). The Muselmänn is a key instance in which the exception (bare life) encroaches 
on the norm (politically qualified life); the Muselmänn is the inhuman that dwells inside 
the human as its very limit. An extreme figure bordering on the human and inhuman, the 
Muselmänner bear the true likeness of humanity, whilst failing to exhibit any of the 
defining qualities of what it is to be human. 
The Muselmänn is the extreme limit of the human but is also a figure which dwells 
at all times within the human, marking a threshold which the prisoners of the camps were 
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at constant risk of crossing (ibid., 51). This is evinced through the selection process for 
the gas chambers, in which the weakest prisoners were selected to be murdered. In the 
process of selection, prisoners went to all lengths to cover their sickness and exhaustion in 
order to hide the Muselmänner who was at every moment lurking within them (ibid., 52). 
This is why the other prisoners loathed the Muselmänn: “[a]ccording to the law that what 
man [sic] despises is also what he fears resembles him, the Muselmänn is universally 
avoided because everyone in the camp recognizes himself in his disfigured face” (ibid.). 
The Muselmänn is not only a threshold that one must avoid crossing at all costs, but is 
the site of an experiment in which morality and humanity themselves are called into question. 
The Muselmänn is a limit figure of a special kind, in which not only categories such as dignity 
and respect, but even the very idea of an ethical limit lose their meaning (ibid., 63).  
Agamben reveals that in the wake of Auschwitz, the fundamental categories of human 
and inhuman life lie in ruin. As the zone of indistinction between the human and the 
inhuman, the Muselmänn becomes a key ethical figure in Agamben’s oeuvre. The figure 
of the Muselmänn calls for the beginning point for a new terrain of ethics—one that 
delimits the boundaries between human and inhuman life. For “[i]f one establishes a limit 
beyond which one ceases to be human, and all or most of humankind passes beyond it, 
this proves not the inhumanity of human beings but, instead, the insufficiency and 
abstraction of the limit” (ibid.). In light of these insights, the next section of this chapter 
considers the means through which Agamben derives the possibility of witnessing from 
the impossibility of witnessing, which he formulates through the necessary relation 
between zoē and bios, the human and the inhuman, the speaking being and the non-
speaking being.  
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Bearing Witness to the Inhuman in the Human 
I must repeat—we, the survivors, are not the true witnesses… We survivors are not only an 
exiguous but also an anomalous minority: we are those who by their prevarications or abilities 
or good luck did not touch bottom. Those who did so, those who saw the Gorgon, have not 
returned to tell about it or have returned mute, but they are the ‘Muslims’ [sic], the submerged, 
the complete witnesses, the ones whose deposition would have a general significance. They are 
the rule, we are the exception… We who were favoured by fate tried, with more or less 
wisdom, to recount not only our fate, but also that of others, the submerged; but this is a 
discourse on ‘behalf of third parties,’ the story of things seen from close by, not experienced 
personally. When the destruction was terminated, the work accomplished was not told by 
anyone, just as no one ever returned to recount his [sic] own death. Even if they had paper and 
pen, the submerged would not have testified because their death had begun before that of their 
body. Weeks and months before being snuffed out, they had already lost the ability to observe, 
to remember, compare and express themselves. We speak in their stead, by proxy (Levi [1986] 
1989, 63-4).  
The above passage—which Agamben refers to as “Levi’s paradox”—expresses the 
central aporia of witnessing Auschwitz. Levi asserts that the Muselmänner are the only 
“true” and “complete” witnesses to the camps because they were the rule, in that they 
were the logical outcome of the Nazis’ efforts to both cognitively and physically 
annihilate their victims and formed the vast majority of the inhabitants of Auschwitz. The 
survivors, on the other hand, are not the true witnesses because they were the exceptional 
few who despite all odds managed to hold on to their humanity. Levi’s paradox resides in 
the fact that although the Muselmänner are the complete witnesses, they had touched 
bottom and lacked the ability to bear witness. The survivors, on the other hand, have the 
capacity to bear witness, but they lack the authority to do so. This raises the following 
question: if the true witnesses of the camps are those who cannot bear witness, how, then, 
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is it possible to bear witness to Auschwitz? In this section, I turn to Agamben’s work on 
witnessing to move beyond Levi’s paradox. 
 Agamben etymologically derives two meanings from the word witness: the first 
comes from the Latin testis, signifying “the person who, in a trial or lawsuit between two 
rival parties, is in the position of a third party,” and the second, superstes, refers to a 
person who has lived through an event and can therefore bear witness to it (2002, 17). It is 
the latter meaning to which Agamben grants precedence; he argues that testimony has 
nothing to do with collecting facts for a trial but, rather, is to do with living through an 
event and of bearing it witness (ibid.). However, this latter meaning of the witness only 
intensifies the aporia of witnessing, which Catherine Mills describes as follows: “if the 
complete and true witnesses of Auschwitz are not the survivors but rather the drowned 
and desolate, those who have not returned at all or who have returned mute, then how is it 
possible that the event of Auschwitz be borne witness to?” (2003, n.p.). 
 Following Levi, Agamben places the Muselmänn at the centre of his ethics of 
testimony, upholding Levi as “the only one who conscientiously sets out to bear witness 
in the place of the Muselmänner, the drowned, those who were demolished and who 
touched bottom” (2002, 59). In his testimonial work on Auschwitz, Levi bears witness to 
the Muselmänn through a particular account of a child deportee. Levi describes this child 
as the “child of death”: he was half paralysed, had atrophied legs, and lacked the ability to 
speak. The inability to speak filled the child’s eyes with an explosive energy—“lost in his 
triangular and wasted face, [his eyes] flashed terribly alive, full of demand, assertion, of 
the will to break loose, to shatter the tomb of his dumbness” (cited in Agamben 2002, 37). 
The child who lacked speech also lacked a proper name. The inmates of Auschwitz called 
him “Hurbinek” because it resembled the inarticulate sounds that the child cried out 
(ibid.). The child to whom Levi bore witness—a “true witness” in Levi’s sense of the 
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term—lacked the ability to bear witness to himself. Accordingly, Agamben argues that 
what is at stake in witnessing is to listen to the “inarticulate babble” that resonates from 
the depths of Auschwitz (ibid., 38). 
 Agamben unravels Levi’s paradox of witnessing through what he identifies as the 
necessary relation between the Muselmänn and the survivor, the inhuman and the human, 
the speaking and the non-speaking being. Situated between the aforementioned extremes, 
witnessing occurs when “the speechless one makes the speaking one speak and where the 
one who speaks bears witness to the impossibility of speaking in her own speech, such 
that the silent and the speaking […] enter into a zone of indistinction” (ibid., 120). In this 
way, Agamben derives the possibility of witnessing from its impossibility, in which the 
Muselmänn and the survivor, the drowned and the saved, the human and the inhuman, and 
the non-speaking and the speaking being, coincide. Indeed, for Agamben, ethics in 
Auschwitz “begins precisely at the point where the Muselmänn, ‘the complete witness,’ 
makes it forever impossible to distinguish between man and non-man” (ibid., 47).  
For Agamben, Levi’s paradox gestures towards the dual structure of witnessing, 
which consists of “the difference and completion of an impossibility and possibility of 
speaking, of the inhuman and the human, a living being and a speaking being” (ibid., 
151). She who bears witness testifies to the “constitutively fractured” subject of 
testimony, which “has no other consistency than disjunction and dislocation—and yet it is 
irreducible to them” (ibid.). Witnessing illuminates the hidden link between the human 
and the inhuman as well as the possibility and impossibility of witnessing. Agamben 
continues: “[i]t is because there is testimony only where there is an impossibility of 
speaking, because there is a witness only where there has been desubjectification, that the 
Muselmänn is the complete witness and that the survivor and the Muselmänn cannot be 
split apart” (ibid., 158, emphasis in original).  
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 Rather than simply reconciling the tension between the drowned and the saved, 
Agamben moves beyond Levi’s paradox by deriving “the value of testimony […from] 
what it lacks; at its center it contains something that cannot be borne witness to and that 
discharges the survivors of authority” (ibid., 34). In other words, while the Muselmänn 
cannot speak for herself, the survivors speak for her by proxy, bearing witness to a 
missing testimony. Thus, the one who bears witness in the name of the drowned must 
bear witness to the impossibility of bearing witness. Emphasising the necessary relation 
between language and non-language, the speaking and the non-speaking being, the 
inhuman and the human, and the Muselmänn and survivor, Agamben derives the 
possibility of witnessing from its impossibility. 
The “remnant” that Agamben indicates in his title, Remnants of Auschwitz, is 
neither the drowned nor the saved but, rather, the necessary relation between them. What 
remains of Auschwitz is the non-speaking being who dwells within the speaking being as 
its innermost limit. As is the case with the inclusive exclusion of zoē from bios, the 
exception from the norm, it is only through preserving the non-speaking being within 
itself that the speaking being can enter language and can differentiate itself from that 
which is without language and speech. As such, there is a lacuna at the heart of every 
survivor’s testimony, in which it is necessary “that the impossibility of bearing witness, 
the lacuna that constitutes human language collapses giving way to a different 
impossibility of bearing witness—that to which does not have language” (ibid., 39). The 
possibility of testimony derives from the impossibility of testimony to the extent that 
“there is an inseparable division and non-coincidence between the inhuman and the 
human, the living being and the speaking being, the Muselmänn and the survivor” (ibid., 
158). Given this, both the possibility and the impossibility of witnessing is marked by the 
immemorial relation between the inside and outside of language, as well as that between 
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the inside and the outside of the category of the human (ibid.). This immemorial relation, 
as the precondition of being, is closely aligned with the notion of originary trauma, which 
is a topic that forms the basis of Part Two of this thesis (albeit, not within the context of 
Agamben’s work). 
Witnessing the Inhuman as Immanent to the Human 
The respective models of witnessing developed by Felman, Laub, and Agamben, oppose 
the traditional notion of the witness heralded by juridico-historical discourse. Where the 
juridico-historical notion of the witness privileges the eyewitness’ ability to testify to the 
reality of the events in question in a factual and empirically verifiable manner, Felman, 
Laub, and Agamben reconceive the witness as she who has lived through an event and 
can therefore bear witness to it. For Felman and Laub, trauma is an event without a 
witness—that is, an event that is impossible to witness as it occurs. Since, in trauma 
theory, the structure of witnessing forms the basis of subjectivity, an event without a 
witness is an event without a subject. The crisis of witnessing cuts across the inside and 
the outside of the traumatic event—as Agamben explains: “it is impossible to bear 
witness to it from the inside—since no one can bear witness to the inside of death, and 
there is no voice for the disappearance of voice—and from the outside—since the 
‘outsider’ is by definition excluded from the event” (2002, 35). However, Agamben 
criticises Felman and Laub of mystifying trauma, positing it outside of language and 
thought. In response to this accusation, I argue that the crisis of witnessing trauma upheld 
by Felman and Laub by no means implies that trauma transcends language and thought. 
Indeed, these theorists derive the possibility of witnessing from its very impossibility, 
whereby the possibility of witnessing proceeds through the performative reenactment of 
the impossibility of witnessing.  
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Just as the impossibility of witnessing does not imply that trauma exists beyond 
the limits of language and thought, the desubjectified other in the event of trauma does 
not transcend or in any way oppose the self. Trauma theorists see witnessing as 
reconstituting the traumatised being’s annihilated subjectivity in the aftermath of trauma. 
But the kind of subjectivity that is to be reconstructed is not the classical humanist 
subject, conceived as a unitary and self-identical being. Instead, witnessing reconstitutes a 
subject who was already fractured to begin with; the subject is inherently split through the 
self-other relation that lies at the heart of subjectivity. Nor is the other that trauma 
theorists refer to a transcendent other, outside or beyond the self. The other is both an 
external, concrete other (namely, she who listens to the witness’ testimony) and an 
internalised other. Far from transcending the subject, the other is their innermost 
condition: it is the subject’s ability to address and to respond to the other that gives rise to 
their capacity to address and respond to themselves.  
Despite Agamben’s objections to the trauma theories of Felman and Laub, I 
suggest that their respective accounts of witnessing, as well as their theses on subjectivity, 
have much more in common than Agamben himself is willing to admit. Drawing on the 
Muselmänn as an exemplary figure of bare life, Agamben describes witnessing as an 
event that reveals the inhuman as the innermost condition of the human. In Agamben’s 
formulation, the inhuman is not directly opposed to the human. For in order for one to be 
considered human, it is necessary that that which is inhuman is separated from the human 
(Agamben calls this separation an “inclusive exclusion”). The exclusion of the inhuman 
from the human does not entirely remove the former from the latter—the inhuman is 
included in the human in virtue of being excluded. In its relation of exteriority—as that 
which lies “outside” of the human—the inhuman forms the human as an interiority. In the 
process of witnessing, the necessary relation between the human and the inhuman, as well 
   
 
163 
 
 
as the possibility and impossibility of speech, is illuminated. Witnessing occurs when the 
im/possibility of witnessing the in/human enter a zone of indistinction which testifies to 
the inseparability of these seemingly opposing terms.  
I suggest that the necessary relation between the human and the inhuman espoused 
by Agamben parallels the relation between the self and the other upheld by Felman and 
Laub. The notion of the human dwells on the plane of the self, while the inhuman 
corresponds with the other. In the accounts of Felman, Laub, and Agamben, the subject is 
conceived as being constitutively fractured, with the process of witnessing illuminating 
the interconnection between the human and the inhuman, the self and the other. The 
insights developed by Felman, Laub and Agamben, reveal that the inhuman (or other) is 
not opposed to the human (or self) but is, rather, its necessary condition. This shows that 
the other-than-human does not transcend the human, but resides at the core of the human 
itself (Wolfe 2003, 17). In this way, the inhuman other is immanent to, and is a necessary 
condition of, the very human subject that is left in ruin after Auschwitz. The instance of 
trauma and the belated attempt to bear witness to it reveals that the subject was always 
already wounded. Trauma reveals the fragmentary nature of subjectivity as being 
constitutively fractured through the interdependence between the self and the other, the 
human and the inhuman. The inhuman is the necessary condition of the human, while the 
process of witnessing illuminates the hitherto hidden link between these extremes. This 
insight is at the crux of what I refer to as the immanence of traumatic rupture. Where the 
inhuman and the other are often conceived as transcending the human, they are immanent 
to the extent that they form the very basis of human subjectivity. As that which forms the 
basis of subjectivity, the inhuman is the originary condition of the human, to the extent 
that the inhuman precedes the coming-into-being of the human. It is precisely the notion 
of origins which forms the basis of Part Two of this thesis. 
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From the Extra/Ordinary to the Originary 
This present chapter is the final instalment of Part One of this thesis. The major theme of 
Part One has been the tension between the extraordinary and the ordinary that arises in the 
conceptualisation of trauma. Where Chapter One examined this tension in the context of 
trauma theory, the tension between the extraordinary and the ordinary assumed various 
guises across chapters Two to Four. In Chapter Two, the tension between the 
extra/ordinary was shown as being manifest in the polemic in Holocaust discourse 
between the exceptional and the exemplary, and the unique and the comparable. In 
Chapter Three, the tension was illuminated through the oppositions between the exception 
and the norm, the radical and the banal. Meanwhile, Chapter Four—which is the present 
chapter of this thesis—turned to the tension between the impossibility and possibility of 
witnessing, along with the tension between the inhuman and the human as correlative to 
the tension between the extra/ordinary. Where the former mentioned categories were 
situated on the side of the extraordinary, the latter were placed on the side of the ordinary. 
The tensions between the extraordinary and the ordinary extrapolated in Part One have 
been placed under the broader banner of the transcendent and the immanent—with the 
extraordinary dwelling on the plane of the transcendent and the ordinary on the side of the 
immanent. In accordance with the central argument of this thesis concerning the 
immanence of traumatic rupture, Part One has been concerned with offering a series of 
arguments which move beyond the mutual exclusivity of the transcendent and the 
immanent, the extraordinary and the ordinary, in order to reveal their interdependence.  
 Part Two of this thesis continues with a discussion of the extra/ordinary facets of 
trauma and introduces the further notion of the originary. At the crux of originary trauma 
is an event that precedes the emergence of the subject. Originary trauma, in other words, 
marks the traumatic origins of subjectivity. Amongst others, one of the major aims of Part 
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Two is to argue that trauma—whether it is conceived as originary or historical trauma—
occurs “prior” to the subject insofar as it is an unpresentable event that cannot be borne 
witness to at the time that it occurs. Trauma ruptures the subject’s sense of themselves as 
a stable and coherent “I” and both precedes and exceeds subjectivity. Originary and 
historical trauma occur in an inaccessible time that cannot be posited until after the fact of 
its occurrence. In this way, the bounds separating the historical and the originary become 
increasingly difficult to delineate. While I will not elaborate on this argument here, it will 
become much more apparent in Part Two of this thesis—particularly in Chapter Seven, 
which marks the culminate moment of this thesis.  
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Chapter Five – Traumatic Awakening: Between the Extraordinary, the Ordinary, 
and the Originary 
Where the primary concern of Part One of this thesis was the tension between the 
extraordinary and the ordinary—with the ordinary and the extraordinary being posited 
under the broader banner of the immanent and the transcendent—Part Two explores the 
notion of originary trauma and, along with it, the tension between reality and fantasy. As 
previously explained, originary trauma pertains to the preontological conditions of the 
subject—that is, the traumatic origins of subjectivity. In the following three chapters of 
this thesis—namely, Chapters Five, Six, and Seven—I draw on psychoanalysis to 
configure the traumatic origins of subjectivity and so too the tension between reality and 
fantasy. Where each chapter of Part One developed an interlocking argument upholding 
the immanence of traumatic rupture, Part Two follows a similar path, but with respect to 
revealing trauma as spilling across the originary.  
Freud’s theoretical insights play an essential role in the conceptualisation of 
trauma, however, his writings on the topic are intermittent and are far from constituting a 
coherent theory of trauma.62 As I explained in Chapter One, trauma is a key focus in 
Freud’s earlier work on hysteria, but he eventually discontinues this line of inquiry to 
develop his famous theory of psychoanalysis.63 Psychoanalysis, Caruth explains, is 
“associated with the theory of repression and return of the repressed, as well as with a 
                                                 
62 Freud’s reflections on trauma appear in his earlier writings on hysteria (see Studies on Hysteria ([1895] 
1955), and the Aetiology of Hysteria ([1896] 1962); his work on traumatised soldiers returning from World 
War I in Beyond the Pleasure Principle ([1920] 1961); and the notion of latency formulated in later work, 
Moses and Monotheism (1939). 
63 The controversial shift that occurs earlier in Freud’s career—from his focus on “actual” events of trauma 
in the context of hysteria to the idea that neuroses are effects of repressed erotic infantile fantasies—is 
criticised for denying the urgent reality of childhood sexual abuse suffered by his patients and is accused of 
replacing “reality” with “fantasy” (Masson 1985; Herman 1992; Van der Kolk and Van der Hart 1995). The 
shift in Freud’s work was introduced in Chapter One of this dissertation and I will turn to it again in 
Chapters Five, Six and Seven. 
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system of unconscious symbolic meanings (the basis of the dream theory in its usual 
interpretation)” (1996, 135n18). The symbolism that arises from the unconscious pertains 
to the realm of fantasy, which—as Dylan Evans explains—“denote[s] a scene which is 
presented to the imagination and which stages an unconscious desire” (1996, 61). 
Nonetheless, trauma “emerges in psychoanalytic theory […] as an interruption of the 
symbolic system and is linked, not to repression, unconsciousness, and symbolization, but 
rather to a temporal delay, repetition, and literal return” (Caruth 1996, 135n18).  
The problem of trauma is something that Freud repeatedly returns to in his 
writings, with trauma emerging as a disruption to his psychoanalytic insights.64 The most 
striking example of this appears in Beyond the Pleasure Principle ([1920] 1961), in which 
Freud examines the compulsion to repeat traumatising events. Written in the immediate 
aftermath of the First World War, Beyond the Pleasure Principle considers the repetitive 
symptoms suffered by soldiers returning from battle. These symptoms include recurring 
dreams, flashbacks and reenactments of the situations in which the individual fell ill. 
What strikes Freud as bewildering is the fact that the repetitive symptoms suffered by 
traumatised individuals cannot be explained under the psychoanalytic notion of wish-
fulfilment since no pleasure or gratification can be observed in those who involuntarily 
relive the events that caused them to become ill in the first place. Indeed, the repetitive 
symptoms of trauma return the traumatised being to the initial traumatic scene against 
their conscious will. 
                                                 
64 In the “Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis”, Freud admits that “[t]raumatic neuroses are not in their 
essence the same thing as the spontaneous neuroses which we are in the habit of investigating and treating 
by analysis; nor have we yet succeeded in bringing them into harmony with our views” ([1917] 1963, 274).  
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In discussing Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle, I consider the phenomenon 
of repetition compulsion as essential to the experience of trauma. Repetition compulsion 
overrides the pleasure principle, replaying the scene that gave rise to the traumatic 
symptoms in an attempt to retroactively master an event that was too overwhelming to be 
cognitised at the time that it occurred. However, as well as observing the compulsion to 
repeat in the aberrant context of trauma, Freud also identifies repetition compulsion in the 
most ordinary of situations, specifically in the context of children’s play. Thus, Freud’s 
remarks on repetition compulsion—which form the basis of his writings on trauma— 
oscillate between the seemingly separate poles of the extraordinary and the ordinary. In 
Part One of this thesis the concept of trauma shifted from an exceptional occurrence that 
lies outside of the bounds of ordinary experience, to a phenomenon that is consistent with 
ordinary experience. This chapter will pursue a similar line of inquiry based on a tension 
that emerges in Freud’s discussion of trauma, in which trauma has competing claims on 
both exceptional and ordinary experiences. However, Chapter Five also moves a step 
beyond this tension and ponders the question of originary trauma, which is a concept that 
I will extrapolate as Chapter Five and the subsequent chapters of Part Two unfold. 
In examining Freud’s account of trauma in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, this 
chapter utilises the interpretative strategies of Caruth, who draws attention to an important 
shift that occurs in Freud’s work. Where Freud initially characterises trauma as an 
aberrant breach in the psyche, he goes on to situate trauma as the originary scene through 
which both life and the death drive come into being (Caruth 2013, 95). As will be 
explained, the traumatic awakening of life from death gives rise to the death drive, which 
strives to return the living organism to its former state of inertia, thus fuelling the 
compulsion to repeat. Here, a tension between the notion of trauma as a breach in 
consciousness and the notion of trauma as being situated at the very origins of life arises. 
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Rather than simply resolve this tension, Chapter Five brings it to light at the interstice of 
Freud’s and Caruth’s work.  
This chapter illuminates the tension between the notion of trauma as a breach in 
the protective shield of consciousness and the notion of trauma as the originary condition 
of life—that is, the traumatic awakening of life from death. In situating trauma at the 
origins of life, I consider the repetitive symptoms of trauma as a return to a more primal 
scene. Rather than reducing trauma to either the extraordinary or the originary, this 
chapter draws on Caruth’s conceptualisation of trauma—as an originary awakening of life 
from death—to situate trauma in a liminal space between these extremes. Caruth draws 
attention to the means through which the originary traumatic awakening of life from death 
mirrors the repetitive dreams experienced by those suffering from trauma: in both 
instances, the survivor repeatedly wakes up in another fright. Unable to access this primal 
traumatic scene, the dreamer is destined to relive the originary scene of trauma in the 
unattainable moment of awakening.  
Siting Trauma: Beyond the Pleasure Principle 
Freud begins Beyond the Pleasure Principle by recapitulating his economic view of the 
psychical processes at the centre of psychoanalysis, in which it is upheld that “the course 
taken by mental events is automatically regulated by the pleasure principle” ([1920] 1961, 
1). In formulating the pleasure principle, Freud takes his cue from thermodynamics, 
conceiving mental events as “set in motion by an unpleasurable tension, and that it takes a 
direction such that its final outcome coincides with a lowering of that tension—that is, 
with an avoidance of unpleasure and a produce of pleasure” (ibid.). He differentiates 
pleasure from unpleasure in relation to the quantity of unbound excitations present in the 
psyche, with pleasure pertaining to a diminution in quantity and unpleasure pertaining to 
an increase in quantity (ibid., 2). Freud explains that “the mental apparatus endeavours to 
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keep the quantity of excitation present in it as low as possible or at least to a constant” 
(ibid., 3). The pleasure principle thus functions in accordance with the principle of 
constancy, whereby psychic equilibrium is associated with pleasure, and psychical 
instability is associated with unpleasure (ibid.).  
While the course of mental events is governed by the pleasure principle, “the 
difficulties of the external world” (ibid., 4) appear to undermine this function, to the 
extent that the pleasure principle seems doomed from its very outset (ibid.). It is because 
of this that Freud posits the pleasure principle as a tendency, whilst acknowledging that 
this “tendency is opposed by certain other forces or circumstances, so that the final 
outcome cannot always be in harmony with the tendency towards pleasure” (ibid., 3-4). In 
reconciling the psyche’s tendency towards pleasure and the obstacles of the outside 
world, Freud introduces the further notion of the reality principle. The reality principle 
“demands and carries into effect the postponement of satisfaction, the abandonment of a 
number of possibilities of gaining satisfaction and the temporary toleration of unpleasure” 
(ibid., 4). Nevertheless, the reality principle still functions under the dominance of the 
pleasure principle in that it only tolerates unpleasure “as a step on the long indirect road 
to pleasure” (ibid.).   
Freud continues his search beyond the pleasure principle by reflecting on the great 
increase in trauma in the aftermath of World War I (ibid., 6). Individuals suffering from 
trauma experience a series of unpleasant symptoms which Freud cannot explain under the 
pleasure principle. Freud is particularly struck by the recurrence of repetitive traumatic 
dreams. He later argues that these dreams are an attempt to retroactively master an event 
that could not be psychically bound at the time it occurred. The dreams that arise in 
trauma do not conform to the pleasure principle but, rather, in accordance with the 
compulsion to repeat. But before I elaborate on traumatic dreams as a repetitive symptom 
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of trauma, I will first consider Freud’s thoughts on the protective function of 
consciousness, whereby trauma is posited as an extensive breach in the protective shield. 
Through this, it will be established that the repetitive symptoms suffered by traumatised 
individuals reenact the conditions that led to the breach in consciousness in an attempt to 
retroactively bind the intrusive stimuli.   
Freud begins Section IV of Beyond the Pleasure Principle by speculating on the 
birth of consciousness. In what almost reads as myth,65 he invokes the picture of 
a living organism in its most simplified possible form as an undifferentiated vesicle of a 
substance that is susceptible to stimulation. Then the surface turned towards the external world 
will from its very situation be differentiated and will serve as an organ for receiving stimuli 
[…] It would be easy to suppose, then, that as a result of the ceaseless impact of external 
stimuli on the surface of the vesicle, its substance to a certain depth may have become 
permanently modified […]. A crust would thus be formed which would at last have to be so 
‘baked through’ by stimulation that it would present the most favourable possible conditions 
for the reception of stimuli and become incapable of any further modification […] now, 
however, they would have become capable of giving rise to consciousness (ibid., 20). 
Freud posits the “baked-through crust” as the protective shield that defends the living 
organism from the hostile environment that surrounds it. Out of the necessity of 
protecting the living substance from the powerful energies of the external world, the 
living organism acquired a shield to defend itself (ibid.). Freud characterises the living 
organism as a fragment “suspended in the middle of an external world charged with the 
most powerful energies; and it would be killed by the stimulation emanating from these if 
it were not provided with a protective shield against stimuli” (ibid., 21). The living vesicle 
attains this protective shield through the following process: “its outermost surface ceases 
                                                 
65 Fletcher comments that Freud’s bizarre theory on the origins of consciousness “hovers as a theoretical 
fiction ambiguously between being a mythical ur-organism, a prototype from which the human brain and 
cerebral cortex supposedly evolved, and a model of the psychical apparatus” (2013, 294). 
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to have the structure proper to living matter, [and] becomes to some degree inorganic and 
thenceforward functions as a special envelope or membrane resistant to stimuli” (ibid.). 
Fletcher draws attention to Freud’s dialectic of life and death, where the death of the outer 
layer forms a filter through which the excessive forces of the external world can pass 
through to the inner layers in a diminished quantity (2013, 296). Through its death, the 
outer layer of the living vesicle receives stimuli “with only a fragment of their original 
intensity” (Freud [1920] 1961, 21). If it were not for this protective layer, Freud suggests, 
the living vesicle would be killed by the overpowering energies emanating from the 
external world.  
While consciousness is traditionally conceived through its ability to receive 
stimuli, Freud argues that the most important function of consciousness is to keep stimuli 
out (ibid.). “Protection against stimuli,” Freud explains, “is an almost more important 
function for the living organism than reception of stimuli” (ibid., emphasis in original). In 
Freud’s radical formulation, consciousness is itself a kind of protective shield from the 
external world. In receiving stimuli, the psychical apparatus takes in small samples in 
order to “discover the direction and nature of the external stimuli” (ibid.). Freud likens the 
sense organs to “little feelers which are all the time making tentative advances towards 
the external world and then drawing back from it” (ibid., 22).  
Having speculated on the origins of consciousness, Freud goes on to define as 
traumatic “any excitations from outside which are powerful enough to break through the 
protective shield” (ibid., 23). Trauma, in other words, is “a consequence of an extensive 
breach being made in the protective shield against stimuli” (ibid., 25). “It seems to me,” 
Freud explains, “that the concept of trauma necessarily implies a connection of this kind 
with a breach in an otherwise efficacious barrier against stimuli” (ibid., 23). Where the 
protective shield would ordinarily protect consciousness from the violent energies of the 
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external world, trauma results from an atypical breach in the protective shield, in which 
the psychical apparatus is flooded with excessive quantities of stimuli and the pleasure 
principle is momentarily suspended. But trauma is not simply the consequence of the 
quantity of stimuli which breach the psychical apparatus. Trauma arises from fright, 
which marks a lack of preparedness to receive excessive quantities of external excitations 
that are moving too quickly. 
Freud attributes the onset of traumatic neurosis to the quality of “fright,” which 
denotes the state of psychical unpreparedness to encounter danger. He differentiates 
“fright” from “fear” and “anxiety” (ibid., 6). While fear is directed towards “a definitive 
object of which to be afraid,” and anxiety “describes a particular state of expecting danger 
or preparing for it, even though it may be an unknown one,” fright refers “to the state a 
person gets into when he [sic] has run into danger without being prepared for it; it 
emphasizes the factor of surprise” (ibid.). Neither fear nor anxiety can produce traumatic 
symptoms—in fact, Freud believes that anxiety actually protects the individual from 
trauma, since it prepares them for impending danger (regardless of whether or not this 
danger is known to them). Freud posits fright as conducive to the onset of traumatic 
neurosis, which is caused “by a lack of preparedness for anxiety” (ibid., 25). Fright is a 
central character of the repetitive dreams that occur in traumatised individuals: “dreams 
occurring in traumatic neuroses have the characteristic of repeatedly bringing the patient 
back to the situation of his [sic] accident, a situation from which he wakes up in another 
fright” (ibid. 7).  
The repetitive dreams that occur for those suffering from trauma seem to 
contradict the pleasure principle insofar as these dreams return the individual back into 
the traumatising situation that caused their symptoms. In psychoanalysis, the function of 
dreams had hitherto been understood as “setting aside any motives that might interrupt 
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sleep, by fulfilling the wishes of the disturbing impulses” (ibid., 27). The hallucinatory 
manner of dreams was thought to bring about the fantasmatic fulfilment of wishes under 
the dominance of the pleasure principle (ibid.). Caruth further explains that in 
psychoanalysis, dreams “had always served the function of fulfilling wishes: of allowing 
the unconscious, conflictual desires of childhood to find expression through the symbolic 
world of the dream” (2013, 3). Freud, however, observes that the dreams of those 
suffering from traumatic neurosis—which repeatedly bring the patient back to the 
situation in which the trauma occurred—interrupt the psychoanalytic understanding of 
fantasmatic wish-fulfilment and can no longer be interpreted as being in service of the 
pleasure principle ([1920] 1961, 26). Where it would be consistent with the wish-
fulfilling function of dreams if the individual were to dream of a healthy past or a future 
cure, the pleasure principle cannot explain why traumatic dreams repeatedly put the 
individual back into the initial situation of trauma (ibid., 6). 
What Freud finds most astounding about traumatic dreams is that they cannot be 
explained as functioning under the pleasure principle. Where Freud sees anxiety dreams 
and punishment dreams as also having unpleasurable and distressing effects, he 
nonetheless sees them as the fantasmatic fulfilment of wishes. In anxiety and punishment 
dreams “it is precisely the forbidden wish fulfilment in the dream that provokes the 
anxiety or the punishment that characterizes them” (Fletcher 2013, 300). However, unlike 
anxiety and punishment dreams, dreams that occur for individuals suffering from trauma 
seem to contradict the pleasure principle, or at least function independently to it. 
Traumatic dreams involuntarily lead the individual “back with such regularity to the 
situation in which the trauma occurred” (Freud [1920] 1961, 26). The repetitive dreams 
occurring in trauma might appear symptomatic of the individual’s fixation to their trauma. 
But Freud observes that “patients suffering from trauma appear more concerned in their 
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waking lives with not thinking about what lead to their illness” (ibid., 7, emphasis in 
original). Far from being fixated to their trauma, traumatised individuals are not 
consciously aware of their trauma whilst they are awake, but are repeatedly and 
involuntarily returned to the original scene of the trauma in their dreams. 
Given this, Freud considers the idea that dreams that occur in trauma are “helping 
to carry out another task, which must be accomplished before the pleasure principle can 
even begin” (ibid., 26). “These dreams,” continues Freud, “are endeavouring to master the 
stimulus retrospectively, by developing the anxiety whose omission was the cause of the 
traumatic neurosis” (ibid.). Rather than functioning under the dominance of the pleasure 
principle, the mental apparatus takes up the task of psychically binding the traumatic 
impressions (ibid., 27)—of mastering “the amount of stimulus which have broken in and 
of binding them, in the psychical sense, so that they can be disposed of” (ibid., 24). The 
repetitive dreams suffered by traumatised beings attempt to retrospectively master the 
breach in the protective shield which caused the illness in the first place (ibid., 26). Thus, 
dreams that occur in traumatic neurosis no longer function in accordance with wish-
fulfilment or the pleasure principle and instead arise “in obedience to the compulsion to 
repeat” (ibid.).  
Fort/Da 
Where Freud begins Section II of Beyond the Pleasure Principle with a discussion of the 
repetitive dreams suffered by traumatised individuals, he goes on to make an unexpected 
shift. Half way into the section, Freud leaves behind “the dark and dismal subject of the 
traumatic neurosis” to examine “the method of working employed by the mental 
apparatus in one of its earliest normal activities—I mean in children’s play” (ibid., 8, 
emphasis in original). Having observed the compulsion to repeat in the aberrant context 
of trauma, Freud identifies repetition compulsion in the most ordinary of situations. In his 
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discussion, Freud reflects on the “puzzling activity constantly repeated” by his one-and-a-
half-year-old grandson (ibid.).66 This little boy had the “disturbing habit of taking any 
small objects that he could get hold of and throwing them away from him in a corner, 
under the bed, and so on, so that hunting for his toys and picking them up was often quite 
a business” (ibid.). When the child would eventually find his toys, he emitted an air of 
satisfaction accompanied by a “long-drawn-out ‘o-o-o-o’” (ibid.).  
Freud later observed the child playing a similar game, but this time with a 
“wooden reel with a piece of string tied round it” (ibid., 9). Holding the string connected 
to the reel, the child would throw the reel over the edge of his curtained cot where he 
could not see it whilst uttering an expressive “o-o-o-o” (ibid.). Following this 
disappearing act, the child would retrieve the reel and hail its reappearance with a joyful 
“a-a-a-a” (ibid.). Freud interprets the sounds of the child—the “o-o-o-o” uttered when the 
reel was cast out of sight and “a-a-a-a” cried in delight as the reel was retrieved—as 
meaning fort and da, which are the German words for “gone” and “here” (ibid.).  
Freud’s grandson started playing this game at around the same time that he was 
for the first time confronted with the loss of his mother. The child “was greatly attached 
to his mother, who had not only fed him herself but had also looked after him without any 
outside help” (ibid., 8). Although he was very attached to his mother, this “good little 
boy” never cried when she left him for a few hours (ibid.). Freud subsequently 
characterises the child’s game as a “great cultural achievement—the instinctual 
renunciation (that is, the renunciation of instinctual satisfaction) which he had made in 
allowing his mother to go without protesting” (ibid., 9). Accordingly, the child 
compensated himself by “staging the disappearance and return of the objects within his 
                                                 
66 Although Freud himself does not show this connection in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, the child was in 
fact the son of his daughter, Sophie. 
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reach” (ibid.). Given this, Freud interprets the child’s game as a reenactment of the 
departure and return of his mother. 
This initial reading of the child’s game emphasises the joy attached to the return 
of the object, which is representative of the return of the mother—“there is no doubt that 
the greater pleasure was attached to the second act” (ibid.). This is consistent with the 
pleasure principle, insofar as the child’s game substitutes the unpleasurable experience of 
his mother’s departure with her pleasurable return. However, Freud makes an observation 
that derails his initial interpretation: although the small child tirelessly repeated the first 
act of the game—the act of disappearance—he did not always carry out “the episode in its 
entirety, with its pleasurable ending” (ibid.). While the child’s reenactment of the return 
of his mother appears to be consistent with the pleasure principle, the fact that the child 
stages the first act of departure more often than that second act of return gestures towards 
something that lies beyond this fundamental psychoanalytic tenet.  
At this stage in his reflections, Freud offers a series of shifting interpretations of 
the child’s game. He suggests that the game could be a means for the child to assume an 
active role in a situation in which he was passive: “[a]t the outset he was in a passive 
situation—he was overpowered by the experience; but, by repeating it, unpleasurable 
though it was, as a game, he took on an active part” (ibid., 10, emphasis in original). 
Alternatively, the game could be read as satisfying the child’s impulse to enact revenge 
on his mother for leaving him. The reenactment of the mother’s departure, signified by 
the child’s throwing away of the reel, can be understood as an act of defiance—“‘[a]ll 
right, then, go away! I don’t need you. I’m sending you away myself’” (ibid.). In staging 
these interpretations, Freud considers the question of why the child would repeat an 
experience—namely, his mother’s departure—when it could not have possibly been 
experienced as pleasurable in any way. The repetitive behaviour of the child echoes the 
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repetition compulsion at the locus of trauma: like the repetitive dreams of the soldier 
faced with the First World War, the game of fort/da played by the child reenacts a painful 
reality that cannot be adequately comprehended—that is, the traumatic loss of his mother. 
In her most recent monograph on trauma, Literature in the Ashes of History 
(2013), Caruth comments on how Freud’s attempt at interpretation curiously wavers 
around the question of whether the child’s game is one of departure or return (65). Caruth 
suggests that Freud’s interpretative struggle “unwittingly repeats the recurring gestures of 
the child’s play” (ibid., ix). Freud enters into his own game of fort/da, drawing the reader 
into each interpretation before staging its disappearance through contradictory readings. 
In light of this, Caruth interprets Freud’s shift in Section II of Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle—from the discussion of soldiers suffering from traumatic neurosis to the 
“ordinary” game of the child—as carrying a significance that exceeds his conscious 
theory of trauma.  
Along with the traumatic loss of the small child, there is a loss evidenced in 
Freud’s writing—namely, the loss of psychoanalytic thinking governed by the pleasure 
principle.67 Caruth reads Freud’s interpretative struggle as emblematic of his own 
difficulties to come to terms with the world in which he lived in the aftermath of the First 
World War. The great increase in trauma in the aftermath of World War I forced Freud to 
question his psychoanalytic insights centred on the child as the site of the pleasure 
principle. According to Caruth, Freud “appears to shift the centre of psychoanalytic 
thinking from the individual struggle with the Oedipal conflicts of childhood with the 
external, collective activities of history, and to make of childhood a reflection of a more 
                                                 
67 Freud was also subject to another traumatic loss—namely, the death of his daughter, Sophie, who was 
also the mother of the child who played the game of fort/da. Sophie died when Freud was in the final stages 
of writing Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Freud briefly remarks on the child’s response to his mother’s 
death in a later-added footnote: “When this child was five and three-quarters, his mother died. Now that she 
was really gone (‘o-o-o’), the little boy showed no signs of grief” ([1920] 1961, 10). 
   
 
180 
 
 
obscure and painful encounter” (ibid., 7). In this way, Freud replaces the child—who acts 
in accordance with the pleasure principle—with the theory of trauma (ibid., 7).  
Caruth reads Freud’s “striking and enigmatic leap that juxtaposes the nightmares of war 
to the child’s game” in terms of a “new understanding of personal and collective history 
in the face of war” (ibid., 5): 
Set against the backdrop of World War I and Freud’s description of the traumatised soldiers 
returning from the battlefield, the child’s game carries with it a special significance: the pathos 
of a startled being, bewildered by an inexplicable absence, desperately trying, with each pull of 
the string, to make the world with which he was familiar reappear. The game of fort/da, framed 
by the losses of the war, thus speaks indirectly to a larger predicament, felt not only by the 
child, but also by the adult who stands, in perplexity, before him: both are experiencing the 
looming danger of a world that might vanish, a world that, in its newly unleashed forms of 
destructiveness, may also be about to disappear (ibid., ix).  
Freud’s own subject position as an individual writing against the backdrop of World War 
I mirrors the child’s game of fort/da: with a pull of the string and the stroke of a pen, both 
the child and Freud are attempting to depart from and to return to a traumatic history that 
neither of them can properly understand. 
Repetition Compulsion  
While individuals suffering from trauma experience symptoms which repeatedly bring 
them back to the distressing situation that caused their illness to arise in the first place, the 
game of fort/da enacted by the child stages the repetition of his mother’s painful 
departure. The crucial link between the dreams experienced in response to the aberrant 
event of trauma and the ordinary games played by children is that they are both governed 
by a phenomenon that lies beyond the pleasure principle—that is, the compulsion to 
repeat. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud invokes the literary example of Tancred 
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and Clorinda from Tasso’s epic poem, Gerusalemme Liberata, as “the most moving 
poetic picture” of repetition compulsion: 
Its hero, Tancred, unwittingly kills his beloved Clorinda in a duel while she is disguised in the 
armour of an enemy knight. After her burial he makes his way into a strange magic forest 
which strikes the Crusaders’ army with terror. He slashes with his sword at a tall tree; but 
blood streams from the cut and the voice of Clorinda, whose soul is imprisoned in the tree, is 
heard complaining that he has wounded his beloved once again (ibid., 16). 
The compulsion to repeat is evidenced in the actions of Tancred, who unknowingly kills 
his beloved Clorinda not only once, but twice.68 “This ‘perpetual recurrence of the same 
thing’,” Freud explains, 
causes us no astonishment when it relates to active behaviour on the part of the person 
concerned and when we can discern in him [sic] an essential character-trait which always 
                                                 
68 Caruth suggests that Freud’s commentary on repetition compulsion in Tasso’s literary example exceeds 
the limits of his conscious theory of repetition compulsion. In addition to the repetitive actions of Tancred, 
Caruth draws attention to the sorrowful voice of Clorinda that cries out from the wound of the tree. She 
argues that Tasso’s epic is a “parable of a wound”: it does not only demonstrate “the unconscious act of the 
infliction of the injury and its inadvertent unwished-for repetition, but the moving and sorrowful voice that 
cries out, a voice that is paradoxically released through the wound” (1996, 2, emphasis in original).  
Caruth’s reading Tasso’s poem has been subject to considerable criticism, most notably for 
conflating the positions of victim and perpetrator (Leys 2001, 292-7). Where Caruth suggests that Tancred 
is a victim of trauma, it is suggested that he could more accurately be described as a perpetrator. In a 
scathing critique, Leys argues that Caruth’s account could have disastrous consequences: 
 
For if, according to her analysis, the murderer Tancred can become the victim of the 
trauma and the voice of Clorinda testimony to his wound, then Caruth’s logic would turn 
the executioners of the Jews into victims and the “cries” of the Jews into testimony to the 
trauma suffered by the Nazis […]. On Caruth’s interpretation, what the parable of Tasso’s 
story tells us is that not only can Tancred be considered a victim of a trauma but that even 
the Nazis are not exempt from the same dispensation (2001, 297, emphasis in original). 
Whilst acknowledging the importance of Leys work on trauma, her criticism of Caruth is not 
entirely fair. Caruth does not invoke the language of victims and perpetrators in her discussion of 
Tancred and Clorinda. As Rothberg points out, being a survivor of trauma does not necessarily 
come with the status of victimhood (2009, 90). What is more, when Leys posits Clorinda as the 
victim of trauma, she overlooks the fact that “[t]he dead are not traumatized, they are dead; trauma 
implies some ‘other’ mode of living on” (ibid.).   
Caruth’s example of Tancred and Clorinda does, however, exhibit the Eurocentric bias 
inherent in much trauma theory, for she does not acknowledge the fact that Clorinda is an Ethiopian 
woman and that Tancred is a European crusader (ibid., 89). For insightful critiques of trauma theory 
which consider the topic of trauma in the context of post-colonialism, see Rothberg’s 
Multidirectional Memory (2009) and Craps’ Postcolonial Witnessing (2013). 
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remains the same and which is compelled to find expression in a repetition of the same 
experiences (ibid., emphasis in original). 
While some instances of repetition bring about pleasure for an individual—children, for 
example, take please in rehearing their favourite stories and in replaying their favourite 
games—the compulsive repetition of painful experiences undermines the functioning of 
the pleasure principle. What truly interests Freud is the latter—that is, those “cases where 
the subject appears to have a passive experience, over which he [sic] has no influence, but 
in which he meets with a repetition of the same fatality” (ibid., emphasis in original).  
The notion of “fate neurosis” or “fate compulsion” is characterised by the 
involuntary repetition of painful past experiences “in which the same or similar fatalities 
occur in a repeating scenario” (Fletcher 2013, 293). The compulsion to repeat gives the 
impression that one is “being pursued by a malignant fate or possessed by some 
‘daemonic’ power” (Freud [1920] 1961, 15). Freud invokes the examples of a “woman 
who married three successive husbands each of whom fell ill soon afterwards and had to 
be nursed by her on their death-beds”; “the benefactor who is abandoned in anger after a 
time by each of his protégés”; and “the lover each of whose love affairs with a woman 
passes through the same phases and reaches the same conclusion” (ibid.). Another 
example can be observed in situations in which individuals repeatedly enter into 
relationships with abusive partners. Repetition compulsion is not initiated by the 
individual’s will, “but rather appear[s] as the possession of some people by a sort of fate, 
a series of painful events to which they are subjected, and which seem to be entirely 
outside their wish or control” (Caruth 1996, 2).  
The compulsion to repeat is first investigated by Freud in his formative essay, 
“Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through” ([1914] 1958). In his reflections on 
transference, Freud examines the compulsion to repeat that takes over the patient in 
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psychoanalytic treatment. Assuming the form of transference, patients repeat “unwanted 
situations and painful emotions […] and revive them with the greatest ingenuity” ([1920] 
1961, 15). In the process of transference, that which cannot be remembered by the 
analysand is involuntarily acted out in their clinical encounters with the analyst ([1914] 
1958, 150). For instance, a patient may not remember being defiant towards their parents 
and instead behaves in this way towards the analyst; the patient may not remember having 
been ashamed of engaging in certain sexual activities, but acts deeply ashamed of their 
treatment and is adamant on keeping it a secret from everyone (ibid.). The analyst, as 
Fletcher comments, “is recruited into the particular scenarios of the transference” (2013, 
291). 
Freud explains that transference was formerly seen as an obstacle to the patient’s 
treatment, however, later psychoanalytic developments rendered this process useful “by 
giving it right to assert itself in a definitive field” ([1914] 1958, 150). The clinical 
encounter is conceived “as a playground in which [… transference] is allowed to expand 
in almost complete freedom and in which it is expected to display to us everything […] 
that is hidden from the patient’s mind” (ibid., 154). In the context of the treatment, the 
patient’s ordinary neurosis manifests as a transference-neurosis, which “has taken over 
all the features of the illness which is at every point accessible to our intervention” (ibid., 
151). Freud contrasts his earlier technique centred on Breuer’s notion of catharsis—in 
which past experiences are recollected in order for them to be purged or abreacted—with 
the more recent psychanalytic technique centred on transference. Transference is not as 
much focused on the past as it is on the present (ibid., 147, 151). In staging the clinical 
encounter as a “playground” for transference, “an indeterminate region between illness 
and real life” is evoked, “through which the transition from one to the other is made” 
(ibid., 151).  
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Freud argues that repetition compulsion is the manifestation of repressed 
unconscious materials, which break their way into consciousness (ibid., 14): 69 repetition 
“is a transference of the forgotten repressed” ([1914] 1958, 151). Freud argues that 
repressed memories are repeated as a contemporary experience as opposed to being 
remembered as something that occurred in the past ([1920] 1961, 12). “As long as the 
patient is in the treatment,” Freud remarks, “he [sic] cannot escape from this compulsion 
to repeat; and in the end we must understand that this is his way of remembering” (ibid., 
150). Repetition compulsion is a kind of acting-out, which Freud opposes to the more 
productive process of working-through.70 It is the function of treatment to help the patient 
work through their neurosis: “to work through it, to overcome it, by continuing, in 
defiance of it, [… is] the fundamental rule of analysis” ([1914] 1958, 155). 
The compulsion to repeat that occurs in transference is the patient’s means of 
acting-out forgotten, repressed material—instead of remembering what has been 
repressed, the patient repeats it without consciously realising it (ibid., 150). The patient 
does not, Freud explains, “remember anything of what he [sic] has forgotten and 
repressed, but acts it out. He reproduces it not as a memory but as an action; he repeats it, 
without, of course, knowing that he is repeating it” (ibid., emphasis in original). For 
Freud, the compulsion to repeat overrides the compulsion to remember: individuals who 
                                                 
69 Freud elaborates: 
In order to make it easier to understand this ‘compulsion to repeat,’ which emerges during the 
psycho-analytic treatment of neurotics, we must above all get rid of the mistaken notion that 
what we are dealing with in our struggle against resistances is resistance on the part of the 
unconscious. The unconscious—that is to say, the ‘repressed’—offers no resistance whatever 
to the efforts of the treatment. Indeed, it itself has no other endeavour than to break through 
the pressure weighing down on it and force its way either to consciousness or to a discharge 
through some real action ([1920] 1961, 113, emphasis in original). 
70 The Freudian notions of acting-out and working-through are integral concepts in the trauma theory of 
LaCapra. In his work, LaCapra see trauma theorists such as Caruth as being too caught up with the 
repetitive reenactment of trauma and neglectful of the vital process of working-through. See the concluding 
chapter of LaCapra’s Writing History, Writing Trauma (2014), titled “Writing (about) Trauma,” 181-220. 
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passively repeat materials belonging to the past do so at the expense of converting these 
materials into memories.  
The compulsion to repeat—evidenced in the repetitive dreams suffered by 
traumatised individuals; the child’s reenactment of his mother’s painful departure; and 
process of transference at the locus of the clinical encounter—cannot be accounted for 
under the pleasure principle, for what is repeated is inevitably painful to those who are 
destined to relive these events at the expense of converting them into memories. Rather 
than functioning under the dominance of the pleasure principle, Freud sees repetition 
compulsion as being “more primitive, more elementary, more instinctual than the 
pleasure-principle which it over-rides” ([1920] 1961, 17). In accounting for the painful 
and self-destructive tendencies at work in repetition compulsion, Freud theorises an 
instinctual force that supersedes the pleasure principle, which he terms the death drive. 
The Death Drive as the Originary Source of Repetition Compulsion  
The question of why it is that individuals so frequently repeat painful events, when there 
is no discernible means of deriving satisfaction from such painful reenactments, leads 
Freud to formulate his controversial theory of the death drive, which is also known as the 
“death instinct,” the “destructive instinct,” and “Thanatos”—the figure of death in Greek 
mythology. Where Section IV of Beyond the Pleasure Principle speculates on the relation 
between the living organism and the powerful excitations emanating from the external 
world, Section V formulates the drives as economic disturbances that arise from the 
internal depths of the living substance (ibid., 28). The protective shield of consciousness 
puts the inside and the outside into dialogue: “[w]hat consciousness yields consists 
essentially of perceptions and excitations coming from the external world and of feelings 
of pleasure and unpleasure which can only arise from within the apparatus” (ibid., 18). 
Situated at the threshold of internal and external forces, the protective shield against 
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stimuli is double-sided, susceptible to stimulation that arises from within and without. As 
well as functioning to receive stimuli emanating from the external world, the protective 
shield of consciousness is susceptible to receiving excitations that arise from the inner-
most depths of the psychical apparatus. While the excitations received from the external 
world are filtered through to consciousness in a diminished quantity, the excitations that 
arise from the inside of the apparatus are not filtered—they “extend into the system 
directly and in undiminished amount, in so far as certain of their characteristics give rise 
to the pleasure-unpleasure series” (ibid., 23). The excitations that arise from within are 
usually more commensurate with the psyche’s functioning than those that come from 
without (ibid.). However, when the quantity of internal excitations become too high, 
“there is a tendency to treat them as though they were acting, not from the inside, but 
from the outside, so it may be possible to bring the shield against stimuli into operation as 
a means of defence against them” (ibid.).  
The excitations that arise from within are what Freud refers to as “instincts” or 
“drives,”71 which are “the representatives of all the forces originating in the interior of the 
body and transmitted to the mental apparatus” (ibid., 28). He explains that “[s]ince all 
instinctual impulses have the unconscious systems as their point of impact, it is hardly an 
innovation to say that they obey the primary processes” (ibid.). Where the primary 
processes designate unconscious psychic functioning, the secondary processes work in 
“normal waking life” (ibid.). Furthermore, the secondary processes receive excitations 
that are bound by the psychic apparatus, while the excitations that are found in the 
                                                 
71 Freud uses the German term Todestriebe to refer to the death drive. James Strachey translates Freud’s 
trieb to drive. However, it has been argued that a better translation of this term is instinct. Fletcher argues:  
 
Despite Strachey’s insistence on the term Trieb, with its fundamental deviance, its vicissitudes 
and its “daemonic” urgency, Freud’s sudden transplantation of this theoretical entity from the 
specific level of human psychical life to ‘inorganic life in general’ indicates […] that, at first 
and even second glance, what is really at stake is a biological concept of instinct/Instinkt 
(human, animal, vegetable?) (2013, 306, emphasis in original).  
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primary processes are unbound and “freely mobile” (ibid.). Freud argues that an inability 
to bind excessive quantities of excitations that arise from the unconscious  
would provoke a disturbance analogous to a traumatic neurosis; and only after the binding has 
accomplished would it be possible for the dominance of the pleasure principle (and of its 
modification, the reality principle) to proceed unhindered. Till then the other task of the mental 
apparatus, the task of mastering or binding excitations, would have precedence—not indeed, in 
opposition to the pleasure principle, but independently of it and to some extent in disregard of 
it (ibid., 29, emphasis in original).  
For Freud, that which lies beyond the pleasure principle occurs before the pleasure 
principle can assume dominance. The mental apparatus must first bind the influx of 
excitations before the pleasure principle can perform its role. Hence, Freud discovers a 
more primitive function of the psychical apparatus, which he ties to repetition 
compulsion. The compulsion to repeat forms an attempt to retrospectively bind the 
excitations that have overwhelmed the mental apparatus. As was seen in the context of 
traumatic neurosis, repetitive dreams endeavour to psychically bind the overwhelming 
quantities of stimuli so they can be disposed of (ibid., 24). Since trauma is the result of an 
unpreparedness to receive excessive quantities of stimuli, the function of repetition is to 
retrospectively master the stimulus “by developing the anxiety whose omission was the 
cause of the traumatic neurosis” (ibid.).  
 Freud attributes the compulsion to repeat to the death drive and speculates that the 
emergence of this drive coincides with the origins of life as a transition from inanimate to 
animate substance: 
The attributes of life were at some time evoked in inanimate matter by the action of a force of 
whose nature we can form no conception. It may perhaps have been a process similar in type to 
that which later caused the development of consciousness in a particular stratum of living 
matter. The tension which then arose in what had hitherto been an inanimate substance 
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endeavoured to cancel itself out. In this way the first instinct came into being: the instinct to 
return to the inanimate state (ibid., 32). 
The death drive came into being at the origins of life as the transformation of matter from 
a state of inertia to that of being alive. According to Freud, the death drive is 
conservative, striving to return to the inanimate state from which life emerged: 
 It seems, then, that an instinct is an urge inherent in organic life to restore to an earlier state 
of things which the living entity has been obliged to abandon under the pressure of external 
disturbing forces; that is, it is a kind of organic elasticity, or, to put it another way, the 
expression of the inertia inherent in organic life (ibid., 30, emphasis in original).  
The death drive tends towards the restoration of the living organism’s earlier state as 
inanimate matter. Freud’s notion of the death drive opposes the idea that living substance 
strives towards development and progress. Indeed, it would be in contradiction with the 
conservative character of the drives if they were to tend towards something new (ibid.). 
“On the contrary,” writes Freud, “it must be an old state of things, an initial state from 
which the living entity has at one time or another departed and to which it is striving on a 
circuitous path” (ibid., 32, emphasis in original). Where the death drive may deceptively 
appear to tend towards progress and change, it is really striving backwards, in a repetitive 
performance of that which it owes its existence (ibid., 34). Freud makes a radical 
assertion: “If we are to take it as truth that knows no exception that everything living dies 
for internal reasons—becomes inorganic once again—then we shall be compelled to say 
that ‘the aim of all life is death’ and, looking backwards, that ‘inanimate things existed 
before living ones’” (ibid., emphasis in original).  
Due to the conservative character of the drives, combined with the assumption that 
inanimate matter existed before living matter, Freud concludes that both the origin and 
the aim of life is to return to its former inanimate state. Since life originated out of the 
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inertness of death, death is both the origin and aim of life. In light of this, life is 
understood as the circuitous detour to death (ibid., 33). “We have no longer to reckon,” 
Freud continues: 
with the organism’s puzzling determination […] to maintain its own existence in the fact of 
every obstacle. What we are left with is the fact that the organism wishes to die only in its own 
fashion. Thus these guardians of life, too, were originally the myrmidons of death. Hence arises 
the paradoxical situation that the living organism struggles most energetically against events 
(dangers, in fact) which might help it to attain its life’s aim rapidly—by a kind of short-circuit 
(ibid.).  
Freud’s controversial thesis regarding the death drive flies in the face of the commonly 
held view that the goal of life is self-preservation. Since the aim of life is death, the drive 
for self-preservation would have to be rethought as a function that assures “that the 
organism shall follow its own path to death, and to ward off any possible ways of 
returning to inorganic existence other than those which are immanent to the organism 
itself” (ibid.).  
 Towards the end of Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud introduces the 
opposition between the life drive (Eros)72 and the death drive (Thanatos), with the former 
conceived as a drive towards unity and cohesion and the latter striving towards 
destruction and annihilation. Laplanche and Jean-Bernard Pontalis observe that the life 
and death drives exhibit the fundamental dualistic tendency in Freud’s thought ([1973] 
1988, 99). The aim of the life drive is to “establish even greater unities and to preserve 
them thus—in short, to bind together” ([1938] 1940 148), while the function of the death 
drive is to return the living organism to its former inanimate state. Although the life and 
                                                 
72 There are times where Freud seems to subsume the sexual drives under the life drive; however, Freud has 
been criticised for this (Fletcher 2013, 304; Laplanche and Pontalis [1973] 1988, 242). Fletcher, for 
instance, argues that in formulating the life drives, Freud leaves aside “the whole question of 
nonreproductive infantile sexuality, of the pregenital component Trieb [drive]” (2013, 311).  
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death drives are essentially opposed, they are often fused together and cannot be 
identified in their pure states (Evans 2006, 33).73 
The notions of the life and death drives, as well as their relation to each other, 
remain highly enigmatic in Freud’s work. The death drive is one of Freud’s most 
controversial and highly criticised concepts, with many of Freud’s psychoanalytic 
followers outright rejecting it.74 While the death drive seems somewhat like a mystical 
force, Freud attempts to ground it in biology through his discussion of the emergence of 
life through the transition from inanimate to animate substance.75 Laub and Susanna Lee 
explain that “Freud himself described the death instinct both as a mythological 
phenomenon and as a biological force” (2002, 435). In the “New Introductory Lectures on 
Psycho-Analysis” (1933), Freud admits that “[t]he theory of the instincts is so to say our 
mythology. Instincts are mythical entities, magnificent in their indefiniteness. In our work 
we cannot for a moment disregard them, yet we are never sure that we are seeing them 
clearly” (145). Nonetheless, Harald Bloom argues that this is precisely what makes 
Freud’s work so powerful:  
Freudian speculation may not be scientific or philosophical; what counts about it is its 
interpretative power. All mythology is interpretation, but interpretation only becomes 
mythology if it ages productively […]. Freud, short of no one, is the dominant mythologist of 
our time (1995, 113).  
Meanwhile, LaCapra argues that “if there’s any broad meaning of the death drive that is 
not altogether mystifying or implicated in biological fantasies, it’s the death drive as the 
                                                 
73 Here, Freud invokes the interplay between life and death in the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer: “For 
him death is the ‘true result and to that extent the purpose of life,’ while the sexual instinct is the will to 
live” (ibid., 44). 
74 A notable exception to this is Melanie Klein, who was amongst the first psychoanalysts to adopt the 
Freudian concept of the death drive. 
75 Lacan corrects Freud’s biological determinism, in repositioning the drives at the level of language. More 
will be said on this in Chapter Six of this thesis, which draws on Lacanian psychoanalysis to examine the 
question of trauma. 
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tendency compulsively to repeat traumatic scenes—often violent scenes—in a way that is 
destructive and self-destructive” ([2001] 2014, 143). 
In addition to the conceptual ambiguity surrounding the drives, Freud also fails to 
make explicit the connection between trauma and the death drive. While the compulsion 
to repeat is central to both of these phenomena (with the death drive being the very source 
from which repetition compulsion emerges) there is a certain inconsistency in his thought 
with regard to the notion of binding. Freud’s earlier reflections on trauma in Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle posit the function of repetition compulsion as an attempt to bind 
excessive amounts of stimuli, where his later reflections on the death drive associate 
repetition compulsion with unbinding. Is the compulsion to repeat to be attributed to 
binding the excessive breach made in the protective shield against stimuli, or should it be 
understood as the work of the death drive, as an unbinding force that attempts to return 
the living substance to an inorganic state? While Freud does not himself resolve this 
conflict, Laub and Lee argue that the “[t]raumatic experience fuses or reconciles the two 
aspects of the death instinct described by Freud: the inclination to quiescence as the end 
of the disturbance and the destructive tendency to do violence both to the self and to 
others” (2002, 437). Indeed, the authors argue that situations of trauma unleash the death 
drive and that the death drive “is in a sense characteristic of traumatic experience” (ibid., 
433). 
Traumatic Awakening: From the Extra/Ordinary to the Originary 
In addition to the shift that occurs in Freud’s work—in which repetition compulsion is 
initially observed in the extraordinary context of trauma, only to be identified in the most 
ordinary activities of children—Caruth identifies another significant shift in Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle “from trauma as an exception, an accident that takes consciousness by 
surprise and thus disrupts it, to trauma as the very origin of consciousness and all of life 
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itself” (1996, 104). In Section IV, Freud characterises trauma as an aberrant breach in the 
protective shield of consciousness, while in Section V he posits trauma at the origins of 
life. In Freud’s work, trauma appears as both a breach in conscious awareness and as the 
very origin of not only consciousness, but of life itself. Rather than reducing trauma to 
either of these extremes alone, this concluding section of Chapter Five draws on Caruth’s 
conceptualisation of trauma—as an originary awakening of life from death—to situate 
trauma in a liminal space between the extraordinary, the ordinary, and the originary. 
Before turning to Caruth’s comments on originary trauma, it is worth summarising 
her remarks on trauma as an aberrant breach in consciousness. In her reading of Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle, Caruth returns to the element of fright in trauma to describe the 
lack of preparedness to recognise a threat to the psyche. She argues that the lack of 
preparedness results in a missed encounter with this threat (2013, 6). The shock to the 
mind’s relation to the external threat interrupts the possibility of directly experiencing this 
threat. Given this, the locus of trauma does not simply reside in a threat to one’s bodily 
existence, “but in the fact that the threat is recognised by the mind one moment too late” 
(ibid., 62, emphasis in original). Trauma is a breach in the psyche that interrupts, rather 
than enters, consciousness. This forms the basis of repetition in the dreams of those 
suffering from trauma: these dreams attempt to master an experience that bypassed 
consciousness at the time of the precipitating event (ibid., 6). The repetitive symptoms of 
trauma return the victim to not only “the reality of a violent event but also the reality of 
the way that its violence has not yet been fully known” (Caruth 1996, 6). Dreams 
occurring in traumatic neurosis are an attempt to relive the “original event” that lead to 
the trauma; however, such attempts inevitably fail and instead wake the patient up in 
another fright (ibid., 139). 
   
 
193 
 
 
Freud’s account of the origins of life—as the transition from inanimate to living 
substance—signals an originary traumatic awakening of life from death. In substantiating 
this point, Caruth modifies James Strachey’s translation of Freud in the Standard Edition 
from “evoked” to “awoken”: 
The attributes of life were at some time awoken in inanimate matter by the action of a force of 
whose nature we can form no conception […]. The tension which then arouse in what had 
hitherto been inanimate substance endeavoured to cancel itself out. In this way the first drive 
came into being: the drive to return to the inanimate state (ibid., 6, my emphasis).  
Caruth links trauma to the scene of the death drive by conceiving the origins of life as 
an originary trauma (ibid., 65). She suggests that life emerged “as an awakening from 
‘death’ for which there was no preparation” (ibid., 7). The origins of life as a traumatic 
awakening from death precedes conscious awareness and thus designates a traumatic 
encounter that strikes the substance in a state of unpreparedness (2013, 7). In this way, 
repetition compulsion is traced “to the origin of life and its awakening” (ibid., 96); 
through the substance’s traumatic awakening into life, the death drive emerges as the 
drive to return the substance to its former inanimate state. The compulsion to repeat is 
tied to the originary scene of trauma, in which the living substance repeats the 
founding moment of trauma to which it owes its existence.  
 Where originary trauma precedes conscious awareness, occurring prior to the 
emergence of life, historical trauma exceeds conscious awareness, disrupting the ordinary 
psychical processes. Nonetheless, both historical and originary trauma are unassimilable 
experiences—they are missed encounters that can only be postulated after the fact of their 
occurrence. The compulsion to repeat emerges as a belated response to an event that 
could not be grasped at the time of its arrival. The dreams suffered by traumatised 
individuals form an attempt to master an event that was too overwhelming to be properly 
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experienced at the time it occurred. Likewise, the compulsion to repeat tied to the death 
drive strives to return to living organism to its former state of inertia, thus repeating the 
originary traumatic scene. What is crucial about trauma—whether it be an aberrant breach 
in the psyche or the founding condition of the psyche—is its belated impact, through 
which an origin that cannot be remembered is destined to be repeated.  
The awakening of life from death parallels the missed encounter with trauma 
which forms the basis of the repetitive awakening from the traumatic nightmare (ibid., 
62). The dreams that are experienced by those suffering from trauma repeatedly bring the 
traumatised being back to the initial traumatic scene—leading them to wake up in another 
state of fright. Having defined trauma as a missed encounter with a threat that is 
recognised one moment too late, Caruth goes on to consider the awakening from the 
dream as a repetitive symptom of trauma: “If ‘fright’ is the term by which Freud defined 
the traumatic effect of not having been prepared in time, then the trauma of the nightmare 
does not simply consist in the experience within the dream but in the experience of 
waking from it” (2013, 6). Traumatic nightmares do not simply bring the traumatised 
being back to the reality of the precipitating event, they reenact the psyche’s 
unpreparedness to encounter this reality: “the dreams not only show the scenes of battle 
but wake the dreamer up in another fright” (ibid., 3-4). “It is the surprise of waking,” 
continues Caruth, “that repeats the unexpectedness of trauma” (ibid., 6). Given this, the 
compulsion to repeat evidenced in the nightmares of individuals suffering from trauma 
not only concern the repetition of the images or manifest content within the dream but, 
more importantly, repeat the moment of awakening as the missed encounter with trauma 
(ibid.). Thus, it is not only the manifest content in the dream through which the trauma is 
repeated, it is the moment of awakening itself that repeats the missed encounter with 
trauma. In this way, the site of repetition can neither be situated on the inside or the 
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outside of the dream but, rather, in a liminal space between sleeping and waking—that is, 
in the gap that constitutes awakening. Whether trauma occurs at the level of the historical 
or the originary, trauma is an event that is not inscribed in memory and is destined to be 
repeated in the unattainable moment of awakening. 
Across this chapter, the compulsion to repeat that lies at the crux of trauma has 
been shown as implicating the extraordinary, the ordinary, and the originary. Through the 
compulsion to repeat, trauma ruptures the bounds separating these seemingly separate 
categories: repetition compulsion occurs in the traumatic symptoms of survivors, the 
ordinary games of children, and the founding moment of life itself. Despite the 
differences between the extraordinary, the ordinary, and the originary, these instances 
coalesce through the compulsion to repeat an event that was too overwhelming to be 
cognitised as it occurred. Arriving “one moment too late,” trauma denotes a shock to 
physical apparatus that is unavailable to conscious awareness. In an attempt to 
retroactively master this shock, the trauma is destined to be repeated not in the manifest 
content of the dream, but in the gap that constitutes the moment of awakening. This gap is 
akin to the transition from life to death, in which the living substance arose from a state of 
inertia and lacked the cognitive capacity to bear witness to this originary transition.  
In the next chapter of this thesis, I spiral back through the topic of originary 
trauma but now in the context of Lacanian psychoanalysis. Here, I will draw on Lacan’s 
notion of the real as the traumatic origin of the symbolic-imaginary and will further 
consider the compulsion to repeat as an attempt to relive a traumatic event that could not 
be mastered at the time that it occurred. Where Freud posits both the death drive and 
repetition compulsion at the level of biology, Lacan characterises them in accordance 
with the structural matrices of the symbolic-imaginary. Nonetheless, Freud and Lacan 
alike formulate repetition compulsion as the repetition of the inaccessible traumatic 
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origins of subjectivity. Rather than positing this originary scene in an idealised and 
transcendent “time before time,” Lacanian psychoanalysis shows that it is only through its 
repetition that the originary trauma can be postulated. In other words, it is only from the 
inside that the outside can be retroactively stated. Through this insight, Chapter Six of this 
thesis offers an argument concerning the immanence of traumatic rupture as that which 
implicates both the immanent and the transcendent.  
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Chapter Six – Missed Encounters with the Traumatic Real: Between Fantasy and 
Reality 
[T]he notion of trauma has confronted us not only with a simple pathology but also with a 
fundamental enigma concerning the psyche’s relation to reality (Caruth 1996, 91).  
Where trauma was a central focus in Freud’s earlier work on hysteria, he turns away from 
this issue in 1897-8 to formulate his famous theory of psychoanalysis. However, the 
problem of trauma persists throughout Freud’s writing, forcing him to reconsider his 
psychoanalytic insights. This was examined in the previous chapter of this thesis, where I 
turned to Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle to discuss trauma as an interruption to 
his theory of psychoanalysis centred on the child as the site of the pleasure principle. 
Having observed the tendency of traumatised individuals to unwillingly repeat painful 
events, Freud formulates the death drive as the source of repetition compulsion and as 
something more primitive than the drive towards pleasure.   
The birth of psychoanalysis is signalled by Freud’s so-called abandonment of the 
seduction theory,76 a move in which he purportedly repositioned the origins of trauma 
away from an external event having occurred in an individual’s past towards the internal 
vicissitudes of fantasy.77 Freud’s theoretical shift has been subject to ongoing hostility, 
with critics accusing Freud of dismissing the traumatic realities endured by his patients 
(Herman 1992; Masson 1985; Van der Kolk and Van der Hart 1995). However, theorists 
have defended Freud by arguing that these criticisms stem from a fundamental 
misunderstanding of his thought; in particular, seeing these criticisms as being based on 
                                                 
76 Freud’s abandonment of the seduction theory was also discussed in Chapter One of this thesis as well as 
in Chapter Five. This topic will be considered again in Chapter Seven. 
77 Evans explains that the Freudian notion of fantasy “denote[s] a scene which is presented to the 
imagination and which stages an unconscious desire” (2006, 61). The notion of fantasy will be discussed in 
more detail towards the end of this chapter. 
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misinterpretations of the psychoanalytic notion of fantasy (Evans 2006; Leys 2000; 
Luckhurst 2008; Radstone 2000). Critics are presented here as misconstruing fantasy as 
something that is directly opposed to reality, when psychoanalysis posits fantasy as a 
fundamental component of reality (Evans 2006, 60). Far from being “a purely illusory 
product of the imagination which stands in the way of a correct perception of reality” 
(ibid.), fantasy is a part of the symbolic-imaginary matrix in which reality is experienced 
and perceived.78 Freud’s shift in focus from the external underpinnings of trauma to its 
internalised and fantasmatic nature does not imply a simple rejection of the reality of his 
patients’ reports of sexual abuse but, rather, stems from his realisation that memories are 
constantly reshaped by fantasy and are not objective renderings of past events (Evans 
2006, 60).  
In Lacanian psychoanalysis, fantasy is constituted by the symbolic-imaginary and 
functions as a protective screen from the traumatic real. Although, as will be shown, 
Lacan posits the symbolic-imaginary as the structural matrix through which reality is 
constituted and perceived, he does not dispense with the notion of the real, which comes 
to occupy a crucial position in his later thought. As I mentioned in the Introduction of this 
thesis, Lacan (especially the later Lacan) does not succumb to cultural constructivism in 
positing the symbolic-imaginary as the determinates of reality. He introduces the notion 
of the real to account for the moments of contingency within the symbolic-imaginary 
automaton. Hence, the Lacanian real is not something that exists independently of the 
                                                 
78 Given that in psychoanalysis fantasy is seen as structuring reality, Evans argues the shift in Freud’s work 
from the external reality of the traumatic event to the internal realm of fantasy is not quite as simplistic as 
many of Freud’s critics make out: 
the change in Freud’s ideas […] does not imply a rejection of the veracity of all the memories 
of sexual abuse, but the discovery of the fundamentally discursive and imaginative nature of 
memory; memories of past events are continually being reshaped in accordance with 
unconscious desires, so much so that symptoms originate not in any supposed ‘objective facts’ 
but in a complex dialectic in which fantasy plays a vital role (2006, 60-1). 
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symbolic-imaginary. Nor is the symbolic-imaginary to be understood as being 
superimposed onto the real. Instead, the real is itself an effect of these orders which 
paradoxically exerts a disruptive influence on them. Far from existing outside or beyond 
these the symbolic-imaginary, the real is the innermost limit of these constitutive orders. 
The real—which manifests itself in the guise of trauma—cuts across reality and fantasy, 
the inside and the outside, the immanent and the transcendent, and cannot be reduced to 
either of these extremes alone. 
The first section of this chapter unpacks Lacan’s ontological triad of the 
imaginary, the symbolic, and the real, which forms the basis of Lacanian psychoanalysis. 
These registers each have their own discrete modes of operation; however, they are 
intricately entangled and are seldom—if ever—experienced on their own. Lacanian 
psychoanalysis works at the level of the symbolic, as the order that structures the 
imaginary and the real. Nevertheless, the real announces itself in the symbolic-imaginary 
as an unassimilable traumatic tear. In the second section of this chapter, I interrogate the 
respective functions of the symbolic and the real through Lacan’s notions of the tuché and 
automaton, which he borrows from Aristotle to distinguish between two types of cause 
([1964] 1998b, 52). As will be shown, the automaton designates the machine-like 
functioning of the symbolic, while the tuché marks the traumatic incursion of the real as 
gesturing beyond the symbolic. Although the traumatic real points to that which lies 
beyond the symbolic, the real is not to be conceived as transcending the symbolic. The 
Lacanian real emerges as both the traumatic origin and the immanent tears in the 
symbolic matrix constitutive of reality. The real is the impossible origin of the symbolic 
that is retroactively constructed by this order. Far from transcending the symbolic, the real 
materialises itself within the symbolic through repetition compulsion.  
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The third section of this chapter draws on the insights developed in the first two 
sections to examine the famous dream of the burning child in Freud’s Interpretation of 
Dreams ([1899] 2010, 514). In turning to this dream, I pose the question of whether the 
traumatic real is to be situated on the side of fantasy or reality. Rather than positing the 
real on either the inside or outside of the fantasmatic realm of the dream, a Lacanian 
reading repositions the traumatic kernel of the real at the unattainable centre of the dream, 
so that the outside appears on the inside as its very limit. In combatting the perceived 
inclination of trauma theorists to situate trauma beyond language and thought, I turn to 
the work of Žižek to consider the extent to which the real can be resituated from a 
transcendent impossibility to an immanent possibility.  
The Imaginary, the Symbolic, and the Real 
The registers of the real, the symbolic, and the imaginary constitute Lacan’s ontology of 
the subject. Lacan illustrates the function of these registers through his famous example 
of the Borromean knot: a figure borrowed from the Borromeo coat of arms that consists 
of a group of three rings that are linked in such a way that if one of them is severed, they 
all become separated (see Figure 1).79     
                                               
            
Figure 1: The Borromean Knot (Lacan [1975] 1998, 124) 
                                                 
79 Žižek offers another useful analogy for understanding the three Lacanian registers through the game of 
chess. In this analogy, the imaginary is likened to the shapes and names of the pieces. Where the figure of 
the knight is traditionally a horse, “it is easy to envision a game with the same rules, but with a different 
imaginary, in which this figure would be called ‘messenger’ or ‘runner’ or whatever” (2006, 8). The 
symbolic order would be the rules that one must follow in order to play the game (for example, the knight 
can move two squares horizontally and one square vertically) (ibid.). Finally, the real is illustrated through 
the contingent circumstances effecting the game, such as the ability of the players and any unpredictable 
intrusions in the game that may prematurely cut it short (ibid., 9). What is important here is that although 
each order has a separate function, they are all caught together in the same game. 
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The Borromean knot illustrates the orders of the imaginary, the symbolic, and the real; 
each ring represents one of the three orders, whilst the points of intersection in the knot 
represents their intricate entanglement. Ellie Ragland-Sullivan notes that much confusion 
surrounding Lacan’s concepts stems from his innovative use of ordinary terms (1987, 
130). In opposition to standard notions, Lacan’s imaginary order does not designate the 
realm of the imagination; the symbolic is not simply a matter of symbolism; and the real, 
as already noted, does not denote any kind of objective or empirically verifiable reality 
(ibid.).80 Despite the fact that these orders cannot be experienced on their own due to their 
mutual entanglement, the following paragraphs of this section will go on to consider each 
of the three orders separately for the sake of clarity.  
The imaginary order is the primary focus of Lacan’s earliest contributions to 
psychoanalysis centred on the formation of the subject through the mirror stage—a 
concept that he presented in 1949 at the Sixteenth International Congress of 
Psychoanalysis in Zurich in a paper titled “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I 
Function as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience” ([1949] 2006).81 The mirror stage 
occurs in infanthood between six and eighteen months of age, and marks the point in 
which the subject emerges through the infant’s identificatory relation to their mirror-
image. Lacan invokes 
the striking spectacle of a nursling in front of a mirror who has not yet mastered walking, or 
even standing, but who—though held tightly by some prop, human or artificial (what, in 
France, we call a trotte-bébé [a sort of walker])—overcomes, in a flutter of jubilant activity, the 
                                                 
80 Lacan’s theoretical oeuvre has been divided into three main periods in which he insisted on the primacy 
of one of the three orders: his focus on the imaginary occurring earliest in his career (1930-40s); the 
symbolic in the middle of his career (1950s); and the real in his later career (1960-70s). But while this 
periodisation is a helpful way into Lacan’s key concepts, it undermines the complexities of the imaginary, 
the symbolic, and the real, which underwent serious revisions and reformulations across Lacan’s work. 
81 Lacan presented an earlier version of this paper in 1936 at the Fourteenth International Psychoanalytical 
Congress in Marienbad. 
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constraints of his [sic] prop in order to adopt a slightly leaning-forward position and take in an 
instantaneous view of their image in order to fix it in his mind (ibid., 75-6). 
The mirror stage, he argues, is a process of identification in which the infant recognises 
herself in her reflected image—it is “the transformation that takes place in the subject 
when he [sic] assumes […] an image” (ibid., 76). The spectacular image in the reflective 
surface brings forth the illusion of unity and wholeness but gives rise to anxiety over the 
sense of fragmentation that predominates over the small child’s experiences. The infant, 
“still trapped in his [sic] motor impotence and nursling dependence” (ibid.), is initially 
unable to demarcate the boundaries separating her own body from that of her mother’s. 
Indeed, the infant’s experiences in, and of, the world are lacking in any kind of unity and 
it is only when they notice their reflected image that they begin to imagine themselves as 
a unified whole. Lacan uses the German term gestalt to refer to infant’s perception of 
their mirror image as a totality that exceeds the sum of its parts. When the infant stumbles 
across the spectacular image reflected before them, they enter an aggressive rivalry with 
the image, before finally submitting to it by identifying it as an image of themselves. This 
identification constitutive of subjectivity is founded on a misidentification—a 
misrecognition—in which the child renounces their earliest divided and fragmented 
experiences in exchange for the illusion of wholeness. Given this, the unitary 
identification with the image is always based on lack. For when the small child identifies 
the image as that of their own, they abandon their earliest experiences of the world in 
exchange for being able to perceive themselves as a unified subject.  
The mirror stage marks the infant’s entrance into the imaginary, which is the order 
that Lacan associates the most closely with images and illusions. As well as pertaining to 
one’s earliest experiences in the world, the imaginary persists throughout one’s entire life. 
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Evans explains that Lacan’s earlier work stresses the historical value of the mirror stage, 
whereas his later work emphasises the structural significance of the imaginary:  
By the early 1950s Lacan no longer regards it [the mirror stage] simply as a moment in the life 
of an infant, but sees it as also representing a permanent structure of subjectivity, the paradigm 
of the imaginary order; it is a stadium […] in which the subject is permanently caught and 
captivated by his [sic] own image (2006, 118). 
Lacan posits the mirror stage as the point at which the subject enters into the imaginary; 
however, he later insists that the imaginary is structured by the symbolic. Katrien 
Libbrecht explains that “the symbolic relation […] is constituted prior to the structuring 
image of the ego, implying that the imaginary experience is inscribed in the register of the 
symbolic as early as one can think it” (2001, 189). Lacan assimilates the functioning of 
the imaginary under the symbolic order, arguing that the imaginary is always already 
structured by the symbolic. Before the infant is even born they are already inscribed in the 
symbolic (for instance, through their naming prior to their birth and through the parent’s 
discovery of their gender). Lacan thus argues that “the signifier is the first mark of the 
subject” ([1964] 1998a, 62). 
 For Lacan, the symbolic is the most fundamental of the three orders and is the 
order most closely associated with language.82 Like the infant’s emergence into the 
imaginary, the entrance into the symbolic is not a historical event in a subject’s life, but is 
the structural condition of subjectivity. Lacan draws on Freud’s example of the child’s 
                                                 
82 Although the symbolic is the order that governs language, language cannot simply be reduced to the 
symbolic—it also consists of components that belong to the imaginary and the real. Language does not only 
include symbols, but also images belonging to the imaginary which gives rise to the notion of an underlying 
reality or referent situated in the domain of the real (although this real is impossible to access). Nonetheless, 
the symbolic order constitutes the orders of the imaginary and the real: the symbolic structures the 
imaginary realm of images and the real that exists as the immanent gaps and inconsistencies of the 
symbolic. 
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game of fort/da83 as illustrative of the subject’s entrance into the symbolic order. The 
game of fort/da—which Freud observes his grandson playing when the child is for the 
first time confronted with the loss of his mother—is interpreted by Lacan as the repetition 
of the infant’s transition from the presymbolic to the symbolic. According to Lacan, when 
the child stages the disappearance and return of a wooden reel over the edge of his cot, 
the reel does not represent the infant’s loss of his mother. Instead, the reel stands for the 
subject himself: the reel “is a small part of the subject that detaches itself from him while 
still remaining his, still retained” (ibid.). 
 The subject’s entrance into the symbolic is accompanied by a constitutive splitting 
of the subject. It is this splitting that the child repeats through the game of fort/da.84 The 
subject’s emergence into the symbolic mutilates the subject, who is split apart by the 
signifier. Linda Belau explains: “[t]he signifier comes into being only insofar as it marks 
the subject with a certain lack; something of an originary or primal plenitude is lost” 
(2001, n.p.). The infant’s emergence into the symbolic is thus a kind of originary or 
primordial trauma. Belau explains: “we must pay the price for our entry into the symbolic 
[…] we can never return to our lost ‘presymbolic’ origin” (ibid.). Unable to access this 
missing origin, the child reenacts the originary trauma by repeating it in the game of 
fort/da. 
In characterising the symbolic as the order that is the most closely aligned with 
language, Lacan draws on Saussure’s structuralist linguistics.85 He conceives language as 
                                                 
83 Refer back to Chapter Five for a full discussion of Freud’s account of the game of fort/da.  
84 In a moving passage, Lacan writes:  
I, too, have seen with my own eyes, opened by maternal divination, the child, traumatized by 
the fact that I was going away despite the appeal, precociously adumbrated in his voice, and 
henceforth more renewed for months at a time—I have seen it let its head fall on my shoulder 
and drop off to sleep, sleep alone being capable of giving him access to the living signifier that 
I had become ([1964] 1998b, 63).  
85 In his Course in General Linguistics ([1916] 1959), Saussure conceives of language as consisting of signs 
as its basic unit. The sign is comprised of a signifier (or, sound-image) and a signified (or, concept). 
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a network of differential relations in which words derive meaning not from their relation 
to a concept or to an external referent, but from the relation of difference between 
signifiers. The symbolic matrix is a network of pure difference: the signifier that dwells in 
the symbolic has no fixed relation to the signified in the imaginary. The divide separating 
the signifier from the signified represents the impossibility of “establish[ing] a one-to-one 
link between signifiers and signified” (Evans 2006, 192).86 The relation between the 
signifier and the signified is not one of stability but is, rather, one of radical instability 
and fluidity. For Lacan, the signifier precedes the signified, so that language is no longer 
comprised of signs, but of signifiers (Evans 2006, 186). The process of signification that 
occurs within the symbolic moves from signifier to signifier in an “endless chain of 
signification” (Homer 2005, 42). 
The symbolic does not only refer to the exchange language, but to the laws that 
govern these exchanges, which are “grounded on our accepting and relying on a complex 
network of rules and other kinds of presuppositions” (Žižek 2006, 9). The symbolic is an 
all-encompassing structure: “[e]verything which is human has to be ordained within a 
universe constituted by the symbolic function” (Lacan [1954] 1991, 29). Lacan 
characterises the symbolic as a totalising universe that swallows all that is human into its 
all-encompassing frame:  
                                                 
Saussure stresses the reciprocal relationship between the signified and the signifier, comparing language 
with a sheet of paper. Where the signified denotes the front side of the paper, the signifier designates the 
back: “one cannot cut the front without cutting the back at the same time; likewise in language, one can 
neither divide sound from thought nor thought from sound” (ibid., 113). But although the signifier and the 
signified are inseparably bound, the relationship between them is arbitrary. One of Saussure’s significant 
insights is his rejection that language bears a direct reference to reality. Far from being “a list of words, 
each corresponding to the thing that it names” (ibid., 65), language is comprised of concepts that do not bear 
directly on an external reality. For instance, the word “tree” does not refer to a tree-in-itself, but to the 
concept of a tree. 
86 See Lacan’s account of this in “The Insistence of the Letter in the Unconscious or Reason Since Freud” 
([1957] 2006). 
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In the symbolic order the totality is called a universe. The symbolic order from the first takes 
on its universal character. It isn’t constituted bit by bit. As soon as the symbol arrives, there is a 
universe of symbols […]. Everything is ordered in accordance with the symbols which have 
emerged, in accordance with the symbols once they have appeared (ibid.).  
It is impossible to conceive of what came before the symbolic insofar as one is always 
already situated within the symbolic: “we find it absolutely impossible to speculate on 
what preceded it other than by symbols” (ibid., 5). According to Lacan, every speaking 
being is constituted by the symbolic—“in the end, it is always the paths of the symbolic 
function which lead us” ([1954] 1991, 31).  
Lacan refers to the symbolic order as the big Other—a term which denotes the 
radical alterity of the very structure that constitutes the subject. The symbolic order 
determines one’s automatic mode of behaving and functioning. The symbolic is the 
matrix that structures the behaviours of individuals: it cannot be thought of as simply 
external because it determines one’s internal thoughts and beliefs. Yet there is a certain 
impenetrability at the core of the symbolic, which underpins the notion of the big Other. 
Žižek describes this as follows: 
The symbolic order, society’s unwritten constitution, is the second nature of every speaking 
being: it is here, directing and controlling my acts; it is the sea I swim in, yet it remains 
ultimately impenetrable—I can never put it in front of me and grasp it. It is as if we, subjects of 
language, talk and interact like puppets, our speech and gestures dictated by some nameless all-
pervasive agency (2006, 8).  
The big Other is the necessary condition for communication and identity-formation, 
swallowing subjects into its automatised machinery. When individuals exchange symbols, 
they are not only communicating amongst themselves, but do so in reference to the big 
Other. “While I’m talking,” explains Žižek, “I am never merely a ‘small other’ 
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(individual) interacting with other ‘small others’: the big Other must always be there” 
(ibid., 9). The big Other operates as the rules of language and society that constitute the 
speaking being, but there is something that remains radically unknown and alien about it. 
Having unpacked Lacan’s registers of the imaginary and the symbolic, I now turn 
to his notion of the real. Of the three orders—the real, the symbolic, and the imaginary—
the real is by far the most difficult to apprehend and it is this elusive quality that gives it 
its character. The real assumes itself in a number of guises at various moments in Lacan’s 
career, appearing with increasing intensity in his later work. While Lacan’s work on the 
governing matrix of the symbolic aligns him with structuralism, his work on the real 
signals his movement into poststructuralism, where he shifts his focus from the 
determining structure of the symbolic to the moments of contingency that jam its internal 
mechanisms. As noted, Lacan’s real does not designate any kind of objective, empirically 
verifiable reality and should not be confused with the Kantian Thing-in-Itself—the 
unknowable noumena87 (Žižek 2006, 65). It is not something “out there”—the underlying 
reality that is lost behind symbolic structure—nor is it something so brutal that the 
symbolic is required to domesticate it (ibid.). The Lacanian real both resists symbolisation 
and persists as the very limit of the symbolic: it is “the traumatic point which is always 
missed but nonetheless always returns although we try—through a set of different 
strategies—to neutralize it, to integrate it into the symbolic order” (Žižek [1989] 2008, 
74).  
                                                 
87 In a section of the Critique of Pure Reason ([1781/1787] 1998), called “On the Ground for the Distinction 
of All Objects into Phenomena and Noumena,” Kant distinguishes between what he terms the phenomenon 
and the noumenon. Put simply, the phenomenon designates the appearance of a thing (that is, the object of 
sensible intuition), whereas the noumenon refers to the thing-in-itself (or, an object that is independent of 
the senses). The philosophical significance of Kant’s distinction is that the subject cannot access reality as it 
“truly is”—the subject, rather, lives in a world of appearances.  
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In The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance (1955), Bruce Fink 
identifies two levels of the real: the presymbolic real that exists before the letter, and a 
real that occurs “after the letter which is characterized by impasses and impossibilities 
due to the relations among the elements of the symbolic order itself […] that is, which is 
generated by the symbolic” (27). The real “before” the letter consists of brute 
presymbolic matter, whereas the real “after” the letter is the residual trace that the 
symbolic inevitably leaves behind (ibid.). In trying to incorporate it into the symbolic 
textures of language, the real returns as a hard kernel “which persists as a surplus and 
returns through all attempts to domesticate it, to gentrify it […] to dissolve it by means of 
explication, of putting-into-words its meaning” (Žižek [1989] 2008, 74). Fink refers to the 
second level of the real—the one that exists “after” the letter—as “kinks in the symbolic 
order” (1955, 30, emphasis in original). These kinks manifest as “something anomalous 
[that] shows up in language, something unaccountable, unexplainable: an aporia” (ibid.). 
However, the notion of a real that exists before or after the letter is absurd, since one is 
always already situated within the symbolic. The very idea of a real that resides before or 
after the symbolic is a quality that the symbolic imposes on the real. Indeed, the real is 
itself timeless and without cracks: 
The division of the real into separate zones, distinct features, and contrasting structures is a 
result of the symbolic order, which, in a manner of speaking, cuts into the smooth façade of the 
real, creating divisions, gaps, and distinguishable entities and laying the real to rest, that is, 
drawing or sucking it into the symbols used to describe it, and thereby annihilating it (Fink 
1955, 24, emphasis in original). 
Where the symbolic order is comprised of differential relations, “[t]he real is absolutely 
without fissure” (Lacan [1955] 1991, 97). As Sean Homer explains, “[t]he real is a kind 
of ubiquitous undifferentiated mass from which we must distinguish ourselves, as 
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subjects, through the process of symbolization” (2005, 83). This characterisation of the 
real pertains to what Fink calls the first level of the real that exists “before” the symbolic. 
The second level of the real, on the other hand, is that which cannot be contained within 
the symbolic and which manifests as tears in this constitutive framework. 
The most significant attribute of the real is that it is in and of itself an 
impossibility: “it is impossible to imagine, impossible to integrate into the symbolic 
order, and impossible to attain in any way” (Evans 2006, 163). The real is “the domain of 
that which subsists outside of symbolization” (Lacan [1954] 2006, 324). However, this 
does not mean that the real exists beyond the symbolic, in an idealised time before time. 
For it is only within the symbolic that the real can be encountered: “we have no means of 
apprehending this real […] except via the go-between of the symbolic” (Lacan [1955] 
1991, 97). Rather than being simply external to the symbolic, the real is the core around 
which the symbolic circles without ever being able to reach. In this way, the real does not 
hide behind the symbolic—it is not the external reality onto which the symbolic is 
superimposed—nor is it an entity situated outside of the symbolic. Rather, the real exists 
as the inherent limits and gaps in the symbolic matrix that constitutes reality. In Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, the symbolic is more commensurate with one’s experience of reality than 
the real, with the real appearing as traumatic tears in the symbolic. 
In his work on the Lacanian real, Žižek illuminates the various interstices at which 
the real is entangled with the symbolic and the imaginary. Although the real is in and of 
itself too traumatic to directly experience, it manifests in other ways that can indeed be 
encountered, namely, at the points of entanglement between the orders. In returning to the 
illustration of the Borromean knot (refer back to Figure 1)—with each seemingly separate 
order being intricately intertwined—Žižek identifies at least three levels of the real: the 
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real Real, imaginary Real, and symbolic Real (Žižek and Daly 2004, 68).88 The real Real 
is in and of itself an impossibility. The real Real cannot be directly encountered because it 
is too traumatic; it is an impossibility devoid of signification—an inconceivable reality. 
The imaginary Real, on the other hand, makes itself felt in instances where something 
“traumatic, mystical, tragic” transpires through someone (ibid., 69). Finally, the symbolic 
Real would be something like a complex scientific formula—in quantum physics, for 
instance—that is meaningless to most people in that it cannot be integrated into their 
symbolic horizon (ibid.). The main point here is that although the real is inherently 
inaccessible, it can indeed be experienced at the various points of entanglement in the 
symbolic-imaginary.  
Having unpacked the Lacanian orders of the symbolic, the imaginary, and the real, 
the next section of this chapter will move on to examine the discrete modes of functioning 
in the symbolic and the real. Where the symbolic operates out of a strict mechanical 
necessity, the real erupts within the symbolic as moments of pure contingency. As will be 
shown, the real is the accidental origin of the symbolic, however, the real can only be 
encountered through the immanent tears within the symbolic. In revealing the Lacanian 
real as the originary cause of the symbolic, I turn to Lacan’s seminar, “Tuché and 
Automaton” ([1964] 1998b), which is featured in his Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis. 
The Lacanian Real as an Originary Trauma 
Lacan begins his seminar by countering accusations that psychoanalysis leads in the 
direction of idealism, that it  
                                                 
88 This logic also applies to the symbolic and the imaginary, which are also intricately entangled. Duane 
Rousselle identifies nine configurations of the orders as formulated by Žižek: the “Real-Real, Real-
Symbolic, Real-Imaginary, Symbolic-Real, Symbolic-Symbolic, Symbolic-Imaginary, Imaginary-Real, 
Imaginary-Symbolic and Imaginary-Imaginary” (2014, 215). 
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reduces the experience […] that urges us to find in the hard supports of conflict, struggle, even 
of the exploitation of man by man, the reasons of our deficiencies—it leads to an ontology of 
the tendencies, which it regards as primitive, internal, already given by the condition of the 
subject (ibid., 53).  
In response to criticisms such as these, Lacan objects that “[n]o praxis is more orientated 
towards that which, at the heart of experience, is the kernel of the real than psycho-
analysis” (ibid.). Indeed, Lacan suggests that the primary object of Freud’s 
psychoanalytic concern is the real that lies behind the automaton (ibid., 54). As the 
previous section of this chapter made clear, the Lacanian real must not be understood as 
residing in an objective, independent reality beyond the symbolic. In this way, the real is 
not a transcendent ideal. Rather, the real is immanent to the symbolic, and persistently 
manifests as that which cannot be integrated into the symbolic. Psychoanalysis is not an 
idealism because it does not posit the real as something “out there” but, rather, posits the 
real as that which jams the internal mechanisms of the symbolic.  
In explaining the internal functioning of the real and the symbolic, Lacan turns to 
book two of the Physics, in which Aristotle uses the notions of tuché and automaton to 
distinguish between two types of cause ([1964] 1998b, 52). The automaton pertains to the 
machine-like functioning of the symbolic order. While the automaton gives the illusion of 
chance, it is nothing but the insistence of the signifier in the signifying chain. There is no 
such thing as a chance occurrence in the symbolic order—it is only at the level of the real 
that there can be such a thing as a purely contingent event (Evans 2006, 25). Catherine 
Malabou explains that the automaton is “that which works all by itself and repeats itself 
according to strict mechanical necessity—as in ‘automatons’ or ‘automatisms’” (2012, 
135). Where the automaton signifies that which occurs on its own, the tuché is that which 
happens by chance, designating “‘pure,’ unforeseen, and perfectly contingent accidents” 
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(ibid.). Lacan opposes the automaton to the tuché, configuring the tuché as “the encounter 
with the real” ([1964] 1998b, 53, emphasis in original) that gestures beyond the symbolic.  
The notion of repetition plays a crucial role in Lacan’s formulation of the tuché 
and automaton. As was discussed in the previous chapter of this thesis, the compulsion to 
repeat is tied to the inability to remember the origin of that which is being repeated. Freud 
ties repetition compulsion to the death drive, which strives to return the living substance 
to its originary state of inertia. The compulsion to repeat proper to the death drive is the 
repetition of “the primal impossibility of a lost time before time existed, before the 
subject was” (Belau 2000, 49). Lacan, however, repositions repetition away from the 
biological drives and instead relates it to the symbolic function. The phenomenon of 
repetition is, for Lacan, the insistence of the signifier in the symbolic chain, which 
implicates both the pleasure principle and the death drive. In regards to the former, Lacan 
explains that 
[t]he function of the pleasure principle is, in effect, to lead the subject from signifier to 
signifier, by generating as many signifiers as are required to maintain at as low a level as 
possible the tension that regulates the whole functioning of the psychic apparatus ([1960] 1992, 
119).  
The death drive, on the other hand, is simultaneously situated within the symbolic and is 
that which strives beyond the symbolic through repetition compulsion. This gives rise to 
the paradoxical formulation wherein that which exists on the inside of the symbolic also 
gestures towards something that lies outside of it. 
Where Freud’s Wiederholungszwang is usually translated in English to repetition 
compulsion, Lacan translates it in French to repetition automatism or automatisme de 
repetition (Evans 2006, 167). The automatised repetition in the symbolic marks a return, 
although not a return of the same thing. It is because the signifier homogenises 
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heterogeneous phenomena that repetition occurs. Fink explains that repetition “implies 
the ‘return’ of something that would be different the second time but for the signifier” 
(1995, 224). He further remarks that repetition is “something of a misnomer, consisting in 
the return, not of the same, but of the different—the return of something else, or 
something other. Thus in fact it would seem that there is no return” (ibid., 223). Lacan 
argues that both adults and “more advanced” children demand the new in their activities 
([1964] 1998b, 61). What Lacan refers to as the “true secret of the ludic” is the inherent 
diversity of repetition (ibid.). Indeed, “[w]hat is repeated, in fact, is always something that 
occurs—the expression tells us quite a lot about its relation to the tuché—as if by chance” 
(ibid., 54, emphasis in original). But where the compulsion to repeat gestures beyond the 
symbolic and towards the real, that which is repeated in the symbolic “is merely 
alienation of its meaning,” however varied or modulated it might seem (ibid.). 
Presenting itself as the tuché beyond the automaton, the real makes its first 
appearance in psychoanalysis in the form of trauma (Lacan [1964] 1998b, 55). Trauma 
belongs to the order of the real, emerging as that which is unassimilable to the symbolic. 
The tuché is the encounter with the real, which can only be a missed encounter within the 
automatised symbolic machine. For Lacan, “trauma is conceived as having necessarily 
been marked by the subjectifying homeostasis that orients the whole functioning defined 
by the pleasure principle” (ibid.). This means that the origins of the subject are the 
tuché—“the encounter with the traumatic real, which also determines that the 
development of the subject is entirely animated by an accident” (Belau 2001, n.p.). 
However, the accidental origin of the subject is not situated before the symbolic. Instead, 
the real as the missing origin of trauma can only be posited belatedly, materialising itself 
through the compulsion to repeat that occurs within the symbolic. It is through the process 
of repetition as it unfolds in the present that an impossible origin that occurred before the 
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symbolic can be retroactively posited. In this way, Lacan posits the tuché—which resides 
at the level of the real—as the traumatic origin of the symbolic order constitutive of 
subjectivity.  
The tuché is a missing origin because it is only from within the symbolic that the 
origin of the symbolic can be grasped. The symbolic produces the real, retroactively 
positing the real as a traumatic origin that can never be accessed. The real of trauma is 
other to language, but it is only through language that there can be such a thing as a 
beyond or outside of language. As Mladen Dolar argues, “[w]hat is beyond language is 
the result of language itself. Only in and through language is there an unspeakable—that 
remainder produced as the fallout of the Symbolic and the Real” (1993, 95). The 
traumatic real is an accidental origin insofar as it is the cause of the symbolic order 
constitutive of subjectivity, yet it is something that is retroactively constructed as an 
origin from inside the vantage-point of the symbolic. In other words, the notion of the 
traumatic real as existing prior to the subjectifying mark of the symbolic can only be 
posited subsequent to the subject’s emergence into the symbolic.  
In her essay, “Trauma and the Material Signifier” (2001), Belau insists that 
psychoanalysis is not an idealism, since it links repetition to the materiality of the 
signifier. The materiality of the signifier resides in its inadequacy, which concretely 
manifests through the compulsion to repeat. She argues that “psychoanalysis can never be 
a reductive idealism,” because it “does not posit the lost experience as some idealized 
content ‘beyond the limits’ of experience or understanding,” nor does it “posit an ideal 
that it holds out as its transcendental organizing principle” (ibid., n.p.). Psychoanalysis is 
first and foremost a praxis of the real because it posits the repetition of a missing origin as 
that which itself constitutes the missing origin. Psychoanalysis does not turn to an 
idealised traumatic origin situated beyond or before the signifier but, rather, stages the 
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repetition of the inadequacy of the signifier—as the missed encounter with the real—
within the very setting of the clinical encounter. Lacan describes psychoanalysis as “an 
encounter, an essential encounter—an appointment to which we are always called with a 
real that eludes us” ([1964] 1998b, 54). Instead of reaching beyond the analytic session in 
search of the transcendental principle of subjectivity, psychoanalysis “embraces the 
materiality of the signifier in its repetition of the impossibility that structures both the 
subject and the traumatic experience” (Belau 2001, n.p.). While the traumatic real is the 
origin of the symbolic, there is no way of imagining what occurred before the symbolic 
except for within the symbolic (ibid.). The origins of the subject are retroactively posited 
through the compulsion to repeat (ibid.). 
Given these insights, psychoanalysis is not an idealism but is, rather, a praxis of 
the real. While the real might appear as an ideal—since it is an impossible origin that 
cannot be directly accessed—it materialises itself through the compulsion to repeat. This 
resonates with Freud’s remarks on the death drive, as the origins of life as emerging from 
the inertness of death. While this originary trauma is impossible to access, it is 
concretised through the repetitive actions of the traumatised individual. Rather than 
pursuing the inaccessible origins of life—which for Lacan would be the presymbolic 
domain of the real—psychoanalysis is concerned with the return of the primordial trauma 
through repetition compulsion. Psychoanalysis is not an idealism because it maintains that 
it is only through the process of repetition that the originary trauma can be retroactively 
posited—it is only from the perspective of the “inside” that the “outside” comes into 
being. 
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The Dream of the Burning Child: Situating the Traumatic Real between Fantasy and 
Reality 
While the insistence on the reality of violence is a necessary and important task […] the debate 
concerning the location of the origins of traumatic experience as inside or outside the psyche 
may […] miss the central Freudian insight into trauma, that the impact of the traumatic event 
lies precisely in its belatedness, in its refusal to be simply located, in its insistent appearance 
outside the boundaries of any single place or time (Caruth 1995, 8-9).  
In regards to the debate concerning Freud’s so-called abandonment of the seduction 
theory, Caruth contends that attempting to situate trauma on either side of reality or 
fantasy misses the central point that trauma cannot be reduced to a single time or place. 
However, in characterising trauma as being fundamentally inaccessible, Caruth is 
criticised for situating trauma in an altogether separate and inaccessible realm that lies 
beyond the limits of language and thought (Belau 2001; Mandel 2001, 2006). Belau 
argues that trauma theorists posit trauma as an idealised and prohibited construct: “insofar 
as it remains beyond our understanding and comprehension, trauma can easily be seen as 
a sort of exceptional experience” (2002, n.p.). Belau argues that “if trauma’s seeming 
incomprehensibility has been the paradoxical starting point for one of the most important 
avenues of its study it has also invited a dangerous elevation of traumatic experience to 
the level of an ideal” (2001, n.p.). Whilst agreeing with critics that trauma should not be 
situated outside or beyond language, I suggest that what really interests Caruth is the gap 
between the inside and the outside, the real and the fantasmatic. As this section unfolds, it 
will become increasingly apparent that within psychoanalysis—particularly the 
psychoanalytic theory of Lacan—the bounds separating reality and fantasy begin to 
disintegrate. 
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In this section, I turn to a famous dream presented by Freud in his Interpretation 
of Dreams to delineate—albeit whilst problematising—the bounds separating fantasy 
from reality. This aids my inquiry into whether trauma is to be situated in reality, as 
Freud’s early work on hysteria maintains, or if it is to be situated in fantasy, which 
Freud’s later work in psychoanalysis upholds. In examining this dream, I utilise the 
insights developed over the previous two sections of this chapter to consider whether the 
traumatic real resides on either side of reality or fantasy. Ordinarily, the fantasmatic realm 
of dreams is opposed to reality, with the transition from the dream to the waking world 
perceived as a shift from fantasy to reality. Indeed, Freud’s interpretation of the dream of 
the burning child upholds this traditional view, insofar as he subordinates the dream to the 
reality that is experienced in the waking world. However, a Lacanian reading of the 
dream offers a very different view. He shows that the closest proximity to the traumatic 
real is inside the dream, thus revealing how that which lies beyond the dream arises from 
within it. This idea is commensurate with the structuring matrices of the symbolic-
imaginary as being closer to the subject’s experience of reality than the domain of the 
real. In this section, I begin with Freud’s interpretation of the dream—which reinforces 
the dichotomous relation between reality and fantasy—before problematising this reading 
with the Lacanian interpretations offered by Caruth and Žižek. 
The dream of the burning child is dreamt by a father whose son had recently died 
of an acute fever ([1899] 2010, 514). The father had kept constant watch over his son 
while he was still alive and decided to get some sleep after the child’s death. The corpse 
of the child was laid out in the next room, surrounded by candles. While the father slept, 
he entrusted an old man to keep watch over his son’s body. However, the man watching 
over the child himself fell asleep and an accident occurred: one of the candles fell, 
causing the child’s corpse to go up in flames. Freud elaborates in this oft-cited passage: 
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A father had been watching beside his child’s sick-bed for days and nights on end. After the 
child had died, he went into the next room to lie down, but left the door open so that he could 
see from his bedroom into the room in which his child’s body was laid out, with tall candles 
standing round it. An old man had been engaged to keep watch over it, and sat beside the body 
murmuring prayers. After a few hours’ sleep, the father had a dream that his child was standing 
beside his bed, caught him by the arm and whispered to him reproachfully: ‘Father, don’t you 
see I’m burning?’ He woke up, noticed a bright glare of light from the next room, hurried into 
it and found that the old watchman had dropped off to sleep and that the wrappings and one of 
the arms of his beloved child’s dead body had been burned by a lighted candle that had fallen 
on them (ibid., emphasis in original). 
The reality of the accident—in which the corpse of the child goes up in flames—appears 
to permeate the father’s dream, causing him to form a dream that closely corresponds to 
what is happening in the next room. However, this strikes Freud as strange, since 
psychoanalysis had “[h]itherto […] been principally concerned with the secret meaning of 
dreams and the method of discovering it and with the means employed by the dream work 
for concealing it” (ibid., 514). The meaning of this particular dream, however, appears 
obvious and raises no problems for interpretation (ibid., 514-5). The dream appears 
strange to Freud insofar as the internal composition of the dream-work directly 
corresponds to the reality situated outside the dream. Freud remarks that the simplest 
interpretation of the dream would be that “[t]he glare of light shone through the open door 
into the sleeping man’s eyes and led him to the conclusion which he would have arrived 
at if he had been awake, namely that a candle had fallen over and set something alight in 
the neighbourhood of the body” ([1899] 2010, 514, emphasis in original). Meanwhile the 
words uttered by the child in the dream—“Father, don’t you see I’m burning?”—were 
probably spoken by the child prior to his death, when he was burning with fever (ibid.).  
   
 
219 
 
 
However, Freud is unsatisfied with this explanation and suggests that it misses 
something crucial. What the above interpretation fails to ask is the question of why the 
father would continue to sleep long enough to incorporate the external disruption into his 
dream when the situation urgently required him to wake up (ibid.). Indeed, the father 
continued to sleep—if only for a moment longer—even though he had become partially 
aware of the accident in the next room. Why does the father conjure up a dream that 
closely responds to reality at the expense of immediately waking up to respond to this 
reality? Freud’s answer to this question is that the father remains asleep to fulfil the wish 
to once more see his son alive. Freud explains that “[i]f the father had woken up first and 
then made the inference that led him to go in the next room, he would, as it were, have 
shortened his child’s life by that moment of time” (ibid.). This interpretation corresponds 
to Freud’s theory of dreams as the fantasmatic fulfilment of unconscious wishes: the 
father failed to wake up in time to respond to the urgent reality in the next room so that he 
could prolong the life of his child within the dream.  
As well as interpreting the dream as fulfilling the father’s wish to see his son alive, 
Freud draws attention to another wish that is being fulfilled—that is, the father’s wish to 
continue sleeping (ibid., 570). Through the dream, both the child’s life and the father’s 
sleep were prolonged (ibid.). Where it is commonly thought that dreams hinder or disrupt 
the restfulness of sleep, Freud regards dreams as the guardians of sleep:  
Every dream which occurs immediately before the sleeper is woken by a loud noise has made 
an attempt at explaining away the arousing stimulus by providing another explanation of it and 
has thus sought to prolong sleep, even if only for a moment (ibid., 681) 
Rather than waking up to respond to the accident in the next room, the father’s dream 
serves two functions: it fulfils the father’s wish to see his son alive once more as well as 
fulfilling a wish common to all dreamers—that is, the wish to continue sleeping. Where 
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the words of the child uttered in the dream—“Father, don’t you see I’m burning?”—may 
appear as some kind of message to the father to wake up, Freud maintains that this 
message must be comprised of words that the child had spoken to his father during his 
life. Given that dreams are motivated by the unconscious desire to remain asleep, the 
father’s dream incorporated the external intrusion to prevent the father from waking up. 
In Freud’s reading of the dream of the burning child, the father ultimately withdraws from 
reality and into the fantasy of the dream. Unable to face the reality of his son’s death, the 
father retreats into the dream, in which his son is represented as living. In other words, 
rather than waking up to face the reality of his son’s corpse being devoured by flames, the 
father flees into the fictional realm of the dream, which is preferred to the traumatic 
reality of his son’s death, situated on the other side of the dream.   
 Where Freud considers the question of what it means for the father to remain 
asleep, Lacan turns to the question of what it means for him to wake up (Caruth 1996, 
97). In his seminar, “Tuché and Automaton,” Lacan frames the dream of the burning child 
around the accident—namely, the one that causes the father to wake up—and raises the 
question of where the reality of the accident is situated. Is the accident located in the 
external reality, in which the child’s corpse has been set alight, or is the reality of the 
accident situated on the inside of the dream, manifest in the child’s utterance, “Father, 
don’t you see I’m burning?”? According to Lacan, “[i]t is not only the reality, the shock, 
the knocking, a noise made to recall him to the real, but this expresses, in his dream, the 
quasi-identity of what is happening, the very reality of an overturned candle setting light 
to the bed in which his child lies” ([1964] 1998b, 57). Contrary to Freud, Lacan posits the 
accident that caused the father to wake up as residing inside the dream. 
As already noted, the Freudian interpretation of the dream sees the father as being 
unable to face the traumatic reality of his son’s death. The father suspends this reality by 
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taking refuge in his dream where his wish for his son to be alive—as well as his wish to 
continue sleeping—is fantasmatically fulfilled. When the glare of the flames shining into 
the father’s eyes becomes too strong to tolerate, he is forced to awaken back into reality. 
Thus, Freud argues that it is the disruptive impact of the stimuli outside of the dream that 
causes the father to wake up. Lacan, however, suggests that it is something inside the 
father’s dream itself that awakes him. Lacan inverts the opposition between the fantasy 
and reality by prioritising the “quasi-identity” of the dream as more fundamentally real in 
the role of waking the father up (ibid., 58). Lacan remarks that there is more reality in the 
message uttered by the child than there is “in the noise by which the father also identifies 
the strange reality of what is happening in the room next door” (ibid.). In opposition to 
Freud, Lacan argues that it is not the glare from the flames in the next room that wakes 
the father but, rather, the child’s words within the dream—namely, “Father, don’t you see 
I’m burning?.” “This sentence,” writes Lacan, “is itself a firebrand—of itself it brings fire 
where it falls—and one cannot see what is burning, for the flames blind us to the fact that 
the fire bears […] on the real” (ibid., 59). In other words, the utterance of the child within 
the dream gesture towards the traumatic real as that which resides beyond the dream. 
However, that which lies beyond the dream can only be encountered within it. In this 
way, Lacan draws attention to the symmetrical relation between the waking world and the 
fantasmatic realm of the dream: 
How can we fail to see that awakening works in two directions—and that the awakening that 
re-situates us in a constituted and represented reality carries out two tasks? The real has to be 
sought beyond the dream—in what the dream has enveloped, hidden from us, behind the lack 
of representation (ibid., 60).  
Accordingly, “the terrible vision of the dead son taking the father by the arm designates a 
beyond that makes itself heard in the dream” (ibid., 59). What interests Lacan is the 
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following question: “what is there that motivates the emergence of the represented reality, 
namely the phenomenon, distance, the gap itself that constitutes awakening?” (ibid., 57). 
Lacan does not see the dream as “a phantasy fulfilling a wish” (ibid., 60), but as an 
encounter with the real that is hidden behind the mask of repetition. In Lacan’s words, 
The place of the real, which stretches from the trauma to the phantasy—in so far as the 
phantasy is never anything more than the screen that conceals something quite primary, 
something determinant in the function of repetition (ibid., 60).  
That which is hidden behind the fantasy is a fundamental lack: “what wakes us is the 
other reality hidden behind the lack of that which takes the place of representation” 
(ibid.). In accordance with the insights developed in the previous two sections of this 
chapter, the constitutive lack of the subject is indicative of the subject’s emergence into 
the symbolic. Rather than seeking the real beyond the automaton, psychoanalysis turns to 
the phenomenon of repetition itself as staging the lost origins of subjectivity whilst at the 
same time materialising them. The real is constituted through the symbolic, as that which 
paradoxically lies beyond the symbolic.  
The words of the child, according to Lacan, express the reality that the father has 
awoken to a situation that is too late for him to prevent:  
is not the action, apparently so urgent, of preventing what is happening in the next room also 
perhaps felt as being in any case too late now, in relation to what is at issue, in the psychical 
reality manifested in the words spoken? Is not the dream essentially, one might say, an act of 
homage to the missed reality—the reality that can no longer produce itself except by repeating 
itself endlessly, in some never attained awakening? (ibid., 58).  
The father’s repeated awakening into a situation to which he cannot adequately respond 
also attests to the father’s missed encounter with his child’s death. The child’s reproachful 
whisper—“Father, don’t you see I’m burning?”—expresses “the missed reality that 
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caused the death of the child” (ibid.). It is behind these sorrowful words that Lacan posits 
trauma as the missed encounter with the real—the tuché that lies beyond the automaton. 
However, as was shown in the previous section of this chapter, it is only within the 
automatic function of the symbolic that the real announces itself.   
In her Lacanian interpretation of the dream, Caruth takes up the idea that the 
moment of awakening reenacts the missed encounter with trauma (1996, 100), which is 
something that I discussed in Chapter Five of this thesis. Rather than positing the real of 
trauma on either side of fantasy or reality, Caruth argues that it is the site of awakening 
itself that is the site of trauma—that is, the gap which exists between fantasy and reality 
(ibid.). Given this, the father’s delayed awakening to the scene of his burning son is the 
traumatic repetition of the earlier trauma suffered by the father when his son had died. 
Just as the father was unable to respond to the situation of his child’s death as it occurred, 
he was also unable to immediately respond to his child’s corpse burning in the next room. 
The father’s missed encounter with his son’s death is reenacted in the repetitive act of 
awakening into a situation that he arrived at one moment too late.89 Caruth writes: 
The relation between the burning within and the burning without is thus neither a fiction (as in 
Freud’s interpretation) nor a direct representation, but a repetition that reveals, in its temporal 
contradiction, how the very bond of the father to the child—his responsiveness to the child’s 
words—is linked to the missing of the child’s death. To awaken is thus precisely to awaken 
only to one’s repetition of a previous failure to see in time (ibid., emphasis in original). 
For Caruth, it is the moment of awakening itself that repeats the scene of trauma, as 
opposed to the reality situated either side of the dream. The child’s words within the 
                                                 
89 This corresponds to Caruth’s comments on the emergence of the death drive through the traumatic 
awakening of life from inert matter. As I explained in Chapter Five, the traumatic awakening into life is a 
missed encounter, since there was no subject present to bear witness to this originary traumatic event. 
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dream are not to be read as a fantasmatic representation of the child’s corpse going up in 
flames, nor are they simply words that the child has uttered while he was alive. Instead, 
they bear on the father’s missed encounter with his child’s death. Caruth thus argues that 
trauma can neither be situated on the inside nor the outside of the dream but, rather, in the 
gap that constitutes awakening. This gap repeats the traumatic event as that which was too 
overwhelming to be experienced at the time that it occurred. 
Žižek offers yet another interpretation of this famous dream, in which he 
counterposes orthodox Freudian interpretations with his own Lacanian reading ([1989] 
2008, 45). For Žižek, the Freudian interpretation—which I have already discussed at 
length in this section—erroneously situates the waking world at the level of reality and 
the dreaming world at the level of fantasmatic wish-fulfilment (whether it be the wish of 
the father to see the son alive, or the wish of the father to remain sleeping). Where 
Freud’s reading sees the father’s awakening as an escape from reality into the dream, 
Žižek inverts this formulation, seeing the father’s awakening as an escape from the 
terrifying reality encountered in the dream. Rather than affirming the dream as fantasy 
and the waking work as reality, Žižek argues that reality is structured by fantasy and that 
it is the dream that comes into the closest proximity to the real.  
 Accepting the proposition that reality is structured by fantasy requires a radical 
rethinking of the notions of reality and fantasy, as well as the relation between these 
terms. Rex Butler explains that “[i]n common parlance, fantasy denotes a separation from 
reality, a construction that is fictional and therefore opposed to reality” (2014, 89). Within 
psychoanalysis, however, fantasy takes on quite a different meaning. For Freud, fantasy is 
“a screen which is presented to the imagination and which stages unconscious desire” 
(Evans 2006, 61). Lacan, on the other hand, emphases the protective function of fantasy, 
seeing it as a screen through which scenes of images defend against the traumatic real. In 
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this sense, fantasy is axiomatic: fantasy “informs all of the subject’s actions and his whole 
way of seeing the world” (Fink 2014, 47). Reality is constituted by fantasy, which is, in 
turn, structured by the symbolic-imaginary. 
The Lacanian notion of fantasy incorporates both imaginary and symbolic 
qualities. Lacan refuses to reduce fantasy to the imaginary and insists that fantasy is “an 
image set to work in the signifying structure” ([1958] 2006, 532). In other words, the 
images in the fantasy are constituted by the symbolic order—as Fink explains, “the 
imaginary has already been transformed, structured, or overwritten by the symbolic” 
(2014, 40). It is also important to note that, for Lacan, individual fantasies such as 
dreams, daydreams, intrusive thoughts, and masturbation fantasies are all thought to stem 
from what he calls the fundamental fantasy (ibid., 42). The fundamental fantasy, as Lacan 
explains, “comes in here only to find itself on the return path of a broader circuit, a circuit 
that, in carrying demand to the limits of being, makes the subject wonder about the lack in 
which he appears to himself as desire” ([1958] 2006, 533). This fundamental lack 
gestures towards the traumatic real, which is something that fantasy functions to cover 
over.  
 In light of this psychoanalytic understanding of fantasy, Žižek argues that it is 
impossible to break out of fantasy to perceive reality as it “truly is” ([1989] 2008, 48). 
Fantasy is not something that obstructs individuals from perceiving reality but, rather, 
constitutes the individual’s very experience of reality. Indeed, “fantasy structures reality 
itself” (ibid., 44). Given this, Žižek suggests that 
if what we experience as ‘reality’ is structured by fantasy, and if fantasy serves as the screen 
that protects us from being directly overwhelmed by the raw Real, then reality itself can 
function as an escape from encountering the Real. In the opposition between dream and reality, 
fantasy is on the side of reality, and it is in dreams that we encounter the traumatic Real—it is 
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not that dreams are for those who cannot endure reality, reality itself is for those who cannot 
endure (the Real that announces itself in) their dreams (2006, 57, emphasis in original).   
Fantasy does not offer an escape from reality, but offers reality itself as an escape from 
the traumatic real which announces itself in fantasy (Žižek [1989] 2008, 45).90 “Reality,” 
as Žižek explains, “is a fantasy-construction which enables us to mask the Real of our 
desire” ([1989] 2008, 45). In this way, Žižek takes up the Lacanian position that the 
function of fantasy is to provide a protective screen against the traumatic real. Reality is 
structured by fantasy, while the real is that which cannot be contained in the fantasy-
frame that constitutes reality.  
Returning to the dream of the burning child, Žižek argues that if “‘dreaming’ 
means fantasizing in order to avoid confronting the Real, the father literally woke up so 
that he could not go on dreaming” (2006, 58). In postulating reality as being structured by 
fantasy, Žižek makes the paradoxical assertion that the father wakes up in order to 
continue sleeping: he escapes from the terrifying real encountered in the dream into a 
reality made up of fantasy. This implies a reversal of the usual notion of the dream as 
fantasy and of the waking world as reality. The father does not retreat from the traumatic 
reality of his son’s death into the fantasmatic world of the dream as much as he turns 
away from the traumatic reality encountered within the dream by waking back up into a 
reality structured by fantasy. What the father encounters in the dream is not some kind of 
refuge from a painful external reality in which the father knows that his son is dead. On 
                                                 
90 It is interesting to note the way that the protective screen of fantasy resonates with what, in Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle, Freud refers to as the protective shield of consciousness (which I discussed in some 
detail in Chapter Five of this thesis). The protective shield keeps out intrusive stimuli by ordering them in 
sequences of time and space. In this way, the protective shield of consciousness serves the function of 
keeping stimuli out as opposed to letting them in, or directly receiving them in an unaltered state. Without 
this protective shield, consciousness would be obliterated. Similarly, fantasy structures what is experienced 
as reality so as to protect consciousness from the traumatic real. Since fantasy structures reality, reality is 
not directly experienced by consciousness, but is held together by fantasies that provide protection against 
being directly overwhelmed by the real.  
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the contrary, the father encounters a much more terrifying reality inside the dream than 
the one he faces outside of it. It is the awful reality encountered inside the dream—
manifest in the child’s reproachful whisper—that forces the father to wake up. The 
father’s fundamental guilt for missing his son’s death, reflected in the words uttered to 
him by his son, “is more terrifying than so-called external reality itself, and that is why he 
awakens” (Žižek [1989] 2008, 45). The father, according to Žižek, “escapes into so-called 
reality to be able to continue to sleep, to maintain his blindness, to elude awakening into 
the Real […] which announces itself in the terrifying dream” (ibid.).  
Žižek demonstrates this point in his reading of a recurring dream that Levi recalls 
during his time at Auschwitz (2001, 196). In his dream, Levi is truly happy to be back at 
home surrounded by his family and loved ones. However, this intense pleasure gives way 
to an even more intense pain, which awakens Levi back into the grim reality of 
Auschwitz. Levi explains: 
It is an intense pleasure, physical, inexpressible, to be at home, among friendly people and to 
have so many things to recount: but I cannot help noticing that my listeners do not follow me. 
In fact, they are completely indifferent: they speak confusedly of other things among 
themselves, as if I was not there. My sister looks at me, gets up and goes away without a word. 
A desolating grief is now born in me, like certain barely remembered pains of one’s 
early infancy. It is pain in its pure state, not tempered by a sense of reality and by the intrusion 
of extraneous circumstances, a pain like that which makes children cry; and it is better for me 
to swim once again up to the surface, but this time I deliberately open my eyes to have a 
guarantee in front of me of being effectively awake (1987, 66). 
The “desolating grief” born in Levi when his story falls upon the deaf ears of his loved 
ones wakes him back into Auschwitz. While the reality of Auschwitz that awaited Levi 
outside of his dream was a reality of unimaginable suffering, it is the extreme pain of not 
being able to transmit his story within the dream that ultimately wakes him up. In the case 
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of Levi’s dream, the idea that there was no one to receive his message is the traumatic 
kernel of the real that awakens him back into fantasy-frame of reality.  
Caruth, however, criticises Žižek’s reading for positioning the real on the side of 
the dream and fantasy on the side of reality. For one thing, Caruth finds it difficult to 
accept that the father’s awakening from his dream is any way an escape—it hardly seems 
valid that the father waking up to discover his dead son burning in the next room is a 
retreat from an even more traumatic reality inside the dream (1996, 142). It would also 
seem problematic to argue that being at home amongst family is a more traumatic reality 
than that of Auschwitz, even if Levi’s family is unwilling to listen to his testimony. More 
importantly, however, Caruth criticises Žižek’s reading of the dream for what appears to 
be a simple inversion of reality and fantasy. Here, she accuses Žižek of overlooking 
Lacan’s fundamental insistence that the encounter with the real resides in the moment of 
awakening, as that which occurs between the dream and the waking world. Where Žižek 
argues that the reality that causes the father to awaken is located inside the dream, Caruth 
asserts that it is too simplistic to position the real on either the inside or the outside. 
Instead, Caruth reads Lacan as suggesting that the missed encounter with the real occurs 
in the moment of transition between the inside and outside; it is the moment between 
sleeping and waking—that is, the moment of awakening—that marks the missed 
encounter with the real, which is the very locus of trauma.   
Although Žižek does perhaps underplay the significance of awakening so central 
to Lacan’s notion of trauma as a missed encounter with the real, I argue that his 
interpretation of the dream offers insight into the means through which the traumatic real 
can be encountered through the immanent textures of fantasy, through the holes in the 
symbolic that fantasy functions to cover over. Žižek repositions the Lacanian real away 
from a transcendent impossibility to an immanent possibility, as that which persists 
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through the fantasmatic constructs of reality. Žižek’s Lacanian insights, in other words, 
demonstrate the immanence of the traumatic real as lying within the fantasy. Far from 
being a radically transcendent entity, the traumatic real is immanent to the fantasy. In this 
way, Žižek’s reading of Lacan resists the common criticism that trauma theorists idealise 
trauma, positioning it as radically transcendent and other.  
Between Reality and Fantasy, the Immanent and the Transcendent: The Traumatic Real as 
the Immanent Origin of the Symbolic 
This chapter turned to Lacanian psychoanalysis to address one of the central aims of Part 
Two of this thesis—that is, of challenging the false dichotomy between reality and 
fantasy in relation to the origins of the traumatic event. Where fantasy is ordinarily placed 
in opposition to reality, Lacanian psychoanalysis posits fantasy as a fundamental 
component of reality, with fantasy, in turn, being structured by the constitutive matrix of 
the symbolic-imaginary. Fantasy is not an obstacle to true perceptions of reality but is, 
rather, the very framework through which reality is perceived. Circumventing the 
dichotomy between reality and fantasy has implications for the criticisms of Freud that I 
discussed in the introduction of this chapter—namely, that the conceptual shift in Freud’s 
work from reality to fantasy dismisses the traumatic reality suffered by his patients. In 
light of the insights developed in this chapter, I maintain that Freud’s critics 
misunderstand the psychoanalytic notion of fantasy. They assume that fantasy opposes 
reality when, in fact, reality is constituted by fantasy. Given that reality is structured by 
fantasy, it makes little sense to claim that Freud’s focus on fantasy dismisses the reality of 
trauma.  
 As well as moving beyond the false dichotomy between reality and fantasy, this 
chapter has challenged the mutual exclusivity between the immanent and the transcendent 
in relation to the rupturing impact of trauma. In so doing, I have posited the Lacanian real 
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as an originary trauma—that is, as the origin of the symbolic-imaginary matrices 
constitutive of subjectivity. The real is both a brute presymbolic domain and a residual 
trace that cannot be assimilated into the symbolic-imaginary orders. Although the real is 
too traumatic to be directly encountered, it manifests as tears within the symbolic-
imaginary. While the real appears “outside” and “beyond” the symbolic-imaginary, it is 
only from within the latter orders that the real announces itself. In this sense, the 
traumatic real is both immanent to, and transcendent of, the constitutive frameworks of 
the symbolic-imaginary. It transcends the symbolic-imaginary to the extent that it exists 
“before” these orders and thus resides “outside” of them. However, the real is immanent 
because it is only from “inside” the symbolic-imaginary that the “outside” can be 
retroactively posited.  
While configuring the Lacanian real as an originary trauma might appear to imply 
that it exists “before” the emergence of the subject, it is only “after” the subject enters the 
symbolic-imaginary that the traumatic origin of subjectivity materialises itself through its 
belated repetition. As I have explained—both in this present chapter and in Chapter Five 
of this thesis—the compulsion to repeat is an attempt to master an event that could not be 
experienced at the time of its arrival. Originary trauma cannot be experienced because it 
precedes the emergence of the subject. Given this, it is only through the repetition of this 
forever lost origin that this origin can be retroactively stated. In this way, the traumatic 
real as the origin of the symbolic-imaginary does not exist in a time “before” these orders. 
For it is only through the compulsion to repeat that occurs after the subject emerges into 
the symbolic-imaginary that the always already lost origin of subjectivity can be 
apprehended.  
Where the notion of trauma developed by trauma theorists such as Caruth is 
criticised for positing trauma as a transcendent impossibility, this chapter has conceived 
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trauma as implicating both the immanent and the transcendent. Rather than configuring 
the originary trauma of the real as a transcendental and idealised origin that precedes the 
symbolic-imaginary, I have argued that the traumatic real is immanent to these orders, 
thus contributing to the overarching argument of this thesis regarding the immanence of 
traumatic rupture. The immanence of traumatic rupture posits the outside as something 
that can only be gestured towards from the inside. This is because the transcendent only 
becomes meaningful from the perspective of immanence. In other words, the traumatic 
real—as that which resides outside the symbolic-imaginary—can only be apprehended 
from the inside of the symbolic-imaginary. In this way, the transcendent and the 
immanent enter a reciprocal relationship.  
 Where Chapter Six turned to Lacanian psychoanalysis to explain what it means 
for reality to be constituted by fantasy (as well as what it means for fantasy, in turn, to be 
always already structured by the symbolic-imaginary), the interconnection between 
reality and fantasy will be carried over into the next chapter of this thesis. In Chapter 
Seven, I examine Freud’s work on hysteria and, in particular, his concept of 
Nachträglichkeit as implicating both an external event of the past and its fantasmatic 
reconstruction from the perspective of the present. Far from being situated in either one of 
these extremes at the expense of the other, I argue that trauma implicates the past and the 
present, reality and fantasy, in a reciprocal and dialogic exchange.  
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Chapter Seven – Presenting Trauma as Unpresentable: From the Historical to the 
Originary 
The experience of […] trauma, fixed or frozen in time, refuses to be represented as past, but is 
perpetually reexperienced in a painful, dissociated, traumatic present (Leys 2000, 2, emphasis 
in original). 
Trauma, as Leys illustrates in the above citation, cuts across both the past and the present; 
it refuses to be situated in the past and repetitively91 manifests itself in the present. While 
I agree with Leys’ portrait of the peculiar temporality of trauma, I disagree with the idea 
that the past “experience” of trauma is “reexperienced” in the present. Characterising the 
symptoms of trauma as the reexperiencing the past erroneously implies that the event was 
experienced at the time it occurred. The past event cannot possibly be reexperienced 
because trauma precludes the subject’s ability to experience the event in the first place. If 
anything, the repetitive symptoms of trauma testify to a disruptive event that was too 
overwhelming to be experienced as it occurred.  
The central characteristic of trauma as an event that bypasses conscious awareness 
bears directly on one of the major aims of this thesis—that of theorising trauma as an 
unpresentable occurrence. In conceiving the unpresentability of trauma, I provide an 
innovative framework for conceptualising a phenomenon that is all too often 
characterised as either unrepresentable or representable. This significant aim is amongst 
two other aims that I actualise in this chapter. Indeed, Chapter Seven is the culminate 
moment of this thesis, in which I conceptualise the unpresentability of trauma; reclaim the 
language of repression in regards to the rupturing impact of trauma on the psyche; and 
reveal the means through which trauma disrupts the seemingly distinct categories of the 
                                                 
91 As was established in Chapter Five of this thesis, the compulsion to repeat arises from an attempt to 
retrospectively master an event that the subject could not process at the time it occurred. 
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historical and the originary. In what remains of this introduction, I will expand on these 
thesis aims92 before briefly unpacking the structural development of the chapter itself.   
One of the key aims of this thesis that I accomplish in Chapter Seven is the 
reclamation of the language of repression—specifically originary repression—with 
regards to trauma. This original contribution to knowledge destabilises the argument that 
when it comes to describing the psychical processing of trauma, repression is an 
erroneous term (Caruth 1995, 1996; Howell and Itzkowitz 2016; van der Kolk and van 
der Hart 1995).93 The concept of dissociation is preferred to repression because the latter 
is seen as mistakenly implying that the traumatic event was registered to consciousness 
before being dispelled into the depths of the unconscious. Repression, it is argued, evokes 
a subject actively pushing away an undesirable experience (Howell and Itzkowitz 2016, 
38). This is an inaccurate portrayal of trauma because the traumatic event is not inscribed 
in consciousness as it occurs. Dissociation, on the other hand, describes the disruptive 
impact of trauma as an event that cannot be cognitised. “Dissociation,” as Elizabeth F. 
Howell and Sheldon Itzkowitz explain, “refers to those gaps in memory, knowledge, and 
emotions that we don’t know—experience94 that was too overwhelming to be 
assimilated” (2016, 38).  
                                                 
92 Note that I will not be addressing these thesis aims in the order they appear in this chapter. 
93 Van der Kolk and van der Hart, for instance, argue that “the concept of dissociation is best suited” to 
trauma and that the concept of repression “should be reserved for the defense against primitive, forbidden, 
Id-impulses” (1995, 169). Although Caruth does at times use the term repression to refer to the psychical 
processing of trauma, she at other times aligns repression with forbidden unconscious wishes which filter 
through to consciousness in the guise of symbols (1996, 135n18). She perceives trauma, on the other hand, 
as a brute, unsymbolised force which is best understood in terms the inherent latency of its experience. In 
accordance with this model of latency, that which bypasses conscious awareness at the time of its 
occurrence manifests belatedly. Latency was discussed in Chapter One of this thesis, in regards to Caruth’s 
reading of the accident set out by Freud in Moses and Monotheism. The notion of latency relates to the dual 
temporality of the Freudian Nachträglichkeit. 
94 The term “experience” is problematic here. If trauma is “too overwhelming to be assimilated” (ibid.) the 
event does not register itself to consciousness as an experience. 
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Although I agree that dissociation is a perfectly apt concept for describing the 
psychical processing of trauma, I am not convinced that dissociation and repression are 
fundamentally incompatible terms. While I maintain that trauma is not subject to 
secondary repression, I argue that, if broadened, the notion of originary repression has a 
considerable potential for describing the rupturing impact of trauma on experience and 
cognition. In secondary repression, an unpleasant experience that was once conscious is 
repressed into the unconscious. The notion of secondary repression cannot apply to 
trauma because trauma is not registered to consciousness to begin with. In originary 
repression, however, trauma is not inscribed in consciousness because it precedes the 
emergence of consciousness—in fact, originary repression accompanies the formation of 
consciousness through originary trauma. While originary repression is bound to originary 
trauma, I broaden the definition of the latter term to explain the means through which 
trauma withstands conscious awareness. Following Lyotard (1990), I reconceive originary 
repression as not only indicative of the originary formation of consciousness, but as a 
kind of forgetting that precedes the subject’s capacity to forget. In so doing, I address the 
correlative aim of this thesis of formulating trauma as an unpresentable event. 
 This chapter interjects into the polemical tendency of theorists to conceive trauma 
as either unrepresentable or representable. In contemporary trauma discourse, the 
traumatised being’s inability to voluntarily access the initial traumatic event gives rise to 
the recurring theme of unrepresentability. However, polemical responses to the perceived 
unrepresentability of trauma are proliferating. The characterisation of trauma as 
unrepresentable is criticised for situating the phenomenon in a transcendent and 
inaccessible realm. In response to this shortcoming, critics argue that trauma is entirely 
representable, thereby repositioning trauma on the plane of immanence.  
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Following Leys (2000) and Rothberg (2000),95 and as examined throughout this 
thesis, I argue that the polemic between the un/representability of trauma has led to an 
impasse in trauma theory, in which theorists insist that trauma need either be 
unrepresentable or representable, with one of these extremes automatically foreclosing the 
possibility of the other. Not only is the mutual exclusive insistence on the 
un/representability of trauma symptomatic of a false dichotomy, both sides of the polemic 
utilise the notion of representation which, I argue, is an erroneous term to describe 
trauma. As indicated by the very name of the concept, to represent is “to make present 
again” (Webb 2009, 63). The conflicting views regarding the un/representability of 
trauma diverge insofar as one upholds that trauma cannot be represented and the other 
argues that trauma can be represented. This is precisely where the problem lies: both 
sides of the polemic imply that trauma is in fact presented to consciousness in the first 
place. In upholding the un/representability of trauma, theorists miss the crucial point that 
trauma is actually unpresentable. While this might be the intended purpose of those who 
insist on the representability of trauma, “unrepresentable” is a particularly fraught term 
for those who argue that trauma precludes its ability to be cognitised at the time it occurs. 
One of the key aims of this thesis is to critically intervene into the interdisciplinary space 
of trauma theory by proposing a move beyond the polemic surrounding the 
un/representability of trauma and to offer a corrective to an imprecise term that is 
pervasive in discussions of trauma. Rather than upholding the un/representability of 
trauma, I argue that it is more precise to characterise trauma as unpresentable.  
                                                 
95 Refer to the Introduction of this thesis, where I unpacked what Rothberg identifies as the contrasting 
views of realism and antirealism as well as the opposition between the mimentic and antimimetic positions 
outlined by Leys. Where the antirealist and the mimetic approaches conceive trauma as an event that is 
unrepresentable, the realist and antimimetic positions posit trauma as being entirely accessible to 
representation. 
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 The final aim of this thesis that I address in Chapter Seven is the problematisation 
of the distinction between historical and originary trauma. As explained in the 
Introduction of this thesis, the categories of historical and originary trauma are coined by 
LaCapra, who differentiates between these terms in response to the tendency of trauma 
theorists to conflate these phenomena. Where historical trauma refers to a factual event to 
have occurred in an individual or collective’s past, originary trauma designates the 
traumatic coming-into-being of the subject. Contra LaCapra, I argue that upholding a 
distinction between the categories of historical and originary trauma is thwarted by the 
unpresentability of trauma. These categories domesticate and neutralise a phenomenon 
which defies presentation and categorisation. What is more, the distinction between the 
historical and the originary is based on the erroneous view that trauma—specifically 
historical trauma—can be grounded in a concrete past event. This gives rise to a causal 
relation between the past and the present and overlooks the reciprocity between the 
external event of the past and its internal reconstruction from the perspective of the 
present.   
 The aforementioned aims—namely, of reclaiming the language of repression; of 
characterising trauma as unpresentable; and of destabilising the bounds separating 
historical and originary trauma—will be achieved in reference to the Freudian concept of 
Nachträglichkeit. Before I move on to outline the basic structure of this chapter, it is 
worth defining this pivotal term, which has actually been implicit across this entire thesis. 
Nachträglichkeit has a variety of English translations, including “belatedness”; “deferred 
action”; “retroactive temporarily”; “retroactive modification”; “afterwardsness”; “double 
wound”; “double blow”; “latency”; and “retrospective attribution”—to name only a few. 
As this chapter goes on to explain, translating Nachträglichkeit from German to English 
proves problematic insofar as the term lends itself to two seemingly conflicting views of 
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temporality (Eickhoff 2006, 1454). Terms like “deferred action,” “latency,” and 
“belatedness” give rise to a progressive view of temporality, in which the past event is 
posited as the cause of the belated onset of traumatic symptoms. Conversely, terms such 
as “retroactive temporarily” and “retroactive modification” lend themselves to a 
retroactive model of temporality, which implies that the later moment of interpretation 
retroactively causes the past event. With its focus on interpretation, the latter rendering of 
Nachträglichkeit has hermeneutic, as well as retroactive, connotations. What both of these 
renderings overlook is the bidirectional structure of Nachträglichkeit, which consists of a 
dialogic exchange between the past and the present, in which the past belatedly manifests 
itself in the present and the present retroactively reconstructs the past. 
 Having defined Nachträglichkeit, as well as having addressed the central aims of 
this thesis that this present chapter addresses, I will now provide an overview of the 
structure of Chapter Seven. The first section of this chapter examines Freud’s notion of 
Nachträglichkeit in his early work on hysteria, with specific reference to his famous case 
study of Emma. The case of Emma becomes a recurrent point of reference across the 
duration of this chapter, insofar as it illuminates the inability to situate trauma in either an 
external event of the past or in the belated process of interpretation in the present. Next, I 
raise the aforementioned issues that emerge when reducing trauma to either the external 
or the internal, the past or the present, with one of these extremes automatically 
foreclosing the possibility of the other.  
In moving beyond the mutual exclusivity between these terms, the second section 
of this chapter turns to Laplanche’s reconceptualisation of Nachträglichkeit, which he 
translates to après-coup in French and afterwardsness in English. Laplanche’s notion of 
afterwardsness synthesises the progressive and the retroactive temporalities of the 
Nachträglichkeit and, along with them, both the external event of the past and the internal 
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moment of reconstruction in the present. In the third section of this chapter, I consider 
Laplanche’s revitalisation of Freud’s seduction theory through his general theory of 
seduction. Laplanche moves from the contingencies of a historical event of seduction to 
posit seduction as the originary condition of subjectivity.  
However, Laplanche’s shift from the historical to the originary runs the risk of 
obfuscating the difference between historical and originary trauma. In view of this 
problem, the fourth section of this chapter provides a more detailed account of 
Laplanche’s shift from historical to originary seduction before going on to problematise 
the grounds by which LaCapra distinguishes between historical and originary trauma. I 
argue that these categories are insufficient because trauma cannot be posited in an 
external event to have occurred in history insofar as trauma interrupts the ability of 
experiencing an event historically. Whether trauma is conceived as historical or originary, 
the defining characteristic of trauma is that it disrupts the traumatised being’s ability to 
cognitise the event on its arrival. Given that trauma is a quantitative rather than a 
qualitative notion, it makes little sense to impose on trauma the status of the historical or 
the originary. As explained in Chapter Five of this thesis, trauma is a breach in the 
protective shield of consciousness by which the psyche is flooded by excessive quantities 
of stimuli emanating from the external world. The trauma is not that which causes the 
breach but is, rather, the breach itself.  
In the fifth section of this chapter, I turn to Lyotard’s reformulation of the 
Freudian Nachträglichkeit as a double blow. Where the first blow of trauma is a shock 
without affect, the second blow is an affect without shock (Lyotard 1990, 16). In 
characterising the first blow as a disruption to the subject’s ability to bind or cognitise the 
event, I argue that trauma is an unpresentable occurrence that is forgotten through 
originary repression. In conceptualising trauma as an event that is forgotten “before” the 
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subject’s capacity to forget, I follow Lyotard in contending that attempts to represent 
trauma efface the unpresentability of the event. Following this, the concluding section of 
Chapter Seven reconsiders the central aims of this thesis that are achieved in this present 
chapter. The concluding section makes way for the final chapter of this thesis which 
spirals back on the other aims that this chapter leaves unresolved. In addition to this, the 
final chapter of this thesis formulates a means through which the unpresentability of 
trauma can be presented without being forgotten anew.   
The Freudian Nachträglichkeit: Between Progression and Retroaction 
One of Freud’s earliest evocations of Nachträglichkeit appears in his case study of Emma 
in the Project for a Scientific Psychology ([1895] 1950).96 Emma is presented as suffering 
from a phobia that prevents her from being able to enter shops alone. She traces the onset 
of this phobia to an incident that occurred when she was twelve years old. Emma had 
                                                 
96 Freud invokes the Nachträglichkeit even early that this in his discussion of Katharina in his Studies on 
Hysteria ([1895] 1955). In this work, Freud recalls being on vacation in the mountains where he was 
approached by a young woman named Katharina who was seeking medical advice. Katharina suffered from 
attacks where she experienced severe shortness of breath and felt as though she was being suffocated (ibid., 
125). These attacks had started two years ago, when Katharina had come across her uncle having sex with 
her family’s cook, Franziska. At the time, this scene had prompted feelings of disgust in Katharina and had 
for some reason or another served as the catalyst for her ongoing attacks. However, Freud notes a 
discrepancy between the event that Katharina had witnessed and her extreme reaction to this event. Why 
would stumbling across her uncle and the family’s cook having sex trigger such an adverse response? 
Surely this scene was not the cause of her symptoms. 
In continuing her one-off treatment with Freud, Katharina began to remember a series of earlier 
events, where her uncle had attempted to sexually abuse her when she was a child. Katharina recalled that 
one of the incidents had occurred one night when her uncle had drunkenly stumbled into her room where 
she was sleeping and had tried to molest her under the pretence of wanting to get into bed with her to 
‘cuddle’. Katharina had rejected her uncle’s advances, finding them annoying but not particularly 
distressing. She did not realise at the time that her uncle was attempting to sexually abuse her, since she 
lacked the knowledge to make sense of the incident. Given this, Freud suggests that when Katharina had 
seen her uncle having sex with the cook, she unconsciously associated this event with her uncle’s earlier 
advances towards her. She thought: “[n]ow he’s doing with her what he wanted to do with me that night and 
those other times” (ibid., 131). Given this, Freud argues that the attacks of anxiety brought on by the later 
scene (where Katharina had stumbled across her uncle in bed with Franziska) ran parallel to an earlier scene 
(in which Katharina’s uncle had tried to sexually abuse her as a child) that had not been recognised as 
traumatic at the time that it occurred.  
Although Freud describes the man who sexually abused Katharina as her uncle in the body of his 
text, he adds in a later footnote in 1924 that this man was in fact Katharina’s father. What is more, while 
Freud initially describes the woman in bed with the uncle/father as the cook, it is later implied that she is 
Katharina’s cousin. 
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gone into a store to buy something, had noticed that the two shop-assistants working there 
were laughing, and had fled from the store in a state of fright. Emma thought that the 
shop-assistants were laughing at her clothing and reveals that she had found one of them 
sexually pleasing. Ever since this incident, which Freud labels “Scene I,” Emma was 
unable to enter shops by herself.  
It strikes Freud as strange, however, that the account provided by Emma 
“explain[s] neither the compulsion nor the determination of symptom” (ibid., 353). There 
seems to be a discrepancy between the event that Emma described and her extreme 
reaction to this event. If Emma had been embarrassed by her clothing as a child she could 
have fixed this issue long ago—she was now an adult who could choose her own clothes. 
Freud moreover observes that “it makes no difference to her clothes whether she goes to a 
shop alone or in company” (ibid., 353). Finally, the phobia of entering shops alone does 
not appear to be in any way related to the fact that Emma had found one of the shop-
assistants sexually pleasing.  
On further investigation, Emma relates to Freud another memory which had 
hitherto been unavailable to her. When Emma was eight years old she had gone into a 
store to buy some sweets and was molested by a grinning shop-keeper who had grabbed 
her genitals through her clothes. Freud refers to this earlier event as “Scene II.” Emma 
admits that she had gone back into the store a second time and that she feels reproachful 
towards herself as a child—it was as if “she had wanted in that way to provoke the 
assault. In fact, a state of ‘oppressive bad conscience’ is to be traced back to this 
experience” (ibid., 354).97  
                                                 
97 The inverted commas around “oppressive bad conscience” suggests that this is Emma’s description of her 
mental state rather than Freud’s.  
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Although Emma denied having in mind the memory of Scene II at the time of 
Scene I, there are associative links between the incidents that, when compounded, explain 
her traumatic symptoms. There is a link between the laughter of the two shop-assistants in 
Scene I and the grin of the man who molested her in Scene II. Another association 
between the incidents is that Emma had on both occasions been in a shop alone. 
Furthermore, clothes are a recurrent feature in both scenes: in Scene I, Emma had thought 
that the two shop-assistants were laughing at her clothing and in Scene II, the shop-keeper 
had grabbed her genitals through her clothes. Freud explains that the element of clothing 
was the only thing that had entered Emma’s consciousness at the time of Scene II. Given 
this, Emma had arrived at what Freud regards as a false observation concerning the 
laughter of the shop-assistants being directed at her clothing (ibid., 355). 
Having identified the associative links between the two events described by 
Emma, Freud highlights a fundamental difference between them. Emma had not yet 
reached puberty in Scene II and lacked the discourse of sexuality to make sense of the 
occurrence. Scene I, on the other hand, had taken place after Emma had gone through 
puberty and had acquired the relevant “physiological powers and understandings” to 
process the event that occurred earlier (Fletcher 2013, 73). Freud explains:  
Here we have the case of a memory arousing an affect which it did not arouse as an experience, 
because in the meantime the change [brought about] in puberty had made possible a different 
understanding of what was remembered.  
Now this case is typical of repression in hysteria. We invariably find that a memory is 
repressed which has only become a trauma by deferred action [Nachträglichkeit]. The cause of 
this is the retardation of puberty as compared with the rest of the individual’s development 
([1895] 1950, 356, emphasis in original).98 
                                                 
98 Having explained the psychical formation of hysteria in the case of Emma, Freud goes on to generalise 
his observations, arguing that “[e]very adolescent individual has memory-traces which can only be 
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Freud calls the impression that Scene II left on Emma’s psyche a “memory,” but this 
impression cannot be thought of as a memory in the proper sense of the term. Scene II 
could not have formed a memory because it was not psychically processed until the time 
of Scene I. This aside, Freud argues that the “memory” of Scene II was belatedly awoken 
at the time of Scene I, giving rise to an affect that Emma could not experience when she 
was molested. The reactivated “memory” of Scene II released a sexual excitation which 
Emma directed at the shop-assistant she found sexually pleasing. Having for the first time 
remembered what had occurred in Scene II, Emma fled from the store in a state of fright. 
Emma’s extreme reaction to Scene I was therefore a deferred response to Scene II. What 
is more, it was not until Scene I that the “memory” of Scene II was repressed into 
Emma’s unconscious because, prior to Scene I, Emma was unable to cognitively process 
Scene II. 
 The case of Emma aptly demonstrates the peculiar temporal structure of 
Nachträglichkeit evinced in Freud’s work on hysteria. Here, an event that occurred at an 
“earlier” moment in time was reactivated at a “later” moment in time. Meanwhile, the 
event that occurred “later” retroactively modified the event that occurred “earlier.” The 
trauma cannot be situated in either event alone: it was not until the “later” scene that the 
impact of the “earlier” scene became apparent, with the “earlier” scene taking on new 
meaning through the advent of puberty, which “made possible a different understanding 
of what was remembered” (ibid.). I have placed the terms “earlier” and “later” in inverted 
commas because the structure of Nachträglichkeit problematises chronological 
                                                 
understood with the emergence of sexual feelings of his [sic] own; and accordingly every adolescent must 
carry the germ of hysteria within him” (ibid., 356). He argues that the difference between people who 
actually suffer from hysteria and those who do not is that the former “have become prematurely sexually 
excitable” (ibid., emphasis in original). This is a peculiar thing to claim, because moments earlier Freud had 
argued that the sexual release felt by Emma in Scene I was a deferred response to Scene II (Fletcher 2013, 
72).  
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temporalisation—indeed, the event that historically occurred earlier was not psychically 
registered until the event that historically occurred later. It is interesting to note that Freud 
himself does not number the scenes chronologically, but in the order that these scenes 
occurred to Emma in her treatment. Neither scene is traumatic in and of itself; trauma 
arises through a dialogic exchange between (at least)99 two scenes, in which the past 
assumes a belated impact on the present and the present retroactively interprets the past.   
Nachträglichkeit gives rise to two seemingly contradictory models of time: one 
that is progressive and one that is retroactive. Where the progressive version abides by a 
forward temporality preceding from the past to the future, the retroactive model 
encompasses a backwards temporal movement from the future to the past. Interpreters of 
Freud have struggled to reconcile the bidirectional trajectories of Nachträglichkeit. This is 
exacerbated by the fact that there is no word in English that captures both meanings of the 
term. There is a tendency of Freud’s translators to privilege either the progressive or 
retroactive version of the term at the expense of the other. Where translations such as 
“deferred action” privilege the former, “retrospective modification” and “retroactive 
attribution” insist on the latter (House and Slotnick 2015, 685).  
In the Standard Edition, James Strachey draws on the progressive interpretation, 
translating the adjective/adverb, nachträglich, to “deferred,” “subsequently,” “in arrears,” 
“later,” et cetera, and the noun, Nachträglichkeit, to “deferred action” (House and 
Slotnick 2015, 685; Laplanche 2005, 267; Thomä and Cheshire 1991, 407). This 
translation neglects the hermeneutic connotations of the term (accompanying the 
retroactive interpretation) and gives rise to determinism (Fletcher 2013, 71; House and 
Slotnick 2015, 685; Laplanche 2005, 265-6). Deferred action implies a forward linear 
                                                 
99 Freud situates Emma’s trauma as occurring across two moments in time, but more scenes can be 
introduced into the equation. There is also the scene in which Emma had returned to the store after she had 
been molested by the shop-keeper as well as the scene in which she receives treatment from Freud. 
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movement in which the past determines that which follows. This is illustrated through the 
analogy of the time-bomb: the assemblage of the bomb at an earlier moment in time is the 
cause of the bomb’s explosion at a later moment in time (Laplanche 2005, 265). 
However, relying on a purely retroactive interpretation of Nachträglichkeit also gives rise 
to determinism, only one that proceeds in the opposite direction. The retroactive position 
reverses the arrow of time and no longer moves from the past to the future, but from the 
future to the past (House and Slotnick 2015, 686). In this context, the past event is 
determined by its retroactive construction from a future perspective.  
These oversimplified versions of Nachträglichkeit reduce trauma to either a 
factual event of the past or to an internal construct of the present, with one of these 
extremes automatically foreclosing the possibility of the other. The former reading posits 
trauma in a factual, dateable event—an event that exists independently of any 
interpretative effort. Here, it is assumed that an objective, external reality is awaiting its 
belated discovery, as though uncovering this past will both explain and cure the intrusive 
traumatic symptoms of which it is the supposed cause. This inevitably leads in the 
direction of naïve realism and historical positivism (Laplanche 2005, 42). On the other 
hand, the retroactive interpretation posits the past as both inaccessible and irrelevant, with 
the past being perceived as an internal construct of the present. This leads to a relativistic 
dismissal of the external factuality of the past event. The progressive and retroactive 
interpretations of Nachträglichkeit are symptomatic of a false dichotomy which overlooks 
the fact that this term necessarily implicates both the external and the internal, the past 
and the present.  
However, the problem remains as to how the conflict between the progressive and 
retroactive interpretations of Nachträglichkeit can be overcome. To move beyond the 
mutual exclusivity between the external event and the internal moment of construction, I 
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will move on to consider Laplanche’s reformulation of the Freudian Nachträglichkeit. As 
mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, Laplanche translates Nachträglichkeit to 
après-coup in French and “afterwardsness” in English. When discussing Laplanche’s 
theory, I will here on in make use of his English neologism, afterwardsness, unless 
otherwise made obvious. 
Laplanche’s Afterwardsness: Situating Trauma in Both the External Event of the Past and 
its Internal Reconstruction from the Present  
In illuminating the dual structure of afterwardsness, Laplanche turns to a famous anecdote 
provided by Freud in his Interpretation of Dreams: 
A young man who was a great admirer of feminine beauty was talking once—so the story 
went—of the good-looking wet-nurse who had suckled him when he was a baby: ‘I’m sorry,’ 
he remarked, ‘that I didn’t make better use of my opportunity.’ I was in the habit of quoting 
this anecdote to explain the factor of deferred action [Nachträglichkeit] in the mechanism of 
the psychoneuroses (cited in Laplanche 2005, 268). 
Laplanche begins by drawing attention to the progressive and retroactive temporalities of 
afterwardsness at play in this anecdote. On the one hand, the infant’s encounter with the 
wet-nurse can be interpreted as abiding by a progressive temporal movement from the 
past to the present, in which the infant’s sexuality is later reawakened in the sexuality of 
the adult via deferred action (Laplanche 2005, 106). On the other hand, the anecdote 
provided by Freud can be read as illustrating a retroactive temporal trajectory from the 
present to the past, in which “the adult man, who sees the child at the wet-nurse’s breast 
retrospectively imagines all that he could have drawn erotically from that situation if only 
he had known” (ibid., 268).  
 Laplanche argues that although Freud’s anecdote exhibits the dual temporalities of 
afterwardsness, Freud himself does not reconcile the conflict between the progressive and 
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retroactive meanings of the term. Laplanche identifies an oversight in Freud’s 
commentary: he “only takes into account the two interlocutors equally centred on the 
subject: that is, the infantile subject, and the adult subject; the one sucks the breast, the 
other experiences erotic pleasure” (ibid.). Freud’s remarks reduce the wet-nurse to a 
breast—“an object for the infant”—whilst failing to perceive the breast as an erogenous 
zone of the woman (ibid., 269, emphasis in original). In overcoming the mutual 
exclusivity between progression and retroaction, Laplanche introduces a third figure into 
the equation—namely, the wet-nurse and the unconscious message she passes on to the 
infant (ibid.). In considering the message of the wet-nurse, Laplanche argues that it “is no 
longer possible to consider afterwardsness as a combination of two opposed terms” 
(ibid.). He explains that 
right at the start, there is something that goes in the direction of the past to the future, from the 
other to the individual in question, that is in the direction from the adult to the baby, which I 
call the implantation of the enigmatic message. This message is then retranslated, following a 
temporal direction which is, in an alternating fashion, by turns retrogressive and progressive 
(ibid.).  
In Laplanche’s formulation, the first instance of afterwardsness marks the implantation of 
the enigmatic message in the undeveloped psyche of the infant. The initial depositing of 
the message abides by a progressive temporal movement from the past to the future. 
However, the infant is ill-equipped to decipher the message at the time that it is received. 
This gives rise to a second instance, in which the infant belatedly attempts to translate the 
message. This later moment adheres to a retroactive temporal trajectory from the present 
to the past. 
 Laplanche sees the structure of afterwardsness as being constitutive of the case of 
Emma. Where the scene in which Emma was molested by the shop-keeper indicates the 
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moment at which an alien message was deposited in her underdeveloped psyche (her 
psyche was underdeveloped because she lacked the ideas necessary to make sense of 
being sexually abused), the scene in which she was confronted with the laughing shop-
assistants signifies the moment of translation. Unlike Freud, Laplanche numbers the 
scenes chronologically. The first scene has sexual content, but Emma is unable to 
apprehend this content; there is “sexual content in the explicit behavior of the adult 
protagonist […] it is a sexual content, as it were, in itself and not for the subject’ ([1970] 
1985, 40, emphasis in original). On the contrary, the second scene occurs at a time when 
Emma had the capacity to understand what a sexual assault is despite the fact that she was 
not sexually assaulted in this scene (ibid.). Laplanche explains that during the interval 
between the first and second scene, the “memory” of the earlier scene exists in neither a 
conscious nor an unconscious repressed state (ibid., 42). The unprocessed fragment of the 
first scene does not reside in consciousness because it was not registered as an experience 
at the time it occurred; nor can it reside in Emma’s unconscious for it was not repressed 
until the later scene. Laplanche suggests that during the interval between the two scenes, 
the uncognitised trace of the earlier scene was “waiting in a kind of limbo, in a corner of 
the ‘preconscious’; the crucial point is that it is not linked to the rest of psychical life” 
(ibid.). At the time of the second scene, the unbound residue of the first scene attacked 
Emma’s psyche from within, acting as “a veritable ‘internal alien entity’” (ibid.). 
In accordance with the complex structure of afterwardsness, Laplanche 
emphasises the necessary relation between the two scenes in the production of Emma’s 
trauma. Scene II was not traumatic; it produced “neither excitation or reaction, nor 
symbolization or psychical elaboration” (ibid.). But if Scene II was not traumatic, Scene I 
was even less so; it was a non-sexual, everyday event (ibid.). Nonetheless, the second 
scene released the unprocessed trace of the first scene and, along with it, the excitation 
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which had not been realised in the former scene. The decisive point is that it is impossible 
to ground the traumatic event in a precise moment: “in situating the trauma, one cannot 
appreciate its traumatic impact, and vice versa” (ibid., 41, emphasis in original). Neither 
scene is traumatic in and of itself—it is only when the scenes are taken together that the 
trauma emerges. Laplanche thus situates the trauma “in the play of ‘deceit’ producing a 
kind of seesaw effect between the two events” (ibid.).  
Laplanche’s commentary on afterwardsness exceeds the case of Emma and his 
discussion of the infant-wet-nurse encounter and assumes a generalisable significance. 
Afterwardsness is a key component of Laplanche’s most important contribution to 
psychoanalysis—that is, his general theory of seduction. Through a revitalisation of 
Freud’s abandoned seduction theory,100 Laplanche conceptualises afterwardsness as the 
originary structure of subjectivity. In the next section of this chapter, I will briefly 
recapitulate Freud’s turn away from the external reality of seduction101 before unpacking 
Laplanche’s general theory of seduction. In the following section, I consider the shift 
from Freud’s views on seduction to Laplanche’s general theory of seduction in terms of a 
movement from the notion of historical to originary trauma.  
Laplanche’s General Theory of Seduction 
As was seen in the case study of Emma, the concept of Nachträglichkeit makes its first 
appearance in Freud’s work on the pathological formation of hysteria accompanying 
childhood sexual abuse. Indeed, many of Freud’s patients recalled “experiences of sexual 
seduction—lived scenes in which the initiative was taken by the other person, who was 
most often an adult” (Laplanche and Pontalis [1973] 1988, 404). However, Freud’s theory 
                                                 
100 Although Freud abandons his theory of seduction, the concept of Nachträglichkeit still appears across his 
writings, most notably in his study of the “wolf man” in From the History of an Infantile Neurosis ([1918] 
1955) and in his later work, Moses and Monotheism (1939). 
101 Freud’s abandonment of the seduction theory was also discussed in Chapters One and Six of this thesis. 
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of seduction reached an impasse, for he had no way of discerning whether the scenes 
reported to him by his patients had actually occurred or if they were constructs of 
fantasised scenes of seduction. Freud attempted to trace the original scene of seduction 
further and further back into his patients’ childhoods (ibid.). Unable to locate the precise 
origins of trauma in a factual event having occurred in the past, Freud shifted his focus to 
the internal vicissitudes of fantasy and unconscious wish. This shift marks the point at 
which Freud abandoned his seduction theory and ventured into the hitherto uncharted 
territory of psychoanalysis. 
 However, Laplanche objects that when Freud renounced his seduction theory, he 
himself “misunderstood his own […] theory as being only about external causality” 
(2005, 104). Freud had “never simply understood seduction as simply outside, but as a 
relation between an external cause, and something like an internal cause” (ibid.). From its 
inception, Freud’s seduction theory 
explained that trauma, in order to be psychic trauma, never comes simply from outside. That is, 
even in the first moment it must be internalized, and then afterwards relived, revivified, in 
order to become an internal trauma. That’s the meaning of his theory that trauma occurs in two 
moments: the trauma, in order to be psychic trauma, doesn’t occur in just one moment. First, 
there is the implantation of something coming from the outside. And this experience, or the 
memory of it, must be reinvested in a second moment, and then it becomes traumatic. It is not 
the first act which is traumatic, it is the internal reviviscence of this memory that becomes 
traumatic (Laplanche 2014, 26, emphasis in original).  
Laplanche contends that Freud’s seduction theory was never based on a simple cause-
and-effect relationship between an external event and the internal emergence of 
symptoms. This was shown in the case of Emma, in which the traumatic reality behind 
her phobia could not be posited in one specific event but, rather, in the interplay between 
two interrelated events. Laplanche draws on Freud and Breuer’s early assertion that 
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“hysterics suffer from reminiscences” as further evidence that Freud’s seduction theory 
did not locate the origin of trauma in an external reality ([1970] 1985, 43). It is the 
internal reminiscence—that is, the memory of an event—which functions as traumatic 
rather than the external event itself. However, this reminiscence cannot be reduced to a 
fantasmatic construct because it was at one stage deposited in the psyche from an external 
source. The structure of Nachträglichkeit is such that the trauma cannot be posited in 
either an external event or in its internal construction. Instead, trauma arises from a 
complex dialectic between these extremes. 
 In his reformulation of the seduction theory, Laplanche takes his cue from the 
perceived shortcomings of Freud’s theory. As well as synthesising the bidirectional 
temporalities of Nachträglichkeit, Laplanche shifts his focus away from the pathology of 
hysteria stemming from a factual historical event to the originary formation of 
subjectivity. What is at stake in the primal scene of seduction—which forms the basis of 
Laplanche’s general seduction theory—are the origins of a subject equipped with a 
conscious and an unconscious (Laplanche and Pontalis [1973] 1988, 332). This shift from 
the historical to the originary is crucial to both this chapter and this thesis in general. But 
before I evaluate this, I will examine Laplanche’s general theory of seduction.  
Laplanche posits the primal scene as the originary encounter between an infant 
(who is the soon-to-be subject) and an adult (who assumes the role of the other). When 
Laplanche speaks of the other, he does not do so in the Lacanian sense of the big Other, 
which I discussed in Chapter Six of this thesis. Instead, Laplanche is referring to the 
concrete other (that is, the adult) who comes into contact with the infant (2005, 215). 
Indeed, Laplanche argues that it is essential to consider “the external person, that is, the 
stranger, and the strangeness of the other” (ibid.). In accordance with the dual structure of 
afterwardsness, Laplanche’s theory of seduction specifies two scenes which consist of the 
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depositing of an enigmatic message in the undeveloped psyche of the infant and the 
infant’s belated attempt to translate this message. “The primal situation,” Laplanche 
explains, “is one in which a new-born child, an infant in the etymological sense of the 
word (in-fans: speechless), is confronted with the adult world” (1989, 90, emphasis in 
original). The infant enters the adult world in a state of complete vulnerability, totally 
dependent on the care of the other for its survival. The infant is thrown into a reality that 
is pregnant with signification while she herself has not yet developed the ability to make 
sense of it. The infant is at odds with the world that she is born into; as well as lacking 
language, the infant lacks the adult’s unconscious discourse of sexuality.  
 In the primal scene of seduction, the infant is invaded with the enigmatic 
messages of the other (2002, 108). The messages of the other are not enigmatic because 
they are “mysterious, hard to get at, or inexplicable” (1999, 11); they are enigmatic 
because they derive from the adult’s unconscious. These messages are just as enigmatic to 
the receiver (namely, the infant) as they are to the sender (that is, the adult) (ibid.). 
Laplanche formulates the enigmatic message through his theory of the “enigmatic 
signifier,” where he distinguishes between a “signifier of” and a “signifier to” (1989, 
44).102 A “signifier of” is a signifier of a signified, and a “signifier to” is a signifier that is 
addressed to someone without that someone knowing what is being signified—“[w]e 
know that it signifies, but not what it signifies” (ibid., 44-5, emphasis in original). The 
enigmatic messages are signifiers proffered to the infant, but the infant—and the adult for 
that matter—are unaware of what is being signified. The initial depositing of the message 
constitutes the first phase of the seduction; however, Laplanche’s model of 
afterwardsness necessitates an interplay between two scenes. As I will go on to show, the 
                                                 
102 Laplanche borrows this distinction from Lacan. Refer back to Chapter Six of this thesis, where I discuss 
Lacan’s notion of the signifier, which he adapted from Saussurean linguistics. 
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second scene comes about through the infant’s belated attempt to translate the enigmatic 
messages.  
 Laplanche introduces the notion of translation103 to describe the process through 
which the infant deciphers the messages of the other. He argues that translation gives rise 
to the infant’s emergence as a subject equipped with a conscious and an unconscious. The 
subject’s conscious is constituted through their successful attempts at translation, while 
the excess that cannot be translated is repressed into the depths of the unconscious. As 
Fletcher notes, translation “always leaves something untranslated; there is always a 
remainder, which Laplanche calls the á traduire, the yet-to-be-translated” (2005, 16). 
Laplanche explains that “only one side of […] translation is clarity, elucidation and 
mastery; it also has a negative side, for translation is always at the same time a failure of 
translation—that is, repression, the constitution of the unconscious from what translation 
deposits as waste” (1996, 11). The failure to fully translate the enigmatic messages of the 
other, and the subsequent repression of the untranslatable excess, indicates the moment at 
which the unconscious comes into being. In other words, the failure of translation is 
accompanied by primal—also referred to as primary and originary—repression.104 Primal 
repression is a key factor in the formation of the unconscious. Fletcher explains that 
primal repression is “the active production of a remainder that constitutes the unconscious 
                                                 
103 Although translation is a linguistic metaphor, Laplanche uses the term to designate both verbal linguistic 
translation and the translation of non-verbal signs and gestures encompassed in the general semiological 
system (1996, 10). He favours the notion of translation over the hermeneutic notion of interpretation 
because the latter implies that it is a factual situation that is being interpreted. Rejecting the activity of 
interpretation set out in hermeneutics, Laplanche argues that the “past cannot be a purely factual one, an 
unprocessed or raw ‘given’” (2005, 269). “In the first place,” he explains, “we always set out from a 
meaning which is expressed, expressed to someone else—from a message” (1996, 10). It is impossible to 
reduce translation to a purely hermeneutic process—“that is to say, that everyone interprets their past 
according to their present—because the past already has something deposited in it that demands to be 
deciphered, which is the message of the other person” (2005, 269).  
104 Laplanche believes that primal repression is a more suitable translation than primary repression. He and 
Pontalis explain: “It would seem preferable to translate ‘Urverdrangung’ by ‘primal repression’ rather than 
by the frequently used alternative of ‘primary repression’; the prefix Ur- is invariably rendered by ‘primal’ 
in the cases of Urphantasie (primal phantasy) and Urszene (primal scene)” ([1973] 1988, 333).  
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as a separate mental system; the depositing of a residue or fallout from a translation 
process that is also a work of self-translation or primary self-representation” (2005, 16-7).  
 Having unpacked Laplanche’s general theory of seduction, the next section of this 
chapter goes on to examine the shift in his work from historical to originary trauma. As I 
have shown, what is at stake for Laplanche is not the issue of childhood sexual abuse but, 
rather, the most ordinary of adult-infant encounters which he sees as facilitating the 
infant’s formation as a subject. Laplanche, however, can be criticised for “building a 
structurally inescapable perversity into the adult-child relationship” (Fletcher 2005, 12). 
His conceptual gesture can moreover be accused of conflating historical and originary 
trauma, thereby obfuscating the difference between those who have and have not 
experienced the painful reality of childhood sexual abuse.  
Between the Historical and the Originary 
In Writing History, Writing Trauma ([2001] 2014), LaCapra delineates the bounds 
separating “historical” from “originary” (the latter of which he also refers to as 
“structural” and “transhistorical”) trauma (83). He describes historical trauma as a 
historically specific event such as the Holocaust, the Apartheid, the dropping of the 
atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and childhood sexual abuse (to name only a 
few). Originary trauma, on the other hand, marks the traumatic origins of subjectivity, 
which cannot “be reduced to a dated historical event or derived from one; it’s status is 
more like that of a condition of possibility of historicity” (ibid., 84). Originary trauma 
assumes itself in various guises, including “the separation of the (m)other, the passage 
from nature to culture, the eruption of the […] pre-symbolic in the symbolic, the entry 
into language, the encounter with the ‘real’” (ibid., 77). While historical trauma can be 
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located at a specific time and place, originary trauma is unlocatable as it designates the 
process through which humans emerge as subjects.105  
The categories of historical and originary trauma correspond to a further 
distinction that LaCapra introduces between absence and loss. Historical trauma involves 
tangible losses, such as those brought about the death of loved ones and the collective 
losses associated with the Holocaust (ibid., 49). Originary trauma involves absence, most 
notably the absence of origins or foundations. Rather than losing something that was once 
possessed (as is the case with historical trauma), originary trauma pertains to a 
preontological or structural absence. The most notable difference between the losses 
associated with historical trauma and the absence indicative of originary trauma is that 
only a select few can legitimately claim to have experienced the former, whereas 
everyone is subject to the latter in virtue of simply being a subject (ibid., 78-9). In light of 
these distinctions, LaCapra criticises the tendency of “more theoretically inclined 
analysts” to conflate historical and originary trauma. He argues that this conceptual 
gesture facilitates “the appropriation of particular traumas by those who did not 
experience them” (ibid., 65)106 and reduces “the significance or force of particular 
historical losses” (ibid., 64).  
Whilst acknowledging the importance of LaCapra’s contributions to trauma 
theory, I argue that trauma—whether it is regarded as historical or originary—cannot be 
                                                 
105 It is important to note that LaCapra insists that historical and originary trauma should not be construed as 
binary opposites. Historical traumas, for instance, can be “transformed or transvalued” into originary 
trauma (ibid., xii): the Holocaust is a “legitimating myth of origins” for the state of Israel, and 9/11 is a 
founding trauma on which American identity is forged (ibid.). LaCapra elaborates that after 9/11 
To be a good American […] you were in a sense obliged to have been traumatized by 9/11 and 
to bear the signs of its post-traumatic effects, including support for the war on terror, which 
could involve violent actions such as war even in the absence or doubtful nature of evidence 
that might lend support to it (notably, the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq) 
(ibid., xiii). 
106 For a more detailed discussion of the tendency of trauma theorists to conflate the subject positions of direct 
victims of trauma and those who are living in the aftermath of trauma, refer to Chapter Three of this thesis.  
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reduced to a factual or dateable event to have occurred in an individual or collective’s 
past. Indeed, the notion of Nachträglichkeit radically calls into question the idea that 
historical trauma can be grounded in a specific historical event as LaCapra claims. The 
complex temporality of Nachträglichkeit is such that trauma necessitates a relation 
between at least two scenes, neither of which are traumatic in and of themselves. The first 
instance of trauma cannot be experienced at the time it occurs; it is only in relation to a 
subsequent event that the first event assumes a traumatic quality. As was shown in my 
earlier discussion of Laplanche, it is impossible to ground a traumatic event in one precise 
moment. Instead, trauma is characteristically split across at least two scenes. It is 
important to note that LaCapra himself recognises that “[t]he belated temporality of 
trauma and the elusive shattering experience related to it render the distinction between 
structural and historical trauma problematic” (ibid., 82). Despite this, he argues that 
historical trauma—as per its name—can be historically situated.                                                           
Although LaCapra does not explicitly accuse Laplanche of conflating historical 
and originary trauma,107  it is easy to see that the former’s critique is applicable to the 
latter’s theoretical insights. As already noted, Laplanche’s general theory of seduction 
mobilises Freud’s remarks on the historical reality of seduction to posit seduction as the 
originary structure of subjectivity. This section continues by further examining 
Laplanche’s shift from the historical to the originary. Following this, I will problematise 
the view that trauma can be reduced to a single time, place, and event, thus calling into 
question the bounds separating the seemingly distinct categories of historical and 
originary trauma. 
                                                 
107 LaCapra levels this critique at a myriad of theorists who I have utilised over the course of this thesis, 
including Caruth, Agamben, Lacan, and Žižek. He also sees Lyotard as being guilty of this gesture. 
Lyotard’s insights will be examined towards the end of this chapter and across the next chapter of this 
thesis.  
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In explaining his shift from the historical reality of seduction to the notion of an 
originary seduction, Laplanche argues that it is in seduction “alone that we find that 
complex and endlessly repeated interplay—midst a temporal succession of missed 
occasions of ‘too early’ and ‘too late’” ([1970] 1985, 43). That which occurs “too early” 
is the infant’s encounter with the adult world—“sexuality comes too early as an 
interhuman relation; it comes from without, imported from the world of adults” (ibid., 43-
4). Conversely, the mutational stages of sexuality come “too late” and, along with them, 
the “‘affective’ and ‘ideational’ counterparts sufficient to allow [… the infant] to 
assimilate the sexual scene and to ‘understand’ it” (ibid., 43). Laplanche’s notion of 
sexuality exceeds the kinds of pleasure usually associated with genital functioning and, as 
he and Pontalis explain, “embraces a whole range of excitations and activities which may 
be observed from infancy onwards” ([1973] 1988, 418). The dialectic between the “too 
early” and the “too late” so central to Laplanche’s reworking of Freud is precisely the 
temporality of afterwardsness. 
Having identified the structure of afterwardsness as an integral feature of 
seduction, Laplanche proposes a shift from historical to originary trauma. He recognises a 
broader explanatory power in Freud’s seduction theory than the pathological formation of 
hysteria following childhood sexual abuse. He asks: “might not the value of the 
explanation extend beyond the factual problem posed by the circumstantial reality of 
seduction?” (ibid., 44, emphasis in original). In formulating his general theory of 
seduction, Laplanche moves beyond the “contingency and transiency” (ibid.) of an 
“actual” event of seduction to consider “the intrusion into the universe of the child of 
certain meanings of the adult world which is conveyed by the most ordinary and innocent 
of acts” (ibid.). He hereby proposes that seduction “should be reinterpreted, not as an 
event, or as a datable lived trauma, but as a factor which is both more diffuse and more 
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structural, a more primal factor as well in the sense that it is so linked to the process of 
humanization” (ibid., 47). 
Laplanche’s shift from historical to originary seduction marks a transition from 
historical to originary trauma. In view of this shift, I now go on to reconsider LaCapra’s 
distinction between these terms. While this entails an defence of Laplanche, the actual 
aim of what follows is to further conceptualise the notion of trauma that I have been 
developing throughout this thesis and to address the major aim of this thesis of 
problematising the distinction between the historical and the originary. As previously 
mentioned, LaCapra situates historical trauma in a specific historical event and argues 
that, unlike its historical counterpart, originary trauma cannot be historically situated 
because it is the founding possibility of historicity. While I tentatively agree with 
LaCapra’s characterisation of originary trauma, I do not subscribe to his view that 
historical trauma can be located at a specific time and place. In agreement with Griselda 
Pollock, I contend that the distinction between historical and originary trauma is 
necessary but unsustainable (2009, 43). 
A major issue with the notion of historical trauma is that it grounds trauma in a 
factual, dateable event. This reduces trauma to a single determining origin, thus lending 
itself to the progressive notion of temporality that I have been problematising across this 
chapter. Under this cause-and-effect model, the traumatic event of the past is perceived as 
determining the belated onset of symptoms in the present. The dual temporality of 
afterwardsness, however, radically undermines the idea that trauma can be situated in a 
single time, place, or event. The logic of afterwardsness reveals that it is not the historical 
event itself that makes trauma traumatic but, rather, the dialectic between the external 
event of the past and its internal reconstruction in the present. As was seen in the case of 
Emma, the event that historically took place earlier (the one in which she was molested 
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by the shop-keeper) was not experienced as traumatic at the time it occurred; it was not 
until the event that historically took place later (the one in which she was confronted with 
the laughing shop-assistants) that Emma was able to cognitise the trauma for the first time 
before subsequently repressing it. If it were not for this “later” event—which can by no 
means be considered traumatic in its own right—Emma might not have remembered what 
happened to her as a younger child and might very well have not been traumatised at all. 
This alone casts a shadow of doubt on the idea that trauma can be grounded in a 
historically specific event. Yet it is not the only issue that arises in attempting to draw a 
definitive line between historical and originary trauma.  
 The main point of difference between originary and historical trauma is that the 
former is a myth of origins that harps back to an impossible time “before” the subject, 
whereas the latter occurs “after” the subject has emerged into subjectivity.108 But the 
substantive difference between these categories is thwarted by the fact that neither 
historical nor originary trauma can be witnessed by the subject at the time they unfold. 
Originary trauma precedes the subject; it occurs in a “time” before there was a subject to 
bear witness to it. Likewise, historical trauma exceeds the subject, undoing the subject’s 
sense of themselves as a stable and coherent “I.” The decisive point is that both historical 
and originary trauma preclude the subject’s capacity to bear witness to the original 
                                                 
108 It is interesting to note that the structure of afterwardsness can itself be read as implicating historical and 
originary trauma insofar as it is the originary traumatic event which gives rise to the subject’s capacity to be 
retraumatised through subsequent instances of historical trauma. In an interview with Caruth, Laplanche 
himself acknowledges that “in every subsequent trauma there is always a relation between the specific 
event, whether it’s a real seduction or a car accident or whatever, and the originary founding” of 
subjectivity (Caruth 2002, 109). If it were not for the originary traumatic event, the subject would not be 
equipped to experience historical trauma as traumatic. In “Art/Trauma/Representation,” Griselda Pollock 
similarly argues that “[t]he historical traumatic event becomes traumatizing in part because it inherent the 
hitherto virtual character of structural trauma (sealed in primal repression) within the formation of a 
subjectivity who cannot know what was always awaiting this belated activation” (2009, 44-5). Where 
originary trauma can be understood as signifying the first moment of afterwardsness, historical trauma can 
be considered as the second moment, in which the first moment is belatedly activated and retroactively 
reconstructed. 
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traumatic event. Given this, it becomes increasingly difficult to ground trauma in a factual 
historical event. 
 Whether trauma is conceived as historical or originary, the precipitating event of 
trauma occurs “too early” for the subject to make sense of it and it is not until it is “too 
late” that it is for the first time grasped—if only partially. Trauma is at odds with 
historical temporalisation and chronologisation in that it is not until a later event that the 
earlier event is posited. Given this, I contend that the “original” event of trauma is not 
original in and of itself; it is through another event, a second one, that the first event gains 
its original status. Conceived through the lens of afterwardsness, trauma spills across a 
precipitating traumatic event that exceeds or precedes the subject’s capacity to bear 
witness to it and a subsequent event in which the precipitating event is reconstructed. 
However, the notions of a “precipitating” and a “subsequent” event are inaccurate, 
because it is not until the subsequent event that the precipitating event is characterised as 
such. Indeed, it is the subsequent event which paradoxically functions as the precipitating 
event in that it prescribes the precipitating event its precipitative power.   
 The notion of an event that cannot be historically witnessed at the time it unfolds 
is the precise meaning of Felman and Laub’s aetiology of trauma as an event without a 
witness (a formulation which I considered at some length in Chapter Four of this thesis). 
Trauma annihilates the subject’s capacity to cognitise the event on its arrival, which 
means that this event cannot be recorded in perception of memory (Laub 1992, 81). In 
Laub’s idiom, trauma is a historical gap—it is only after its occurrence that the traumatic 
event “begins to be historically grasped and seen” (ibid.). What makes trauma traumatic is 
that it cannot be witnessed as it historically occurs. Instead of characterising trauma as an 
event that occurs within history (as is the case with the notion of historical trauma), it is 
more accurate to describe trauma as an event that interrupts the possibility of 
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experiencing an event historically. As well as problematising the category of historical 
trauma, this insight supports the notion of trauma as an unpresentable occurrence—but 
more will be said on this in the next two sections of this chapter.  
In the trauma theory of Felman and Laub, the performative act of witnessing is 
characterised as the belated process through which an inaccessible traumatic past is 
retroactively experienced. This is the first time that the original traumatic event is 
properly experienced by the subject because the original event was too traumatic to 
assimilate into consciousness at the time that it struck. Where traumatised individuals 
appear destined to compulsively repeat the event that led to their illness, bearing witness 
to this event is a means of assuming an active role in a situation in which the traumatised 
being was passive. But in emphasising the creative act of witnessing, it is important to 
consider the external reality of the past without rendering it a mere construct of the 
present imposed backwards in time. On the one hand, reducing trauma to a historical 
event of the past overlooks the fact that this event was not cognitised at the time of its 
arrival. On the other hand, reducing trauma to a fantasmatic construct of the present 
disregards the reality of the external event. In accordance with the latter line of 
argumentation, any account of the traumatic past is necessarily a fabrication, which leads 
to the problematic idea that there is essentially no difference between history and myth.  
Laplanche provides a means of overcoming this dilemma. In fact, this dilemma 
resonates with the one I raised earlier in this chapter concerning the progressive and 
retroactive interpretations of Nachträglichkeit. Based on the temporality of 
afterwardsness, Laplanche’s general theory of seduction does not simply conceive the 
primal scene as occurring in a mythical time before time. Likewise, the scene of 
translation is not simply the process by which the past is constructed anew from a future 
perspective. The primal scene is a lived encounter between an infant and a concrete, adult 
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other. While the depositing of the message is itself metaphorical, the relationship between 
the infant and adult is a brute fact. Laplanche’s account is irreducible to either history or 
myth insofar as the formation of the subject is grounded in a concrete event, however 
generalisable it might be. Where Laplanche’s general theory of seduction is an account of 
the originary formation of the subject, it problematises the view that originary trauma is 
nothing but an abstract and hyperbolic myth of origins, for the primal scene refers to an 
actual encounter between an infant and an adult. Following Laplanche, I stress the 
importance of upholding both the external factuality of trauma and its internal, 
fantasmatic reconstruction without one of these extremes foreclosing the possibility of the 
other. This is why I refer to the second moment of afterwardsness as a process of 
reconstruction and not simply one of construction. The notion of construction implies that 
there is nothing there in the first place to be deciphered and that it is the internal moment 
of construction alone which constitutes the trauma. However, the notion of reconstruction 
acknowledges the fact that there was always something awaiting translation.  
Laplanche’s notion of afterwardsness remedies the tendency to privilege either the 
past at the expense of the present or the present at the expense of the past; it moves 
beyond the false dichotomy between the external event and its internal construction. In 
accordance with the logic of afterwardsness, trauma arises when an external event of past 
and an internal event of the present are taken together. Far from stemming from a single 
causal origin, trauma is determined by the interrelation between at least two events which 
can both be attributed causal significance. But while the external reality of trauma is a 
brute fact, it is a reality that cannot be retrieved by the infant because it preceded their 
emergence into subjectivity. This, however, does not negate the existence of this reality.   
In the next section of this chapter, I continue with my discussion of 
Nachträglichkeit through a reading of Lyotard. Lyotard’s insights provide the tools 
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necessary for conceiving trauma as an unpresentable event without denying the factuality 
of its occurrence. Unlike LaCapra, who objects to the tendency of theorists to 
dehistoricise trauma, Lyotard sees historical representation itself as denying the brute 
factuality of trauma for reasons which will become apparent later. Through Lyotard, the 
following section of this thesis conceptualises trauma as an unpresentable event without a 
single determining origin. This constitutes a significant contribution to the 
interdisciplinary space of trauma theory. Where there is an ongoing insistence that trauma 
need either be characterised as unrepresentable or representable, I argue that trauma is 
actually unpresentable.  
Presenting Trauma as Unpresentable: Nachträglichkeit as the Lyotardian Double Blow 
Lyotard reformulates Nachträglichkeit as a double blow, which he bases on the French 
translation of the term, après-coup (with après meaning after and coup meaning blow or 
shock) (Tomiche 1994, 53). The double blow of trauma is constitutively asymmetrical, 
consisting of a shock with affect and an affect without shock (Lyotard 1990, 16). The first 
blow is the overwhelming and unassimilable encounter with trauma. It strikes the 
psychical apparatus in a state of unpreparedness and does not make an impression on 
either the conscious or the unconscious. The initial blow, 
the first excitation, upsets the apparatus with such ‘force’ that is not registered. It is like a 
whistle that is inaudible to humans but not to dogs, or like infrared or ultraviolet light. In terms 
of a general mechanics, the force of the excitation cannot be “bound,” composed, neutralized, 
fixed in accordance with other forces “within” the apparatus, and to that extent does not give 
rise to a mise-en-scène. This force is not set to work in the machine of the mind. It is deposited 
there (ibid., 15). 
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Although the first blow bypasses conscious awareness, it gives rise to an excitation.109 
Yet this excitation is not recognised by the traumatised subject. It affects the subject, but 
the subject is unaware of having been affected; the affect does not enter, nor is it 
“introduced,” to the psyche (ibid., 12). As Lyotard puts it, it is “a shock of which the 
shocked is unaware, and which the apparatus (the mind) cannot register […] a shock by 
which it is not affected” (ibid.).  
Lyotard contrasts the affect that accompanies the first blow of trauma with the 
Freudian order of Vorstellung—that is, the order of psychical representations ([1989] 
2002, 32). Representations are associated with ideas, which are reproductions of earlier 
perceptions that have been assimilated into consciousness (Laplanche and Pontalis [1970] 
1985, 200). The imperceptible affect is radically other to representation; the affect is an 
excessive (in both quantity and intensity) force that is without any ideational 
counterpart.110 Although the affect is deposited in the psychical apparatus, it lies outside 
of representation—it cannot be “organized into sets that can be thought in terms of words 
of images” (ibid., 16). In this way, the affect is inaccessible to consciousness and cannot 
be repressed into the unconscious—but more will be said on repression later. As 
previously stated, the affect is there in the mind (Lyotard does not specify where), but it 
                                                 
109 In saying this, Lyotard disagrees with Freud that there was no release of affect at the time of Scene II. 
What is at stake in Lyotard’s commentary on Nachträglichkeit is not the question of why Emma was 
affected at the time of Scene I but was not affected at the time of Scene II but, rather, the question of 
“[w]hy, having been affected, has she forgotten that she was affected?” ([1989] 2002, 35). In response to 
this question, Lyotard asserts that “[t]o have forgotten is to say that she does not possess, through what 
follows and up to T0, any representation of scene 2” (ibid., emphasis in original). Note that Lyotard refers 
to Scene I as TI; Scene II as T2; and the analytic scene when Emma received treatment from Freud as T0. 
110 Lyotard formulates the affect through the Freudian notion of the unconscious affect. The unconscious 
affect is a paradoxical formulation, for Freud argued that the unconscious is made up of representations 
since only representations can be repressed. However, Lyotard mobilises Freud notion of the unconscious 
affect (which Lyotard terms the affect phrase) to formulate an alternative view of the unconscious as being 
non-representational. For a detailed analysis of Lyotard’s reformulation of the unconscious see Anne 
Tomiche’s “Rephrasing the Freudian Unconscious: Lyotard’s Affect-Phrase” (1994).      
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does not present itself to the subject. “The affect,” he writes, “only says one thing—that it 
is there—but is witness neither for nor of what is there” ([1989] 2002, 32).  
The first blow strikes the mind in a state of infancy and is not inscribed in 
consciousness. Since the affect cannot be psychically bound, it is without any 
recognisable effect. Lyotard thus refers to the first blow as a shock without affect (1990, 
17). This may appear contradictory given that Lyotard argues that the first blow is 
accompanied by an affect. However, in characterising the first blow as a shock without 
affect, Lyotard is referring to the fact that the subject is unaware that they have been 
affected. The first blow of trauma is a shock to the mind’s relation to a threat that cannot 
be experienced. The first blow is not inscribed in consciousness or memory, so all that 
remains of the trauma is a trace of unbound and unsynthesisable energy (Woodward 
2013, 178). Given the unpresentable status of the affect, it is not subject to representation 
or historical chronologisation—it appears as a “blank” in the subject’s lived temporal 
schema (2002, 32). 
It is not until the second blow that the affect of the first blow announces itself to 
the subject. In the second blow, the unbound affect left behind from the first blow 
“commands a flight without a ‘real’ motive” (ibid.). Here, Lyotard is drawing on the case 
of Emma, who at the time of Scene II flees the store in a state of fright when nothing 
traumatic has happened to her (ibid.). This corresponds to the dialogic structure of 
Nachträglichkeit as occurring both “too early” and “too late.” The shop-keeper’s assault 
on Emma occurs “too early” for her to make sense of it and it is not until it is “too late” 
that the affect first makes its presence felt. The feeling that accompanies Emma’s flight 
from the store testifies to the fact that something has happened to her without telling her 
what that something is: “[i]t indicates the quod but not the quid. The essence of the event: 
that there is ‘comes before’ what there is” (2000, 16, emphasis in original). The quod 
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corresponds to “that there is” and the quid designates “what there is.” These distinctions 
are crucial to Lyotard’s formulation of the event. The event corresponds to the quod 
(“that there is”). In the event, something happens, but what has happened cannot be 
apprehended until after the fact that it has happened. In other words, the event is the brute 
fact that something has happened, which, for Lyotard, necessarily occurs before what has 
happened can be specified. Prescribing a specific quality to the event covers over its 
essential unpresentability.   
Although Lyotard’s reformulation of Nachträglichkeit encompasses a first and 
second blow, he argues that it is erroneous to position these blows in a linear or 
chronological sequence. Chronological temporalisation is a kind of specification that 
eradicates the unpresentability of the event. Lyotard asserts that “[t]hese terms ‘first’ and 
‘second’ are terrible, because they put the clear mirror and the mirror on an equal footing” 
(1988b, 56). When the affect manifests itself in the second blow, it does not appear as 
though it is stemming from the first blow and assumes itself as a new feeling (Tomiche 
1994, 60). The double blow of trauma, as previously mentioned, is constitutively 
asymmetrical and is not subject to chronological temporalisation. As Lyotard explains, 
“what happened earlier is given at a later date” and “what is later in the symptom (the 
second blow) occurs ‘before’ what happened earlier (the first blow)” (1990, 16). In this 
way, the second blow paradoxically precedes the first blow. As was seen in the case of 
Emma, the scene in which she was confronted with the laughing shop-assistants (Scene I) 
is recognised by her before the earlier scene—that is, the scene in which she is molested 
by the shop-keeper (Scene II). While Scene II historically took place “before” Scene I, it 
is not until Scene I that the impact of Scene II is for the first time felt. Given this, the 
second blow arises “before” the first blow. While this is not the case in a historical sense, 
   
 
266 
 
 
trauma forecloses historical temporalisation and defies the ability to be placed in a 
succession of “befores” and “afters.”   
In accounting for the psychical whereabouts of the affect in the interval between 
the first and second blow, Lyotard (like Laplanche), interprets the Freudian 
Nachträglichkeit as occurring at the level of originary—or primary—repression. Trauma 
cannot be repressed in the ordinary sense of the term (namely, through secondary 
repression) because it does not present itself to consciousness at the time that it occurs. In 
secondary repression, something that has presented itself to consciousness is repressed 
into the unconscious. However, originary repression does not carry the same baggage as 
secondary repression. In Lyotard’s reformulation of originary repression, that which is 
repressed was never presented to consciousness to begin with. Lyotard uses the term 
“forget” synonymously with “repress” and distinguishes between two types of forgetting 
which correspond with the distinction between originary and secondary repression. Where 
the latter is “a representational, reversible forgetting,” the former is “a forgetting that 
thwarts all representation” (1990, 5). In other words, the kind of forgetting that occurs at 
the level of secondary repression designates the forgetting of something which was 
inscribed in consciousness before being subsequently forgotten. On the contrary, the type 
of forgetting that corresponds to originary repression pertains to the forgetting of 
something which was not presented to consciousness in the first place. This is why trauma 
is an unpresentable occurrence that is subject to originary repression: the initial blow of 
trauma is forgotten before there is a subject present to forget it. In other words, trauma is 
something that is always already forgotten, before forgetting.  
Understood in this way, I argue that originary repression is not only applicable to 
the originary constitution of the conscious and unconscious which accompanies the 
process of originary trauma, originary repression is applicable to trauma in general. In 
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reclaiming the language of repression in regards to the psychical impact of trauma, the 
notion of originary repression must be broadened. This can be achieved through Lyotard’s 
notion of originary repression as the forgetting of that which is forgotten “before” 
forgetting. Unlike the notion of secondary repression, originary repression does not imply 
that trauma is first registered to consciousness before being dispelled into the 
unconscious. In Lyotard’s reformulation of originary repression, repression designates the 
forgetting of that which is forgotten before there is a subject equipped with the capacity to 
forget. In accordance with one of the major aims of this thesis, I argue that repression is a 
perfectly suitable term for accounting for the cognitive processing of trauma if trauma is 
conceived as paradoxically forgotten “before” forgetting. Trauma is forgotten before 
forgetting insofar as the precipitating event of trauma is not inscribed in consciousness at 
the time that it occurs and, in this way, precedes the subject’s capacity to forget. The 
peculiar way in which trauma is forgotten before forgetting bears directly on a correlative 
aim of this thesis—that is of presenting trauma as unpresentable. 
Lyotard refers to the object of originary forgetting as the Forgotten. The Forgotten 
is “not to be remembered for what it has been and what it is, because it has not been 
anything and is nothing, but must be remembered as something that never ceases to be 
forgotten” (ibid., 3). Ashley Woodward clarifies: “[t]he Forgotten, for Lyotard, is 
something that could not be presented in the first place, and so cannot be remembered 
through a re-presentation” (2013, 178, emphasis in original). It is therefore erroneous to 
refer to trauma as either representable or unrepresentable, as both sides of the polemic in 
trauma theory suggests. Where the conflicting views regarding the un/representability of 
trauma offer incompatible perspectives as to whether or not trauma can be represented, 
both sides take for granted that trauma is in fact presented to consciousness in the first 
place. But for trauma to be considered un/representable, the trauma would have first had 
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to have been presented to consciousness. In moving beyond the polemic between the 
un/representability of trauma, I provide a corrective to the imprecise language used in 
reference to trauma and utilise the notion of unpresentability as an innovative way of 
conceptualising trauma.   
Attempts to represent trauma cover over the fact that trauma was not presented to 
consciousness in the first place. Representation, in other words, effaces the 
unpresentability of trauma. Lyotard argues that representation is a means of forgetting 
what he terms the Forgotten, since it forgets that the Forgotten occurs “before” forgetting. 
That which is forgotten “before” forgetting “was never part of any memory as such and 
which any memory, as memory, forgets in turn by representing (that is, by giving form to 
it or producing an image for it)” (Carroll 1990, xii). Although representation is ordinarily 
understood as preserving something in memory, Lyotard believes that it does the exact 
opposite (1990, 26). Only that which has been inscribed in memory can be recovered by 
finding an appropriate representation. However, that which cannot be inscribed in 
memory—that which was not presented to consciousness—cannot be represented without 
being forgotten all over again: 
[w]henever one represents, one inscribes in memory, and this might seem a good defense 
against forgetting. It is, I believe, just the opposite. Only that which has been inscribed can, in 
the current sense of the term, be forgotten, because it could be effaced. But what is not 
inscribed, through lack of inscribable surface, of duration and place for the inscription to be 
situated […] let us say, what is not material for experience because the forms and formations of 
experience […] are inapt and inept for it—cannot be forgotten, [it] does not offer a hold to 
forgetting, and remains present “only” as an affection that one cannot even qualify (ibid.).    
The political stake in Lyotard’s work is to remember that the Forgotten precedes the 
subject’s capacity to forget. This is not to be achieved through representation because 
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representation takes for granted that the trauma was in the first instance present. Again, 
this is why debates surrounding the un/representability are insufficient in accounting for 
the rupturing impact of trauma. Both sides of the polemic erroneously uphold the notion 
of representation, which overlooks the unpresentability of trauma. That which was not 
presented to consciousness cannot be considered as being either representable or 
unrepresentable. Trauma, I have argued, is neither of these extremes but is, rather, 
unpresentable.  
With this in mind, the concluding chapter of this thesis formulates a means of 
presenting the unpresentability of trauma without forgetting it anew. In so doing, I 
continue with my discussion of Lyotard and utilise his notion of the postmodern sublime 
which, I argue, is an effective tool for presenting the unpresentability of trauma. 
However, before this can be achieved, it is of course necessary to conclude the present 
chapter, which has been the culminate moment of this thesis. In this chapter, I have 
offered a series of original contributions to trauma theory. These include: the 
destabilisation of historical and originary trauma; the presentation of trauma as 
unpresentable; and the reclamation of the language of repression.  
Beyond the Historical and the Originary, the Representable and the Unpresentable 
[I]t is simply taken for granted that time and causality move from the traumatic event to the 
other criterial features [of trauma] and that the event inscribes itself on the symptoms. Because 
the traumatic event is the cause of the syndromal feelings and behaviors, it is logical to say that 
it precedes them. If this were not true, if it were acceptable for syndromal features to occur 
before the traumatic event, then the term “reexperience” would lose its accepted meaning 
(Young 1995, 115-6, emphasis in original).  
Trauma implicates both the past and the present in a circular and dialogic exchange. But 
as Young indicates in the above passage, the relationship between the past and the present 
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is often placed on a causal linear axis, in which the event of the past is posited as the 
determining factor in the belated onset of symptoms. Under this logic, the past event is 
perpetually reexperienced in the present. However, the structure of trauma is far more 
complex than this. Trauma is at odds with chronological temporality insofar as it is not 
until after the original traumatic event that the trauma first makes its presence felt. The 
initial traumatic blow does not present itself to consciousness at the time it unfolds and 
cannot be thought of as an event that was experienced in the past. The traumatic 
symptoms which manifest themselves in the present are not the reexperiencing of the past 
because the past event was not experienced to begin with. These symptoms retroactively 
attempt to experience an event that could not be experienced on its arrival.  
The peculiar temporality of trauma—whereby the past belatedly manifests itself in 
the present and the present retroactively interprets the past—abides by the structure of 
Nachträglichkeit. This concept has been utilised in this chapter to address some of the 
major aims of this thesis—namely, of destabilising the distinction between historical and 
originary trauma; of reclaiming the language of repression; and of characterising trauma 
as unpresentable. In this concluding section of Chapter Seven, I will recapitulate the 
issues that accompany the concept of Nachträglichkeit before addressing the means 
through which this term has facilitated the ability of this chapter to fulfil the crucial aims 
that this thesis set out to achieve.  
As this chapter has shown, the bidirectional structure of Nachträglichkeit 
problematises the view that trauma can be situated in either an external event of the past 
or in the internal reconstruction of the past projected backwards in time from the present. 
Irreducible to either the external or the internal, the past or the present, trauma 
necessitates a relation between both of these extremes. However, despite the reciprocal 
and dialogic structure of Nachträglichkeit, the term is often reduced to either a 
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progressive or a retroactive model of causality, which precede from either the past to the 
present or from the present to the past. These renderings of Nachträglichkeit erroneously 
posit trauma in either the external event of the past or in its internal construction from the 
present. As this chapter has demonstrated, the progressive and retroactive versions of 
Nachträglichkeit give rise to a dilemma. The progressive interpretation results in 
historical positivism, which upholds the naïve view that an objective event of the past 
awaits its belated discovery. Conversely, the retroactive interpretation leads to the cultural 
constructivist view that the past is nothing but a fantasmatic construct of the present.   
 In synthesising the bidirectional temporalities of trauma, this chapter turned to the 
work of Laplanche, whose notion of afterwardsness takes into account both the external 
event of the past and its internal reconstruction in the present. Laplanche posits the logic 
of afterwardsness at the primal scene of seduction, which he formulates under his general 
theory of seduction. In the primal scene, the enigmatic message of the adult is deposited 
in the underdeveloped psyche of the infant, who is then faced with the impossible task of 
translating this message. Where that which is successfully translated gives rise to the 
infant’s consciousness, the unassimilable excess goes on to form the unconscious. The 
structure of afterwardsness, which is constitutive of Laplanche’s general theory of 
seduction, implicates a bidirectional movement from both the past to the present and from 
the present to the past. The enigmatic message of the other that is deposited in the infant’s 
presubjectivised psyche follows a causal trajectory from the past to the present. 
Conversely, the infant’s belated attempt to translate this message abides by the movement 
from the present to the past.  
While Laplanche’s notion of afterwardsness circumvents the tendency of theorists 
to reduce Nachträglichkeit to either a progressive or retroactive model of temporality, his 
general theory of seduction runs the risk of obfuscating what LaCapra refers to as 
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historical and originary trauma. Chapter Seven drew on this issue to address a further aim 
of this thesis—that is, to problematise the distinction between historical and originary 
trauma. Where LaCapra criticises trauma theorists for conflating the historical and the 
originary, I have argued that the basis on which LaCapra distinguishes between these 
terms erroneously situates historical trauma in a factual, dateable event. This is at odds 
with the structure of afterwardsness, which reveals that trauma cuts across both the past 
and the present and is irreducible to either of these extremes alone. The notion of 
historical trauma, I have argued, succumbs to the view that the event of the past is the 
cause of the symptoms in the present, when the symptoms of the present also function as 
the cause of the past. The category of historical trauma, as per its name, posits the trauma 
in a historical event when trauma itself precludes the subject’s ability to experience an 
event historically. Given this, I have argued that it is more accurate to describe trauma as 
an interruption to history than it is to describe trauma as an event that occurs within 
history. Problematising the clear-cut distinction between the historical and the originary 
facilitates two further aims of this thesis that this chapter has addressed. Firstly, it has 
enabled me to posit trauma as an unpresentable event that precedes both specification and 
historical temporalisation. Secondly, it has allowed me to reclaim the language of 
repression in regards to the psychical impact of trauma on not only the level of originary 
trauma, but so too on the level of historical trauma. In what follows, I will address the 
first aim before moving on to the second.  
By conceptualising the unpresentability of trauma, I have shown that the polemic 
concerning the un/representability of trauma is riven with erroneous rhetoric which 
reinforces the problematic assumption that trauma is presented to consciousness. As I 
have shown, for trauma to be considered either representable or unrepresentable, it must 
have first been presented to the subject. Neither of these views offer an accurate 
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description of trauma because trauma bypasses conscious awareness at the time it occurs. 
This means that trauma is neither of these extremes but is, rather, unpresentable. In 
characterising trauma as an unpresentable event, I have offered a corrective to the 
imprecise and problematic language utilised in the polemic between the 
un/representability of trauma and have offered an innovative way of conceptualising 
trauma. Additionally, conceptualising trauma as an unpresentable occurrence has 
provided me with another way to problematise the distinction between historical and 
originary trauma which I gestured towards in the introduction of this chapter but am yet to 
return to. The categories of the historical and the originary impose on trauma specific 
qualities that efface the unpresentability of its occurrence. Just as trauma is not subject to 
chronological temporalisation—as I have shown through the notion of Nachträglichkeit—
it is problematic to impose on trauma the status of the historical or the originary. Trauma 
is a quantitative notion rather than a qualitative one. Since trauma designates the 
inassimilable impact of an event on consciousness, attributing a specific quality to this 
event neutralises its disruptive force. In Lyotard’s idiom, it forgets that the quod precedes 
the quid—“that it happens” occurs before “what has happened.” 
This leads on to the final aim that this chapter has fulfilled. If the categories of 
historical and originary trauma no longer suffice, it need not be an issue to conceive of 
trauma as an event that is repressed through originary repression. Where the notion of 
repression ordinarily carries with it the baggage of secondary repression—that is, the 
forgetting of an event that is inscribed in consciousness prior to being repressed into the 
unconscious—originary repression designates the forgetting of an event that was not 
presented in the first place. In broadening the concept of originary repression to designate 
the forgetting of an event that is forgotten “before” forgetting, repression becomes a 
perfectly appropriate term for describing the psychical impact of trauma on the psyche. 
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While this does not entail a rejection of the notion of dissociation, it does problematise 
the pervasive view in trauma theory that the concepts of repression and dissociation are 
fundamentally incompatible. Originary repression and dissociation are compatible to the 
extent that both concepts suggest that the trauma is not presented to consciousness as it 
occurs. In view of this, the final chapter of this thesis will consider how the 
unpresentability of trauma can be presented without being effaced. But before I achieve 
this, the next instalment of this thesis will begin by offering some concluding remarks on 
the immanence of traumatic rupture.  
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Final Reflections – Presenting the(re is an) Unpresentable: Trauma, the Differend, 
and the Postmodern Sublime 
As an event that bypasses conscious awareness at the time of its arrival, leaving no 
inscription in cognition or memory, the core of psychic trauma is absence. Drawing on 
the testimony of trauma survivors, Laub and Daniel Podell use the metaphors of a 
“gaping, vertiginous black hole”111 and an “empty circle”112 to signify trauma (1995, 
992). Nonetheless, as well as being marked by an absence of traces, trauma paradoxically 
assumes itself as a deferred presence. In accordance with the dual structure of 
Nachträglichkeit (which I examined at some length in the previous chapter of this thesis), 
trauma is too overwhelming to be experienced as an event that occurred in the past and 
instead manifests itself belatedly in the present.  
 In the previous chapter of this thesis, I argued that far from being either 
unrepresentable or representable, trauma is in fact unpresentable. In light of this insight, 
this final chapter goes on to consider how the unpresentability of trauma can be presented 
without immediately betraying its unpresentability. More specifically, I consider the 
                                                 
111 Nadine Fresco uses this term in reference to her interviews with the children of Holocaust survivors: 
The gaping, vertiginous black hole of the unmentionable years … The silence formed like a 
heavy pall that weighed down on everyone. Parents explained nothing, children asked nothing. 
The forbidden memory of death manifested itself only in the form of incomprehensible attacks 
of pain … The silence was all the more implacable in that it was often concealed behind words, 
again, always the same words, an unchanging story, a tale repeated over and over again, made 
up of selections from the war. 
 It was a silence that swallowed up the past, all the past, the past before death, before 
destruction. To speak up and thus to realize the grin of death, which was the grip of silence, 
seems to have represented for these parents too grave a danger for such an action to seem 
possible (cited in Laub 1992, 64). 
112 Laub and Podell note that the “empty circle” of trauma was 
coined by an analytic patient, Mrs A, the child of two Holocaust survivors, in the process of 
relating one of her dreams […]. In a shortened form, the dream runs as follows: there was an 
‘empty circle’; she knew that her position could be related to that circle. Exactly where she 
was, she did not know, but she felt her reference to it. Many things distracted her from looking 
at it” (1995, 992, emphasis in original). 
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question of how an event that was never presented to consciousness to begin with can be 
presented without forgetting its essential unpresentability. This requires an anti-
representational strategy that imparts the unpresentable locus of trauma without, on the 
one hand, positing trauma as a transcendent impossibility or, on the other hand, closing 
over the gaping wound of trauma.  
 Although this is the final chapter of this thesis, it is not quite a “conclusion” in the 
typical sense of the term. Indeed, many of the key aims of this thesis were addressed in 
Chapter Seven, which itself functioned as a preemptive conclusion. There is, however, 
one specific thesis aim that I have not yet reflected on—namely, the immanence of 
traumatic rupture. As indicated by the very title of this thesis, this insight has formed the 
basis of my research. I have left this topic open because this present chapter explores a 
means of presenting the immanence of traumatic rupture through Lyotard’s postmodern 
sublime. Before exploring the productive possibilities of the Lyotardian sublime, the first 
section of this chapter will address the immanence of traumatic rupture. Following this, I 
will move on to consider the role of art in bearing witness to trauma. Non-representational 
art, I will show, can resonate with the absence of trauma by means of negative 
presentation and is thus a privileged space for lending a voice to trauma without closing 
over the void. Following this discussion, the third section of this chapter will focus on the 
Kantian sublime to preface Lyotard’s adaptation of this concept. I will revisit the work of 
Lyotard—specifically his philosophical project centred on the postmodern condition and 
the differend—to provide the contextual details necessary for understanding his work on 
the sublime. The concluding section of this chapter will consider Lyotard’s modern and 
postmodern modalities of the sublime before arguing that the latter has significant 
potential in bearing witness to the unpresentability of trauma without effacing its essential 
unpresentability.  
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On the Immanence of Traumatic Rupture 
One of the major aims of this thesis has been to move beyond the insistence that trauma 
need either be conceived as immanent to, or transcendent of, the frameworks in which it 
occurs. Theorists who uphold the latter position situate trauma outside and beyond these 
frameworks. Conversely, the former position conceives trauma as an event that is on the 
same continuum as these frameworks. I maintain that this polemical proclivity has led to a 
conceptual impasse in trauma theory, rooted in a false dichotomy between the 
transcendent and the immanent. There is an ongoing unwillingness on both sides of the 
polemic to consider the accounts offered by their adversaries. In overcoming this short-
sightedness, this thesis has refused to uphold either of these possibilities at the expense of 
the other. In so doing, this thesis has drawn on the strengths of both accounts whilst 
moving beyond their respective shortcomings, both of which I will now recapitulate. 
Theorists who posit trauma as a transcendent phenomenon bear witness to its 
wounding impact without closing it over. This position is constitutive of the classical 
trauma theories of Felman, Laub, and Caruth. Their accounts are informed by a myriad of 
survivors’ testimonies, especially those who describe their encounters with trauma as 
unspeakable, unimaginable, incomprehensible, and so on. Yet a problem with this 
approach is that it leads to a fixation on trauma that borders on piety, such that any 
attempt to render trauma intelligible is akin to sacrilege. Insisting that trauma is radically 
other to language and thought also mystifies trauma, thus removing it from the contexts in 
which it occurs.  
Critics enter a polemic with classical trauma theorists by situating trauma on a 
plane of immanence. This approach posits trauma on the same continuum as the socio-
cultural and historical contexts that facilitate its occurrence in the first place. However, a 
problem with this perspective is that it negates the wounding impact of trauma and 
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reduces the unknown to the already known. Denying the rupturing impact of trauma not 
only rejects the accounts offered by trauma theorists, it dismisses the testimonies of 
survivors who posit trauma beyond the grasp of language and thought. These critics also 
overlook the fact that although trauma is inextricably tied to the contexts in which it 
occurs, the locus of trauma does not reside in the event that brought about the trauma. 
However awful some events might be, they are not in and of themselves traumatic. 
Indeed, trauma is a wound that is inflicted on the psyche in response to an event. 
Rather than reinforcing what I perceive to be a false dichotomy, I have placed 
throughout this thesis two seemingly opposing extremes into a dialogic relation. This 
thesis has offered a series of interlocking arguments, which I have advanced under the 
name of the immanence of traumatic rupture, to contend that the rupturing impact of 
trauma is immanent to the contexts in which it occurs. Through this, I have moved 
beyond the conceptual impasse in trauma theory and have opened a path for 
reinvigorating this interdisciplinary space. In a manner that reverberates with the 
constitutive wound of trauma, my argument concerning the immanence of traumatic 
rupture has not preceded in a linear fashion. In accordance with the methodological 
underpinnings of this thesis, which has unfurled through a hermeneutic spiral, I have 
considered how the tension between the transcendent and the immanent has manifested 
itself across a diverse disciplinary spectrum. By exacerbating the tension between the 
immanent and the transcendent, I have circumvented the antagonistic relation between 
these terms by revealing their intricate entanglement.   
Despite the nonlinearity of the arguments advanced across this thesis under the 
name of the immanence of traumatic rupture, there has been a dominant and recurrent 
theme—namely, that it is only from a perspective of immanence that the transcendent can 
be maintained. The immanence of traumatic rupture is such that the disruptive impact of 
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trauma—which is in and of itself a transcendent impossibility—can only be apprehended 
from a position of immanence. As an event that bypasses conscious awareness at the time 
it occurs, the shattering force of trauma can only be posited after the fact of its 
occurrence. So, trauma is transcendent to the extent that it is an inaccessible event that 
fractures the traumatised being’s sense of themselves as a stable and coherent “I” and, 
along with it, the chronological unfolding of time. Meanwhile, trauma is immanent 
insofar as its disruptive impact can only be felt after the fact of its occurrence, when the 
subject is resubmerged in the structural matrices that constitute their sense of reality.   
As well as placing the transcendent and the immanent into a dialogic exchange, 
the immanence of traumatic rupture places the before and the after, the past and the 
present, in a reciprocal and circular relation. This overcomes the pervasive tendency in 
both common understandings of trauma in general and in trauma discourse in particular to 
place too strong an emphasis on the traumatic past. What is truly traumatic is the fact that 
trauma refuses to be situated in the past and carries on into the present. While this might 
seem to be a pessimistic observation, it has the potential to liberate the traumatised being 
from a fixation on an unattainable past. For this traumatic past did not actually present 
itself to the subject at the time that it occurred—it is a past that can only be postulated 
from the vantage-point of the present, which is in a constant process of reshaping the past. 
Given this, the past and the present are inextricably interwoven. Having finally reflected 
on the central theme of this thesis considering the immanence of traumatic rupture, the 
rest of this chapter will consider if and how art can bear witness to this phenomenon. 
Art and Trauma 
Theodor Adorno’s famous pronouncement—“[t]o write poetry after Auschwitz is 
barbaric” (1967, 32)—has become shorthand in trauma theory for the precarious, yet 
necessary, relation between art and trauma. Although art has the potential to efface the 
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shattering impact of trauma, it might also provide survivors with an outlet for bearing 
witness to their wounds without closing them over. Adorno warns that when it comes to 
artistic depictions of Auschwitz, “the [a]esthetic principle of stylization make[s …] an 
unthinkable fate appear to have some meaning; it is transfigured, something of its horror 
is removed” (ibid., 313).113 Nonetheless, Adorno later returns to his claim concerning the 
relation between art and Auschwitz to argue that “it is in art alone that suffering can still 
find its own voice, consolation, without being immediately betrayed by it” ([1962] 1978, 
312). It is the aim of this chapter to explore how art might lend a voice to trauma without 
forsaking it. This aim is a continuation of the previous chapter of this thesis concerning 
the possibility of presenting the unpresentability of trauma without effacing it. Moreover, 
this aim resonates with the immanence of traumatic rupture, as I propose that effective 
presentations of trauma should posit the outside in a relation of immanence to the inside. 
 The capacity of art to bear witness to trauma is not to be found in positive 
representations of trauma, in which something that is absent is made present. Although 
representations of trauma are “essential to historical records and social awareness,” they 
“often function as screen memories—consciously or unconsciously working to cover up 
and resist confrontation with the more inner aspects of the horror of the very atrocities 
documented” (Laub and Podell 1995, 996). Applefeld regretfully remarks: “[i]f you read 
the many collections of testimony written about the Holocaust, you will immediately see 
that they are actually repressions, meant to put events in proper chronological order” 
(cited in ibid.). To represent trauma is not to remember it; when trauma is represented, it 
                                                 
113 Artistic stylisation beautifies, sanitises, and neutralises the horrors of Auschwitz. Although Adorno 
explicitly refers to the inability of art (and, more specially, lyric poetry) to do justice to Auschwitz, he 
criticises all language and thought occurring after Auschwitz for being implicated in the atrocities. To 
continue writing poetry, or to carry on thinking in accordance with the conventions that lead to Auschwitz, 
is a radical act of denial and complicity. He explains: “When genocide becomes part of the cultural heritage 
in the themes of committed literature, it becomes easier to play along with the culture which gave birth to 
murder” ([1962] 1978, 313). 
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loses its traumatic character. What is more, the tactic of representation depicts trauma as 
an event belonging to the past whilst disregarding its ongoing impact on the present. 
 But despite the impossibility of representing trauma, art can bear witness to 
trauma by resonating with its absence (ibid., 992). When it comes to presenting the 
“vertiginous black hole” (ibid., 65), the use of negative presentation in art—which 
includes holes, tears, and empty spaces—can put forward the emptiness of trauma without 
covering it over.114 I argue that a particularly effective means of bearing witness to trauma 
can be found in Lyotard’s postmodern modality of the sublime. Before I go on to examine 
this phenomenon, however, I will first consider what Kant has to say on the topic as a 
preamble to the Lyotardian sublime. 
The Traumatic Sublime 
In Heidegger and “the jews,” Lyotard draws an analogy between the Kantian sublime 
and the Freudian Nachträglichkeit in upholding both events as unpresentable. Neither 
Nachträglichkeit nor the sublime can be inscribed in consciousness; they are events that 
happen before what has happened can be specified. In the Freudian Nachträglichkeit and 
                                                 
114 Trauma theorists praise Lanzmann’s nine-and-a-half-hour film, Shoah (1985), for effectively capturing 
the unrepresentability of trauma through its use of negative presentation (Felman and Laub 1992; Laub and 
Podell 1995). Lanzmann’s Shoah is more concerned with the unfolding of trauma in the present than it is 
with representing trauma as belonging to the past. The film consists of a collection of interviews with 
survivors, perpetrators, and other witnesses of the Holocaust. Unplanned and unscripted, Lanzmann refrains 
from any direct representations of the Holocaust, including documentary materials and photographs. Indeed, 
one of the greatest powers of the film lies its silences and omissions: 
What makes the power of the testimony in the film and what constitutes in general the impact 
of the film is not the words but the equivocal puzzling relation between words and voice, that 
intersection, that is, between words, voice, rhythm, melody, images, writing, and silence. Each 
testimony speaks to us beyond words, beyond its melody, like the unique performance of 
singing (Felman 1992, 277-8). 
However, in likening the function of testimony in Shoah to the performance of a song, Felman aestheticises 
trauma, which is something that Lanzmann himself goes to great lengths to avoid (Agamben 2002, 36). By 
taking “recourse to the metaphor of a song”, Agamben accuses Felman of deriving “an aesthetic possibility 
from a logical impossibility” (ibid., 36). Given this, it is not surprising that critics have drawn attention to 
the tendency of trauma theorists to mystify and aestheticise trauma (Agamben 2002; Kansteiner 2004; 
Kansteiner and Weilnböck 2008; LaCapra [2001] 2014). 
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the Kantian sublime, the psychical apparatus fails to bind or inscribe an event in 
consciousness—neither “lets itself be inscribed in ‘memory,’ even an unconscious one” 
(1990, 5). The Freudian Nachträglichkeit has already been examined in Chapter Seven of 
this thesis; however, the Kantian sublime still requires consideration.  
In his Critique of Judgement ([1790] 2007), Kant characterises the sublime as a 
mixture of pleasure and pain that accompanies a cognitive discordance between the 
faculties of the imagination and the understanding in response to an overwhelming 
encounter. Kant’s work on the cognitive faculties appear across his Critique of Pure 
Reason ([1781/1787] 1998),115 his Critique of Practical Reason ([1788] 2015), and his 
Critique of Judgement ([1790] 2007). Kant designates sensibility as the faculty that is 
susceptible to receiving sensory givens (1998, A20/B34). The sensory givens received by 
sensibility are called intuitions, which are provided to sensibility by the imagination.116 
Cognition is, moreover, reliant on the faculty of understanding, which functions in 
accordance with concepts. Concepts differ from intuitions insofar as the latter are singular 
sensory perceptions whereas the former refer to more general representations. The faculty 
of understanding is responsible for synthesising the intuitions provided to sensibility by 
the imagination under concepts. 
The faculties of sensibility, the imagination, and the understanding all correspond 
to worldly experiences. Kant, however, postulates a further faculty—that of reason—as 
the source of ideas that cannot be experientially verified. He differentiates between the 
                                                 
115 Kant published his Critique of Pure Reason in 1781 and published a substantially revised edition in 
1787. Most recent English translations include both editions, which are labelled ‘A’ and ‘B’. When citing 
the first Critique, it is standard practice to provide the page numbers for both editions (unless, of course, the 
citation is only featured in one of the editions). 
116 Kant’s work on the faculties is in many ways a response to the conflicting views of rationalists (such as 
René Descartes) and empiricists (such as David Hume), who insist that human cognition and worldly 
knowledge derive from either reason or the senses alone. Contrary to these views, Kant formulates human 
cognition as necessitating the cooperation between both of these faculties. For Kant, experience and 
cognition are dependent on the senses and the understanding: “[t]houghts without content are empty, 
intuitions without concepts are blind” (ibid., A51/B75).  
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understanding (as the faculty of concepts that function as rules) and reason (as the faculty 
of universal principles).117 The faculty of understanding unifies intuitions under concepts, 
whereas the faculty of reason is responsible for unifying concepts under ideas (1998, 
A302/B359). Such ideas include infinity, freedom, and God—none of which can be 
derived from sensory experience. Hence, the difference between the concepts presented 
by the understanding and the ideas provided by reason is that the former are constitutive 
of experience and the latter transcend experience. Ideas are what Kant refers to as 
suprasensible, in that they do not correspond with anything that can be found in the 
sensible world. 
The sublime designates a disjunction between the powers of cognition in response 
to an overwhelming encounter with the sensible world. The sentiment of the sublime is a 
type of reflective judgement and is not a quality of a thing-in-itself but is, rather, an 
affective state that is evoked in the subject. Kant’s notion of judgement requires further 
explanation in order to understand what a reflective judgement is. In his Critique of 
Judgement, Kant introduces the faculty of judgement to unify the heterogeneous domains 
of sensibility, understanding, and reason. Judgement is responsible for bridging the divide 
between concepts and ideas, as well as being responsible for unifying intuitions under 
concepts. With regard to the latter, Kant explains that “the task of judgement is to exhibit 
(exhibere) the concept, i.e., to place beside the concept an intuition corresponding to it” 
([1790] 2007, 27, emphasis in original). Nonetheless, judgement is not only a bridge 
between intuitions, concepts, and ideas, but is a faculty in its own right and is 
fundamental to the activity of thought. Kant distinguishes between two kinds of 
judgements which he calls determinate and reflective. Determinate judgements move 
                                                 
117 Kant upholds reason as the realm of freedom and the moral law, which is independent from worldly 
experience. 
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from a universal to a particular; the mode of judgement is determinate when there is a 
preexisting rule under which a particular can be subsumed.118 On the contrary, when only 
the particular is given the mode of judgement is reflective. Reflective judgements start 
from a particular in search of a universal and are indeterminate, since a universal rule 
under which a particular can be placed may or may not already exist. When the universal 
is lacking, reflective judgements can create new rules.  
Kant introduces the aesthetics the beautiful and the sublime as two types of 
reflective judgements. In the beautiful, there are a lack of concepts under which to 
subsume intuitions, so that the intuitions provided to sensibility by the imagination are no 
longer subordinated to the concepts of understanding. The beautiful, nonetheless, 
produces concord between the imagination and understanding—“as if” objects in nature 
were predetermined to resonate with the human faculties of cognition. This gives rise to 
the feeling of pleasure which is brought about by the harmonious free-play between the 
understanding and imagination.  
The sentiment of the sublime, on the other hand, induces radical discord between 
the cognitive faculties and consists of a mixture of pleasure and pain. The sublime occurs 
when the imagination fails to provide sensibility with an intuition, which could then be 
subsumed under a concept of the understanding. The feeling of pain indicative of the 
sublime comes with the discordance between the imagination and understanding in 
response to an overwhelming encounter. The sublime consists of two movements 
corresponding to the contradictory feelings of pain and pleasure. The feeling of pain 
arises when the powers of cognition are overwhelmed as the imagination fails to present 
                                                 
118 Kant explains that determinative judgements operate “under universal transcendental laws given by the 
understanding, [and] is only subsumptive. The law is marked out for it a priori, and hence it does not need 
to devise a law of its own so that it can subsume the particular in nature under the universal” ([1790] 
2007,19). 
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sensibility with an adequate form that can be bound and cognised by the concepts of 
understanding. The feeling of pleasure, on the other hand, occurs when the faculty of 
reason triumphs over nature by producing a suprasensible idea.  
Kant distinguishes between two modalities of the sublime: the mathematical and 
the dynamical. The former relates to encounters with absolute greatness and the latter 
pertains to encounters with absolute power. The mathematical sublime is a response to the 
physical size of objects, which evokes a sense of greatness in the mind of the spectator. 
Encounters with the pyramids, a starry sky, or vast expanses of mountains can evoke the 
mathematical sublime. In this modality of the sublime, the imagination is unable to grasp 
the vast quantity of sensory givens. One recognises that one is perceiving a totality 
comprised of multiple parts, but there are so many parts that they cannot be grasped 
simultaneously as a whole. This gives rise to the feeling of pain, which is associated with 
the inability of the imagination to form an adequate presentation to be offered to the 
faculties of sensibility and understanding. However, the feeling of pain is accompanied by 
a pleasurable feeling that arises when the mind grasps its own limitations in the face of 
greatness. More specifically, the feeling of pleasure occurs when reason produces a 
negative presentation through a suprasensible idea, such as the idea of infinity, which 
exists independently from the sensible realm.119 For Kant, the fact that suprasensible ideas 
cannot be derived from sensible intuitions attests to the supremacy of reason over nature. 
While the mathematical sublime is a response to the inability of consciousness to 
measure greatness, the dynamical sublime is evoked through the mind’s inability to 
                                                 
119 Philip Shaw provides an example of the mathematical sublime through the encounter with a starry sky:  
in contemplating the stars, the ability of imagination to present an object and the understanding 
to present an object ‘fit’ for understanding necessarily fails, yet this does not prevent my 
sustaining the ‘idea’ of the universe as infinitely great […]. The very fact that I can conceive of 
an infinite universe at the very moment when my imagination fails points to the existence of a 
faculty completely unrelated to sensuous intuition. This faculty is reason (2006, 80). 
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measure omnipotent forces, such as the immense power of storms, volcanoes, 
earthquakes, et cetera.120 Like the mathematical sublime, the dynamical sublime arises 
from a failure of the imagination to present an intuition that can be grasped by the 
understanding; the dynamical sublime occurs when the mind is faced with its own 
weakness in the face of the omnipotent forces of nature. Like the mathematical sublime—
which is accompanied by the feeling of pleasure that arises when reason prevails over 
nature—the dynamical sublime produces pleasure when the faculty of reason 
comprehends its own weakness in the face of chaos and is, in this way, able to overcome 
this chaos. 
As indicated by Lyotard’s analogy, the dissonance between the cognitive facilities 
that occurs in the sublime mirrors the breach of consciousness in the event of trauma. The 
shattering impact of trauma is analogous to the sublime, which brings forth feelings of 
unspeakability, incomprehensibility, and the pain that accompanies cognitive discord. 
Neither trauma nor the sublime are to be found in objects themselves, but in the reaction 
that encounters with objects provoke in the subject. Nonetheless, the Kantian notion of 
the dynamical sublime shares more in common with trauma than the mathematical 
sublime owing to the state of fear that is evoked in the former. 
The dynamical sublime is inextricably tied to fear. However, it is necessary that 
the object that arouses the dynamical sublime produces fear without it threatening the 
                                                 
120 Kant provides the following examples of the dynamically sublime:  
 
Bold, overhanging, and, as it were, threatening rocks, thunderclouds piled up the vault of 
heaven, borne along with flashes and peals, volcanoes in all their violence of destruction, 
hurricanes leaving desolation in their track, the boundless ocean rising with rebellious force, 
the high waterfall of some mighty river, and the like, make our power of resistance of trifling 
moment in comparison with their might. But, provided our own position is secure, their aspect 
is all the more attractive for its fearfulness; and we readily call these objects sublime, because 
they raise the forces of the soul above the height of vulgar commonplace, and discover within 
us a power of resistance of quite another kind, which gives us courage to be able to measure 
ourselves against the seeming omnipotence of nature ([1790] 2007, 91). 
   
 
287 
 
 
well-being of the observer. Kant explains that “[o]ne who is in a state of fear can[not …] 
play the part of the judge of the sublime […]. He [sic] flees from the sight of an object 
filling him with dread; and it is impossible to take delight in terror that is seriously 
entertained” (ibid., 91). Hence, a condition of this modality of the sublime is that the 
dangerous object must be perceived at a safe enough distance so as to not encroach upon 
the safety of the spectator. The distance that separates the subject from the omnipotent 
forces of nature is crucial to the feeling of pleasure indicative of the dynamical sublime.  
The safe distance from danger that forms a condition of the dynamical sublime 
obviously does not correspond to those who have been subject to trauma. As Dylan 
Sawyer remarks: “[t]he traumatic event [… is] unable to provide the ‘safe distance’ 
necessary to evoke a sense of the ‘traditional’ sublime, overwhelming the perspective of 
its victim to ensure that […] he or she cannot escape trauma’s shadow” (2014, 171). The 
similarities between trauma and the sublime are limited to the first movement of the 
sublime, which consists of pain accompanied by the overwhelming of the cognitive 
faculties. The feelings of pleasure central to the second phase of the sublime do not at all 
correspond to trauma. Trauma is without the edification accompanying the ascendance of 
reason over chaos and forecloses the possibility of experiencing pleasure. Given this, 
Sawyer is right to say that trauma is an “unmediated and ‘negative’ inversion of the 
sublime” (ibid.). 
If applied to trauma, the feeling of pleasure that accompanies the second 
movement of the sublime may very well serve a redemptive and aestheticising function. 
While I do not take issue with drawing an analogy between trauma and the sublime, it is 
crucial that these events are not conflated. This is a warning that can be derived from the 
work of LaCapra (1996) and Zachary Braiterman (2000). Where LaCarpa criticises 
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Lyotard for conflating trauma and the sublime,121 Braiterman warns that conflating the 
traumas of the Holocaust with the sublime “preclude[s] a rhetoric of shock and 
incomprehensibility,” so that “the expression of that shock soon sounds pleasant, 
sentimental, and even maudlin” (2000, 11). Given that collapsing trauma into the sublime 
has the effect of aestheticising trauma, it is not the aim of this chapter to simply conflate 
these disparate phenomena. Rather, I propose that the sublime—specifically, Lyotard’s 
postmodern sublime—provides an effective means of bearing witness to the 
unpresentability of trauma. What is more, the postmodern sublime, as I will go on to 
argue, can be mobilised to resonate with the essential unpresentability of trauma without 
closing it over or positing it in a transcendental “beyond.” But before delving into this, I 
will first consider Lyotard’s notions of the postmodern condition and the differend, as 
these concepts will help shed light on the Lyotardian sublime.  
The Postmodern Differend 
Lyotard uses the term “postmodern” to describe “the state of our culture following those 
transformations which […] have altered the game rules for science, literature and the arts” 
(1984, xxiii). He argues that these transformations can be placed in the context of a 
crisis—or a widespread incredulity—towards metanarratives. A metanarrative, which 
Lyotard also refers to as a grand narrative, is a totalising framework of thought that 
claims to determine the meaning of all possible events under an all-encompassing 
frame.122 Where the modern world posited knowledge as a task of matching data or 
                                                 
121 While I agree with LaCapra that trauma and the sublime should not be conflated, I disagree with his 
assertion that Lyotard conflates these phenomena. Drawing on similarities between trauma and the sublime 
through an analogy by no means implies that these terms are identical. See Chapter Two of this thesis for a 
detailed discussion of the analogical relation (indicative of the paradigm) as preserving the irreducible 
singularity between heterogeneous entities.  
122 Metanarratives assume a legitimising function insofar as they serve as yardsticks to measure and 
authenticate genres of discourse. For example, metanarratives associated with the Enlightenment posit 
humans as working towards emancipation through technological advancement and the attainment of 
   
 
289 
 
 
statements against some “metadiscourse […] making an explicit appeal to some grand 
narrative” (ibid., xiii), the postmodern condition has resulted from a widespread 
disenchantment with the narratives heralded by modernity. This, in turn, produces a crisis 
in postmodern cultures regarding what constitutes knowledge. What separates the 
postmodern condition from that of the modern is that in the former, discourses appeal to 
grand narratives for their legitimisation whereas in the latter, knowledge is local and 
plural, consisting of a multiplicity of discourse genres.  
 Due to the absence of any universally valid criteria for determining events, 
incommensurable discourse genres attempt to appropriate events under their own rules. 
However, the meaning of an event cannot be encapsulated in one discourse alone. When 
one discourse purports to explain an event, it forecloses a myriad of other possible 
explanations. Given this, there is always something that gets left behind by discourse—an 
excess that cannot be contained. Lyotard posits the excess that resides between 
incommensurable discourses as the differend, which is “the unstable state and instant of 
language wherein something which must be able to be put into phrases cannot yet be” 
(1988a, 13). 
The differend occurs when individuals cannot come to an agreement in a situation 
of conflict because there is no common measure through which an event can be 
assessed.123 In one of his many examples of the differend, Lyotard conducts a thought 
experiment that he offers as an analogy for the traumatic impact of Auschwitz: 
                                                 
objective knowledge. Discourses in science and the arts are legitimised by such metanarratives when they 
claim to be progressing towards an absolute truth that will free humanity from the shackles of ignorance. 
123 The differend occurs when an interlocutor is excluded from a discussion and cannot legitimately express 
damages inflicted on them, due to the imposition of a rule of judgement that that is not applicable to the 
silenced party (ibid., 9). In juridical terms, the differend is opposed to a plaintiff in a litigation, who can 
express damages in the idiom of the court (ibid., 5). Lyotard explains: “a case of differend takes place 
between two parties when the ‘regulation’ of the conflict that opposes them is done in the idiom of one of 
the parties while the wrong suffered by the other is not signified by that idiom” (ibid.). The differend results 
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Suppose that an earthquake destroys not only lives, buildings, and objects but also the 
instruments used to measure earthquakes directly and indirectly. The impossibility of 
quantitatively measuring it does not prohibit, but rather inspires in the minds of the survivors 
the idea of a very great seismic force (ibid., 56). 
Not only were lives destroyed at Auschwitz, so too were the empirical means to establish 
the crimes to their full extent (ibid., 56).124 However, the impossibility of measuring the 
crimes does not lead to their denial. The differend that arises in this context is 
accompanied by a sublime feeling that attests to the incomprehensibility of the 
occurrence. This feeling testifies to that which cannot be expressed in language and 
thought.  
Presenting the(re is an) Unpresentable: Trauma and the Postmodern Sublime  
The feeling accompanying the differend—that one cannot find the right words to express 
something; that thought has reached it limits—attests to the sentiment of the sublime 
(Lyotard 1994, 123). Lyotard posits the sublime as a response (specific to the arts, but he 
also draws on the sublime to denote a general cultural response) to the crisis of 
modernity, which I outlined in the previous section. In an appendix to The Postmodern 
Condition (1984)—an essay entitled “Answering the Question: What is 
Postmodernism?”—Lyotard argues that the sublime is the defining feature of modern and 
postmodern art. The sublime, he asserts, is a response to “the withdrawal of the real […] 
                                                 
from an inability to establish a damage in the discourse of the dominant party, which, in turn, results in a 
wrong (ibid.). 
124 Another example of the differend can be found in the context of Indigenous Australians’ claims to land 
rights. Where Indigenous Australians claim that their land was wrongfully taken away from them by British 
colonizers, evidence of their rights to land may not be—and currently are not—recognized by the 
Australian juridical system or government. The final rule of judgment is expressed in favour of the 
hegemony of the law, and Aboriginal Australian people are unable to establish the damages inflicted upon 
them, thus resulting in cases of the differend. Although in 1992 the High Australian Court ruled in favour of 
Torres Straight Islanders’ rights to land, in what is now referred to as the Mabo case, the rules for this are 
still problematic, as they are couched in Eurocentric discourse which do not well describe Indigenous 
Australians’ relationship/s to land. 
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according to the sublime relation between the presentable and the conceivable” (ibid., 79). 
Lyotard explains that both modern and postmodern art endeavour to “present the fact that 
the unpresentable exists” (ibid.). However, he sees modern and postmodern art as placing 
different emphases on the unpresentable.  
In the modern sublime, an emphasis is placed “on the powerlessness of the faculty 
of presentation, on the nostalgia for presence felt by the human subject, on the obscure 
and futile will which inhabits him [sic] in spite of everything” (ibid., 79). The modern 
sublime is nostalgic for a unity of experience and attempts to present this lost presence. 
However, Lyotard is skeptical of the modern sublime because it is haunted by a sense of 
lack and nostalgia for a reality that was always already lost. The postmodern sublime, 
however, is not haunted by this sense of nostalgia. While the modern sublime laments 
over the loss of origins, which it attempts to restore, the postmodern sublime “puts 
forward the unpresentable in presentation itself” (ibid., 81). Contrary to its modern 
counterpart, the postmodern sublime is not marked by “nostalgia for the unattainable” 
(ibid.). Free from nostalgia for lost presence, the postmodern sublime instils a stronger 
sense of the unpresentable.  
It is important to clarify that the sublime is not something that an artist can create 
or represent; the artist cannot make the sublime—art can only make the event of the 
sublime happen (1990, 45). Like trauma, the sublime is an event that occurs before what 
occurs is made apparent. As I discussed in Chapter Seven of this thesis, the event testifies 
to the it happens which necessarily occurs before what happens. The event is felt by the 
subject before it is assimilated into language and discourse and, in this way, occurs both 
too soon and too late. It occurs too soon because it strikes the psyche in a state of 
unpreparedness; it occurs too late because it is only after its occurrence that the subject 
can reflect on it and prescribe it with meaning. Since the sublime is an event rather than 
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an object, art cannot be sublime in and of itself. The sublime is a response to a work of 
art—it is a happening in the here and now. Given this, the inexpressibility of the sublime 
does not gesture towards an unknowable past. It is the moment of the sublime itself that is 
inexpressible. “The inexpressible,” explains Lyotard, “does not reside in an over there, in 
another word, or another time, but in this: in that (something) happens” (1988b, 93).  
 In the wake of the rupturing impact of trauma, in which an event of the past could 
not be experienced by the subject at the time of its arrival, the modern modality of the 
sublime embarks on a search for the missing origins of trauma. This pursuit is inevitably 
haunted by lack and nostalgia for an unattainable traumatic past. The modern sublime 
laments the loss of origins and tries to present the unpresentable traumatic past. However, 
this can only ever be a nostalgia for something that was never there to begin with, since 
the precipitating event of trauma did not actually present itself to consciousness in the 
first place. Hence, presenting the unpresentability of trauma might very well serve the 
contrapurposive function of presenting a past that was always already missing. What is at 
stake is not to present the unpresentable, but to present that there is an unpresentable. 
Where the modern modality of the sublime is fixated on the traumatic past—
invoking the past as something that was once there but has now been lost—the 
postmodern sublime acknowledges that the traumatic past was not actually presented to 
the subject in the first place. Unlike the modern sublime, which attempts to restore a past 
that was never present, the postmodern sublime presents this lack of presence in the 
present. Rather than situating trauma in a transcendent “beyond,” the postmodern sublime 
posits trauma in the here and now—as Lyotard remarks, the sublime is “[n]ot elsewhere, 
not up there or over there […] not once upon a time. But […] here, now” (ibid.). In this 
way, the postmodern sublime does not reduce trauma to a bygone past event but bears 
witness to trauma as a constant presence within the present. Through this, it bears witness 
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to the immanence of traumatic rupture insofar as the rupturing impact of trauma is placed 
in the immanent present as opposed to the transcendent past.  
Before this thesis comes to an end, I would like to take a moment to reflect on the 
significance of positing traumatic rupture on a plane of immanence. The significance of 
this insight, as I have already made clear, is that it moves beyond the mutually exclusive 
insistence that trauma need either be conceived in a relation of immanence or 
transcendence to the contexts in which it occurs. This is a specific contribution to the field 
of trauma theory which, I have argued, is caught in a conceptual impasse rooted in a false 
dichotomy between these terms. Nonetheless, a more general significance of the major 
insight that I have developed over the course of this thesis can be garnered—that is, that it 
liberates the traumatised being from the forever lost clutches of an unattainable traumatic 
past. While many survivors of trauma appear fixated on the traumatic event of the past, 
this is a past that cannot be accessed because the (non)experience of trauma was too 
overwhelming to be cognitised at the time of its arrival. While this by no means denies 
the brute factuality of the past event, the ongoing impact of trauma on the present—in the 
here and now—is all that remains of the past. So rather than lamenting over a past that 
was never present, but paradoxically assumes itself in a belated presence, the focus should 
be on the dialogic exchange between the past and the present. Indeed, the past itself is in a 
constant process of being reshaped by the present. Attempting to unearth the past in an 
unaltered and pure state will only perpetuate the immense suffering that the traumatised 
subject is already forced to endure.  
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